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1. 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
An examination of W. Norman Pittenger's understanding of 'salvation' 
This thesis examines Pittenger's reintei^pretation of Christian 
theology with the aid of Whiteheadian process philosophy, with special 
reference to his understanding of salvation. The question i t faces i s 
what does salvation i n Christ mean i n a theology which stresses God's 
operation w i t h i n the creative process, l u r i n g i t towards i t s 
fu l f i l m e n t ? The main emphases of Pittenger's thought are developed to 
show how they contribute to his view of salvation. 
I n Chapter 1 he i s shown to r e j e c t any understanding of s i n which 
implies that there i s a breach between God and man, seeing sin rather 
as the f a i l u r e of the i n d i v i d u a l to f u l f i l his God-given aim and thus 
co-operate i n the divine i n t e n t i o n f o r creation. I n the following 
three Christological chapters Jesus i s seen, i n Pittenger's account, 
as the only man who f u l f i l l e d t h i s aim; and therein lay his 
'decisiveness'. There was i n him a marriage of divine grace and human 
response whereby he became the focus of the divine loving a c t i v i t y i n 
the world. Since, however, his difference from other men was a matter 
of degree rather than kind i t follows that what was f u l f i l l e d i n him 
i s p o t e ntial i n a l l men. Thus salvation i s that wholeness of l i v i n g 
which comes from seeking to f u l f i l one's God-given aim. I n subsequent 
chapters various ramifications of t h i s view of salvation are discussed. 
I n Chapter 5 the process view of how God overcomes e v i l i s considered 
and related to the cross. Chapter 6 examines the experience of 
salvation i n terms of responding to the example of Christ and knowing 
him only through the Church. Chapter 7 shows that Pittenger's t a l k of 
salvation excludes reference to an a f t e r - l i f e . 
This understanding of salvation i s p r i n c i p a l l y c r i t i c i z e d as 
inadequate on the grounds of i t s denial of any divine salvatory 
i n i t i a t i v e i n Christ. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many of the books and a r t i c l e s that he has w r i t t e n Norman 
Pittenger has sought to express the Christian f a i t h i n terms of process 
thought, a system based on the philosophical writings of A l f r e d North 
Whitehead and his disciple and i n t e r p r e t e r Charles Hartshorne, taking 
an e v o l u t i o n i s t and processive view of the cosmos. The volume of his 
wri t i n g s i n t h i s vein has increased since I966 when he l e f t the U.S.A. 
and s e t t l e d i n Cambridge as a senior resident of King's College. Most 
of these writings were intended f o r 'a general educated public rather 
than f o r philosophical or theological experts',(l) and thus when 
compared with the w r i t i n g s , f o r example, of John Cobb Jnr. or Peter 
Hamilton are c l e a r l y non-technical i n t h e i r use of process thought. 
Indeed Pittenger's general yet enthusiastic approach hardly bears 
comparison with the increasing number of highly technical a r t i c l e s i n 
the process vein being published i n philosophical and theological 
journals, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the quarterly published from the School 
of Theology, Claremont, California, 'Process Studies'. During his 
career, however, as the Gomph Professor of Christian Apologetics at 
the General Theological Seminary, New York, he did make a s i g n i f i c a n t 
contribution to process theology i n the f i e l d of Christology. I n 19^ -4 
he published 'Christ and Christian Faith', which was his f i r s t foray 
i n t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the doctrine of Christ i n the l i g h t of 
process philosophy. This was i n many ways a precursor to his major 
study, 'The Word Incarnate', i n 1959* which he describes as 'an extended 
essay i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the person and work of Jesus i n process-
(1) P.T.C.F., p. i x . 
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terms'.(2) This was followed by 'Christology Reconsidered' i n 1970 i n 
which he sought to answer his c r i t i c s , though he did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
develop the main thesis of the e a r l i e r book. 
I n an i l l u m i n a t i n g and frank a r t i c l e o f f e r i n g 'A S t r i c t l y Personal 
Account', Pittenger t e l l s of his 'conversion' to process thought early 
i n the 1940s. Being aware of the lack of some conceptuality upon which 
to ground his theological thinking and being d i s s a t i s f i e d with most of 
the current options, he was introduced to the writings of Hartshorne, 
which he found exactly what he needed. He moved on to reading Whitehead 
and t h i s completed his 'conversion'. 
' I can almost date the day, l i k e a convert i n a 
r e v i v a l i s t i c mission, my glad acceptance of t h i s new 
way of looking at things. I t was i n the middle of the 
war years, I was working with a small group of ordinands 
exempted from the d r a f t , and I had to give a short t a l k 
on what Christian f a i t h i n God as love had to say i n a 
tragi c and desperate time l i k e that through which we were 
then l i v i n g . To my astonishment, I found that what I 
then was impelled to say was nothing other than a 
presentation of the "process" view that God i s involved 
i n , suffers with, receives from and shares with our human 
anguish, and i n a world where things go wrong saves 
whatever i s salvable; that his transcendence i s the 
i n e x h a u s t i b i l i t y and faithfulness of his love; that what 
the Christian f a i t h points to i n Jesus Christ, i s exactly 
such suffering love disclosed i n human suffering and love -
and that the whole world goes that way.'(3) 
Such a conversion led i n e v i t a b l y to the work of propagation. As 
Pittenger admits, he i s more than j u s t a believer i n the process 
conceptuality; rather he says, ' I am f a i r l y close to being an evangelist 
f o r i t ' , because i t seems to him to be 'true, so f a r as t h i s can be said 
of any metaphysical v i s i o n of the world' and ' i t f i t s i n with the 
(2) i b i d . , p. v i i i . 
(3) W. N. Pittenger: 'A S t r i c t l y Personal Account', Process Studies, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1971, pp. 131-132. 
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deepest deliverances of the Christian f a i t h ' . ( 4 ) Pittenger, then, i s 
suggesting that there i s 'a " f i t " between process thought and the 
a r t i c u l a t i o n of the Christian f a i t h which we know as theology'.(5) 
This means that the Christian f a i t h i s being interpreted i n terms of 
the evolutionary perspective which i s the central conviction of process 
thought. I t i s a system which stresses that t h i s i s a 'changing, 
moving, l i v i n g , active world, i n which we have to do not with i n e r t 
substances, but with dynamic processes, not so much with things as with 
events.(6) Certain consequences flow from t h i s attempted ' f i t ' . 
F i r s t l y God i s related to such a processive world view by being 
understood i n terms of his a c t i v i t y . Further, as against 'classical 
theism' and theological systems which speak of God's absoluteness and 
aseity, process theology emphasises the divine relatedness to the 
world.(7) Pittenger even suggests that i t i s process theology alone 
which has grasped the t r u t h of the loving relatedness of God.(8) Thus 
the phrase 'the loving a c t i v i t y of God' w i l l be repeated often i n the 
course of t h i s study, because i t r e f l e c t s a major element i n Pittenger's 
thought and i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christian theology i n process 
terms. 
'Hence t h e i r ( i . e . process theologians) conception of 
divine Reality ... i s not that of an unmoved mover or 
changeless essence, but rather of a l i v i n g , constantly 
creative, i n f i n i t e l y related, ceaselessly operative 
Reality; the universe at i t s core i s movement, dynamism, 
a c t i v i t y , and not sheer and unrelated abstraction. 
(4) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited', Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), p. 220. 
(5) i b i d . , p. 216. 
(6) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Thought: A Contemporary Trend i n 
Theology', Expository Times, Vol. 76, (1965), p. 270. 
(7) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited', p. 212. 
(8) i b i d . , p. 213. 
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Whitehead's view, that the cosmos i s "al.ive' f, i s basic 
to the whole enterprise of process-thought; and t h i s 
carries with i t a conviction that the only reasonable 
explanation of the l i v i n g cosmos i s i n f a c t "the 
l i v i n g God".'(9) 
Secondly, human l i f e i s described i n terms of i t s becoming, but 
a becoming known only i n terms of mutuality and i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
'Man i s a dynamic becoming ... Man i s on the move bound 
together with his human brethren i n one bundle of l i f e 
and organic to the natural order of which he i s a part. 
... He may make or he may refuse to make his proper 
contribution to the creative advance which i s the purpose 
of God. Above a l l , man i s made to become a lover i n the 
mutuality which i s giving and receiving i n respect and 
tenderness.'(10) 
Thirdly, i t i s i n e f f e c t an amalgam of these two points that 
directs Pittenger's Christology. He believes 'that the process 
conceptuality offers an a t t r a c t i v e and viable understanding of the 
person of Christ, as being the supremely ' impoirtant' clue to and 
unveiling of that loving relationship w i t h man which characterizes 
the nature of God. Thus he speaks of Jesus as the one i n whom the 
perfect marriage of divine a c t i v i t y and human becoming was effected. 
He i s the one i n whom that love which i s at once the divine i n t e n t i o n 
and human f u l f i l m e n t i s manifested. 
Fourthly, i n a system such as process thought which emphasizes 
persuasion and love as being 'more profoundly i n d i c a t i v e of the dynamic 
drive i n the creative advance than coercion or sheer power',(11) the 
Christian theologian, Pittenger suggests, w i l l be greatly aided i n his 
attempts to i n t e r p r e t the saving work of Christ. P a r t i c u l a r l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r Pittenger i n t h i s regard i s that i n process terms 
(9) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Thought: A Contemporary Trend i n 
Theology', p. 270. 
(10) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited', p. 219. 
(11) i b i d . , p. 215. 
12. 
salvation can never be viewed, as a narrow i n d i v i d u a l concern. 
'For t h i s conceptuality sees not only the c e n t r a l i t y 
of persuasion and the use of every occasion towards 
growing good, but also emphasizes the societal q u a l i t y 
of the world with i t s interpenetrative and r e l a t i o n a l 
manifestation. The Christian conviction that through 
Christ God has achieved something which can be shared by 
others i s illuminated by such a world view. To be 
"saved" i s to f i n d "the l i f e which i s l i f e indeed", l i f e 
t r u l y i n shared Love.'(12) 
The purpose of t h i s study i s to examine Pittenger's theology 
b u i l t upon these process insights and p a r t i c u l a r l y his understanding 
of the saving work of Christ and then to ask whether he safeguards what 
Christian theology has sought to contain of Christian experience w i t h i n 
a doctrine of salvation. This w i l l also raise the question of whether 
an e v o l u t i o n i s t scheme has s u f f i c i e n t areas of compatibility with 
t r a d i t i o n a l understandings of salvation,, Process theology i s becoming 
more widely known and i n f l u e n t i a l and thus, though few of i t s adherents 
have discussed salvation or atonement doctrines, i t i s r i g h t that i t s 
underlying insights should be examined i n terms of t h i s c r u c i a l area of 
Christian thought. This examination of Pittenger's work might be seen 
as a small contribution to t h i s end. 
Two preliminary points must be made. F i r s t l y , although Pittenger's 
work may not be technically d e f i n i t i v e of process thought and though the 
c r i t i c i s m w i l l be made that he e n l i s t s process insights i n a theology 
whose presuppositions betray the influence of the theological school of 
English Modernism yet his faithfulness to the process insights and his 
desire to i n t e r p r e t Christian theology i n processive and ev o l u t i o n i s t 
terms must be acknowledged and thus his approach to an understanding 
of salvation taken as representative of the conceptuality he espouses. 
(12) i b i d . , p. 216. 
13. 
An examination of his understanding of salvation i n the process vein 
w i l l expose the dangers attendant upon any attempt to understand 
salvation w i t h i n an evolutionary world view. 
Secondly, though Pittenger makes many references to salvation 
and though he clearl y believes that process insights o f f e r profound 
i l l u m i n a t i o n f o r understanding salvation he nevertheless presents no 
separate and sustained discussion of salvation i n a process vein, thus 
making i t necessary to extract his understanding of i t from a 
consideration of his theology i n general. This accounts f o r the 
subject order of t h i s thesis, f o r i t i s from an investigation of his 
understanding of si n and of his Christology that the main emphases of 
his understanding of salvation w i l l emerge. Hence the thesis begins 
wi t h a consideration of his understanding of sin, not only because his 
view of salvation i s dependent on that d e f i n i t i o n , but prima r i l y 
because i n the course of that chapter several d i s t i n c t i v e elements of 
his theology which w i l l determine his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of salvation w i l l 
be outlined. These are taken up, developed and consolidated i n the 
subsequent Christological chapters. 
A precis of the chapters and t h e i r sequence w i l l indicate the 
course t h i s study w i l l follow. 
I n Chapter 1 I t r y to show that Pittenger does not accept any 
view of si n which implies that the relationship between God and man i s 
thereby broken or that man i s thereby prevented from displaying those 
characteristics of goodness which indicate that, even as a sinner, the 
word of God i s operative i n him. Using a Whiteheadian concept he 
reinterprets s i n as the f a i l u r e to f u l f i l the God-given aim of l i f e 
whose characteristic i s love. By t h i s device he seeks to maintain the 
essential d i g n i t y of man as made i n the divine image and yet recognise 
th a t he f a i l s to l i v e up to that dignity. Salvation thus becomes a 
14. 
matter of restoration, a way of l i v i n g i n which wholeness comes through 
seeking the f u l f i l m e n t of that aim. The concept of aim i s important 
f o r t h i s study and i s taken up i n the three Christological chapters as 
being explanatory of the significance of Jesus; being the only man who 
t r u l y f u l f i l l e d the God-given aim of his l i f e . 
A d i s t i n c t i v e feature of Pittenger's theology i s that he places 
heavy emphasis upon the humanity of Jesus and interprets his ' d i v i n i t y ' 
only i n the l i g h t of that humanity. This i s discussed i n Chapter 2. 
The significance of t h i s chapter f o r the thesis i s not only that i t i s 
the basis f o r Pittenger's understanding of the significance of Jesus 
and his accomplishments but primarily because i t grounds a l l t a l k of 
salvation i n Christ i n the human s i t u a t i o n . The two s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Christological chapters that follow seek to show that i n Pittenger's 
scheme the 'decisiveness' of Jesus i s to be accounted f o r as the 
special marriage of divine grace and human response that was to be 
found i n him; his difference from other men being a matter of degree 
rather than of kind. Jesus' f u l l - h e a r t e d response to the divine aim 
meant that he became the 'important' clue to the divine nature, the 
'focal' manifestation of the divine a c t i v i t y . I t i s thus that 
Pittenger i s able to speak of a revelation of the divine love i n Christ 
w i t h i n an evolutionary and processive world-view, and God's involvement 
i n i t . One consequence of such a Christology i s that salvation becomes 
essentially a matter of the person l i v i n g i n response to the example of 
Christ and to the divine loving a c t i v i t y as seen i n him and thereby 
moving towards the f u l f i l m e n t of his God-given aim. I t i s thus the 
exemplarist atonement theory that accords with Pittenger's theological 
position. 
An essential aspect of Pittenger's process view of salvation i s 
his emphasis upon God's a b i l i t y , through the operation of his love, to 
15. 
overcome e v i l . For t h i s he employs the Whiteheadian dipolar concept 
of God, seeing his transmuting of e v i l being effected through the 
operation of his consequent nature. This i s discussed i n some d e t a i l 
i n Chapter 5* where i t i s also related to the cross. Pittenger's 
b e l i e f that Calvary i s symbolic of the divine loving a c t i v i t y i s 
c r i t i c i z e d , though i t i s recognised as being consonant with h i s 
theological approach. I n Chapter 6 the experience of salvation as 
wholeness i s related to responding to the example of Jesus and also to 
the Church; f o r Pittenger believes that i t i s w i t h i n the Christian 
community alone that t h i s way of wholesome l i v i n g i n Christ can be 
known, f o r i t i s only i n the Church that Jesus i s remembered and 
experienced thus making response to him possible. A further chapter 
shows that despite some reservations Pittenger regards salvation as 
exclusively a this-worldly a f f a i r with reference to an a f t e r - l i f e 
excluded. 
I n the f i n a l chapter i t i s suggested that although. Pittenger 
offers a coherent and self-consistent view of salvation yet he does 
so only a t the expense of ignoring or muting those elements of 
t r a d i t i o n a l Christian thought that he finds uncongenial. His 
reductionist approach to theology, which, w i l l be demonstrated i n the 
course of this'study, leaves him with a view of salvation which 
neglects certain elements which Christian thought would claim to be 
essential f o r any f u l l understanding of the divine i n i t i a t i v e i n 
Christ 'for us men and f o r our salvation'. 
16. 
CHAPTER 1 
PITTENGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF SIN AND HUMAN NATURE 
( l ) Sin not simply a refusal to obey divine or natural law 
This chapter must begin with Pittenger's summary and unsubstantiated 
dismissal of what he regards as inadequate d e f i n i t i o n s of sin. Thus he 
says that s i n i s 'not the breaking of Commandments which have been 
handed down from on high; neither i s i t f a i l u r e to conform to some 
s t a t i c law, given once for a l l ' . ( l ) He acknowledges that i t would be 
'easy enough to c l a s s i f y certain human acts as s i n f u l ' i f one believed 
i n a ' l i s t of things that had been revealed as contrary to God's w i l l ' , 
' i f one regarded the Ten Commandments as having quite l i t e r a l l y been 
given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, then obviously the disobedience 
of any man to any of these commandments (would be) a s i n f u l act'.(2) 
Since, however, he considers that Old Testament scholarship has shown 
the Decalogue i n o r i g i n to be a 'summing up of t r i b a l mores ... 
influenced by other codes i n the Near East',(3) he i s unable to accept 
i t as a satisfactory framework f o r a modern understanding of sin. 
Secondly, whereas i t was possible f o r a mediaeval theologian, 'who 
worked with the idea of "natural moral law", to label as s i n f u l those 
acts that could be categorized as unnatural, i n the sense that they 
were contrary to what was w i l l e d by God as part of the normal behaviour 
expected of a human being and i n accord with the "nature" of man as 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y human';(4) such a philosophy does not hold sway today 
(1) C.R., p. 51. 
(2) W. N. Pittenger: 'A Fresh Look at Christian Moral Theology', 
Religion i n L i f e , Vol. 38, 1969. p. 550. 
O) i b i d . , p. 551. 
(4) i b i d . , p. 550. 
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and thus does not provide a basis f o r a contemporary d e f i n i t i o n of sin. 
Indeed Pittenger finds the whole concept of 'moral law' inadequate 
because of i t s apparent attempt to provide a narrow categorization f o r 
human nature and behaviour. He believes that an adequate contemporary 
view of morality must take account of the dynamic, 'becoming' nature of 
l i f e which modern philosophy, especially process thought, i s so aware 
of. His own understanding of sin seeks to take f u l l account of t h i s . ( 5 ) 
He talks about sin, however, as 'man's root problem', as a 
'sit u a t i o n or state or condition which requires att e n t i o n ' , to which he 
attaches the epithet 'disease'; of which s i n f u l acts are only 
symptomatic.(6) S i g n i f i c a n t l y though, he refuses to understand t h i s 
'disease' i n terms of o r i g i n a l sin. 
A consideration of his r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o r i g i n a l s i n and i t s 
implications f o r human nature i s important f o r t h i s study. 
(2) Original sin and the nature of man 
(a) The f a l l 
His c r i t i q u e of the concept begins by re j e c t i n g the idea of a 
f a l l w ith which o r i g i n a l sin i s usually associated. Pittenger l i k e 
anyone who takes evolution seriously and who regards creation as an 
on-going process moving from simple to more complex life-forms does 
not accept as i n any way h i s t o r i c a l l y trustworthy the b i b l i c a l picture 
of the f a l l of man, with i t s undeniable implication of a f a l l from a 
once perfect and harmonious state. I f there never was i n the past a 
state of perfection then the notion of a f a l l i s inconceivable. Thus 
Pittenger would only use the f a l l story as an e x i s t e n t i a l description 
(5) i b i d . , p. 551. 
(6) Last Things, p. j59> 
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of human l i f e . 
' i f we use the F a l l story at al l . . I t must be as a story-
t o l d about each of us, not as an h i s t o r i c a l account of 
how sin came i n t o the world. But what i s true of each 
one of us i s that there i s a defection from the excellence 
which i s the divine i n t e n t i o n f o r us '(7) 
Pittenger c r i t i c i z e s theologians who while accepting the b i b l i c a l 
account of the f a l l as 'highly mythological and dependent upon ancient 
legends' s t i l l t r e a t t h i s 'material f o r theological purposes, as i f i t 
were h i s t o r i c a l ( 8 ) and who seek to employ a concept of 'fallenness'. 
This f o r Pittenger i s no l i v e option. Not only does he not accept the 
v a l i d i t y of the f a l l narratives i n Genesis for h i s t o r i c a l reasons, he 
also rejects the view of man and sin implied i n them. For him sin i s 
not 'natural to man'(9) i n the sense that i t i s endemic to his nature, 
yet t h i s i s what, he suggests, those who i n t e r p r e t o r i g i n a l sin i n f a l l 
terms are saying. This reference i s aimed p a r t i c u l a r l y at certain 
'modern attempts to refurbish the t r a d i t i o n a l theory' of o r i g i n a l s i n 
by presenting a 'quasi b i o l o g i c a l way of stating' i t . ( 1 0 ) 
(b) His r e j e c t i o n of some modern reinterpretations of o r i g i n a l s i n 
He dismisses, f o r example, N. P. Williams' attempt 'to get at the 
problem by postulating a pre-mundane f a l l ' as 'patently' belonging ' i n 
the realm of the f a n c i f u l and the fantastic'.(11) Pittenger i s not 
alone(12) or wholly u n j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s c r i t i c i s m but i n concentrating 
upon one aspect of Williams' thesis he neglects an important underlying 
(7) G.P., p. 60. 
(8) Time f o r Consent, p. 54. 
(9) W.I., p. 208. 
(10) i b i d . , p. 211. 
(11) i b i d . , p. 211. 
(12) e.g. J. S. Boys Smith, review, i n J.T.S., Vol. XXIX, 1928, 
pp. 505-310. 
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emphasis i n the l a t t e r ' s work. 
N. P. Williams' exhaustive study of the concept of the f a l l 
concludes with his own r e d e f i n i t i o n of 'inherited i n f i r m i t y ' ; a 
r e d e f i n i t i o n which does not r e l y upon any supposed h i s t o r i c a l value 
i n the Adam story. Williams postulates that the creation o r i g i n a l l y 
was purely good but p r i o r to the appearance of man what he c a l l s the 
World-Soul turned from God and by that r e b e l l i o n e v i l originated. 
'The World-Soul was created good; but ... at the beginning 
of lime, i n some transcendental and incomprehensible 
manner, i t turned away from God and i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
Self, thus shattering i t s own i n t e r i o r being, which 
depended upon God f o r i t s s t a b i l i t y and coherence ...'(13) 
Thus creation became apostate. As Williams says, i t i s t h i s 'remote 
and mysterious event', 'this primaeval catastrophe', which should be 
seen as 'the true and ultimate F a l l ' whose e f f e c t i s 'the continuity 
and homogeneity of e v i l throughout a l l ranks of organised l i f e , from 
the b a cillus up to Man'.(l4) This f i n a l comment i s s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r 
although the accusation that Williams moves from the realm of theology 
to fantasy has some force, i n leaving his c r i t i c i s m at t h i s point 
Pittenger i s neglecting the motive behind Williams' theorizing. By 
postulating that the f a l l consists i n a 'pre-cosmic v i t i a t i o n of the 
whole Life-Force when i t was s t i l l one and simple',(15) Williams was 
t r y i n g to account f o r 'the congenital weakness or disorder of human 
nature'; (16) ' i t s inherent moral weakness or bias towards sin'.(l7) 
(13) N. P. Williams: The Ideas of the F a l l and of Original Sin, 
(Bampton Lectures 1924), London, Longmans, 1927, p. 526. 
(14) i b i d . , p. 524. 
(15) i b i d . , p. 523. 
(16) i b i d . , p. 491. 
(17) i b i d . , p. 456. 
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This 'inherited i n f i r m i t y ' , (a phrase Williams prefers to Original 
Sin),(18) t h i s 'weakness of w i l l ' , ( l 9 ) 'inheres i n the human stock as 
an hereditary character transmitted from parent to offspring through 
b i o l o g i c a l and not merely through what i s called social heredity'.(20) 
This f i n a l phrase i s s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r Pittenger i s one who offers a 
social d e f i n i t i o n of o r i g i n a l sin. Yet Williams and Pittenger are not 
only divided by the former's implied r e j e c t i o n of the l a t t e r ' s approach 
but, as w i l l be demonstrated, Pittenger t o t a l l y repudiates any suggestion 
t h a t there i s a b i o l o g i c a l l y transmitted weakness or moral i n f i r m i t y and 
tendency towards e v i l i n man. This would be his r e a l quarrel with a 
position l i k e that of Williams, and not simply the l a t t e r ' s f a n t a s t i c 
concept of a pre-mundane f a l l . Pittenger c l e a r l y believes that a 
position such as that of Williams runs counter to his own view that 
s i n i s not 'natural to man'.(21) 
He s i m i l a r l y c r i t i c i z e s William Temple f o r f i n d i n g i n man's 
'self-centredness' 'the r e a l meaning of Original Sin'.(22) Such a 
view seems to Pittenger to be ' i n r e a l danger of confusing what I take 
to be the necessity f o r b i o l o g i c a l and psychological selfhood and i t s 
assertion as the condition of selfhood at a l l with v i o l a t i o n of the 
w i l l of God'; though he recognises that 'Temple t r i e d c a r e f u l l y to 
avoid any such thing'.(23) An example of t h i s would be a baby's 
screaming and kicking at i t s mother to get attention or food. Such an 
exh i b i t i o n of selfhood, Pittenger suggests, i s of the essence of human 
(18) i b i d . , p. 458. 
(19) i b i d . , p. 457-
(20) i b i d . , p. 460. 
(21) W.I., p. 208. 
(22) i b i d . , p. 211. 
(23) i b i d . , p. 211. 
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b i o l o g i c a l and psychological make-up and necessary i f the c h i l d i s to 
survive.(24) 
This, however, i s to miss the point Temple was making. Temple 
was speaking of 'self-centredness' i n terms of 'self-seeking' which 
might 'express i t s e l f as aspiration a f t e r wealth, or power, or 
popularity, or any other occasion of s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n ' . ( 2 5 ) Temple 
was thus seeking to account f o r the 'unquestionable bias or tendency 
to e v i l i n human nature' which 'theologians have called Original 
Sin'.(26) He admits that t h i s 'self-assertion'(27) i s allowed f o r i n 
the manner of God's creation, i n the sense that ' i t must be regarded 
as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the divine purpose that f i n i t e s p i r i t s should make 
choices contrary to that purpose',(28) but i n that they do 'follow t h e i r 
own apparent good without reference to God', and thus t h e i r actions are 
'contrary to God's w i l l and t h e i r own real good'(29) does not a l t e r the 
f a c t that such a tendency i s deeply embedded i n human nature and as 
such i s the ' v i t a l t r u t h and importance of o r i g i n a l sin'.(JO) Pittenger, 
however, disputes that there i s such a bias or tendency to e v i l i n human 
nature. This i s further shown by his c r i t i c i s m s of St. Augustine. 
(c) Criticisms of St. Augustine 
Pittenger's position here i s simply stated. 
(24) Human Nature, p. 39 • 
(25) William Temple: Nature, Man and God, London, Macmillan, 1935* 
p. 424. 
(26) i b i d . , p. 363. 
(27) i b i d . , p. 365. 
(28) i b i d . , p. 501. 
(29) i b i d . , p. 501. 
(30) i b i d . , p. 502. 
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' I should not wish to defend St. Augustine's conception of 
man as a "mass of perd i t i o n " or his view of " o r i g i n a l s i n " 
as t o t a l l y laming man and making him impotent ever to 
choose any good that i s r e a l l y good. ' (31) 
He accuses St. Augustine of 'making shocking statements' about man's 
'utter depravity',(32) suggesting that man i s born g u i l t y with a 
corrupted nature prone to sin and therefore incapable of communion with 
God. He s p e c i f i c a l l y rejects the suggestion that such i s transmitted 
to subsequent generations through the sexual procreation of the human 
race, or worse that concupiscence l i e s at the heart of the problem.(33) 
Whether Pittenger accurately r e f l e c t s the Augustinian position or merely 
presents a caricature i s not a matter that need be considered here. 
What i s s i g n i f i c a n t , though, i s what his reactions indicate about 
Pittenger's own understanding of o r i g i n a l sin. Two main emphases may 
be detected which w i l l be considered i n more d e t a i l . F i r s t his 
strenuous r e j e c t i o n of any h i n t that man's nature i s 'depraved' i n the 
sense that his natural tendency i s to e v i l requires a consideration of 
his alternative understanding of human nature. Secondly his denial 
that the 'race of man i s infected by sin' and that 'th i s kind of 
i n f e c t i o n i s taken to be almost b i o l o g i c a l i n nature - as may be seen 
i n the thought of St. Augustine',(34) leads i n t o an examination of his 
re-appraisal of the o r i g i n a l sin theme. 
(d) Pittenger's view of human nature 
Disputing the view that because of his s i n f u l condition man i n 
his natural and unredeemed state i s incapable of fellowship with God, 
(31) Human Nature, p. 150. 
(32) W.I., p. 213. 
(33) G.P., p. 60. 
(34) C.R., p. 32. 
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Pittenger a l l i e s himself w i t h the catholic view that sees man, even 
i n his natural state as 'capax i n f i n i t i ' . Although as he says: 
' i t i s true that s i n has seriously damaged t h i s 'capacity'; 
to use the Thomist phrases, man i s not only 'privatus boni' 
but 'vulneratus i n naturalibus'. But Catholic C h r i s t i a n i t y 
at least, i n Anglican as well as Roman and Orthodox dress, 
has consistently refused to see man as 'non capax i n f i n i t i ' ; 
f o r t h i s reason i t has been accused by some modern 
Protestant theologians of a lack of realism about sin. 
I n my judgement, the t r u t h i s that Catholic C h r i s t i a n i t y 
has been truer here to the b i b l i c a l teaching that man i s 
made i n the image of God than have the modern theologians 
who somehow seem to think that they honour God by 
denigrating his creation.'(35) 
A few lines l a t e r Pittenger emphasizes t h i s more clearly. For him not 
only has sin not rendered a relationship between man and God impossible, 
but rather i n spite of sin relationship between God and man remains. 
' I f man i s what the Bible says he i s , some unbreakable 
ontological relationship must continue between him and God, 
and between the Saviour and those whom he came to save.'(36) 
This high estimate of man, based upon the view that he i s made i n the 
image of God, i s crucial i n Pittenger's thought. Man can only t r u l y 
be understood when he i s set i n the context of the operation of the 
word of God, the agent of creation. This per se precludes the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that man can ever be thought of as depraved, as having no 
spark of the divine i n him. 
'Man i s 'grounded' i n the Eternal Word, who i n divers 
manners and i n varying i n t e n s i t y works i n and through him, 
r e a l i z i n g or making actual the perfection of manhood which 
i s the divine i n t e n t i o n f o r the creation of man. The Word, 
as 'ground' of man, i s of course not i d e n t i c a l with man; 
man i s not himself divine. But the Word i s the divine 
creative energy which c a l l s man i n t o being and holds him i n 
being; the Word i s the power working i n man, 'the l i g h t 
l i ghtening every man', 'the l i f e which i s the l i g h t of man' 
- thwarted by sin, denied by s e l f - w i l l , rejected but never 
ejected from the l i f e of the creature.'(37) 
(35) W.I., p. 239. 
(36) i b i d . , p. 239. 
(37) i b i d . , p. 240. 
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I t must be emphasized again that t h i s description of the di g n i t y of 
man, because he i s i n God's image, i s not of man a f t e r he has been 
saved or redeemed, rather i t i s of man i n his natural, indeed s i n f u l 
state. Sin i s not able to destroy the ontological relationship between 
God and man. The 'imago dei' i n man may be distorted, but never 
n u l l i f i e d , and t h i s i s because the divine Logos i s present. This f o r 
Pittenger i s of utmost significance. The Logos at work i n the creative 
process i s a key-note of his theological understanding and determinative 
of his Christology. How i t affects his understanding of sin must now 
be set out more clearly. Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of sin w i l l be 
presented l a t e r , i n section 3. 
(e) Pittenger's i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t stress and i t s r e l a t i o n to sin 
Pittenger summarizes his espousal of the Logos t r a d i t i o n i n 
Christian thought with i t s emphasis upon the a c t i v i t y of God i n the 
whole of creation seen most clear l y i n Jesus Christ, by describing t h i s 
as an 'incarnational' world. 
'This World, then, i s an incarnational World ... I am sure 
that there i s no other Christian way of describing the 
creation. As Cardinal Berulle once wrote, the incarnation 
i s the manner and mode of a l l God's work i n the world: 
supremely we should add: i t i s the manner and mode of God's 
work and way i n and for and with men.'(38) 
I n r e l a t i n g t h i s to the discussion of the nature of man i n respect of 
his sinfulness Pittenger's grounding i n the Logos t r a d i t i o n requires 
that the 'imago dei' i n a l l men must be given i t s f u l l weight. Thus 
he can say: 
'The confident assurance that man i s i n God's image i s the 
guarantee f o r Christian theology that man i n his essential 
nature i s 'salvable', however he may have f a l l e n i n t o sin 
(38) i b i d . , p. 6. 
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and remain i n a s i n f u l state; i t i s the guarantee that he 
i s the c h i l d of God who i s nowhere without the loving 
care of his heavenly Father and i s always welcomed home 
when he turns to the Father from wickedness and wrong. 
Furthermore, t h i s assurance makes i t possible f o r the 
Christian to claim with confidence that God 'has nowhere 
l e f t himself without witness', and that i n a l l the 'good' 
done by men, however p a r t i a l they may be i n t h e i r goodness, 
as well as i n every t r u t h f u l thought and loving deed and 
creation of beauty, God has been and i s at work. I n man's 
moral sense, i n his search f o r t r u t h i n any f i e l d , i n his 
courage and devotion, i n his making of things lovely and 
harmonious, there i s something of the divine operation. 
A l l of t h i s i s the work of the Logos who undergirds human 
l i f e i n i t s h i s t o r i c a l situations, moves through nature and 
his t o r y to achieve his great ends, and makes 'even the 
wrath of men' to praise the God who created and creates, 
who revealed and reveals, and who w i l l s to crown t h i s 
continuing action by bringing his creation i n t o personal 
union with himself.'(39) 
Pittenger clearly intends that his incarnational stress with i t s 
suggestion that sirce 'man i s undergirded by God1 there i s ' i n man even 
as sinner' ' s u f f i c i e n t of God's operation' and ' s u f f i c i e n t r e f l e c t i o n 
of God's true i n t e n t i o n f o r man'(40) to stand i n contrast to any view 
of s i n which speaks of man having a bias or tendency towards e v i l . He 
repudiates those theologians who imply that sinfulness i s the most 
obvious and determinative characteristic of human nature.(4l) For 
himself he stresses that he does not wish to minimize the gravity of 
sin(42) yet he sees i t i n no sense endemic or natural to man but more, 
as the t i t l e of one of his books suggests, a matter of 'goodness 
distorted'. No sin however grievous can destroy the relationship 
between God and man. Thus sin can never be regarded as holding the 
ultimate t r u t h about human nature. The consequence of t h i s f o r 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
i b i d 
i b i d . , p. 5> 
i b i d . , p. 238. 
i b i d • s 
• 9 
P. 5-
P. 5f. 
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Pittenger's theology w i l l be considered, a f t e r his alternative to a 
bi o l o g i c a l view of o r i g i n a l sin has been considered. 
( f ) Pittenger's sociological analysis of in h e r i t e d sinfulness 
Although he rejects any bio l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o r i g i n a l 
s i n and any view of inhe r i t e d sinfulness which would suggest that a man 
i s born with a corrupted nature prone to sin, Pittenger does not wish 
to minimize the recognition that sin i s ' t r a g i c a l l y serious'.(4j) He 
says that 'through the long h i s t o r y of man, there has accumulated a 
great mass of wrong-doing, which affects every new-born member of the 
race'(44) and thus admits a v a l i d i t y to the concept of 'inherited 
sinfulness', though only when interpreted i n s t r i c t l y sociological 
and never b i o l o g i c a l terms. I n t h i s he acknowledges that he i s 
following a clue from P. R. Tennant who concluded that 'the generality 
of s i n finds i t s s u f f i c i e n t explanation i n the moral psychology of the 
in d i v i d u a l and i n the s o l i d a r i t y of the race i n respect of conative 
propensities'.(45) I t i s with t h i s l a t t e r suggestion that we are 
concerned here and the following quotation draws out i t s implications. 
' i f i t be true ... that man's sociology i s as much a part 
of his 'nature' as i s his biology, we ought to be able to 
see that what Tennant c a l l s 'the s o l i d a r i t y of the race' 
has a great deal to do with the s i t u a t i o n i n which we f i n d 
ourselves. 'We are members one of another' both i n our 
evil-doing and i n our right-doing. What we do has i t s 
enormous consequences f o r those who are around us and f o r 
those who come a f t e r us; s i m i l a r l y , the evil-doing of our 
own ancestors has helped to b u i l d up a state of a f f a i r s i n 
which tendencies are implanted i n us, from e a r l i e r days, 
such that the less worthy path appears the more a t t r a c t i v e , 
and the securing of our own immediate desires, at the 
expense of better and more r i c h l y rewarding ends, i s more 
readily accepted.'(46) 
(43) i b i d . , p. 212. 
(44) i b i d . , p. 212. 
(45) i b i d . , p. 211, quoting F. R. Tennant: The Concept of Sin, 
Cambridge, The University Press, 1912, p. 272. 
(46) i b i d . , p. 212. 
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I t i s clear then that Pittenger's 'sociological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
'inherited sinfulness'; by which he means that 'man as a sinner i s 
not a s o l i t a r y sinner; (rather) he sins as a member of society, and 
the sins of his brethren i n the corporate l i f e of society are re f l e c t e d 
i n him and work upon him',(47) has two aspects. F i r s t l y i n the 
contemporary s i t u a t i o n an individual's behaviour and attitudes are to 
a large extent determined and conditioned by the society i n which he 
has been educated and brought up. Thus the ' s i n f u l ' aspects of that 
society w i l l be an element i n t h i s conditioning. Secondly the profound 
influence of past upon present must be recognised. Thus i n the present 
discussion 'the evil-doing of our own ancestors' i s recognised as a 
present influence on society i n respect of being a major factor i n the 
conditioning and creation of present attitudes. The actions and 
attitudes of ancestors, both f o r good and e v i l , have played t h e i r part 
i n the construction of contemporary society. The e v i l ones, however, 
have t h e i r potency i n that they create the s i t u a t i o n i n which a man i s 
caught up i n t h i s s i n f u l conditioning so that 'he i s i n a state of 
aliena t i o n from God's w i l l f o r him, (and) i s not acting as human nature 
i s intended to act'. But Pittenger stresses, 'this i s not true of him 
as an isolated monad ... i t i s true of him i n his deep social 
rootedness'. 'To understand t h i s ' , he asserts, 'is to come closer to 
grasping the re a l meaning of the miscalled doctrine of o r i g i n a l sin'. (48) 
I n laying such emphasis on t h i s social understanding of si n , 
Pittenger i s employing one of the basic insights of process thought, 
b u i l t upon the concept of 'mutual prehension'. I n process philosophy 
(47) Human Nature, p. 99. 
(48) i b i d . , p. 99. 
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the world i s an i n t e r - r e l a t e d society of 'occasions', which means 
th a t : 
'A man does not and cannot e x i s t i n complete i s o l a t i o n 
from other men, or from his present environment, or from 
his own past h i s t o r y and the more general hi s t o r y of the 
human race of which as a man he i s a part, or from the 
natural order to which he and his whole race belong, or 
from the possible developments which are before him and 
mankind i n general. Each man i s a focusing, a 
concretizing, of a l l these. Thus i n being himself he i s 
not himself alone; he i s a l l that has gone to make him up, 
a l l that surrounds him, a l l that presses upon him, a l l 
that he himself enters i n t o and i n which he shares, a l l 
which he may be.'(49) 
(g) Possible examples of sin viewed sociologically 
Since Pittenger's societal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of in h e r i t e d sinfulness 
i s c r u c i a l to his view of o r i g i n a l sin, before o f f e r i n g any c r i t i c a l 
comments about i t , to pursue i t s implications with the aid of examples, 
should indicate more precisely what Pittenger i s saying. 
I t i s undeniable that each i n d i v i d u a l i s conditioned by the 
society i n which he i s nurtured; which would include the influence of 
home, family, school, social grouping, neighbourhood, environment, 
r e l i g i o n and nation. From t h i s social environment many beneficial 
effects would be imbibed; but, what Pittenger i s saying i s that the 
e v i l aspects of such conditioning are the essence of in h e r i t e d 
sinfulness and can be equated with what t r a d i t i o n a l theology has called 
o r i g i n a l sin. For example an individual's a t t i t u d e to other people 
w i l l be largely determined by his social conditioning and i f t h i s i s 
coloured by envy, prejudice or unreasoned fear then his attitudes w i l l 
i n e v i t a b l y be s i n f u l . S i m i l a r l y his a t t i t u d e to moral values, to the 
purpose of l i f e , to the pursuit of material advantages w i l l l a rgely be 
(49) P.T.C.F., p. 13. 
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determined by his social conditioning. 
An i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s might be of a c h i l d brought up i n an 
atmosphere which elevates the pursuit of material wealth, and the 
comforts and pleasures that flow from i t , with small concern f o r 
consequences to others. Such a c h i l d w i l l almost i n e v i t a b l y grow i n t o 
a person who grossly displays these s e l f i s h a t t i t u d e s . This 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y i s c l e a r l y a feature of the conditioned alienation deep 
i n man's social rootedness to which Pittenger points. This i s where 
his r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o r i g i n a l sin might seem to have most force, 
f o r there i s clear l y a sense i n which people are caught up by that 
social conditioning, including i t s s i n f u l e v i l aspects, so that they 
became conformed to i t and i t would appear that there i s nothing they 
can do to break from i t s f e t t e r s . 
An obvious, though extreme, example of t h i s would be the 
conditioning which creates an Afrikaans South African. Here ancestor 
influence i s very marked. The system of Apartheid, universally 
condemned as e v i l , i s the product of many years of Boer culture, of a 
struggle to make a l i v i n g out of a largely h o s t i l e environment, of 
constant attempts to maintain mastery over the native population i n 
order to secure t h e i r own position, of a peculiar b e l i e f that they 
were enjoying the blessing and guidance of divine providence, of a 
determination to maintain r a c i a l p u r i t y and rigorous standards of 
personal morality i n pursuit of prosperity and security. These and 
many other motivations, some o r i g i n a l l y noble, some harmless, some 
dangerously wrong have created the present s i t u a t i o n i n which i t i s 
almost impossible f o r an Afrikaaner to question or c r i t i c i s e l e t alone 
escape from, the social atmosphere i n which he was nurtured. Indeed 
few i n that society would countenance the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e i r social 
system i s i n any sense e v i l ; such i s the power of the conditioning. 
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When someone, however, l i k e Beyers Naude, does come to recognise the 
inherent e v i l of his society and seeks to free himself from i t s 
clutches i n order to seek i t s transformation, the personal doubt and 
agony involved and the consequent pressures and odium are enormous.(50) 
Such can be the dreadful imprisoning i n e v i t a b i l i t y of s i n f u l 
social conditioning which Pittenger would believe i s true of every 
social environment not only the more extreme situations l i k e South 
Afri c a . There i s further no doubt that such a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
a l l pervasive vicious g r i p of sin with i t s tentacles stretched out 
through a person's entire social environment lends valuable new insights 
to an e x i s t e n t i a l awareness of the power and subtlety of sin. The 
question, however, must be asked whether Pittenger i s correct i n 
o f f e r i n g t h i s as a complete r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o r i g i n a l s in. On 
analysis a l l he has said i s that human beings are involved i n t h e i r 
social environment and that i t i s through the s i n f u l conditioning 
inherent i n that, that individuals are caught up i n a sin s i t u a t i o n . 
Yet those theologians who were quoted e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter were 
cl e a r l y seeking to say something more about o r i g i n a l sin. For them 
o r i g i n a l s i n was sociologically invariable. They were pointing to an 
endemic flaw i n human nature and were seeking to describe i t and account 
f o r i t . N. P. Williams indeed was quoted as making t h i s specific point 
that 'inherited i n f i r m i t y ' i s 'transmitted' through the 'human stock' 
'and not merely through what i s called social heredity'.(51) However 
variously i t might have been expressed t r a d i t i o n a l Christian theology 
i n speaking of o r i g i n a l s i n has used the language of biology. The 
(50) The T r i a l of Beyers Naude, London, Search Press, 1975. 
(51) op.cit., p. 460. 
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t a i n t of sin; a corrupted nature prone to sin are examples of t h i s . 
F. R. Barry says that 'a tendency to s i n _ i s inherited', that 'a 
propensity to commit sin must be recognised as innate i n a l l of us'.(52) 
These are but indications that there i s a widespread theological opinion 
which would doubt that Pittenger's sociological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
i n h e r i t e d sinfulness i s exhaustive or even adequate. 
Although I think Pittenger i s mistaken to claim that h i s 
sociological analysis i s 'the r e a l meaning of the miscalled doctrine 
of o r i g i n a l s i n ' , yet I do not f i n d i t necessary to pursue the contrast 
between Pittenger and other more t r a d i t i o n a l theologians on t h i s matter 
further. I t i s , I think, enough that the point of difference has been 
defined. His main emphasis and the contrasts that he himself draws 
with other views have been established. 
I t would be valuable, however, to indicate at t h i s point where 
his understanding of o r i g i n a l s i n w i l l lead his theology. F i r s t l y a 
view of man which denies his innate bias towards sin and which stresses 
his essential 'dignitas',(53) a l b e i t distorted by sin, w i l l propose the 
need for the restoration of man to his proper place of honour through 
the loving operation of God. I t w i l l be indicated that such i s 
Pittenger's view of salvation; namely being restored to communion with 
God, which i s the essence of man's di g n i t y , by being i n the fellowship 
and following the example of the one i n whose l i f e the 'imago dei' was 
f u l l y v i s i b l e . Secondly his view that sin comes basically through 
s i n f u l social conditioning w i l l lead i n t o the search f o r a society from 
which s i n f u l conditioning has been eradicated and where men and women 
may experience the way of God's love. This i s 'the position the Church 
(52) F. R. Barry: The Atonement, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1968, 
p. 55. 
(53) Human Nature, p. 82. 
32. 
plays i n Pittenger's theology; even, as w i l l be shown, to the point 
of making the Church part of the process of salvation. 
Having now established the basis f o r Pittenger's understanding of 
sin we w i l l proceed to examine his d i s t i n c t i v e teaching about sin and 
i t s process background. 
(3) Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of si n 
The foregoing discussion has intimated that Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n 
of s i n should be expected to cover three main areas of his understanding 
of the subject. F i r s t i t must a f f i r m what he ca l l s 'the true nature of 
God's human Children',(54) primarily by showing that despite s i n an 
ontological relationship remains between God a.nd man made i n his image. 
Secondly since an important aspect of his emphasis on s i n f u l social 
conditioning i s that men are 'impeded and di s t o r t e d through antecedent 
human conditions'(55) and themselves have a deleterious e f f e c t upon 
others i n t h e i r own and subsequent generations, then the f a c t of sin 
d i s t o r t i n g human relationships must be a factor i n his d e f i n i t i o n . 
Thirdly since, as was indicated e a r l i e r , Pittenger believes that his 
own understanding of si n takes account of the dynamic, 'becoming', 
q u a l i t y of l i f e i n a way e a r l i e r theories of sin were unable to, then 
such a 'change of world view' which i t s 'vision of the world i n 
process'(56) must be i n t e g r a l to his d e f i n i t i o n . The device by which 
Pittenger holds these dimensions together w i t h i n a d e f i n i t i o n of si n 
i s the concept of 'aim', which he borrows from Whitehead's conceptuality. 
This prim a r i l y i s a positive emphasis. Against those whom he accuses 
(54) C.R., p. 46. 
(55) i b i d . , p. 51. 
(56) i b i d . , p. 46. 
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of i m p l y i n g t h a t s i n i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r about human l i f e , 
P i t t e n g e r believes t h a t i t i s God's aim f o r man t h a t i s h i s prime 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . 
'But the r e a l i t y of our manhood, as each of us i s a man, 
i s the a c t u a l i z i n g of deep, a l l - p e n e t r a t i n g , a l l - i n t e g r a t i n g 
l o v e , u n i t i n g us w i t h our bret h r e n ; and through t h a t u n i t i n g , 
u n i t i n g us also w i t h the source of love, h i m s e l f Love, 
namely God. This i s the achievement, through our f r e e human 
dec i s i o n s , of the i n i t i a l aim ( t o use once again the 
language o f process thought) which God, the cosmic Love 
seeking ever t o d i f f u s e i t s e l f more f u l l y and widely, has 
provided f o r each man - the i n i t i a l aim which each man may 
take and make i n t o h i s own s u b j e c t i v e aim.'(57) 
Sin i s the f a i l u r e t o f u l f i l t h i s God-given aim. 
'Sin i s a c o n d i t i o n or s t a t e or s i t u a t i o n i n human existence 
i n which men f i n d themselves impotent before the requirements 
which they see, however dimly, are l a i d upon them simply by 
v i r t u e of t h e i r being men. I t i s a 'grace-less' s t a t e , as 
one might put i t ; because i t i s a s t a t e i n which there i s 
f a i l u r e i n harmonizing the i d e a l and the a c t u a l , f a i l u r e i n 
i n t e g r a t i o n of the s e l f - always, mind you, the s e l f i n 
r e l a t i o n w i t h others f o r we know of no other human selfhood -
and f a i l u r e t o move towards the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are present as the ' i n i t i a l aim' of our 
l i v e s i s made i n t o the 's u b j e c t i v e aim' ( i n Whiteheadian 
language) whose r e a l i z a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s our 'becoming' i n 
manhood ... God's purpose f o r us, h i s w i l l i s n o t h i n g other 
than t h a t we should become ourselves as he i n i t i a l l y aims us 
to become - and I have put i t i n t h i s somewhat clumsy way 
because I wish t o s t r e s s the aim which i s i n t e g r a l t o human 
nature. S in ... i s a r e l i g i o u s l y f r e i g h t e d term whose 
purpose i s t o p o i n t t o t h a t s t a t e : our f a i l u r e t o become 
what we are created t o become and hence our f a i l u r e t o 'obey' 
God's commands which i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t we s h a l l become what 
we are created t o become.'(58) 
Since P i t t e n g e r alone amongst process theologians i n t e r p r e t s s i n 
so s p e c i f i c a l l y i n terms of aim h i s use of the concept must be regarded 
as r e p r e s e n t i n g a d i s t i n c t development beyond Whitehead's o r i g i n a l 
i n t e n t i o n . Because of t h i s , and also because the concept f i g u r e s 
prominently i n P i t t e n g e r ' s C h r i s t o l o g y , h i s use of the n o t i o n of aim 
(57) i b i d . , p. 50. 
(58) Last Things, p. 37. 
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must be set i n i t s process background. 
(4) The concept of aim 
I n the preceding quotations P i t t e n g e r may be noted t o have drawn 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b j e c t i v e aim and i n i t i a l aim. The former being 
the more gen e r a l i z e d concept i n d i c a t i n g t h a t l i f e has aim and purpose, 
the l a t t e r being d e s c r i p t i v e of the mode of God's o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n 
l i f e . That d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l be maintained i n t h i s d iscussion and w i l l 
be t r e a t e d i n t h a t order. 
(a) S u b j e c t i v e aim and the purposive nature of l i f e 
By employing the concept of s u b j e c t i v e aim P i t t e n g e r seeks t o 
s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t each man i s a 'process of s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n and s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n ' , 'a dynamic creature w i t h a t h r u s t 
or d r i v e towards the r e a l i z a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l i t y ' . ( 5 9 ) He even says 
t h a t 'each man f i n d s h i s i d e n t i t y through h i s movement towards the 
a c t u a l i z i n g of h i s s u b j e c t i v e aim'.(60) He does t h i s by s e t t i n g 
humanity w i t h i n the purposive and processive view o f human l i f e which 
i s of the essence o f Whitehead's c o n c e p t u a l i t y . Recognising t h a t there 
i s 'an element of t e l e o l o g i c a l concern i n a l l process thought',(6l) he 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t ' s u b j e c t i v e aim' i s the mechanism by which t h i s i s 
expressed. This i s h i s d e f i n i t i o n . 
'This ' s u b j e c t i v e aim' which i s proper t o each s e r i e s of 
occasions ... has always about i t a d i r e c t i v e q u a l i t y , ( i t ) 
i s t o be understood as the goal or end towards which a 
given process moves, y e t i t must also be seen as i n some 
sense immanently a t work i n t h a t process moving i t towards 
i t s goal or end or a c t u a l i z a t i o n . ' ( 6 2 ) 
(59) C.R., p. 46. 
(60) i b i d . , p. 46. 
(61) P.T.C.F., p. 15. 
(62) i b i d . , p. 15. 
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The phrase 'series of occasions' needs explanation. I n process 
thought an a c t u a l occasion or e n t i t y , being i n e f f e c t an i n s t a n t of 
experience, i s the basic c o n s t i t u e n t of l i v i n g . A human l i f e i s , f o r 
example, thus seen as a s e r i e s or r o u t i n g of such occasions. Now 
although, as w i l l be demonstrated p r e s e n t l y , i t i s necessary t o speak 
of the s u b j e c t i v e aim of a s i n g l e a c t u a l occasion, the concept of aim 
i s made c l e a r e r i f i n i t i a l l y i t i s seen i n the context of a s e r i e s of 
occasions. This i s where P i t t e n g e r i s p l a c i n g i t i n the preceding 
q u o t a t i o n . That q u o t a t i o n also i n d i c a t e s t h a t process references t o 
'aim' mean more than t h a t l i f e i s i n general purposive. Rather i t i s 
saying t h a t every 'series of occasions' has w i t h i n i t a d i r e c t i v e 
q u a l i t y ; t h a t every human l i f e has immanently a t work w i t h i n i t an aim 
which moves i t towards i t s f u l f i l m e n t . P i t t e n g e r c l a r i f i e s t h i s f u r t h e r 
by saying t h a t although i n human terms t h i s aim i s conscious, i n lower 
forms of l i f e i t need not be so. He gives an example of t h i s when he 
speaks of an acorn not being aware of the aim which keeps i t moving 
towards i t s proper development i n t o an oak t r e e ; y e t conscious or not 
i t i s indeed i t s 's u b j e c t i v e aim' which keeps i t on the course of i t s 
proper development.(63) 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the s u b j e c t i v e aim, however, can only be f u l l y 
grasped when seen i n r e l a t i o n t o each a c t u a l occasion. 
(b) The s u b j e c t i v e aim i n each a c t u a l occasion 
Whitehead st a t e s simply t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e aim ' c o n t r o l s the 
becoming of a subject'.(64) With gre a t e r complexity he says: 
(63) i b i d . , p. 15. 
(64) Whitehead: Process, p. J>0. 
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'The ' o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s ' o f the a c t u a l e n t i t i e s i n the 
a c t u a l world, r e l a t i v e t o a d e f i n i t e a c t u a l e n t i t y , 
c o n s t i t u t e the e f f i c i e n t causes out of which t h a t a c t u a l 
e n t i t y a r i s e s : the 'sub j e c t i v e aim' a t ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' 
c o n s t i t u t e s the f i n a l cause or l u r e , whereby there i s 
determinate concrescence; and t h a t a t t a i n e d ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' 
remains as an element i n the content of c r e a t i v e purpose.'(65) 
I n order t o c l a r i f y how the s u b j e c t i v e aim c o n t r o l s the becoming 
of the subj e c t two comments must be made on t h i s q u o t a t i o n . F i r s t , i n 
Whitehead's thought ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' i s i n e f f e c t a generic term f o r the 
f u l f i l m e n t or completion t o which an a c t u a l occasion or s e r i e s of 
occasions aims. This w i l l be v a r i a b l e . For an acorn i t would simply 
be t o become an oak. For a man a v a r i e t y of ' s a t i s f a c t i o n s ' w i l l 
present themselves w i t h each new experience, beyond which there i s the 
i d e a l o f a l i f e ' s f u l f i l m e n t . The aim towards s a t i s f a c t i o n i s thus a 
c r u c i a l element i n the becoming both of an a c t u a l e n t i t y and of a 
sub j e c t . For, secondly, i t i s the mechanics o f aim v i s a v i s a c t u a l 
e n t i t y , which t h a t q u o t a t i o n speaks of as concrescence, t h a t determines 
how any a c t u a l e n t i t y and thus s u b j e c t w i l l become. I n a s e r i e s of 
occasions each new occasion i s i n f l u e n c e d by i t s predecessor and then 
i n f l u e n c e s i t s successor through mutual prehension. The analogy of a 
r e e l of cine f i l m helps t o describe t h i s process. But what i s c r u c i a l , 
i s t h a t these occasions i n s e r i e s are not l o o s e l y but i n t i m a t e l y 
connected. I n process thought there i s a strong emphasis on 
interdependence, upon e n t i t i e s i n f l u e n c i n g and a f f e c t i n g each other. 
An 'actual e n t i t y ' i s made up through the prehension of other e n t i t i e s . 
Concrescence i s the word used f o r t h i s coming together, t h i s a s s i m i l a t i o n 
of the e f f e c t s of a c t u a l e n t i t i e s or occasions t o form a new occasion. 
Concrescence i s the name given t o the whole process o f becoming when i t 
(65) i b i d . , p. 105. 
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i s found i n a s i n g l e a c t u a l e n t i t y . Thus Whitehead can say t h a t 
concrescence i s 'the r e a l i n t e r n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r 
existent'.(66) I t i s 'the name f o r the process i n which the universe 
of many t h i n g s acquires an i n d i v i d u a l unity'.(67) A new occasion i s 
thus a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i n f l u e n c e s of other occasions come together t o 
form a new u n i t of experience. On the broader scale t h i s means t h a t 
i n process thought a person i s made up of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of various 
f a c t o r s and i n f l u e n c e s . But as the q u o t a t i o n upon which these comments 
are being made i n d i c a t e d , ' s u b j e c t i v e aim' a t ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' i s a 
determining and e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t i n every concrescence. Whitehead's 
i n t e r p r e t e r Donald Sherburne explains why. 
'The s u b j e c t i v e aim of an a c t u a l e n t i t y i s the id.eal o f 
what t h a t subject could become, which shapes the very 
nature of the becoming subject. The d o c t r i n e t h a t each 
a c t u a l e n t i t y i s causa s u i means t h a t there i s not f i r s t 
a s u b j e c t , which then s o r t s out f e e l i n g s ; i t means, 
r a t h e r , t h a t there are f i r s t f e e l i n g s which, through 
i n t e g r a t i o n s , acquires the u n i t y of a s u b j e c t . Process 
doesn't presuppose a s u b j e c t ; r a t h e r , the s u b j e c t emerges 
from the process.'(68) 
This i s h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r understanding ' s u b j e c t i v e aim'. 
I t i s very d i f f e r e n t from t h i n k i n g i n terms of a person who has an aim 
or goal. Rather here i t i s the aim which i n e f f e c t creates the person. 
I n process thought ' s u b j e c t i v e aim' i s the determining f a c t o r i n the 
concrescence of prehensions from other a c t u a l e n t i t i e s t o form the 
new occasion. 
I t may thus be concluded t h a t as i t i s the s u b j e c t i v e aim which 
determines the make up of an a c t u a l e n t i t y f r o n the number of prehensions 
(66) i b i d . , p. 242. 
(67) i b i d . , p. 243. 
(68) D. W. Sherburne: A Key t o Whitehead's 'Process and R e a l i t y ' , 
Bloomington and London: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press Paperback, 
f i r s t pub. Macmillan, 1966, p. 244. 
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t h a t come together t o form i t , so i t i s s u b j e c t i v e aim which must be 
acknowledged as the p r i n c i p l e whereby those 'congeries of occasions, 
events, pressures, movements and routes',(69) as P i t t e n g e r c a l l s them, 
which make up our l i f e ' s experience come together i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
focus they do. I t i s the p r i n c i p l e of s u b j e c t i v e aim which explains 
why t h i s and not 'some other possible occurrence' has been brought 
' i n t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r concrete moment of what we commonly c a l l 
existence'.(70) 
(c) God and the concept of aim 
Donald Sherburne comments t h a t i t i s 'sub j e c t i v e aim' which i s 
'the mode of God's op e r a t i o n i n the world'.(71) Whitehead h i m s e l f 
o f f e r s as a basic p r i n c i p l e of h i s c o n c e p t u a l i t y t h a t 'the w o r l d i s 
s e l f - c r e a t i v e ' . Together these epitomize the process view of God's 
involvement w i t h c r e a t i o n , which a t the same time guarantees i t s 
freedom. The extended q u o t a t i o n from Whitehead i s t h i s . 
'The w o r l d i s s e l f - c r e a t i v e ; and the a c t u a l e n t i t y as 
s e l f - c r e a t i n g creature passes i n t o i t s immortal f u n c t i o n 
as p a r t - c r e a t o r o f the transcendent world. I n i t s s e l f -
c r e a t i o n the a c t u a l e n t i t y i s guided by i t s i d e a l of 
i t s e l f as i n d i v i d u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n and as transcendent 
c r e a t o r . The enjoyment of t h i s i d e a l i s the 's u b j e c t i v e 
aim' by reason of which the a c t u a l e n t i t y i s a 
determinate process.'(72) 
Here several basic process m o t i f s are employed t o i n d i c a t e how 
God can provide l i f e w i t h i t s aim i n a manner which allows f o r 
maximum freedom. For aim i s the manner i n which the coming together 
of prehensions i n concrescence t o form a new occasion i s 'guided by 
(69) P.T.C.P., p. 15. 
(70) i b i d . , p. 15. 
(71) i b i d . , p. 244. 
(72) Whitehead: Process, p. 103. 
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i t s i d e a l of i t s e l f as i n d i v i d u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n ' . I t i s thus t h a t a 
new occasion i s created; s e l f - c r e a t e d , t h a t i s by i t s a s s i m i l a t i o n o f 
previous occasions i n response t o i t s aim. 
God's primary involvement i n t h i s process, as a q u o t a t i o n from 
P i t t e n g e r e a r l i e r i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n showed, i s t o provide the i n i t i a l 
aim f o r each new occasion, thus seeking t h a t t h a t occasion might create 
i t s e l f according t o i t s h i g h e s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s . But as P i t t e n g e r also 
acknowledged i n t h a t q u o t a t i o n , r e l a t i n g the discussion t o the meaning 
of s i n , the new occasion need not a c t u a l i z e these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n 
the process o f s e l f - c r e a t i o n i t can choose t o r e j e c t God's i n i t i a l aim 
and thus modify i t s own s u b j e c t i v e aim. 
(d) God and i n i t i a l aim 
At the opening of t h i s s e c t i o n the p o i n t must be made t h a t one 
n o t two aims are under discussion. The i n i t i a l aim i s best understood 
as 'the i n i t i a l phase of each s u b j e c t i v e aim',(73) or the ' i n i t i a l 
s u b j e c t i v e aim'.(74) I t i s the means suggested by process thought by 
which God becomes i n v o l v e d w i t h the s u b j e c t i v e aim o f each a c t u a l e n t i t y . 
Indeed so close w i t h i n t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i t y i s the r e l a t i o n of God t o 
i n i t i a l aim t h a t sometimes Whitehead comes close t o equating them.(75) 
I t i s through ' i n i t i a l aim' t h a t Whitehead can speak of God c r e a t i n g 
the ' c r e a t i v i t y ' by which a novel concrescence, or new a c t u a l occasion, 
comes t o being. God o f f e r s the i n i t i a l push from which the process 
of s e l f - c r e a t i o n starts.(76) Thus Whitehead can say of God: 
(73) i b i d . , p. 406. 
(74) i b i d . , p. 287. 
(75) i b i d . , p. 286. 
(76) i b i d . , p. 286. 
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'He i s the l u r e f o r f e e l i n g , the e t e r n a l urge of d e s i r e . 
His p a r t i c u l a r relevance t o each c r e a t i v e a c t as i t 
a r i s e s from i t s own c o n d i t i o n e d standpoint i n the wo r l d , 
c o n s t i t u t e s him the i n i t i a l 'object o f d e s i r e ' e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the i n i t i a l phase of each s u b j e c t i v e aim.'(77) 
Thus the character of any new occasion i s c o n s t i t u t e d by 
prehensions from the a c t u a l w o r l d i n which i t i s s i t u a t e d and by the 
i n i t i a l c r e a t i v e impetus i t receives from God. How i t employs t h a t 
i n i t i a l aim w i l l depend upon i t s own s u b j e c t i v e aim, or how God's 
i n i t i a l aim has been received by previous occasions i n i t s r e l a t e d 
s e r i e s . Yet i t i s through ' i n i t i a l aim' t h a t God urges the c r e a t i v e 
process forwards i n t o n o v e l t y . Whitehead i s c l e a r t h a t 'the novel 
f e e l i n g s d e r i v e d from God are the foundations of progress',(78) and 
t h a t 'apart from the i n t e r v e n t i o n of God, there could be n o t h i n g new 
i n the world, and no order i n the wor l d ' ; indeed a p a r t from God 'the 
course o f c r e a t i o n would be a dead l e v e l of ineffectiveness'.(79) 
John Cobb i n a survey of the development of Whitehead's concept 
of God(8o) provides the background f o r understending how ' i n i t i a l aim' 
i s i n t e g r a l t o the process view of God. A b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s 
w i l l help t o c l a r i f y t h i s discussion. Cobb suggests t h a t i n 'Science 
and the Modern World' Whitehead f i n d s i t necessary t o p o s i t the 
metaphysical p r i n c i p l e of co n c r e t i o n or l i m i t a t i o n i n order t o account 
f o r the o r d e r l i n e s s of the world'.(8l) The cu l m i n a t i o n of the argument 
of t h i s book i s t h a t i t i s God who e f f e c t s t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , being 
h i m s e l f the ' P r i n c i p l e of Concretion'.(82) I n 'Relig i o n i n the Making' 
(77) i b i d . , p. 406. 
(78) i b i d . , p. 289. 
(79) i b i d . , p. 288. 
(80) John Cobb Jnr.: A C h r i s t i a n N a t u r a l Theology, London, L u t t e r w o r t h 
Press, 1966, pp. 135-175. 
(81) Whitehead: Science, p. 221. 
(82) i b i d . , p. 216. 
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Whitehead goes beyond t h i s i n i t i a l metaphysical statement by supplementing 
i t w i t h concepts drawn from r e l i g i o u s thought, thus enabling him t o be 
more p o s i t i v e about the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y . So he introduces the n o t i o n 
o f c r e a t i v i t y ( 8 3 ) and God i s seen as the one who harmonizes and thus 
d i r e c t s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of c r e a t i v i t y i n the universe. The t e c h n i c a l 
method by which Whitehead does t h i s i n t h i s book, i s t o p o s i t God as an 
'actual entity'(84) a l b e i t a very s p e c i a l one. Cobb comments t h a t by 
suggesting t h a t God i s an a c t u a l e n t i t y , and t h a t i n the advance o f 
c r e a t i v i t y , God i s seen as o f f e r i n g t o the w o r l d 'the v i s i o n of i d e a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y ' as an important f a c t o r i n the making of any new e n t i t y . ( 8 5 ) 
Yet the questions remain how does God d i r e c t c r e a t i v i t y ? , how does he 
make a v a i l a b l e t o each occasion i t s appropriate ideas? Cobb suggests 
t h a t Whitehead only answers t h i s when i n 'Process and R e a l i t y ' he 
presents the concept of ' i n i t i a l aim'. There he i n t r o d u c e d the idea o f 
' s u b j e c t i v e aim' by which a novel a c t u a l e n t i t y takes account both o f 
i t s predecessors and of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t are open t o i t and then 
b r i n g s i n t h a t o f ' i n i t i a l aim' which describes the nature and o r i g i n s 
of t h i s aim as being of God. 
Thus God i n process thought i s seen both t o b r i n g c r e a t i o n t o 
order through l i m i t a t i o n and t o encourage movement towards n o v e l t y and 
c r e a t i v i t y by p r o v i d i n g the i n i t i a l aim of any a c t u a l e n t i t y . God i s 
t h e r e f o r e described by Whitehead as 'the organ o f n o v e l t y , aiming a t 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n ' . ( 8 6 ) This God-given i n i t i a l aim operates through 
p r o f f e r r i n g a l u r e towards f u l f i l m e n t and s a t i s f a c t i o n . Each new occasion 
(83) Whitehead: R e l i g i o n , p. 114. 
(84) i b i d . , p. 146. 
(85) Cobb, o p . c i t . , p. 149. 
(86) Whitehead: Process, p. 83. 
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i s presented, w i t h a 'realm of pure p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' a l b e i t only such as 
are r e l e v a n t t o t h a t occasion's a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and environment. I n 
such terms c r e a t i v e movement towards n o v e l t y i s procured and y e t 
freedom i s maintained and the w o r l d remains s e l f - c r e a t i v e . As Whitehead 
says; 'each temporal e n t i t y ... derives from God i t s basic conceptual 
( i . e . i n i t i a l ) aim, r e l e v a n t t o i t s a c t u a l w o r l d , y e t w i t h i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n s 
a w a i t i n g i t s own decisions'.(87) 
The character of t h i s God-given aim must now be described and then 
the question of whether i t s d e n i a l c o n s t i t u t e s s i n , as P i t t e n g e r believes 
i t does, must be asked. 
(e) The nature of God's op e r a t i o n through aim 
John Cobb o f f e r s t h i s evocative d e s c r i p t i o n of the d i v i n e l y 
p r o f f e r e d aim, from, as i t were, the human viewpoint. 
'We are thus o f f e r e d a v i s i o n of something beyond ourselves 
and our past t h a t c a l l s us forward i n each moment i n t o a 
y e t u n s e t t l e d f u t u r e , l u r i n g us w i t h new and r i c h e r 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r our being. That something i s an ever-
changing p o s s i b i l i t y which impinges upon us as the r e l e v a n t 
i d e a l f o r each new moment. I t i s the power t h a t makes f o r 
n o v e l t y , c r e a t i v i t y and l i f e . I t s power i s t h a t of an 
i d e a l , a power which i s not coercive, but n o t , f o r t h a t 
reason, i n e f f e c t u a l . ' ( 8 8 ) 
Such a p i c t u r e i s consonant w i t h Whitehead's own view of God. I n a 
cele b r a t e d passage i n 'Process and R e a l i t y ' Whitehead dismisses those 
three t h e i s t i c views which he suggests have misl e d countless generations 
and stresses i n s t e a d the simple 'Galilean o r i g i n of C h r i s t i a n i t y ' . 
' I t does not emphasise the r u l i n g Caesar, or the r u t h l e s s 
m o r a l i s t or the unmoved mover. I t dwells upon the tender 
elements i n the wor l d , which slowly and i n quietness 
operate by lo v e ; and i t f i n d s purpose i n the present 
(87) i b i d . , p. 262. 
(88) John B. Cobb Jnr.: God and the World, P h i l a d e l p h i a , The 
Westminster Press, 1969, p. 55. 
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immediacy o f a kingdom not of t h i s world. Love n e i t h e r 
r u l e s , nor i s i t unmoved; also i t i s a l i t t l e o b l i v i o u s 
t o morals.'(89) 
Donald Sherburne's comment should be noted t h a t i n t h i s passage 
Whitehead i s ' i m p l i c i t l y r e f e r r i n g t o h i s d o c t r i n e of God as the 
source of s u b j e c t i v e aims'. 'God works slowly because there i s no 
compulsion upon an a c t u a l e n t i t y t o accept the p r o f f e r e d lure'.(90) 
I t i s i n such terms, then, t h a t Whitehead employs t h i s concept 
o f aim t o describe the f a c t and the character c f God's involvement i n 
the ongoing process of c r e a t i o n ; an involvement which guarantees 
maximum freedom w i t h i n the process f o r i t s s e l f - c r e a t i o n . F u r t h e r , 
there i s no evidence t h a t Whitehead ever went beyond t h i s usage. For 
him the concept of aim was r e s t r i c t e d t o c r e a t i v i t y . P i t t e n g e r , 
however, w h i l e r e c o g n i s i n g the concept as d e s c r i p t i v e of a dynamic view 
o f l i f e , develops i t i n such a way t h a t i t s negation can be i n t e r p r e t e d 
as s i n . P i t t e n g e r ' s d i s t i n c t i v e use of the concept, t h e r e f o r e , must be 
accorded a separate discussion. 
(5) P i t t e n g e r ' s use of the concept of aim 
P i t t e n g e r ' s development of the concept of aim can be accounted 
f o r i n three phases. F i r s t l y , although i n a few places he speaks of 
'the i n i t i a l aim given by God' t o 'each e n t i t y or occasion' i n response 
t o which t h a t e n t i t y 'achieves i t s own genuine s a t i s f a c t i o n ' ; ( 9 1 ) y e t 
h i s predominant use of the concept I s more generalized. I n s t e a d o f 
r e s t r i c t i n g the concept t o a c t u a l e n t i t i e s or t o the idea of c r e a t i v i t y , 
he speaks of i t as expressive o f God's i n t e n t i o n f o r the whole of a 
(89) o p . c i t . , p. 404. 
(90) Sherburne: o p . c i t . , p. 244. 
(91) C.R., p. 83. 
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l i f e . Thus he can w r i t e : 
'To each human l i f e God o f f e r s a purpose,, an i n t e n t i o n , 
a d i r e c t i o n t o f o l l o w ... p r o v i d i n g f o r each a c t u a l 
human l i f e i t s i n i t i a l aim; by accepting t h i s t h a t l i f e 
w i l l be able t o r e a l i z e i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . ' ( 9 2 ) 
The use of the synonyms 'purpose, i n t e n t i o n , d i r e c t i o n ' are evidence 
o f h i s generalized use of the aim concept. The p e c u l i a r use of the 
word ' a c t u a l ' r e l a t i v e t o 'human l i f e ' , (Whitehead uses i t of 'actual 
occasion') might be i n t e r p r e t e d as a camouflage f o r h i s broadening of 
process terms. By t h i s broadening he can equate God-given aim w i t h 
' v o c a t i o n a l lure'(93) as being the high e s t i n t e n t i o n f o r the f u l f i l m e n t 
o f any human l i f e . P i t t e n g e r also speaks of God's aim f o r human l i f e 
i n general. Again using a synonym f o r aim he can r e f e r t o , 'the basic 
God-given m o t i f ( s i c ) of man's l i f e ' , being t o ' r e a l i z e h i m s e l f , i n 
and w i t h and f o r h i s b r e t h r e n ... t o become the expressive agent f o r 
the deepest and high e s t lov e , God himself'.(94) 
By broadening the concept, however, beyond Whitehead's i n i t i a l 
n o t i o n he i s able the more r e a d i l y t o i n t e r p r e t i t i n terms of h i s 
theology. Thus secondly he r e l a t e s the broadened concept t o the work 
of the Logos. I n speaking of a s i n g l e i d e n t i c a l God-given aim presented 
t o every man, which he defines as the aim f o r a 'completely r e a l i z e d 
manhood w i t h the bre t h r e n and i n God', (95) he i s also able t o p o s i t 
t h a t i t i s 'the Logos who provides both the d i v i n e l y given p a t t e r n f o r 
f u l f i l m e n t and also the d r i v i n g power which awakens the response of the 
c r e a t i o n moving i t towards s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n as the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of 
(92) i b i d . , p. 139. 
(93) i b i d . , p. 143. 
(94) i b i d . , p. 54. 
(95) i b i d . , p. 58. 
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p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ' . ( 9 6 ) This i s the essence of h i s i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t 
emphasis. The character of the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y and i t s r e l a t i o n t o 
mankind, seeing God as love o p e r a t i n g through l u r e and s o l i c i t a t i o n 
and a l l o w i n g maximum human freedom, i s encapsulated f o r P i t t e n g e r w i t h i n 
the concept of aim. Further w i t h i n t h a t dynamic view o f God's 
involvement w i t h humanity there i s guaranteed f o r P i t t e n g e r h i s h i g h 
estimate o f the e s s e n t i a l d i g n i t y of man. Thus he can t r a n s l a t e the 
God-given aim i n terms of the imago d e i . 
'Man made ' i n the image of God', i s intended t o r e f l e c t 
i n c r e a t u r e l y love the 'Love which moves the sun and the 
other s t a r s ' when and as he loves - or ... when he f r e e l y 
consents t o l e t the cosmic love work through him as a 
p ersonalized agent - he i s on the way t o h i s r e a l i z a t i o n 
of p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t h a t concrete f u l f i l m e n t about which 
we have spoken. This i s man as God created him t o be, 
meant him t o be, wants him t o be.'(97) 
This q u o t a t i o n leads d i r e c t l y i n t o the t h i r d aspect of P i t t e n g e r ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f aim, namely t h a t 'man I s a t h r u s t f o r love who seeks 
f u l f i l m e n t i n l o v i n g and being loved, i n g i v i n g and r e c e i v i n g , and t h i s 
i n r i c h e s t community'.(98) I t i s the d i v i n e aim, i n words already 
quoted, t h a t any man should become 'the expressive agent f o r the 
deepest and h i g h e s t love, God h i m s e l f ' . Aim then becomes i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h love. The c o r o l l a r y of which i s t h a t i t s d e n i a l must c o n s t i t u t e 
s i n . For when man i s i n d e f e c t i o n from h i s t r u e aim of love,(99) and 
when 'as a l o v e r man i s both f r u s t r a t e d and also l i a b l e t o d i s t o r t i o n 
and t w i s t i n g ' , then t h i s ' i s h i s sin'.(100) 
I t should be noted here t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s d e f i n i t i o n of s i n i n 
(96) i b i d . , p. l l j . 
(97) Love i s the Clue, p. 47. 
(98) G.D., p. 94. 
(99) G.P., p. 60. 
(100) Time f o r Consent, p. 44. 
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terms of f a i l u r e t o f u l f i l the God-given aim o f l i f e not only covers 
a l l forms of human wrongdoing but also i s o f f e r e d as an explanation of 
the f a c t o f e v i l . P i t t e n g e r nowhere discusses any d i s t i n c t i o n between 
s i n and e v i l , and i n chapter f i v e i t w i l l be demonstrated t h a t whatever 
discu s s i o n he does o f f e r o f e v i l i s dependent upon the concept of aim. 
Pi t t e n g e r ' s use of the concept of aim, however, i s c l e a r l y an 
extension beyond Whitehead's suggestion t h a t God's involvement i n ongoing 
c r e a t i o n i s ch a r a c t e r i z e d by love. There i s no evidence t h a t Whitehead 
intended or would have countenanced such an extension as P i t t e n g e r 
makes. Nevertheless P i t t e n g e r ' s use of the concept of aim i s a major 
element i n h i s thought, and w i l l t h e r e f o r e play an important p a r t i n 
t h i s t h e s i s . 
P i t t e n g e r , i t was noted e a r l i e r , seeks t o f i n d a ' f i t ' between 
process thought and C h r i s t i a n theology. The concept of aim, a l b e i t 
m o d i f i e d beyond i t s o r i g i n a l usage, i s a major t o o l i n t h i s attempted 
' f i t ' , being important n ot only f o r h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f s i n but also f o r 
h i s C h r i s t o l o g y and understanding of s a l v a t i o n . Understanding aim i n 
a broad i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t sense, as a u n i v e r s a l God-given t h r u s t f o r 
l o v e , s a l v a t i o n w i l l be seen as the process whereby man i s r e s t o r e d t o 
h i s t r u e l o v i n g s e l f i n f e l l o w s h i p w i t h God and i n r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
h i s f e l l o w s . This w i l l be e f f e c t e d as men come i n t o communion w i t h 
C h r i s t , the one i n whom God's aim was f u l f i l l e d , the one i n whom the 
Logos was f u l l y o p e r a t i v e . 
I t i s here, i n C h r i s t o l o g y , t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
aim i n i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t terms i s a t i t s c l e a r e s t . For 'the I n c a r n a t i o n 
of God i n C h r i s t ' which i s 'our clue t o the nature of God and the 
purpose which he has i n h i s world', i s also 'our clue t o the d i v i n e l y -
intended nature of man ... t o the p o t e n t i a l i t y which by d i v i n e c r e a t i o n 
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i s implanted i n man'.(101) The various strands of P i t t e n g e r ' s 
thought, which w i l l be developed i n subsequent chapters, are h e l d 
together w i t h i n an i m p l i c i t concept o f aim, i n t e r p r e t e d i n 
i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t terms, i n t h i s q u o t a t i o n . 
'We need t o r e v i s e our d o c t r i n e of man so t h a t what 
c l a s s i c a l l y i s s t y l e d "the I n c a r n a t i o n " i l l u m i n a t e s 
human nature g e n e r a l l y as w e l l as describes Jesus C h r i s t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y . This w i l l mean t h a t d o c t r i n e s o f the 
atonement, f o r example, must be seen i n terms of t r u e 
"at-one-ment" where man, created t o be a l o v e r , i s given 
the capacity t o love and i s h i m s e l f a place where d i v i n e 
love i s ceaselessly a t work evoking some s o r t o f response 
i n l o v i n g a c t i v i t y . Man w i l l then be known as "co-creator" 
w i t h God, as Whitehead put i t only a few days before h i s 
death; t h i s i s man's d i g n i t y , h i s g l o r y , h i s purpose f o r 
existence.'(102) 
Before, however, moving on t o a study of P i t t e n g e r ' s C h r i s t o l o g y , 
which t h i s q u o t a t i o n leads i n t o , a few i n t e r i m comments w i l l be made 
about P i t t e n g e r ' s understanding of s i n . 
(6) Summary and Comments 
A summary of the two major sections of t h i s chapter i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t having r e j e c t e d any suggestion t h a t s i n i s endemic t o human nature 
P i t t e n g e r ' s a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o speak of man's f a i l u r e t o f u l f i l h i s God-
given aim; a f a i l u r e t o r e a l i z e h i m s e l f as the l o v e r God intends him t o 
be, a f a i l u r e t o be accounted f o r l a r g e l y by h i s s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n i n g . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n t o be drawn from t h i s , which w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a t e d i n 
the course of t h i s study, i s t h a t should a human being be brought i n t o 
a new s i t u a t i o n , both personal and s o c i a l , i n which love was supreme, 
then he would be enabled t o l i v e i n accordance w i t h h i s God-given aim. 
Stated thus P i t t e n g e r ' s understanding of s i n i s inadequate and 
(101) W.I., p. 243-
(102) W. N. P i t t e n g e r : 'Towards a More C h r i s t i a n Theology', R e l i g i o n 
i n L i f e , V o l . 36, 1967, p. 504. 
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naive. I t s inadequacy i s demonstrated by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i t 
seems t o be o b l i v i o u s t o the t r a g i c dimension of s i n . Despite h i s 
p r o t e s t a t i o n s t h a t he i n no way minimizes s i n or e v i l or i t s h o r r i f i c 
e f f e c t s i n the world(103) the impression h i s view o f s i n leaves i s of 
one w h o l l y u n r e l a t e d t o the r e a l world, wholly unconscious o f i t s 
t r a g i c power and e f f e c t i n the world. Even h i s simple pr e s u p p o s i t i o n 
t h a t a l l of l i f e i s purposive i s s t r a n g e l y u n r e l a t e d t o the r e a l world. 
These p r e l i m i n a r y observations must be expanded i n t o more d e t a i l e d 
c r i t i c i s m s . 
F i r s t l y h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t there must be 'a d r i v e or a t h r u s t 
or a dynamic i n human nature which cannot be f o r g o t t e n i f we hope 
a c c u r a t e l y t o describe what i t means t o be human', seems t o be 
unnecessarily harsh on those whose l i v e s have no sense o f the dynamic; 
the aged i n f i r m , the d e f i c i e n t , the s t a r v i n g , the deprived. No doubt 
P i t t e n g e r would respond t h a t h i s reference i s t o a t h r u s t of love which 
i s a p p l i c a b l e i n every s i t u a t i o n o f l i f e and t h e r e f o r e such c r i t i c i s m 
i s t o misunderstand h i s i n t e n t i o n . Not only, however, do I t h i n k such 
a c r i t i c i s m has substance but i t also demonstrates i n r e a l terms the 
d i f f e r e n c e between Whitehead's and P i t t e n g e r ' s use of the concept o f 
aim. Taking the example of an aged and chronic i n f i r m person, 
Whitehead's concept of aim would simply say t h a t a t each moment of t h a t 
person's d a i l y l i f e God presents an i d e a l f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n but only one 
which i s s t r i c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h a t person's s i t u a t i o n , a b i l i t y , 
environment and p h y s i c a l and mental c o n d i t i o n ; w i t h no sense t h a t 
f a i l u r e t o r e a l i z e t h a t aim could be considered s i n . P i t t e n g e r ' s 
broader a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept, however, i n terms of the f u l f i l m e n t 
(103) G.D., p. 21. 
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of God's purpose f o r love, not only Ignores the simple application of 
Whitehead's concept but i n so doing makes the whole idea at best 
inappropriate, at worst cruel, f o r those whose l i v e s cannot t r u l y be 
describable i n terms of thrust f o r love. There must be many m i l l i o n s 
i n the world whose l i f e ' s expectations are so circumscribed as to make 
Pittenger's description of human l i f e seem so unreal as to be callous. 
This conclusion i s confirmed when, secondly, the trag i c dimension 
of s i n i s considered; a dimension which affects both the victims and 
the perpetrators. I n respect of victims there are vast areas of human 
experience which t e s t i f y to the trag i c effects of human wrongdoing. 
History i s l i t t e r e d with the victims of war, oppression and persecution. 
The names Dachau, Belsen, the Gulag Archipelago and Hiroshima symbolize 
such horror i n t h i s century. Now although i n a l a t e r chapter Pittenger's 
understanding of how God overcomes e v i l i n the world w i l l be discussed 
there can be no doubt that part of the human tragedy i s that sin breeds 
sin. Something of outbreak of violence and urban g u e r i l l a warfare, 
f o r example i n Northern Ireland, the Middle East and South America, can 
be accounted f o r as the reaction of those who f o r years and generations 
have smarted under oppression. The victims of i n j u s t i c e have become so 
embittered that by t h e i r reaction sin gains new force. I t may be to 
parody Pittenger to say that the advice to an urban g u e r i l l a that he 
seek to f u l f i l the God-given aim of his l i f e and become a lover would 
be u t t e r l y naive, but that parody underlines the weakness of Pittenger's 
position. 
Further, though, there i s the deep tragedy of those who know 
t h e i r deeds have been e v i l . This i s a theme which has been the core 
of the tragedian's a r t through the centuries. I o f f e r three examples. 
F i r s t there might be the picture of Shakespeare's Lady Macbeth, semi-
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crazed, oppressed by the murders to which she has been party, i n a 
sleep-walking attempt to wash her hands of blood.(104) Secondly i n 
Dostoyevsky's novel with the s i g n i f i c a n t t i t l e 'Crime and Punishment', 
Raskolnikov's punishment l i e s i n his deepening alienation from himself 
a f t e r the murder of an old moneylender. His private torment reaches 
i t s climax when before surrendering himself to the authorities he 
confesses his g u i l t to Sonia, the g i r l who cares f o r him. 
'"Was i t the old hag I k i l l e d ? No, I k i l l e d myself, not 
the old hag. I did away with myself at one blow and for 
good. I t was the d e v i l who k i l l e d the old hag, not I . 
But enough. Enough, Sonia, enough! Leave me alone!" 
he suddenly shouted i n a spasm of black despair.'(105) 
Evidence of similar torment of the wrong-doer i s found i n a modern 
popular novel. I n John Brain's 'Room at the Top' Joe Lampton, the 
anti-hero, seduces the daughter of a wealthy factory owner and the 
marriage r e s u l t i n g from her pregnancy assures his entree to the Top. 
Meanwhile he also comes to know Alice, a married woman, and t h e i r 
relationship grows i n t o genuine love. Both a f f a i r s mature almost 
simultaneously. Shortly a f t e r Joe finishes t h e i r l i a i s o n , Alice gets 
drunk and i s k i l l e d when her car crashes at speed i n t o a w a l l , at a 
beauty spot where she and Joe had come to know each other. Joe 
recognises that she has died t r y i n g to escape the g r i e f he had brought 
her. The book ends with Joe l y i n g i n the road i n drunken remorse, 
crying, " I murdered Alice". To the assurance of his friends, "Nobody 
blames you", he rep l i e s , "Oh my God, that's the trouble".(106) 
(104) William Shakespeare: Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 1. 
(105) Pyodor Dostoyevsky: Crime and Punishment., Penguin Classics 
Edition translated by David Magarshack, London, Penguin Books, 
1951, P. 433-
(106) John Braine: Room at the Top, Paperback Edition, Penguin Books, 
London, 1959, P- 235. 
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These three examples i l l u s t r a t e the deep personal tragedy that 
can follow evildoing. This i s i n f i n i t e l y more than some f a i l u r e to 
f u l f i l a God-given aim and the exhortation to seek to become a lover and 
thus f u l f i l your aim would seem to be crass to such characters. Their 
actions were deeply irrevocable, i n one sense irredeemable, and t h i s 
they themselves recognised. Pittenger's view of sin seems f a r removed 
from the deep tragedy which sin breeds so often i n human experience 
and which these examples from f i c t i o n i l l u s t r a t e . 
Quite simply Pittenger's understanding of sin seems best suited 
to some ideal world, which t h i s world patently i s not. At t h i s point 
of the thesis one might wonder, granted that Pittenger's diagnosis of 
the human s i t u a t i o n i s r i g h t , why the Christian Church has l a i d such 
stress i n i t s worship and preaching upon the death of Jesus upon the 
Cross f o r the sins of the whole world. The Cross, indeed, seems to 
point to and h i g h l i g h t a tr a g i c dimension of human experience which 
Pittenger's system ignores. But i n order to see how Pittenger 
int e r p r e t s the Cross i t i s necessary f i r s t to examine his Christology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PITTENGER'S CHRISTOLOGY - THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST 
( l ) Introduction 
A strong emphasis on the humanity of Christ i s the mark of 
Pittenger's Christology, and only i n the l i g h t of that emphasis does 
he i n t e r p r e t his ' d i v i n i t y ' , with Jesus' difference or 'speciality' 
from other men being seen as a matter of 'degree' rather than of 'kind' 
I n the concept of 'aim' he finds a ready t o o l with which to explicate 
t h i s , f o r i t i s i n that Jesus f u l f i l l e d the God-given aim of l i f e that 
he i s distinguished from others who f a i l to do so. The corollary of 
t h i s f o r salvation i s that i t i s as people move, i n the fellowship of 
Christ, towards the r e a l i z a t i o n of God's aim f o r love that they w i l l 
know wholeness of l i f e . Thus Pittenger's stress on the 'genuine, 
complete, normal manhood of Jesus',(l) has essentially a so t e r i o l o g i c a l 
motive, fo r he fears that i f Jesus i s 'removed from the concrete human 
si t u a t i o n which we men share together', then he becomes 'irrelevant' to 
us.(2) He therefore i n s i s t s that the action of God seen i n Christ i s 
not i n contrast to 'that of God i n every man', e.nd he c r i t i c i z e s 
c l a s s i c a l theology f o r regarding his saving work as 'done to us rather 
than done i n us', thus making Jesus 'a strange v i s i t o r from some other 
sphere, rather than the victorious participant i n our human condition'. 
This f i n a l phrase encapsulates Pittenger's approach to Christology. 
Jesus i s the one who v i c t o r i o u s l y f u l f i l l e d l i f e ' s God-given aim and 
(1) C.R., p. 2. 
(2) i b i d . , p. J. 
(3) i b i d . , p. j5. 
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who enables others to move towards such f u l f i l m e n t . This approach 
requires a human Jesus. 
His emphasis on Jesus being t r u l y man i s confirmed by his 
opposition to a l l docetic tendencies i n Christology, i m p l i c i t ' i n much 
of the popular d i s l i k e f o r a strong emphasis on the t o t a l r e a l i t y of 
Jesus' humanity', which he finds p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst 'those who think 
of t h e i r view as r i g i d l y orthodox'.(4) He recognises that ' i t was 
perhaps inevitable that the overwhelming Christian experience of God 
made available to men i n Jesus would lead to a less vigorous insistence 
on the manhood which was h i s ' ; 
'yet the f a i l u r e to stress to the f u l l the r e a l i t y of 
that manhood, i n a l l i t s royal splendour and i n a l l i t s 
necessary l i m i t a t i o n , has led to an impoverishment of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y i n age a f t e r age. I t i s only w i t h i n the 
l a s t hundred years that the thinking of Christians has 
been able to give r i g h t value to that humanity.'(5) 
Reference here i s to advances i n Gospel c r i t i c i s m over the past century 
which, he implies, have made possible a clearer picture of the human 
Jesus. I t i s with a discussion of how Pittenger uses the Gospels that 
his description of Jesus' l i f e and ministry and i t s significance f o r 
his Christology must begin. 
(2) His approach to the Gospel narratives 
(a) The c r i t i c a l study of the Gospels 
I t was prima r i l y the 'Jesus of history' movement that made 
possible an unequivocal emphasis on Christ's humanity. Donald B a i l l i e 
says of i t : 
( k ) W.I., p. 8. 
(5) G.P., p. 31. 
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'The present s i t u a t i o n i n Christology i s one which could 
not have emerged before the 'Jesus of hist o r y ' movement, 
but only a f t e r i t ... I f the h i s t o r i c o - c r i t i c a l 
movement, wi t h i t s rediscovery of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus, 
l a i d a new and sometimes s t a r t l i n g emphasis on our Lord's 
humanity, and took i t more seriously than i t had ever 
been taken before i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Gospel 
story, the present tendency i s not to shrink back again 
from that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but to carry i t f u r t h e r s t i l l , 
to go a l l the way wit h i t . And not as a matter of 
unwelcome h i s t o r i c a l necessity, but as a matter of f a i t h , 
of theological t r u t h ...'(6) 
Now while Pittenger would agree wi t h B a i l l i e that the 'Jesus of history' 
movement began a process of thought which served to make the docetic 
positio n untenable, not least because i t started from the 'hard facts' 
of the human Jesus instead of from 'speculation and theories' about his 
d i v i n i t y , ( 7 ) yet he also i s c r i t i c a l of i t because, especially i n i t s 
more extreme guises, i t led to a theology which was 'far removed from 
the deepest insights of the Christian f a i t h ' , ( 8 ) namely that form of 
Liberal Protestantism which reduced C h r i s t i a n i t y to being i n essence, 
'the teaching of Jesus about God's Fatherhood and Man's brotherhood and 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i v i n g "eternally i n the midst of time"'.(9) Such 
a view Pittenger accuses of not being s u f f i c i e n t l y ' h i s t o r i c a l l y 
grounded' i n that an 'exaggerated insistence on the Jesus of history' 
excludes recognition of the h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y of ' f a i t h i n his 
person'.(10) Whereas he requires that 'interpretations of Jesus i n 
higher terms',(11) which f i n d expression i n the supernatural and 
miraculous elements i n the Gospels, should be recognised as h i s t o r i c a l 
data since they are a r e f l e c t i o n of 'the r e a l i t y of the continuing 
(6) D. M. B a i l l i e : God was i n Christ, London, Faber, 1948, pp 9-10. 
(7) W.I., p. 8. 
(8) i b i d . , p. 8. 
(9) i b i d . , p. 77. 
(10) i b i d . , p. 8. 
(11) i b i d . , p. 9-
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experience of his presence and power i n the l i f e of the Christian 
community'.(12) He finds support i n t h i s from the insights of 
Form-Criticism. 
He suggests that the most s i g n i f i c a n t conclusion obtained from 
the Form-Criticism of the Gospels i s that they are theological and 
kerygmatic documents w r i t t e n to evince f a i t h i n the l i v i n g Lord and 
not simply to present an account of the l i f e of Jesus; that 'our 
information concerning our Lord comes to us through the experience of 
the p r i m i t i v e Christian community'.(13) Thus the f a i t h of the Early 
Church i s seen as an important h i s t o r i c a l datum fo r any understanding 
of the person of Jesus. 
'Everything that we know about him i s mediated to us 
through the f a i t h - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p r i m i t i v e 
Christian community; and while t h e o r e t i c a l l y we may 
speak of the 'days of his f l e s h ' without any such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the t r u t h i s that t h i s 'uninterpreted' 
figure i s i n i t s detailed portrayal almost e n t i r e l y a 
figment of the c r i t i c ' s imagination.' (14) 
Yet t h i s does not mean that he regards the h i s t o r i c i t y of Jesus as 
i n s u b s t a n t i a l l y based, with t o t a l reliance being placed upon the Church's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Despite his own emphasis upon the Church as the vehicle 
f o r knowledge of Jesus he c r i t i c i z e s those who suggest that 'there i s 
nothing known about Jesus which has any v a l i d claim to being h i s t o r i c a l ' 
and that we must simply accept the Gospels as 'the Church's i n t e r p r e t a t i v e 
story of the figure whom i t worships'.(15) Such scepticism seems to 
Pittenger a mistaken use of Form-Criticism. For himself Form-Criticism 
has provided a ' d i f f e r e n t way of getting at the h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e ' which 
need not i n any way make 'the h i s t o r i c i t y of that figure questionable'. 
(12) i b i d . , p. 77-
(13) i b i d . , p. 49. 
(14) i b i d . , p. 9. 
(15) C.R., pp. 28f. 
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'We can only get at Jesus through the eyes of those who 
already believed i n him to be highly exalted as t h e i r 
risen Lord. But t h i s does not necessarily e n t a i l either 
that we must accept t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r mode of i n t e r p r e t i n g 
him or that we must r e j e c t any possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
him.'(16) 
So towards his understanding of the human Jesus, Pittenger seeks to 
hold together two strands which help him to establish the h i s t o r i c i t y 
of Jesus; f i r s t , there i s the experience of the Christian community, 
secondly, there i s the ascertainable h i s t o r i c i t y of the person of 
Jesus which can be discovered w i t h i n and beyond the Church's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of him found i n the Gospels. He c a l l s t h i s approach 
'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' . 
(b) Double h i s t o r i c i t y 
By t h i s device Pittenger seeks to maintain two truths about the 
human Jesus. F i r s t l y , i t makes i t possible to t a l k about Jesus as an 
h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e ; f o r he i s i n no doubt that i f any emphasis i s to be 
l a i d upon the humanity of Jesus then t h i s must be f i r m l y grounded i n 
the events of his t o r y , 'however uncertain we may be about the detai l s 
of that history', f o r unless one i s 'able to say something about his 
human l i f e at a given time and place the humanity claimed f o r him 
vanishes i n t o t h i n air'.(17) Secondly, double h i s t o r i c i t y gives grounds 
'for saying that Jesus was not simply an instance of manhood but that 
he was 'important' i n the ongoing l i f e of the human race'.(l8) 
Pittenger employs t h i s word 'importance', borrowed from Whitehead, to 
indicate the significance of Jesus both f o r the early Christian community 
and f o r his e f f e c t upon subsequent history. Jesus was thus a man but a 
(16) i b i d . , p. 29. 
(17) i b i d . , p. 22. 
(18) i b i d . , p. 25. 
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very special one whose l i f e has to be judged i n terms of his t o t a l 
impact. Both of these factors of h i s t o r i c i t y have, i n Pittenger's 
view, to be held together i f a complete understanding of Jesus i s to 
be gained. This i s his d e f i n i t i o n of h i s t o r i c i t y . 
'The word h i s t o r i c a l can mean at least two things. 
I t can mean that there was, as a matter of reasonable 
induction from the available evidence, such an 
h i s t o r i c a l event or person or act. I suppose that 
t h i s i s the commonly accepted sense of the word. 
But h i s t o r i c a l can also mean that the results of 
some supposed event, the precise deta i l s of which 
are not anything l i k e so clear as we might wish 
them to be, are such that they have been ploughed 
i n t o succeeding ages, r e s u l t i n g i n modified a t t i t u d e s , 
awakening new convictions, giving new insights i n t o 
how things go i n the world.'(19) 
Pittenger i n s i s t s that 'the Christian theologian must a f f i r m of Jesus 
of Nazareth both meanings of the term historical'.(20) Thus, on the 
one hand, 'Jesus did l i v e 1 and 'he was the kind of man' that 'the 
t o t a l impression' of the 'available evidence' portrays him to be'.(21) 
(What he means by t h i s w i l l be considered i n a moment.) Then, on the 
other hand, he i s also h i s t o r i c a l i n the sense that 'he has been 
remembered ... i n such a fashion that his impact upon the world has 
wrought enormous changes i n the attitudes which have been taken i n 
succeeding ages, i n the convictions about God and man and t h e i r 
r elationship which his existence has engendered'.(22) The medium f o r 
t h i s has been the Church, f o r borrowing a phrase from John Knox which 
w i l l be examined i n a l a t e r chapter, i t i s the task of the Church to 
'remember* Jesus. 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
i b i d . , pp. 24-25. 
i b i d 
i b i d . 
i b i d 
P. 25. 
P. 25. 
P. 25. 
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Now while Pittenger i s r i g h t to say that ' i t would be quite 
impossible ... to make assertions about the 'importance' of Jesus, 
i f we had no good reason to think that h i s t o r i c i t y i n our f i r s t sense 
did not apply to him',(23) yet he lays such emphasis upon the f a i t h -
experience of the Church and i t s task of remembrance that i t might be 
suspected that his double h i s t o r i c i t y i s a somewhat unbalanced device. 
Clearly f o r him the f a i t h of the Church i s a more s i g n i f i c a n t 
h i s t o r i c a l datum than the l i f e of Jesus, f o r without the former the 
l a t t e r would not be what i t i s . 
' I t i s the l i v i n g community alone which brings the f a c t 
of Jesus Christ before a l l succeeding generations of 
men. Without that community he would be an h i s t o r i c a l 
f i g u r e , but he would not be the figure that i n Christian 
experience he has been seen to be.'(24) 
This should be a recognised factor i n any reading of the Gospels. 
'The New Testament i t s e l f i s r i g h t l y read only when i t 
i s seen as the account of the way i n which the Jesus 
of h i s t o r y was apprehended i n the days of his fl e s h as 
prophet and perhaps 'more than a prophet', became the 
Christ of the Church's f a i t h through the event of the 
Resurrection, and through the continuing communion of 
the disciples and others w i t h him, now risen, experienced 
i n the early days of the Christian community.'(25) 
I t i s thus by a process of accounting f o r and removing those elements 
i n the Gospels which r e f l e c t 'heightening' due to the apologetic and 
evangelistic concerns of the early Church and which describe the 
importance of Jesus i n the mythological thought forms of the f i r s t 
century, that he i s able to detect 'the over-all impression (of Jesus) 
which the Gospels convey',(26) and upon which h i s stress on the 
humanity of Jesus depends. The operation of t h i s p r i n c i p l e w i l l be 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
i b i d . , p. 26. 
W.I., p. 78. 
i b i d . , p. 78. 
C.R • > P. 31. 
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noted i n subsequent pages. However, by making the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus 
wholly dependent on the experience of the Church, while at the same 
time stressing that the human Jesus, however l i t t l e may be known about 
him, i s v i t a l l y important, Pittenger could be accused of wanting to have 
his cake and eat i t . Yet perhaps t h i s device of 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' 
should be recognised as a genuine attempt to hold together both the 
f a i t h of the Church and the f a c t of Jesus, against tendencies that would 
lay exclusive stress on one or the other. The whole tenor of Pittenger's 
theological approach would lead one to suspect that he would tend 
towards a good deal of scepticism about the de t a i l s of the l i f e of 
Jesus, and although i n subsequent pages his picture of Jesus w i l l be 
shown to be a heavily reduced one, yet he holds back from t o t a l 
scepticism p r i m a r i l y because he recognises that any stress upon the 
humanity of Jesus must be dependent upon some knowledge of the 
h i s t o r i c a l Jesus. 'Double h i s t o r i c i t y ' might thus be seen as the 
boundary that Pittenger erects to prevent excessive scepticism about 
the human Jesus. Indeed the residual picture of Jesus that emerges 
a f t e r the operation of t h i s p r i n c i p l e f i t s neatly i n t o Pittenger's 
theological scheme. Pittenger i s thus enabled to speak of Jesus having 
a strong sense of mission r e l a t i v e to the coming of God's kingdom, 
which he i s able to translate i n terms of the f u l f i l m e n t of his l i f e ' s 
aim. 
Despite, however, my contention that t h i s 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' 
i s unbalanced, that the f a i t h of the Church i s clear l y f o r Pittenger 
the more s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r i c a l datum and that the picture of Jesus he 
presents i s a much reduced one, a f t e r the heightened Gospel elements 
have been accounted f o r , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that one c r i t i c i s m 
that i s l a i d against him i s that he lays too much emphasis on the 
h i s t o r i c a l f i gure. I n a l a t e r chapter, John Knox, whose scepticism 
6o. 
about the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus i s more marked than Pittenger's, w i l l be 
quoted as saying that Pittenger lays s i g n i f i c a n t l y less stress upon 
the Church than he does himself. I t w i l l then be suggested that t h i s 
might be accounted f o r as r e s u l t i n g from the approach described by 
Pittenger as 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' , which, i n a somewhat clumsy manner, 
seeks both to stress the Church's role and also emphasize the h i s t o r i c a l 
f i g u r e . I t i s then to the p o r t r a i t of Jesus discovered beyond the 
application of t h i s device of 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' that we now turn. 
(3) Pittenger's p o r t r a i t of Jesus 
This i s Pittenger's description of Jesus' l i f e , gleaned from 
the 'over-all impression' the Gospels convey. 
'He went about doing good; he preached, taught, healed, 
l i v e d i n such a manner that many were drawn to him; he 
boldly announced the coming of God's kingdom of j u s t i c e 
and of love; he was f i n a l l y brought to the end which the 
gospels describe: arrest, t r i a l , and c r u c i f i x i o n . And 
he was believed by those who had companied wi t h him, and 
l a t e r by thousands of others, to have been raised from 
among the dead; the conviction i s w r i t t e n p l a i n l y over 
a l l the material and no matter how we may f e e l impelled 
to understand the mode of the resurrection the f a c t 
of the p r i m i t i v e b e l i e f that he was ' l e t loose i n t o the 
world' ... i s e n t i r e l y unquestionable.'(27) 
Although i n that quotation the two aspects of double h i s t o r i c i t y can 
be detected, the Christian experience of the Resurrection i s c l e a r l y 
regarded as 'determinative of the whole New Testament picture of 
Christ',(28) and so before any deta i l s about the l i f e and ministry of 
Jesus can be discussed the heightened elements of the story which 
betray the concerns of the Church have to be accounted f o r . 
(27) i b i d . , p. 31. 
(28) W.I., p. 52. 
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(h) Pittenger's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 'heightened' elements i n 
the Gospels 
Speaking of these 'heightened' elements Pittenger quotes with 
approval these words of Bethune-Baker from his 'Way of Modernism': 
'To dismiss these stories of Christ's miracles, the 
v i r g i n a l conception, and the empty tomb as worthless, 
when we are seeking a true valuation of Jesus and the 
whole experience of which he was the centre, i s to 
shut one's eyes to some of the b i t s of evidence we have 
about him and the impression he produced.'(29) 
That t h i s i s also Pittenger's understanding i s clear, as i t i s quite 
consistent with his general approach. Stories associated w i t h the 
N a t i v i t y , the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus he categorizes as 
'legend'; by which he means; 
'... tales t o l d about an h i s t o r i c person or event, w i t h 
the i n t e n t i o n (perhaps never consciously formulated as 
such) of heightening the testimony to the significance 
which t h i s person or event i s believed to possess.'(30) 
I t i s not necessary to investigate these events of the l i f e of Christ 
i n any d e t a i l ; rather what i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r t h i s study i s Pittenger's 
general approach to them, recognising as he does the significance of 
the experience of the Church i n them. Although, f o r example, Pittenger 
would allow himself a good deal of scepticism as to j u s t how much 
h i s t o r i c a l f a c t l i e s behind the B i r t h stories, yet he believes they are 
important f o r Christological thought because 'they are ind i c a t i v e of 
the high valuation which early Christians placed upon the person of 
Christ and t h e i r conviction that he was not tc be explained solely i n 
terms of human perfection - God was supremely and specially involved i n 
the l i f e of t h e i r Lord'.(31) He treats the V i r g i n a l Conception i n a 
(29) i b i d . , p. 53. 
(30) i b i d . , p. 68. 
(31) i b i d . , p. 66. 
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s i m i l a r way. Believing that 'Christology does not demand or imply the 
conception of Jesus without human paternal co-operation', he prefers 
to think of t h i s story as 'poetic and imaginative, rather than 
h i s t o r i c a l l y (and b i o l o g i c a l l y ) veridical',(32) seeking to express the 
high significance of Jesus. This same approach i s applied to the 
narratives of the Empty Tomb. Pittenger speaks of them as 'carriers 
f o r the pr i m i t i v e Christian community's conviction' that Jesus who had 
l i v e d and who had been c r u c i f i e d , 'was alive again w i t h his disciples'.(33) 
Yet while f o r Pittenger the stories of the Empty Tomb are not of absolute 
significance the Resurrection i s central to the Christian f a i t h . 
'On the basis of New Testament evidence we must say that 
the Christian f a i t h includes at i t s heart the assertion 
that Jesus, though he died, i s yet alive f o r ever more; 
and that he i s a l i v e , not i n some vague sense of 
survival of the soul a f t e r death, but i n the f u l l e s t 
and richest sense possible - namely, i n the whole 
i n t e g r i t y of his human nature as well as i n the 
d i v i n i t y which i s his by v i r t u e of his intimate and 
'personal' relationship of that human nature with God.'(34) 
The important point to be noted here i s that Pittenger takes the 
humanity of Christ deep i n t o the Resurrection, which he in t e r p r e t s as 
the a f f i r m a t i o n that i n Christ, i n v i r t u e of his relationship with God, 
there i s seen l i f e which not even death can conquer. Indeed the 
believer's relationship ' i n Christ' makes t h i s l i f e available to them. 
'That Jesus i s a l i v e , i n the f u l l i n t e g r i t y of his 
divine-human personality, that he i s both 'with God' 
and 'with men', and that he energizes i n his disciples: 
these assertions are essential to the Christian f a i t h ... 
our present relationship with him i s i t s e l f an entrance 
i n t o his own risen l i f e , f o r as the believer responds to 
him i n f a i t h , love, and worship, Christ gives him the 
power to share i n his own l i f e w ith God."(35) 
(32) 
03) 
04) 
05) 
i b i d . , p. 66. 
i b i d . , p. 67. 
i b i d . , p. 68. 
i b i d . , p. 69. 
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This view i s confirmed by Pittenger's view of the Ascension. The 
significance of t h i s narrative which he regards as legend i s that; 
'The Lord, known i n f a i t h and risen from the dead, i s 
with God and of God. His S p i r i t and his l i f e , h i s 
very s e l f , are regnant at the centre of a l l things. 
As Jesus Christ l i v e d i n our humanity as a true man, 
so humanity i s enthroned i n Godhead: God knows human 
l i f e and shares i n human experience i n and through 
that relationship with manhood established i n Christ, 
shown to be indestructible by his r i s i n g from the dead, 
and now 'throned' with God i n heavenly places.'(56) 
By thus understanding the 'heightened' elements of the Gospels Pittenger 
seeks to safeguard the humanity of Jesus. He rejects any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the miraculous as evidence of the divine at work i n Christ's l i f e 
overturning natural laws since such would im p e r i l Christ's humanity. 
'The Incarnation neither demands nor implies 'miracle' 
i n the vulgar sense of the disruptive v i o l a t i o n of the 
r e l a t i v e l y s e t t l e d order of nature which i s God's way 
of working i n the world.'(57) 
Thus he concludes: 
'The humanity of Jesus i s t r u l y human; and to h i s t o r i c a l 
study, i n i t s s t r i c t sense, he yields nothing but 
humanity ... The works of healing which he performed are 
the work of a man, related to God as intimately as man can 
be related; they are not contradictions of the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of human nature.'(58) 
Various aspects of the l i f e and ministry of Jesus the man must now be 
considered. 
(5) The l i f e and ministry of Jesus 
Pittenger discerns the l i f e of Jesus only w i t h i n the context of 
normal human, social, c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s conditioning. I f he i s 
t r u l y human he must be a man of a specific time, place and culture. 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
i b i d . , p. 69. 
i b i d . , p. 184. 
i b i d . , pp. 117-118. 
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Thus Pittenger emphasizes his Jewishness. 
'Whatever may have been d i f f e r e n t about him, h i s Jewishness 
- and that the Jewishness appropriate to someone l i v i n g 
there and then - i s an unquestionable fa c t . What he 
taught, how he looked at the world, his conception of God, 
and the l i k e , did not have about i t the sort of 
o r i g i n a l i t y which might be supposed i f he had appeared 
as a b o l t from the blue. A l l of i t i s set i n the context 
of the Judaism of his age. Jesus' o r i g i n a l i t y , which i s 
cert a i n l y marked, was of another sort.' ( 3 9 ) 
This o r i g i n a l i t y he finds exemplified by Jesus' references to the 
Kingdom of God. He shared with his contemporaries 'those eschatalogical 
ideas concerning the Kingdom and i t s manner of coming which are commonly 
summed up under the heading of "apocalyptic"'; meaning the hope that 
the Kingdom would come w i t h i n the near future. Pittenger stresses that 
'the "residual" picture of Jesus' i n the Gospels ' i s of a man who 
conceived his mission to be the announcement of the imminent coming of 
the Kingdom of God'.(40) This was the underlying theme of his preaching, 
teaching and miracles. Against n a t i o n a l i s t i c views of the Kingdom, he 
spoke of the coming of the 'reign of God, which would replace the 
kingdoms of t h i s world, marked as they were by a s i n f u l defection from 
God's w i l l ' . ( 4 1 ) 
Further Jesus was the ' l i v i n g embodiment of a l l that he taught 
and did'. I n his l i f e there was expressed 'submission to the w i l l of 
God, acceptance of God's kingly r u l e , and ... the f a i t h , hope and love 
which would mark the Kingdom when i t came'.(42) Pittenger stresses 
also that the 'general impression' of Jesus i n the Gospels shows that 
he regarded himself not only as the bearer of Good's message but also 
(39) C.R., p. 35. 
(40) i b i d . , p. 35-
(41) W.I., p. 60. 
(42) i b i d . , p. 61. 
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as the instrument of i t s working. He speaks of 'the indubitable 
h i s t o r i c i t y of Jesus' sense of divine vocation and his statement, both 
i n word and deed, of the demand which God makes f o r ra d i c a l obedience'. 
This i s perhaps Pittenger's f u l l e s t Statement of Jesus' consciousness 
of his vocation: 
'There seems no doubt that he f e l t himself to be the 
central actor i n a great drama which would usher i n the 
coming Kingdom. God had sent him to undertake t h i s 
role and he f u l f i l l e d i t to the end, even when i t became 
apparent to him that the w i l l of God f o r the achieving 
of t h i s end involved his own submission to death as the 
supreme act which would have i t s essential place i n 
establishing the Kingdom - the act f o r which, on the 
one hand, God waited, and which, on the other hand, he 
had ordained as a necessary part i n the accomplishment 
of t h i s purpose of making his Kingdom a r e a l i t y i n the 
a f f a i r s of men.'(44) 
This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Jesus with the Kingdom of God even to the Cross 
Pittenger r i g h t l y asserts i s found deep i n the New Testament. Although 
he i s unwilli n g to define Jesus' self-consciousness, believing that the 
Gospel records do not provide s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r such an enterprise 
yet he i s sure that the 'general impression' i s of one whose task was to 
bring about the f u l f i l m e n t of God's purpose and the establishment of 
his kingly rule among men',(45) and t h i s included 'obedience to the 
point of death'.(46) 
This picture of Jesus as being dedicated to God's w i l l and purpose 
i s an important element i n Pittenger's Christology because i t provides 
corroboration f o r his suggestion, which w i l l be discussed more f u l l y 
l a t e r , that Jesus actualized the God-given aim of l i f e , which i s the 
furtherance of the divine w i l l of love. 
(45) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
C.R., p. J6. 
W.I., p. 61 . 
i b i d . , p. 6 l n . 
G.P P. 35-
(6) Some furt h e r implications of Jesus' humanity 
I t i s a basic p r i n c i p l e of Pittenger's insistence on the f u l l 
humanity of Jesus that he l i v e d 'a human l i f e under the same human 
conditions as face any one of us';(47) meaning that he was subject to 
hunger, t h i r s t , disease, tiredness, physical stimulation and a l l other 
natural concomitants of the human condition. This also means that he 
grew to maturity physically, emotionally and mentally according to the 
normal human time scale. Now although Pittenger accepts that few i f 
any theologians today would quarrel with t h i s insistence on the maturing 
physical humanity of Jesus, since the docetic heresy which speaks of 
Jesus only 'assuming the appearance of manhood' has long since been 
rejected, yet he i s not so sure that the more subtle docetic tendency 
which accepts 'the humanity of Jesus so f a r as his physical body i s 
concerned but hesitates at allowing to him a 'genuine human centre of 
personality' does not s t i l l have support'.(48) Pittenger himself 
believes that i t i s important to i n s i s t on the f u l l r e a l i t y of Jesus' 
human psyche;(49) i n which he would include the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
knowledge f o r a man of his time, the natural development of his mental 
and emotional capacities and the growth of his consciousness. Possibly 
Pittenger's most detailed statement of t h i s position i s when he quotes 
the following from John Knox: 
'The r e a l l y authentic marks (of Jesus' humanity) must be 
found i n his consciousness. Unless he had a human 
consciousness, he was not a man. I f he did not think 
and f e e l , about himself and others, as a man does; i f 
he did not take man's l o t f o r granted as being 
intimately, e n t i r e l y and irrevocably his own; i f he did 
(47) i b i d . , p. 24. 
(48) C.R., p. 22. 
(49) i b i d . , p. 35. 
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not share at the very deepest levels of his conscious 
and subconscious l i f e , i n our human anxieties, 
perple x i t i e s , and loneliness; i f his joys were not 
characteristic human joys and his hopes, human hopes; 
i f his knowledge of God was not i n every part and 
under every aspect the kind of knowledge which i t i s 
given to man, the creature, to have - then he was not 
a true human being, he was not made man, and the 
Docetics were essentially right.'(50) 
The necessity of i n s i s t i n g upon the human consciousness of Jesus i s 
brought out i n Pittenger's comments on H. M. Helton's 'A Study i n 
Christology' (London, S.P.C.K., 1917). Pittenger here outlines 
Relton's doctrine of 'enhypostasia': 
'The essence of t h i s theory i s that the personal centre 
of the l i f e of Jesus Christ as the incarnation of God 
i s to be found not i n his humanity, but i n the Divine 
Word who i s incarnate tiere. Dr. Relton i n s i s t s that 
the humanity of Jesus must be f u l l and r e a l ; and he 
also i n s i s t s that i t must have a proper 'centring' i n 
a personal ego. But whereas i n men generally t h i s 
'centring' i s i n a human hypostasis or person, i n the 
incarnate Lord the humanity i s given i t s personal 
centre by the Word who takes to himself the human 
nature i n and through which he l i v e s among men.'(51) 
There i s no doubt that t h i s doctrine of enhypostasia means that the 
manhood of Jesus has no independent personality of i t s own but that 
i t receives i t by i t s assumption by the Logos. Enhypostasia seeks to 
maintain the humanity of Christ by i n s i s t i n g that the human a t t r i b u t e s 
were not l o s t but rather included w i t h i n the hypostasis of the Godhead. 
Yet i n spite of Relton's i n t e n t i o n of aff i r m i n g the f u l l humanity of 
Jesus and of avoiding anhypostasia, the danger i s c l e a r l y present. 
Pittenger points t h i s out. 
(50) W.I., p. 10 - John Knox: The Death of Christ, London, Collins, 
1959, P. 71. 
(51) W.I., p. 100. 
'While i t i s said that t h i s theory does not i n any sense 
deny the f u l l humanity of Jesus, some of those who accept 
i t have realized that an inevitable corollary of the 
doctrine i s anhypostasia, or impersonality, so f a r as the 
humanity i s concerned. That i s to say, the human nature 
of Jesus i n f a c t must lack any s t r i c t l y human personal 
centre.'(52) 
Pittenger w i l l have none of t h i s , i n s i s t i n g that Jesus must 'possess a 
human centring such as i s common to the rest of us'.(53) Indeed 
Pittenger goes beyond t h i s and int e r p r e t s hypostasis as a centre of 
human experience. This point of view, however, i s questioned by John 
Mclntyre, who i s j u s t as aware of the f a i l i n g s of enhypostasia. 
' i t would perhaps be a l i t t l e too premature to follow too 
closely Pittenger's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of hypostasis as the 
centre of human experiences; f o r ... i t i s not immediately 
j u s t i f i a b l e to translate what i s a s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l concept 
i n t o psychological terminology.'(54) 
This c r i t i c i s m evoked the following reply from Pittenger: 
'He f a i l s to see that precisely because I refuse to 
i n t e r p r e t the Fathers'.' use of the term hypostasis as 
si g n i f y i n g such a centre of human experiences (which 
would be to misinterpret them) yet argue that we today 
are bound to i n t e r p r e t i t i n precisely that fashion. 
I found i t impossible to accept either an anhypostatic 
(no human hypostasis) or an enhypostatie (the only 
hypostasis of the human nature i s i n the divine 
hypostasis) christology. I n such a christology, f o r us 
today, our Lord would have no human centring or would 
f i n d that centring of his human experiences i n the 
divine word - and that would mean, i n the l i g h t of our 
way of seeing human personality and. human nature and 
human existence, a l l three, that he was not f u l l y human 
at all.'(55) 
I t i s clear from t h i s discussion that when Pittenger speaks of the 
humanity of Jesus that he means a human personality w i t h i n a human 
(52) i b i d . , p. 100. 
(53) i b i d . , p. 100. 
(54) John Mclntyre: The Shape of Christology, London, S.C.M., 1966, 
P. 97-
(55) C.R., p. 43f. 
psycho-physical organism. Some further implications of t h i s must now 
be l i s t e d . 
F i r s t l y , Pittenger stresses that Jesus' knowledge could not have 
been more than was available to any man l i v i n g i n Palestine i n the 
f i r s t century. His awareness of events, his fund of information were 
s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . He was conditioned by the thought-forms and belief s 
of his day. As an instance of t h i s Pittenger mentions Jesus' b e l i e f 
that emotional and mental disorders were due to demonic possession.(56) 
Secondly, l i k e any other human being, Jesus must have developed towards 
maturity i n every aspect of l i f e over a normal time scale. Pittenger's 
use of the process conceptuality requires that he views any human being, 
Jesus included, as a developing creature i n a process of becoming. When 
a l i f e i s viewed as a 'routing of occasions' and experiences are seen as 
i t s basic ingredients, then development towards maturity i s the natural 
concomitant.(57) So the t h i r d conclusion Pittenger draws from t h i s i s 
that Jesus' s p i r i t u a l and moral understanding were also the products of 
a process of maturing. Thus, f o r example, his awareness of a special 
commission to usher i n God's kingdom must have developed during his 
maturing years, with several moments of special s p i r i t u a l i n s i g h t as 
occasions w i t h i n that process. Pittenger suggests that the Gospels 
provide evidence 'of the fa c t that Jesus did not come to his acceptance 
of vocation without a struggle'.(58) The Temptation story he sees as 
an example of t h i s and he interprets the agony i n Gethsemane as a 
'poignant testimony to some memory w i t h i n the p r i m i t i v e community that 
the figure i n whom they reposed t h e i r f a i t h had not found i t easy to 
(56) i b i d . , p. 38. 
(57) i b i d . , p. 47. 
(58) i b i d . , p. 37. 
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accept the vocation which l e d him to death'.(59) I t should be 
commented, however, that these Gospel narratives are susceptible of 
alter n a t i v e interpretations. I would suggest that the Temptation 
narrative i s descriptive of a Jesus who though sure of his divine 
vocation had at the beginning and indeed throughout his ministry to 
counter subtle and plausible attempts to lure him from what he recognised 
to be his true path; as H. E. W. Turner describes the Temptation, 'an 
inner wrestling with wrong ways of f u l f i l l i n g His Messianic Call';(60) 
while I would suggest that the agony i n the Garden i s expressive of 
Jesus' genuine human f r a i l t y . While maintaining his submission to God's 
w i l l , he realized that the moment of t e r r i b l e ordeal was upon him. 
Pittenger's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these passages i s altogether too slanted 
towards his theological presuppositions. 
The four t h point he makes i s the corollary of a l l t h i s , namely 
that Jesus did not have some automatic goodness, but rather the q u a l i t y 
of goodness which marked his l i f e 'had to be acquired'(6l) as he 
matured. Here his antithesis to docetism i s at i t s plainest. He i s 
not saying that Jesus once was bad and then improved, rather he i s 
making a Christological point against those who would speak of Jesus 
as being perfect because God was i n him. He i s asserting that l i k e any 
other human being i t was as Jesus developed physically and mentally 
that his moral awareness also grew, though f o r him t h i s was sharpened 
by his simultaneous growing awareness of a special vocation to make 
God's rule e f f e c t i v e i n the world. Of course the s c r i p t u r a l evidence 
(59) i b i d . , p. 37. 
(60) H. E. W. Turner: Jesus Master and Lord, London, Mowbray, 1953, 
p. 99-
(61) C.R., p. 37. 
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f o r such an estimate of Jesus i s scanty. He presents i n evidence the 
meeting of Jesus with the Syro-Phoenician woman i n St. Mark Ch. 7 
vs. 24-30, and i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t version i n St. Matthew Ch. 15 
vs. 21-28, both f o r Jesus' personal moral maturing and his growing 
awareness of the implications of his ministry. Jesus' f i r s t ungracious 
reaction describing the Gentiles as dogs and implying that 'salvation 
i s f o r Jews only'; a reaction l a t e r repented when 'confronted by human 
despair, moved by human need and even ... attracted by the w i t of the 
mother's response'; i s evidence f o r Pittenger that Jesus himself had to 
learn that 'salvation has a wider sweep' than j u s t the Jews and also 
that his response to human need was not automatic'.(62) However, despite 
i n the same context suggesting that 'we do not need to make of the story 
a psychological account portraying i n t e r n a l development i n Jesus' mind 
or feelings', Pittenger seems to come perilously close to that. Further, 
despite his preference f o r the 'over-all impression' of Jesus to be 
found i n the Gospels, which would preclude any p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
psychological portrayal of Jesus, Pittenger does seem to lay undue 
emphasis upon every d e t a i l of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r story. I n t h i s I think 
he i s g u i l t y of a piece of exegetical special pleading which i s i n -
consistent with his general understanding of -the Bible. This, however, 
i s i t s e l f a s i g n i f i c a n t piece of evidence about Pittenger's Christology; 
namely that he i s at pains to stress that i n every respect Jesus was a 
man l i k e other men. Whatever might be said about Jesus' distinctiveness 
must be said s t r i c t l y w i t h i n that context and without prejudice to i t . 
This w i l l become clearer as the various strands of t h i s chapter are 
drawn together i n a consideration of the 'Sinlessness of Jesus', wi t h 
(62) i b i d . , p. 37-
72. 
which t h i s chapter w i l l close. 
(7) The Sinlessness of Jesus 
Five preliminary points which indicate the nature of Pittenger's 
opposition to the idea of the 'Sinlessness of Jesus' w i l l be made. 
F i r s t , Pittenger's approach to the Gospel narratives means that 
he considers i t impossible 'to demonstrate from the available material 
that Jesus was absolutely sinless',(63) i n the sense that at no time i n 
his l i f e had he ever performed a wrong action or cherished an unworthy 
thought. The kerugmatic nature of the Gospels and the 'vast areas of 
Jesus' l i f e about which we know nothing at all', ( 6 4 ) preclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of making any h i s t o r i c a l l y satisfactory statement about 
whether Jesus did or did not commit actions that could be deemed s i n f u l . 
I t i s not possible to argue from silence either way.(65) 
Secondly, Pittenger suspects any doctrine of the sinlessness of 
Christ of being docetic. To expect that every action, word and thought 
of Jesus was perfect i s , to Pittenger, tantamount to believing that 
'Jesus l i v e d , acted and spoke i n a non-human manner altogether';(66) 
such a sinless Jesus would be 'too s p i r i t u a l , too i d e a l , too inhuman, 
too unnatural'.(67) (Pittenger i s here meaning sin i n i t s more usual 
senses and not according to his reinterpretation.) 
Thirdly, emphasis on the humanity of Jesus requires the recognition 
that he shared i n a l l the deficiencies of the human s i t u a t i o n . 'He 
could not have been human had he not done so: he would have been inhuman 
(63) i b i d . , p. 55. 
(64) i b i d . , p. 55-
(65) i b i d . , p. 55. 
(66) i b i d . , p. 6l. 
(67) i b i d . , p. 61. 
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i f he had not been exempted, automatically so to say, from that kind 
of participation 1.(68) Two considerations follow from t h i s . F i r s t l y , 
r e c a l l i n g Pittenger's 'sociological' view of sin, Jesus' p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the human s i t u a t i o n meant that h i s l i f e and outlook were to a large 
extent 'socially conditioned by v i r t u e of his l i v i n g i n that time and 
place'.(69) That, f o r example, he shared the attitudes and prejudices 
of the 'narrow Judaism' i n which he was brought up i s shown, Pittenger 
believes, i n the story of his encounter with the Syro-Phoenician 
woman.(70) But, i t should be noted, Pittenger does not regard such 
conditioning as making Jesus s i n f u l . Recalling his d e f i n i t i o n of s i n 
he would say that although t h i s conditioning might and probably did 
involve Jesus i n less than f u l l y worthy actions or sentiments yet t h i s 
did not of i t s e l f e n t a i l that the 'aim' of his l i f e was d i s t o r t e d or 
subjected to variation'.(71) The second point r e l a t i n g to Jesus' f u l l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the human condition concerns the question of his being 
tempted to sin. Simply stated Pittenger, following John Knox, believes 
t h a t any admission that Jesus was tempted undermines any possible t a l k 
of his sinlessness. The very f a c t of temptation on t h i s view presupposes 
the presence of sin. Temptation would mean the submission, perhaps only 
momentarily, to the allurement and enticement of the p a r t i c u l a r s i n , but 
s u f f i c i e n t to make the idea of sinlessness inapplicable to someone who 
has known temptation. As John Knox writes: 
(68) i b i d . , p. 57. 
(69) i b i d . , p. 57-
(70) i b i d . , p. 55. 
(71) i b i d . , p. 57. 
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' i s not si n the presupposition and precondition of 
temptation even when our resistance or God's grace keeps 
i t from being, i n overt act, i t s consequence? Am I 
r e a l l y tempted i f I do not, however b r i e f l y or 
te n t a t i v e l y ... consent? ... Can we think of Jesus as 
tempted - and moreover tempted i n a l l respects as we 
are - and yet as not knowing from w i t h i n the e x i s t e n t i a l 
meaning of human sinfulness?'(72) 
Temptation here c l e a r l y i s not thought of as coming from without, but 
i s the working of the person's own mind through conscious or subconscious 
desires and as such the tendency to sin which i s part of human 
conditioning i s presupposed. Thus i n that Jesus knew temptation his 
'sinlessness' i s called i n question yet his complete p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the human s i t u a t i o n , including those aspects of human conditioning which 
would be characterized as tending to e v i l , i s affirmed. Talk of the 
human Jesus must include the recognition that he knew 'the presence of 
e v i l i n the human heart and the poignant r e a l i t y of temptation'.(73) 
As Pittenger says, the admission that Jesus shared 'the human condition 
as i t a ctually exists' means that he shared 'in a s i t u a t i o n characterized 
by sin and i t s consequences'.(74) 
The f o u r t h reservation that Pittenger has to t a l k of the 
'sinlessness of Christ" i s that those who use t h i s phrase often seem to 
imply 'that sinfulness was almost the determinative characteristic of 
human nature',(75) as though i n Christian thought 'the concept of sin 
i s more central than God himself'.(76) This viewpoint could not allow 
Jesus to be one with s i n f u l human nature f o r that would be to compromise 
his d i v i n i t y and his redeeming work, hence his 'sinlessness' must be 
(72) John Knox: The Humanity and D i v i n i t y of Christ, Cambridge, 
University Press, 1967* p. 46f. 
(73) i b i d . , p. 69. 
(74) C.R., p. 45-
(75) i b i d . , p. 46. 
(76) i b i d . , p. 63. 
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rigorously adhered to. Pittenger's objection to t h i s estimate of the 
'radical nature of sin' i s that, 
' i t contradicts the doctrine of God's creation of the 
world and hence the goodness of that world which God 
creates - as the Genesis story should have made pl a i n . 
Sin cannot be called radical i n any soundly b i b l i c a l 
theology ... (fo r t h i s ) i s to say that e v i l i s at the 
root of things, i n the very f a c t of creation. This i s 
not C h r i s t i a n i t y but a species of Manieheism.'(77) 
The f i n a l preliminary point i s that although Pittenger has 
reservations about the concept of the 'sinlessness of Jesus' and what 
t h i s i s usually thought to imply, and although his stress on the 
humanity of Christ requires his f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s i n f u l 
structures of the world, yet he refuses t o admit that Jesus was ' s i n f u l 
i n concrete w i l l e d action'.(78) Speaking of the humanity of Jesus 
Pittenger says: 
'Nothing that men possess - save the s i n which possesses 
them - i s absent from the l i f e of the incarnate Lord.'(79) 
This unwillingness to admit that Jesus consciously sinned or allowed 
s i n f u l desires to dictate the course of his l i f e i s expressed by 
Pittenger i n process terms when he says that the f a c t of Jesus' social 
conditionedness does not e n t a i l that the God-directed subjective aim 
of his l i f e was 'distorted or subjected to variation'.(80) Indeed 
Pittenger believes that so closely did Jesus 'actualize' the divine aim 
and w i l l that i t was 'precisely such a response as made him the e n t i r e l y 
adequate instrument f o r the Word - and so made him the 'incarnation' of 
that Word'.(8l) 
(77) i b i d . , pp. 5>54. 
(78) i b i d . , p. 45. 
(79) W.I., p. 237. 
(80) C.R., p. 57. 
(81) G.P., p. 27. 
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This reference to Christology i s deliberate, f o r i n the next few 
pages the significance of Pittenger's understanding of the 'sinlessness 
of Jesus' both f o r his Christology and f o r his picture of salvation w i l l 
be demonstrated. 
He considers that most discussion of the 'sinlessness of Jesus' 
has been approached i n the 'wrong way', based upon an inadequate idea 
of sin.(82) Sin f o r Pittenger i s a f a i l u r e to actualize the God-given 
aim of l i f e . I t i s a f a i l u r e , 
'... to move i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n - outwardly towards 
one's fellows, forward along the path of true s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n i n community, inwardly i n actualizing one's 
own p o s s i b i l i t y , and hence towards God who energizes i n 
human l i f e to create and nourish love-in-action.'(83) 
Pittenger believes that Jesus' l i f e was a f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s way and 
i t i s i n t h i s positive sense that he would r e i n t e r p r e t the 'sinlessness 
of Christ', suggesting that t h i s picture i s consonant wi t h the 'general 
impression' of Jesus to be found i n the Gospels. 
'... We have s u f f i c i e n t material i n the gospels to assure 
us that i n the l i f e that was remembered and reported by 
the p r i m i t i v e Christian Church there was an out-going, 
active and creative goodness ... (that) ... the general 
impression which emerges from taking that portrayal as a 
whole shows us a man who was recalled as being u t t e r l y 
loving i n his relationship w i t h others, however exacting 
and demanding may have been his words as he spoke of 
God's Kingdom and i t s requirements ... (that) ... the 
t o t a l impression which the h i s t o r i c a l data give us ... 
conveys to us the picture of a man who can properly be 
described as embodying love-in-action.' (84 ) 
The e a r l i e r discussion of Jesus' t o t a l , personal commitment to the 
Kingdom of God can be seen as corroborative evidence of t h i s conclusion. 
Secondly, Pittenger sees Jesus as the one who f u l f i l l e d the God-
(82) C.R., p. 46. 
(83) i b i d . , p. 51. 
(84) i b i d . , p. 55f. 
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given 'aim' of his l i f e and he would consider the foregoing estimate 
of h i s l i f e and character to be an expression of t h i s . What i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t about Jesus f o r Pittenger i s the in t e n t i o n of his l i f e . 
'A man i s to be judged, then, i n terms of where he 
intends to go, the dir e c t i o n of the movement which 
i s his existence; our evaluation of si n i s to be 
made through considering the future aim or purpose 
or goal, rather than through concentration on the 
material with which any man ine v i t a b l y must work.'(85) 
Pittenger's evaluation of the l i f e of Jesus i s that i t s motivation and 
di r e c t i o n was the f u l f i l m e n t of God's w i l l and the bringing i n of his 
Kingdom and that t h i s overcame whatever deficiencies there were i n his 
social conditioning. The nub of Pittenger's r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
'sinlessness of Christ' i s that he was the one whose l i f e was wholly 
directed to the f u l f i l m e n t of God's w i l l of love. 
Two related points remain to be drawn out r e l a t i n g Pittenger's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christ's sinlessness to atonement thought and 
Christology. F i r s t l y Pittenger suggests that his understanding of 
Jesus' r e l a t i o n to human sin not only provides the clue 'to the nature 
of Jesus' own accomplishment' w h i l s t sharing i n the human s i t u a t i o n , 
but also shows that Jesus, 
'can be f o r those whom he called his brethren a source of 
that grace which empowers them to become the lovers they 
are meant to be - or, i n theological idiom, to be saved.'(86) 
Just as Jesus overcame the l i m i t s of the human s i t u a t i o n and did not 
succumb to si n so he i n turn can be the source of victorious l i v i n g f o r 
his followers because the 'positive, creative outgoing love and goodness 
of Jesus i s shareable and i s shared'.(87) This i s the essence of his 
(85) i b i d . , p. 58. 
(86) i b i d . , p. 55-
(87) i b i d . , p. 63. 
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understanding of salvation. What i s crucial about i t , though, i s his 
suggestion that i t i s w i t h i n the l i m i t s and deficiencies of humanity 
which we and Jesus completely share that t h i s salvation i s known. 
Secondly, t h i s i s made possible only through grace. Pittenger i s 
clear that the only way i n which a person car., realize the God-given 
aim of his l i f e and thus overcome sin i s through the operation of the 
grace and love of God. This emphasis on grace i s so strong i n 
Pittenger's w r i t i n g that the charge of Pelagianism which i s sometimes 
l a i d against him i s wholly unjustified.(88) He constantly stresses the 
' p r i o r i t y of God's grace and love operating i n the world'.(89) I t i s 
a man's dependence 'upon that highest and deepest love' which alone 
makes possible the r e a l i z a t i o n of the 'basic God-given motif and aim' 
of his life.(90) 
This i s how Pittenger approaches the significance of Jesus. I t 
was as the divine love united 'his freedom, his in t e l l i g e n c e and 
i n i t i a t i v e as well as his human creative capacity with the aim or w i l l 
of his heavenly Father',(91) that he was able to be recognised as the 
one ' i n the i n t e g r i t y of whose f u l l humanity God's action was found'.(92) 
Pittenger can thus i d e n t i f y the love seen and known i n the l i f e of Jesus 
w i t h 'the divine love which moves the sun and other stars',(93) and i t 
i s i n sharing i n t h i s love and grace as seen i n Jesus which f o r him i s 
the essence of salvation. 
i b i d . , p. 64. 
i b i d . , p. 64. 
i b i d . , p. 54. 
i b i d . , p. 62. 
G.P., p. 32. 
C.R., p. 63. 
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'To be caught up i n t o and to be grasped by Christ's love 
i s to l i v e i n Christ. To l i v e i n Christ i s to part i c i p a t e 
i n the creative love, thus active i n human loving, which 
i s the very r e a l i t y of God himself. ' (94) 
This p r i o r i t y of grace i n christology and salvation w i l l be considered 
more deeply l a t e r . At present, though, i n the f i n a l paragraph of t h i s 
chapter i t i s necessary to emphasise again that f o r Pittenger what i s 
so crucial i s that t h i s grace and salvation are known i n our normal 
human l i v e s j u s t as 
'he who went through the world on f i r e with the love of 
God - (who) was indeed the true Prometheus who brought 
the divine f i r e to men ... did (so) i n our own human 
terms, under our own conditions, and as one of 
ourselves.'(95) 
(94) i b i d . , p. 63. 
(95) G.P., p. 32. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PITTENGER'S CHRISTOLOGY 
( l ) Introduction 
Pittenger's insistence upon Christ's humanity and h i s r e j e c t i o n 
of a l l forms of docetism make him somewhat tentative when speaking of 
his ' d i v i n i t y ' , as i s indicated by his use of parenthetic commas 
whenever he applies the word to Christ.(1) He prefers to speak of 
his s p e c i a l i t y . 
'My own i n t e r e s t i s to t r y to f i n d a way which w i l l 
preserve the f u l l humanity of Jesus, on. the one hand, 
yet not deny that s p e c i a l i t y which the Christian 
experience i n s i s t e n t l y claims i t has found i n him.'(2) 
This approach, s t a r t i n g w i t h the humanity of Jesus and then i n t e r p r e t i n g 
how God acted on and i n him can be i d e n t i f i e d with the Antiochene 
t r a d i t i o n of Christology, which Pittenger acknowledges as his own.(3) 
I t has, however, been the opposite Alexandrine i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which has 
largely determined Christological thought since the Council of Ephesus 
i n 431 A.D. 
John Cobb, who i s also sympathetic to the Antiochene approach, 
because 'they were more f a i t h f u l to the Bible i n t h e i r insistence on 
recognising the f u l l y personal humanity of Jesus', suggests that: 
'They l o s t out i n part because they had available to 
them no conceptuality f o r explaining how God could at 
his own i n i t i a t i v e be genuinely present to and i n a 
man without displacing some element i n the personal 
humanity of that man.' (4) 
(1) W.I., pp. 1-2. 
(2) C.R., p. 65. 
(3) i b i d . , p. 41. 
(4) John B. Cobb Jnr., 'The F i n a l i t y of Christ i n a Whiteheadian 
Perspective', The F i n a l i t y of Christ, Ed., Dow Kirkpatrick, 
Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1966, p. 139. 
81. 
He goes on to say that the deficiencies inherent i n the Antiochene 
position can be supplied by new p o s s i b i l i t i e s of thought offered by 
the philosophy of Whitehead. From a Whiteheadian perspective, 
'a Christian can a f f i r m the special presence of God 
to and i n a man without reducing the man's f u l l 
personal responsible humanity on the one hand or 
minimizing the divine i n i t i a t i v e on the other.'(5) 
Pittenger s i m i l a r l y recognises the value of process thought i n the 
Christological enterprise, i n overcoming the deficiencies of 
t r a d i t i o n a l ways of thought. 
'The doctrine of Christ conceived and stated i n 
process terms ... makes sense as the t r a d i t i o n a l 
does not, while i t also secures ... what I believe 
was the i n t e n t i o n of classical theology when i t 
spoke of Jesus as 'God-man' and believed that i n 
him God had indeed ' v i s i t e d and redeemed' his 
people.'(6) 
Pittenger's Christology i n a process vein, then, concentrates upon 
'God's act i n manhood - or perhaps better, the a c t i v i t y of God i n the 
man Jesus'.(7) This primary stress upon the a c t i v i t y of God means 
that Pittenger's Christology i s best categorized as belonging to an 
'event' type which asks 'what was God doing i n Jesus',(8) i n contrast 
to 'substance' or 'person' Christologies which have 'thought of Jesus 
as a pre-existent supernatural being made fle s h and have asked by what 
process he became incarnate'.(9) Such an 'event' approach to 
Christology f i t s exactly with what has been seen to be Pittenger's 
general incarnational emphasis. Thus the basis of Pittenger's thesis 
i s that i t i s only 'in the context of (such) an incarnational presence 
(5) i b i d . , p. 139. (Cobb's approach though i s d i f f e r e n t from Pittenger' 
(6) W. N. Pittenger: 'The Doctrine of Christ i n a Process Theology', 
Expository Times, Vol. 82, 1970, p. 8. 
(7) C.R., p. 135. 
(8) i b i d . , p. 134. 
(9) i b i d . , p. 1^4, quoting Dennis Nineham: 'Jesus i n the Gospels', 
Ed. W. N. Pittenger, Christ f o r us Today, London, S.C.M. Press, 
1968, p. 64. 
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of the Word of God i n nature, i n h i s t o r y and i n human l i f e ' that the 
Incarnation of God i n Christ can be understood,(10) because i n Jesus 
there i s 'focused' that divine operation which i s 'diffused' 
elsewhere.(11) 
I t i s i n such a way that Pittenger explains the union of God and 
man i n Christ. I t i s not a matter of substances. Rather his 
incarnational stress requires f i r s t that he acknowledges that 'there 
i s always union between God and man, of some sort and i n some way'; 
then secondly he can proceed to say that ' i n Jesus Christ, there i s 
the union, to which a l l others point and from, which they are seen i n 
a l l t h e i r r i c h p o t e n t i a l i t y yet i n a l l t h e i r t r a g i c f a i l u r e ' . ( 1 2 ) 
I t follows from t h i s that Jesus' difference from other men can only be 
a matter of degree. Any suggestion that he i s d i f f e r e n t i n kind 'from 
other instances of God's presence and a c t i v i t y i n the a f f a i r s of men 
and i n t h e i r experience', would make him 'to a l l intents and purposes, 
an anomaly'.(13) 
(2) A Matter of Degree 
Pittenger admits that 'the chief reason that the notion of a 
'difference of degree' has been rejected i s that i t has been assumed 
that i t would make our Lord only s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from the rest of 
us'.(l4) He i n s i s t s , however, that t h i s need not be the case; for a 
difference of degree could be between one and. an i n f i n i t e number and 
he quotes i n support Hastings Rashdall's dictum that difference i n 
(10) W.I., p. 240. 
(11) i b i d . , p. 241. 
(12) i b i d . , p. 241. 
(13) W. N. Pittenger: Art. 'The Doctrine of Christ i n a Process 
Theology' i n Expository Times, Vol. 82, 1970, p. 9. 
(14) W.I., p. 241. 
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degree 'can amount to a difference i n kind'.(15) Elsewhere he says 
that 'a difference I n degree, i f i t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y large, can make a 
very great difference' ;(16) and his conclusion i s that: 
'The difference i n degree between our Lord's actualization 
of union between God and man, and our own p i t i f u l 
approximations to i t , i s a difference so great that i t 
leads us to adore him, to f i n d i n him both our Lord and 
Saviour, and also our Master and Pattern, and hence one 
whom we can love as Brother and worship as Lord.'(17) 
Pittenger expounds the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s degree Christology with the 
following considerations. 
(a) I t s r e l a t i o n to the humanity of Jesus 
When discussing humanity, with reference to Jesus, Pittenger 
draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between 'ordinary manhood' and the d i s t i n c t 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y of each person. 'No man' i s 'run-of-the-mill'; 'simply 
i d e n t i c a l with every other man'. I n each man there i s something which 
i s i r r e d u c i b l y himself'.(18) I t i s the broad psychological and 
physiological s i m i l a r i t i e s between men to which Pittenger refers as 
'ordinary manhood'.(19) Jesus was of t h i s 'ordinary manhood'j he was 
a man l i k e any other; the Gospels providing no evidence of 'some 
special area of his manhood where Jesus was e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from 
other men'.(20) Yet his marked i n d i v i d u a l i t y would have impressed 
those who knew him making him 'one who was ordinary, yet i n another 
sense out of the ordinary'.(21) 
(15) i b i d . , p. 241. 
(16) C.R., p. 112. 
(17) W.I., p. 241. 
(18) C.R., p. 117-
(19) i b i d . , p. 118. 
(20) i b i d . , p. 116. 
(21) i b i d . , p. 118. 
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This dual d e f i n i t i o n of humanity supports Pittenger's degree 
Christology; p a r t i c u l a r l y when a l l i e d to t h i s concept of the 
f u l f i l m e n t of l i f e ' s aim. I n Jesus the s p e c i a l i t y of the in d i v i d u a l 
was most marked and t h i s was largely to be accounted f o r by the 
f u l f i l m e n t of his po t e n t i a l , the actualization of his God-given aim. 
'Thus we may say that Jesus, i n the dynamic existence 
which was hi s , f u l f i l l e d the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which were 
also his i n a manner that impressed those who companied 
with him as being extraordinary without being a v i o l a t i o n 
of the ordinary conditions of manhood. His l i f e , so f a r 
as we read about i t , was an integrated whole i n which his 
l i v i n g , loving, knowing, self-awareness, and relationships 
with others were at t h e i r best and most complete. His 
degree of r e a l i z a t i o n was not the same as that of other 
men whom his companions knew; i t was immeasurably 
d i f f e r e n t yet not u t t e r l y removed from the experience 
of manhood elsewhere seen.'(22) 
Pittenger goes on to suggest that t h i s way of speaking of Jesus 
being l i f t e d out of 'the general ordinariness which attaches to a l l 
men as such' i s consistent with what the Fathers, with t h e i r very 
d i f f e r e n t idiom, t r i e d to say about Jesus when they i n s i s t e d that 
Jesus was 'of one substance with us, as touching his manhood', but 
also sought to speak 'of the eminent degree i n which his manhood was 
realized'.(23) This they did by reference to his complete, perfect 
manhood, and 'their to us incredible insistence on the miraculous 
q u a l i t i e s which they saw i n him as the gospels portray Jesus, and 
t h e i r u n f a i l i n g stress on the representative nature of the manhood 
which was his'.(24) 
The significance of t h i s i n Pittenger's thought i s that the 
Incarnation becomes 'our clue to the divinely-intended nature of man 
himself, to the p o t e n t i a l i t y which by divine creation i s implanted i n 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
i b i d , 
i b i d . , pp. 119-120. 
i b i d . , pp. 120f. 
p. 120. 
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man'.(25) Jesus, thus seen as the one i n whom human po t e n t i a l i s 
realized to the highest degree, can be described as 'the proper man, 
the representative man'.(26) This relates to t a l k of salvation; f o r 
the purpose of l i f e i s thus to realize l i f e ' s divinely-intended aim 
as seen i n Christ; or as Pittenger expresses i t , quoting the New 
Testament, we are called 'to grow up i n a l l things unto him who i s the 
head, even Christ'.(27) 
(b) I t s r e l a t i o n to the Cosmic Process 
Pittenger employs Whitehead's conceptuality to define more closely 
t h i s difference between Jesus and other men. I n process thought the 
universe i s characterized by ongoing movement through events, by 
movement i n t o novelty through creative advance. Thus 'every occasion, 
occurrence or event i n the creative advance which i s the Cosmos'(28) 
i s d i f f e r e n t from every other occasion because i t i s a new creative 
moment. 
I n Whitehead's terminology each actual e n t i t y of occasion i s a 
concrescence of prehensions. That i s i t i s made up of various factors, 
of previous occasions and t h e i r make-up, of present feelings or 
influences, and of the subjective aim which i s present to each occasion 
and which might be accepted or rejected. Pittenger summarizes t h i s , 
which was accorded a f u l l e r discussion i n an e a r l i e r chapter, by saying: 
'Each occasion ... has i t s own prehending or grasping 
of the organic process at that special focal point 
which i t i s , ... yet each has such prehensions or 
graspings, with the giving-receiving which t h i s 
e n t a i l s , i n a mode appropriate to i t s own 
pa r t i c u l a r l e v e l of becoming.'(29) 
(25) W.I., p. 243. 
(26) i b i d . , p. 244. 
(27) i b i d . , p. 244. 
(28) C.R., p. 121. 
(29) i b i d . , p. 121. 
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I n terms of human l i f e Pittenger i nterprets t h i s as meaning that 
'each instance of manhood i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from each other 
instance'.(30) This difference i s accounted f o r i n part by that 
person's past, which would include the h i s t o r i c a l , c u l t u r a l and 
ideological background as wel l as the natural s e t t i n g i n which he 
finds himself. He i s also affected by present factors, his relationships 
and environment i n which he l i v e s , so that he both modifies and i s 
modified by them.(31) Further he i s ' q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from 
other men' i n 'consequence of the subjective aim which he has taken as 
his own'. 'A man's 'vocation', as we might c a l l i t , i s a determinant 
of his own specific q u a l i t y as a man. What he sets out to do, above 
a l l what he sets out to become, whether i n v i v i d awareness as i n a 
more diffused and unconscious manner, w i l l work towards making him the 
pa r t i c u l a r s e l f that he is.'(32) 
Pittenger makes these generalizations about human l i f e from the 
insights of process thought. I t i s because each instant of experience, 
each actual occasion, i s a novel focusing of various factors including 
i t s subjective aim, that i t possesses a 'qualitative distinctiveness'. 
These insights are then applied to a 'routing of occasions', i n t h i s 
case human l i f e . I t i s i n the l i g h t of these considerations and t h e i r 
application to human l i f e that Pittenger understands 'the specific 
q u a l i t a t i v e difference of Jesus' l i f e . 
(30) i b i d . , p. 123. 
(31) i b i d . , p. 123. 
(32) i b i d . , p. 123. 
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' i n Jesus Christ, since he i s t r u l y a nan, the same 
complex of factors w i l l necessarily be i n view when 
we wish to see him i n his s p e c i f i c i t y . I n the series 
of occasions which constitute his human existence, a 
character appears which i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t 
from that found i n other such series of occasions. 
Yet t h i s i s not i n contradiction t o , nor u t t e r l y 
unlike those other occasions of human existence i n 
t h e i r routing. The event of Jesus Christ takes place 
i n h i s t o r y : i t f a l l s i n t o the pattern of human 
occasions and h i s t o r i c a l occurrences. But i t i s 
d i s t i n c t i v e and i t i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from 
other events, since t h i s distinctiveness and 
qu a l i t a t i v e difference i s the mark of a l l events.'(33) 
That conclusion i s merely saying that each human being, indeed each 
insta n t of human experience, i s unique. Pittenger, however, goes 
beyond t h i s and speaks of Jesus having a more d i s t i n c t i v e 'speciality' 
which he accounts f o r by saying that Jesus 'accepted his vocation made 
his decision and his subsequent decisions, and set about f u l f i l l i n g 
the aim which was his aim'.(34) I n other words whereas i n every other 
human l i f e or routing of occasions negative decisions towards the 
subjective aim are determinative, i n Jesus alone i s that God-given 
aim f u l f i l l e d . Thus, as was noted i n an e a r l i e r chapter, whereas 
other men pervert t h e i r God-given aim, which i s sin, the l i f e of Jesus 
was marked by v i c t o r y over sin, i n that he f u l f i l l e d the aims proper 
to himself. Thus the conclusion i s again drawn that Jesus i s d i f f e r e n t 
from other men, only i n degree, i n terms only of his f u l f i l m e n t of his 
God-given aim. His difference i s not one of kind i n the sense that he 
i s ' u t t e r l y and e n t i r e l y sui generis' f o r that would be to remove him 
'from the realm of the human and the h i s t o r i c a l . ( 3 5 ) 
(33) i b i d . , p. 124. 
(34) i b i d . , p. 124. 
(35) i b i d . , p. 124. 
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(c) I t s r e l a t i o n to Emergent Evolution and Salvation 
A further quotation, which i n ef f e c t concludes Pittenger's 
discussion of difference of degree, raises two further i n t e r e s t i n g 
points about his theology. He writes of the event of Jesus: 
' i t i s d i f f e r e n t i n degree from other events, i n a 
degree that i s by us immeasurable but with results 
which establish i t s difference i n the consequences 
fo r other men which i t has brought about. 
A. E. Taylor once spoke about t h i s as the q u a l i t y of 
l i f e which was released i n t o the world through the 
event of Christ. And to use that word q u a l i t y i s to 
add that the degree of difference i s such that i n an 
eminent fashion there i s q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n 
which i n one way or another i s true everywhere i n 
the world of occasions. Difference i n degree produces 
difference i n what the specific instance includes and 
produces. ' (3>6) 
From t h i s i t i s clear that Pittenger intends i t to be understood 
that although the difference of Jesus to other humans i s only one of 
degree nevertheless when judged by i t s results the difference i s very 
s i g n i f i c a n t indeed. 
F i r s t l y the phrase 'event of Christ' has a special place i n 
Pittenger's thought. By i t he means that t o t a l event with Jesus Christ 
as i t s focus which i s the manifestation of the divine loving a c t i v i t y 
beginning from I s r a e l and including the Christian Church. What Pittenger 
i s implying here i s that the event i s wholly r e l i a n t upon that difference 
of degree between Jesus and other men, namely his f u l f i l m e n t of his aim. 
I f Jesus had not done so then that event and the consequences that flow 
from i t and i n part constitute i t could never have been conceived. 
Part of those 'consequences f o r other men', that are brought about i n 
that event, are that men can share i n that t o t a l Christ event. They 
can become participant i n the gracious, continuing l i f e of Christ, 
(36) i b i d . , p. 124. 
sharing i n his v i c t o r y , so that they might come to move towards the 
f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r God-given aim. This would be the experience of 
coming to be at-one with God i n Christ and t h i s i s the path of 
salvation. 
Secondly, and a l l i e d to t h i s , the consequence of Christ's 
difference can be set i n a broader, indeed cosmic, context. Alongside 
his use of process thought Pittenger also i s attracted by the insights 
of 'emergent evolution' associated p a r t i c u l a r l y with Professor Lloyd 
Morgan. This view, which represented a marked change i n understanding 
evolution when i t was f i r s t propounded, simply suggests that 'within 
the on-going process of evolution i t i s an 'observable f a c t ' that there 
i s 'the appearance of the genuinely new';(37) that there i s creative 
movement i n t o novelty. This leads to 'what we may c a l l a graded world-
order' which traces 'a continuity of process' 'from matter up through 
l i f e to mind and on to s p i r i t or apprehension of value'. Yet 'each 
higher l e v e l i s very much more than the mere resultant of that which 
has gone before'; indeed 'each higher level 'emerges' with a genuine 
element of novelty about i t ' . ( 3 8 ) 
Pittenger sees the incarnation as j u s t such a novel emergence 
which took the creative process to a d i s t i n c t l y higher l e v e l ; i n the 
words of the preceding quotation, the difference of degree marked i n 
Jesus 'i s such that i n an eminent fashion there i s q u a l i t a t i v e 
d i s t i n c t i o n which ... i s true everywhere i n the world of occasions'. 
This quotation expresses more f u l l y Pittenger's opinion on t h i s matter: 
(37) W.I., p. 150. 
(38) i b i d . , p. 151. 
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'Jesus Christ i s 'emergent' i n the world process, 
continuous with that order at i t s human and h i s t o r i c a l 
l e v e l . He i s a genuine emergent, fo r he i s the bringer 
of a 'new being' i n t o which men are taken f o r enlarged 
and enriched l i f e through the self-commitment consequent 
upon genuinely and v i t a l l y meeting him i n the l i f e of 
the Christian community. I f we describe t h i s by c a l l i n g 
Jesus Christ the emergence of God-manhood, then those 
who are thus 'taken i n t o him' are made participants i n 
that order of God-manhood. But t h i s neither demands nor 
implies divine intervention i n the sense of an i r r u p t i o n 
of God i n t o his world; the world i t s e l f i s constantly 
informed and moulded by the same Word who i n Jesus i s 
thus f u l l y emergent so f a r as we men can apprehend such 
emergence. He i s the unique focus f o r a universal 
presence and operation. But that focus i s the act of 
God who nowhere leaves himself without witness and 
everlastingly works with love and compassion f o r h i s 
creatures ... (being) deeply involved i n the a f f a i r s 
of the world and so ... shapes i t i n t o conformity with 
the purpose f o r which he has brought i t i n t o existence.'(39) 
I n that quotation almost every nuance of Pittenger's theology 
gets an a i r i n g . The divine loving a c t i v i t y operating through the 
creative process and human his t o r y , focused i n the Christ event i n a 
manner that did not necessitate any i n t r u s i o n ab extra, i s the broad 
context. The marriage of the divine and human i n Christ, with i t s 
consequence of a new way of being, represented i n a new community of 
those who have met with Christ and have had t h e i r self-commitment 
( i . e . f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r God-given aim) strengthened i n his t o t a l 
self-commitment, i s the essence of the new emergent. Such p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n new being i n Christ i s f o r Pittenger salvation, as w i l l be 
demonstrated. Further that t h i s r e a l l y did represent a new emergent 
i n the creative process would be confirmed by Pittenger by pointing to 
the great strides made i n human advancement i n knowledge, education, 
medical services and emancipation i n association with Christ's Church. 
This i s the basic thesis of his book 'The Christian Church or Social 
(39) i b i d . , pp. 191-192. 
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Process'. 
I n the l i g h t of a l l t h i s the question whether Jesus was i n any 
sense unique must now be asked. 
(3) The Uniqueness of Jesus 
Defining the word unique as 'absolutely and completely d i f f e r e n t 
from anything else', Pittenger refuses to use i t of Jesus: but 
employing a d i s t i n c t i o n , borrowed from Professor Moule, between a 
uniqueness of inclusion and one of exclusion he finds that the former 
sense can be employed while s t i l l maintaining the difference between 
Jesus and other men to be one of degree.(40) A uniqueness of exclusion, 
i n t h i s context, permitting no pa r a l l e l s or s i m i l a r i t i e s , would imply 
that the event of Jesus was absolutely and completely d i f f e r e n t from 
any other and would thus remove i t from genuine human and h i s t o r i c a l 
circumstances.(41) Such would be open to the c r i t i c i s m Pittenger 
levels against 'difference of kind' Christologies, that of making Jesus 
anomolous to human his t o r y , which amounts to a docetic view of 
Christ.(42) A uniqueness of inclusion, however, would allow f o r 'values 
or characteristics or q u a l i t i e s ' found i n a person ' i n some eminent 
manner', also to be found i n others 'but i n a much less adequate 
fashion'.(43) Thus, r e c a l l i n g previous discussions, the uniqueness of 
Jesus l i e s i n the consummate degree to which he f u l f i l s the pot e n t i a l 
requirements of his humanity. A l l men are i n some sense unique but 
Jesus raises t h i s uniqueness to a new special l e v e l . 
(40) C.R., p. 125. 
(41) i b i d . , p. 125. 
(42) i b i d . , p. 126. 
(43) i b i d . , p. 125. 
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Pittenger i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s inclusive view of Jesus' uniqueness 
by reference to his Jewishness. Jesus, he says, was a Jew and can 
only be understood i n terms of Jewish r e l i g i o n , culture and t r a d i t i o n . 
This Jewishness was the essence of the 'inclusiveness which was proper 
to him'.(44) Jesus' uniqueness wi t h i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , Pittenger 
suggests, lay i n the 'radical c r i t i c i s m ' of i t ; i n the sense of a 
'creative' 'grasping of that t r a d i t i o n ' s most profound i n t e n t i o n ' and 
an 'urgent desire, to i n s i s t on such changes (within that r e l i g i o u s 
t r a d i t i o n ) as would make what had been learned viable i n a new 
situation'.(45) He says of Jesus that he was i n f a c t : 
'a true r a d i c a l , who penetrated to the heart of the 
Jewish awareness of God and God's w i l l as i t had been 
worked out i n h i s t o r y , who provided a fresh but not 
t o t a l l y discontinuous beginning i n the understanding 
of man v i s a v i s that God, and who i n doing t h i s (both 
by what he said and by what he did, as wel l as by what 
he was) established a new i n t e n s i t y i n the relationship 
between God and man. This i s what i s intended when we 
speak of l i f e i n Christ; yet we must always be clear 
that t h i s new l i f e i s not i n u t t e r contradiction to the 
communion of God and man which the Jewish t r a d i t i o n had 
i t s e l f enabled and out of which Jesus had come.'(46) 
This example makes i t clear that i n Pittenger's thought the 
difference between Jesus and other men l i e s i n the i n t e n s i t y of degree 
not only to which he f u l f i l s h is own God-given human pot e n t i a l but also 
f u l f i l s the divine w i l l and i n t e n t i o n of his re l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l 
t r a d i t i o n . His uniqueness i s more marked than that of other men 
because he f u l f i l s God's w i l l i n every area of l i f e . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
true when seen i n r e l a t i o n to the divine loving a c t i v i t y which i s such a 
keynote i n Pittenger's theology. He speaks of 'the b i b l i c a l picture of 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
i b i d . , pp. 127f. 
i b i d . , p. 128. 
i b i d . , p. 127. 
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the yearning love of God, urgently seeking a response, f i n d i n g value 
i n the beloved, desiring the returning love of the other, and 
essentially concerned to establish a relationship between the two'.(47) 
He relates t h i s 'root a t t r i b u t e ' of God to Christology by i n s i s t i n g 
that ' i n and through' the human loving of Jesus Christ, the divine 
love i s manifested i n a l l i t s glory'.(48) This f i t s i n to his whole 
theological approach which he would explain by saying that since God 
i s love then 'wherever love i s ... there God i s present, God i s 
active'.(49) He goes on, ' I have also i n s i s t e d that God i s present 
and active not i n spite of, i n contradiction of, i n denial of, against, 
a l l human loving but precisely and exactly i n that human loving, which 
he completes and corrects'.(50) 
This i s a further example of his i n c a r n a t i o n a l i s t approach, 
which here relates to his degree Christology, f o r he stresses that 
'the love of God, or God as love i n Jesus Christ i s most cert a i n l y not 
absolutely d i f f e r e n t i n kind from the love of God, or God as love 
wherever t h i s i s seen i n the h i s t o r y of the human race and i n the 
experience of the sons of men'.(51) The 'very great difference i n 
degree of i n t e n s i t y ' between 'the divine love that i s active i n the 
human loving of Jesus Christ and the other persons and events i n which 
the divine love i s active' i s to be accounted f o r p r i m a r i l y by the 
d i f f e r e n t 'quality of response' i n the l i f e of Jesus which enabled a 
new effectiveness of love i n his l i f e . ( 5 2 ) Any view that implies the 
(47) i b i d . , P. 130. 
(48) i b i d . , P. 130. 
(49) i b i d . , P. 131. 
(50) i b i d . , P- 131. 
(51) i b i d . , P- 131. 
(52) i b i d . , P- 131. 
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divine love i n Jesus i s d i f f e r e n t i n kind from that i n other men would 
fo r Pittenger be 'to render the divine love i n Jesus Christ 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to us', indeed to make i t 'unavailable to us: f o r i t 
i s only i n our human situations as men that we can be loved of God'.(53) 
Here again there i s a h i n t of Pittenger's view of salvation, which 
i s known 'within our human si t u a t i o n ' and i s essentially allowing the 
divine love to f u l f i l our human l i v e s , r a i s i n g our response to God and 
our fellows to a new le v e l i n the fellowship of Christ, which would be 
to f u l f i l the divinely intended aim of loving as i t i s seen i n him. 
I f the love of God i n Christ were d i f f e r e n t i n kind from that i n every 
human occasion then such a view of salvation could not stand, thus 
Pittenger's understanding of atonement and salvation i s seen to be 
anchored to a degree Christology. 
I t i s , however, how the union of the human and divine i n Christ 
can be equated w i t h a degree Christology i n Pittenger's thought that 
remains to be considered. 
(4) The Union of the Divine and Human i n Christ 
Pittenger describes the Chalcedonian D e f i n i t i o n of 451 A.D. as 
being 'concerned to state as d e f i n i t i v e l y as possible the minimum 
assertion which Christian f a i t h and experience, building on the basic 
datum of the New Testament witness, demanded should be made about our 
Lord', which was that he i s ' t r u l y God, t r u l y man, t r u l y the personal 
union of these two'.(54) Characteristically he tackles the problem of 
t h i s 'personal union' from the manward side f i n d i n g that i t was the 
Antiochene school, most ably represented by Theodore of Mopsuestia, 
(53) i b i d . , p. 132. 
(54) W.I., pp. 86-87. 
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whose Christology held the balance between the d i v i n i t y and humanity 
of Jesus; 'holding the two i n genuine unity without negating the 
r e a l i t y of either'.(55) What he finds so a t t r a c t i v e about the 
Mopsuestian position i s that the union between the human and divine 
i n Christ i s 'conceived a f t e r the analogy of personal union' 'which 
allows f o r the most complete interpenetration' the one of the other 
w i t h i n the single person.(56) 
(a) His approach to a Christology of 'personal union' 
The use of personal analogies, f i r s t l y , needs to be distinguished 
from the classical Christological formulation of 'two natures i n one 
person' which Pittenger describes as 'incredible' f o r most people today, 
not least because i t 'presupposes concepts that are not ours, ideas of 
the nature of God and of man, of the ways i n which God and man may be 
or are related, and of the p o s s i b i l i t y of combining them i n a meaningful 
fashion that to many of us are absurd, i n the l i g h t of our awareness of 
these matters'.(57) He also c r i t i c i z e s the classical approach i n that 
i t implies 'a mechanical union i n which godhead and manhood, or God and 
that man, are stuck together i n some less than personal manner';(58) 
which can be and i s interpreted as suggesting that the relationship 
between God and man i n Jesus Christ i s of a schizophroid type'.(59) 
By t h i s he i s r e f e r r i n g to the tendency of suggesting that sometimes 
Jesus was 'speaking as God and sometimes as man'. He finds evidence of 
t h i s i n the 'Tome of Leo' though he admits that i t was 'hardly the 
(55) i b i d . , p. 89. 
(56) C.R., p. 7-
(57) i b i d . , p. 12. 
(58) i b i d . , p. 12. 
(59) i b i d . , p. 13. 
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genuine i n t e n t i o n of the P a t r i s t i c theologians'. Rather what must be 
upheld i s that ' i n the t o t a l being and action of Jesus Christ, both 
God and man are simultaneously and continuously present and at work'.(60) 
Certainly Pittenger dismisses Christologies which would be 
categorized as Alexandrine and which imply that the 'acts of the 
incarnate l i f e are theandric acts; acts of a divine person i n human 
nature; the personal subject of these acts, not (being) a man but 
God'.(6l) I n t h i s regard he quotes a c r i t i c i s m by G. C. Stead of 
E. L. Mascall's 'Via Media' (Longmans, 1956).(62) Mascall i s accused 
of f a i l i n g to personalize the humanity of Christ i n a human person by 
exalt i n g i t to the stupendous d i g n i t y of being personalized i n the 
person of God the Son. The r e s u l t of such a view of 'impersonal 
humanity', which would imply that Jesus 'had no human character or 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' , no 'personality' i n the current sense 'is to deny the 
humanity of Jesus'. 'God became man, he assumed human nature, but he 
was not a man.'(63) Any such impersonal view i s unsatisfactory f o r 
Pittenger; not least because i t smacks of docetism. His approach i s 
to hold together the humanity and d i v i n i t y of Christ and account f o r 
t h e i r union i n terms of 'personal union'. ' I t i s to be conceived a f t e r 
the analogy of personal union such as we know i n say, human marriage or 
the love of a lover f o r his beloved ... The union of God and man i n 
Jesus i s more l i k e what we know of personal relationship ... of the 
"gracious" q u a l i t y of such relationship'.(64) Such an approach, at 
(60) i b i d . , p. 13. 
(61) W.I., p. 90. 
(62) i b i d . , p. 90. (Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. V I I I (NS), 
October 1957, pp. 382-385.) 
(63) i b i d . , p. 91. 
(64) C.R., p. 12. 
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onee 'highly personal, highly moral, highly r e l i g i o u s ' , i s found 
amongst 'the thinkers who prepared f o r , were associated with and 
followed the l i n e taken by Theodore of Mopsuestia'.(65) 
(b) Theodore of Mopsuestia 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that i n addition to Pittenger another thinker 
who uses Whitehead1s conceptuality f o r understanding theology, Peter 
N. Hamilton, also values the insights of Theodore; and both admit an 
indebtedness of Fr. F. A. Sullivan's discussion of 'The Christology of 
Theodore of Mopsuestia' (Rome, 1 9 5 6 ) . Sullivan, Pittenger says, 
'correctly states the Mopsuestian position on the uni t y of Christ when 
he says that f o r Theodore there i s i n Christ "an inhab i t a t i o n " of the 
"divine nature" or of God i n human nature or i n the man which i s 
"superior i n duration and i n degree, but not i n essential character 
to that ... which characterizes the inhabitation of God by "good 
pleasure" (eudokia) i n ... saints"'. ( 6 6 ) Hamilton lays out cl e a r l y 
how t h i s concept of 'inhabitation' or 'indwelling' was understood by 
Theodore. 
'Theodore i s considering the r e l a t i o n of indwelling, which 
he uses to explain the union of God and man i n Christ. 
He f i r s t considers the general mode of divine indwelling 
i n men, and then applies t h i s to Christ. Theodore i s 
searching f o r the sense i n which God's indwelling i n men 
i s not universal, being found i n some men but not i n a l l : 
f o r t h i s purpose he rejects indwelling according to 
substance and indwelling according to a c t i v i t y (energeia = 
energy), both of which apply universally.. He settl e s on 
indwelling by "good pleasure" (eudokia), and to show that 
t h i s form of indwelling i s selective ( i n our modern idiom) 
Theodore quotes Psalm 147: 11; "the Lord takes pleasure 
i n those who fear him; i n those who hope on his steadfast 
love" (R.S.V.). This indwelling by good pleasure manifests 
(65) i b i d . , p. l j . 
(66) W.I., p. 90 . 
i t s e l f i n the f a c t that "God i s near to such men by the 
a t t i t u d e of disposition of his w i l l ... He i s w i l l i n g 
to grant special assistance, special co-operation, to 
those i n whom he i s pleased".'(67) 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s Theodore turns to God's indwelling i n Jesus which 
he distinguishes from other indwelling; the d i s t i n c t i o n l y i n g i n 
supe r i o r i t y of 'duration and degree'. Pittenger goes on to say: 
'This superiority i n "duration" i s found "because the 
union, i n the case of the homo assumptus (as Theodore 
consistently c a l l s the manhood of Jesus ...) begins at 
the moment of his formation i n the womb"; i t i s 
"superior i n degree, f o r the grace granted to the homo 
assumptus was to redound to the benefit of a l l men; 
his v i c t o r y over sin was to win salvation f o r a l l " 
(Sullivan, pp. 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ) . ' ( 6 8 ) 
Pittenger disagrees with Sullivan over whether t h i s 'indwelling' 
constitutes personal unity. Sullivan thinks that i t does not. He 
suggests that Theodore's formula 'two natures but one person (prosopon)' 
masks the f a c t that he uses the word nature i n a 'concrete personal 
sense', which would imply rather a c o - a c t i v i t y of the Word and man; 
any union would at best be one of 'honour and worship' united i n a 
common prosopon which would r e a l l y be the inclusion of two persons. 
Pittenger disagrees and quotes i n contradiction part of a review of 
Sullivan's work by R. V. Sellers. Against Sullivan's contention that 
at best t h i s i s some 'accidental' union, rather than one which i s 
i n t e g r a l and ontological, Sellers writes: 
(67) Peter N. Hamilton: The Living God and the Modern World, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1967, p. 207. 
(68) W.I., p. 90 . 
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'Christ i s the one i n whom, as Theodore expressly 
states, the divine Word has "united to himself" a 
complete manhood. The union of the natures "e f f e c t s " 
the "one prosopon", but behind the union i s the Word 
himself who makes the f i r s t move, and, one may argue, 
the factors of " c o - a c t i v i t y " and "honour" have t h e i r 
ground i n him and his purpose of accomplishing the 
salvation of the world.' (69) 
Pittenger accepts the judgement of Sellers that Theodore did maintain 
the unity of Christ's person and that i n Christ there i s a union 
through grace, through 'good pleasure', of the divine and the human. 
How Pittenger uses the Mopsuestian i n s i g h t f o r his own Christological 
understanding must await the placing of i t w i t h i n the context of the 
divine a c t i v i t y . F i r s t , though, i t s s i m i l a r i t y to Pittenger's whole 
Christological enterprise must be underlined. 
F i r s t l y , the Word's 'indwelling' i n 'energeia' i n a l l men and 
by 'eudokia' i n the chosen few i s similar to Pittenger's whole 
immanental emphasis, though he would probably wish to correct Theodore 
by stressing that God dwells through his Word i n 'eudokia', i n grace, 
i n every man. Secondly, that the divine indwelling i n Christ i s not 
superior i n essential character to that i n other men, would accord 
closely with his Christology of degree not of kind. Thirdly, both 
Theodore and Pittenger begin from the humanity of Christ, as t y p i f i e s 
the Antiochene position. I t remains now to examine how Pittenger 
uses Theodore's insights. 
(c) Pittenger's understanding of personal union 
Pittenger i n s i s t s that the divine-human union i n Christ was no 
'accidental' a f f a i r i n the sense that i t 'just happened' that 'God and 
(69) R. V. Sellers: review of Sullivan i n The Journal of Theological 
Studies , N.S., Vol. 8, October 1957, p. 341. 
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man were brought together here'; nor was i t some mere inci d e n t a l 
example of 'God-man togetherness', with no sort of s p e c i a l i t y or 
'importance'. Rather i t has to be seen as taking place ' i n accordance 
w i t h the divine purpose, but with f u l l dependence upon the r e a l i t y of 
human response'.(70) I t i s precisely i n terms of such a formula, the 
divine purpose plus the human response, that Pittenger understands the 
personal union through 'good-pleasure' i n Christ. I t i s through 
eudokia, (God's goodwill expressed i n the man Jesus) and sunapheia 
(intimate co-operative union i n moral terms), (71) that Pittenger finds 
himself best able 'to speak of the relationship or union of God and 
tha t man'.(72) These two elements which comprise the union must be 
distinguished. 
( i ) The action of the Word 
So f i r s t l y , t h i s union must be set and understood w i t h i n the 
context of the divine loving a c t i v i t y i n the world, at once creative 
and redemptive, expressed i n the Word. Pittenger then begins from 
'the divine r e a l i t y whom we c a l l God (and who) i s nowhere absent from 
the creation'. 
'In i t a l l , through i t a l l , he works and moves; i t i s 
informed by him and without him i t woiild not be what 
i t i s . God i s i n t h i s sense the ground of a l l 
existence, yet he i s not exhausted by t h i s presence 
and operation i n the created order; he i s transcendent, 
i n a fashion perhaps not e n t i r e l y unlike that i n which 
we can say a man transcends and i s not exhausted by his 
actions.' ( 7 3 ) 
The operative agent of t h i s i s the Logos, the Word of God, who i s 
(70) C.R., p. 12 . 
(71) i b i d . , p. 13-
(72) i b i d . , p. 12 . 
(73) G.P., p. 25 . 
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present i n each person despite his sin and f a i l u r e . Pittenger then 
points to the Christian experience, expressed i n the Gospels, that 
the 'same Word "by whom a l l things were made", and who i s "also the 
l i g h t that lighteneth every man" ... above a l l i s the Word who so 
energized i n and shone through the l i f e of Jesus t h e i r Lord, that 
believers could only speak of him as that one i n whom "the Word was 
made fl e s h and dwelt among us"'.(7^) The Word, however, needs to be 
interpenetrated by the human response. 
( i i ) The human response 
For Pittenger every instant of human l i f e has i t s God-given aim, 
the r e a l i z a t i o n of which leads to human f u l f i l m e n t , f a i l u r e to do so 
being sin. Each man bears the imago dei, 'human nature (being) 
grounded i n the divine Word',(75) and i t i s only i n response to the 
divine Word and to the divine w i l l which he expresses that t h i s image 
of God i n man w i l l become clearer. 
'The increasing moral and s p i r i t u a l discernment of man, 
his obedience to the divine w i l l , and his employment 
fo r the divine purpose, are a l l of them responsive to 
the movement of the divine a c t i v i t y , the Word, i n him. 
He i s not t r u l y himself, as man i n the f u l l e s t 
i n t e n t i o n , u n t i l and unless that response i s f u l l and 
enti r e . His p o t e n t i a l i t y i s to be the instrument f o r 
the divine Self-expression i n terms appropriate to the 
human s i t u a t i o n ; the more man responds to God, -the 
more t h i s becomes actualized.' ( 7 6 ) 
I t i s from t h i s standpoint that Pittenger interprets the response of 
Jesus, as being the one who t r u l y f u l f i l l e d the God-given aim of his 
l i f e . 
(74) i b i d . , p. 26 . 
(75) i b i d . , p. 27 . 
(76) i b i d . , p. 27. 
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' i n t h i s man, Jesus, i n h i s f u l l and. true humanity, there 
was precisely such a response as made him the e n t i r e l y 
adequate instrument or vehicle f o r the Word. 1(77) 
As was noted, however, with respect to the 'sinlessness of Jesus' such 
a conclusion cannot conclusively be demonstrated, the Gospel records 
are not s u f f i c i e n t l y complete to permit i t . rJaus his conclusion about 
Jesus i s essentially a matter of b e l i e f , but t h i s b e l i e f , o r i g i n a l l y 
that of the early Christians, that i n t h i s man was seen the perfect 
response to God, thus allowing the divine love to be f u l l y realized i n 
him, i s more than a matter of i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f since i t i s cr u c i a l 
to the whole way of Christian discipleship. 
'Belief i n t h i s instance i s the response which we make to 
what Jesus can do for us by quickening i n us the self-same 
working of the Word and the answering or response i n our 
human l i f e which i n t r a d i t i o n a l Christian theology i s the 
action of the Holy S p i r i t . I t i s along such lines that we 
can understand the general Christian conviction that 
somehow, i n and through Jesus Christ, God i s specially and 
decisively present and at work, that i n Christ God 
reconciles us to himself, and that the Self-expression (or 
Word of God) i s i n him known to us i n human terms and with 
singular i n t e n s i t y . ' ( 7 8 ) 
The connection between Pittenger's Christology and doctrine of salvation 
i s here apparent. I t i s as men respond to the loving a c t i v i t y of God 
manifested i n Christ that they w i l l know the 'quickening i n jjrs" the s e l f -
same working of the Word', and then move towards the f u l f i l m e n t of the 
divine w i l l of love. Christ, the one i n whom human response and divine 
grace were most perfect l y married i s thus the archtype of our salvation. 
God's presence 'known to us i n human terms and with singular i n t e n s i t y ' 
i n Christ thus becomes the hope and goal towards which we move i n the 
fellowship of Christ. This path i s towards the f u l f i l m e n t of our 
(77) i b i d . , p. 27 . 
(78) i b i d . , pp. 27 -28 . 
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God-given aim and thus i s a r e j e c t i o n of sin and the way of salvation. 
So, for Pittenger, there i s i n Christ the perfect personal union 
of the divine Word and human response. I n order, however, to be clear 
what he means by t h i s , two possible interpretations of t h i s union, 
which he rej e c t s , should be considered. 
( i i i ) Two false t r a i l s 
F i r s t l y , Pittenger says of his approach that i t i s no 'deifying 
of Jesus the Man of Nazareth l i k e that i n pagan cu l t s , i n which a hero 
was exalted more and more to the position of a god'.(79) Christian 
experience rather has seen Jesus not as a god, nor even as one who 
merely 'showed God to the world, without himself sharing i n that which 
he disclosed'; but as 'the revelation or manifestation of the one and 
only God', being 'linked with God i n some genuine unity of person'.(80) 
I t was with t h i s t r u t h that the controversies surrounding the early 
oecumenical councils were concerned. This was more than simply a 
quarrel about an i o t a i n Greek; 'as i t has been caricatured', rather 
'the t r u t h i s that the whole Christian l i f e i n f a i t h i s centered i n 
that i o t a which distinguishes between same substance and l i k e substance'. 
Thus the r e a l i t y met i n Christ was d i v i n i t y i t s e l f , God himself. Thus 
he describes the Christian conviction as being t h i s 'inescapable t r u t h 
t hat anyone who asks for a r e a l i t y more real than that which encounters 
him i n Christ knows not f o r what he asks. Which i s the same as saying 
that t h i s r e a l i t y met i n Christ i s God himself'. ( 8 l ) 
The second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that Pittenger rejects as being an 
(79) i b i d . , p. 26. 
(80) i b i d . , p. 26. 
(81) W.I., p. 84. 
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Inadequate description of Christ's person, i s that here we have the 
supreme example of human nature 'moving towards r e a l i z i n g a potential 
d i v i n i t y which i s inherent i n i t as such. This r e a l i z a t i o n occurs 
when, i n Jesus, we have a perfect human nature, which then by d e f i n i t i o n 
i s divine'. ( 8 2 ) Clearly t h i s must be a tempting avenue f o r someone l i k e 
Pittenger who stresses the divine germ i n every man, and whose view of 
sin and human nature would speak of the former as being the f a i l u r e to 
realize the divinely intended aim of the l a t t e r . The reason why 
Pittenger rejects any understanding of the ' d i v i n i t y ' of Christ as being 
the perfection of human nature i n him i s s i g n i f i c a n t . He does so 
because such a view admits of no divine transcendence, implying that 
God and the world are i d e n t i c a l , which they are not. I f man were to 
aspire to d i v i n i t y both the human and the divine must at least i n theory 
be on the same l e v e l , which they are not. However, 'the world i s i n 
God, God i s i n the world, he penetrates i t and works through i t and 
employs i t f o r his purposes, but he i s himself not the world nor 
anything i n the world, not even human nature at i t s best'. (83) 
Elsewhere Pittenger responds to any 'misunderstanding' of his 
'phrases about the 'actualization' i n our Lord of a human ' p o t e n t i a l i t y ' 
everywhere found i n men and i n some of them ' p a r t i a l l y realized': 
'In no sense whatsoever am I asserting that these p a r t i a l 
r e a l i z a t i o n s , and above a l l the 'actualization' i n Christ, 
are accomplished by some 'natural unfolding' or by the 
unaided e f f o r t s of manhood alone. The whole point of my 
argument has been that i t i s by the divine action, the 
Self-expression of God, the operation of the Word, that 
t h i s occurs. I n every instance of p a r t i a l r e a l i z a t i o n , 
i t i s the word of God at work; a f o r t i o r i i n the case of 
Jesus Christ, the Word of God i s active i n f u l l measure.'(84) 
(82) G.P., p. 27 . 
(83) i b i d . , p. 28. 
(84) W.I., p. 244. 
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This i s consistent with Pittenger's whole position. I t accords with 
h i s rejoinders to those who accuse him, especially i n respect of his 
view of sin, of being a modern Pelagian. He does not teach that e v i l 
can be overcome by human e f f o r t alone, that human progress i s 
inev i t a b l e , or that human pot e n t i a l i n any man or even i n Christ can 
be realized by his own unaided e f f o r t s . Rather he i n s i s t s on 'love's 
p r i o r i t y ' , on the p r i o r i t y of God's grace, which i s 'his love operating 
i n the world'. (85) Despite his emphasis on Christ's humanity and on 
the value of a l l humanity i t has to be recognised that t h i s i s dependent 
on the p r i o r a f f i r m a t i o n of the divine loving a c t i v i t y . 'We love 
because he f i r s t loved us.'(86) So his answer to the 'how' of t h i s 
union of God and the man i s to speak of 'the energizing and indwelling 
of God i n him by mutual interpenetration of the divine and the human 
reaching a climactic stage'.(87) 
( i v ) The interpenetration 
That phrase, 'the energizing and indwelling of God by mutual 
interpenetration of the divine and the human reaches a climactic stage' 
i n Christ, i s a succinct expression of Pittenger's Christology. I t 
makes i t clear that the operation of the divine Word i s the prime factor 
but also that i t i s only when that finds a welcoming human response that 
new heights can be reached i n divine-human encounter; that only occurred 
i n Christ. I n the following formula which Pittenger offers as a summary 
statement of Antiochene Christology these same points are held 
together: 
(85) C.R., p. 64. 
(86) W.I., p. 245. 
(87) G.P., p. 26 . 
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'The Eternal Son or Word so appropriated and employed 
the .humanity which by divine providential operation was 
conceived and born of Mary that he possessed i n that 
humanity an organ fo r self-expression which was adequate 
to his purposes, while the human l i f e which was conceived 
and born of Mary so appropriated and expressed the Eternal 
Son or Word that such an organ was i n fa c t available f o r 
the Son's or Word's purposes among men.'(88) 
The context of that quotation i s a discussion of Theodore of Mopsuestia 
and by i t he not only indicates that he believes that Theodore did 
manage to speak s a t i s f a c t o r i l y of the union of God and man i n Christ to 
form a single person (prosopon), but that he did so without destroying 
either of the two u n i t i n g natures; and from t h i s he takes the clue f o r 
his own Christology. Indeed the foregoing i s an adequate summary of 
Pittenger's own position. As H. E. W. Turner says: 
'For Pittenger there i s no decisive break, no invasion from 
without (the classical statement of the I-ncarnation), no 
st i c k i n g together of two u t t e r l y disparate e n t i t i e s (the 
divine and human natures of Christ) or the replacement of 
one e n t i t y by another (the impersonal manhood), but 
rather the perfectly adjusted and s u f f i c i e n t vehicle i n 
and through whom the divine a c t i v i t y and purpose sire 
operative i n man, as man and f o r man.'(89) 
I t i s thus through the 'coincidence',(90) the 'compresence'(91) or as 
Pittenger himself would say the 'mutual interpenetration' of divine 
and human acts that the u n i t y of Christ's person i s maintained i n 
Pittenger's thought. I t i s through mutual response, through a 
re c i p r o c i t y i n 'good w i l l ' (eudokia) of which human love and marriage 
are the only possible images, that there i s seen i n the l i f e of Jesus 
that perfect harmony of God and man. However, f o r the meaning of t h i s 
to be f u l l y grasped one needs to be constantly reminded that Pittenger 
(88) W.I., p. 92 . 
(89) H. E. W. Turner: Jesus the Christ, Mowbrays, London, 1976, p. 100. 
(90) i b i d . , p. 100. 
(91) John Mclntyre: The Shape of Christology, London, S.C.M. Press, 
1966, p. 140. 
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i s not t a l k i n g about the coming together of substances. No doubt, 
as was noted e a r l i e r , since the Antiochenes had only a metaphysics of 
substances with which to work they were open to the c r i t i c i s m of t r y i n g 
to force two i n t o one and f a i l i n g to do so creating a divided Christ. 
Pittenger, however, believes that process thought with i t s stress on 
dynamic becoming obviates such d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
(v) The process perspective 
The aspects of process thought that are of significance here are 
the God-given aim of each occasion i n l i f e and also that each actual 
occasion i s a concrescence of prehensions. Both of these have already 
been outlined. The prevenience of the divine Logos can readily be 
equated with the divine aim present to each moment of l i f e and the 
prehension i n t e g r a l to each occasion, noticeable at both microscopic 
and macroscopic levels, i s how the mutual interpenetration of the divine 
and human i n Jesus can be understood. Thus at each moment of Jesus' 
l i f e there was a coming together of the divine aim and the affirmative 
response to i t ; a response b u i l t upon similar responses made i n e a r l i e r 
occasions. Each moment of his l i f e was a r i c h , positive concrescence of 
divine and human prehensions. Thus on the larger scale i t i s possible 
to say that his was a l i f e u t t e r l y dedicated to the divine w i l l of love, 
i n which there was the richest possible coming together of God and man. 
Although he may have borrowed insights eind vocabulary from the 
Antiochene Fathers i t i s only r e a l l y i n the dynamic terms as supplied 
by process thought that Pittenger's Christology can r e a l l y be understood. 
He i s speaking of the coming together of the human response and the 
divine aim at each moment of Christ's experience. Indeed i t i s only 
because at each moment of his experience that he made a positive response 
to the God-given aim of his l i f e that the d i r e c t i o n of his l i f e was as i t 
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was and the estimate of his person was made that he was the God-Man. 
( v i ) The implications of t h i s 'personal union' 
Such considerations should be borne i n mind i n the following 
rather beautiful quotation where the positive response of Jesus to 
the divine prevenient grace i s contrasted to our own desperately 
inadequate response. 
'The fanning i n t o flame of the divinely-implanted 
p o s s i b i l i t y of 'yes' to God i s both our work and the 
work of Godj but i t i s f i r s t the work of God. So i n 
Christ himself. The p o t e n t i a l i t y of a man's being the 
adequate organon f o r the Divine Self-expression i s the 
secret t r u t h about ourselves. I t s r e a l i z a t i o n i n divers 
manners here and there, i s effected through God's action 
which expresses i t s e l f i n our own free response as 
increasingly integrated human personalities. I t s 
actualization i n the person of Jesus Christ i s therefore 
both the Self-expression of God i n him ... and the f u l l 
and free response of a genuine Man i n whom God achieved 
through prevenient operation i n preparation, creation, 
and continuing s e l f - g i v i n g , what manhood i t s e l f also 
achieved: a human l i f e at once everywhere t r u l y 
creaturely and yet also at once everywhere the instrument 
fo r the divine Self-expression. This i s neither 'from 
below' alone, nor 'from above' alone; i t i s both, or 
better, i t i s 'alongside' manhood, through and i n and by 
manhood, bringing manhood to the t r u t h about i t s e l f which 
God eternally purposed from the beginning.'(92) 
Thus t h i s 'actualization' which was accomplished i n Christ and which 
should be the aim of l i f e f o r each person must neither be thought of 
as from above or from below alone; that i s as divine intervention 
irrespective of human response or human e f f o r t seeking alone to f i n d a 
maturity which would approach d i v i n i t y . I t i s only through the 
gracious interpenetration of both dimensions, only as the free human 
response to the operation of the divine Word i s enriched by being 
accepted by the divine Word,that f u l l actualization as seen i n Christ 
i s possible. 
(92) W.I., p. 245. 
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This i t should be noted again i n passing i s important f o r 
salvation i n Pittenger's view. 
'This 'actualization' i n the person of Christ Jesus, 
'once' accomplished i n man's his t o r y , i s also possessed 
of a 'for a l l ' q u a l i t y - by which I mean that i t i s not 
an isolated and i n e f f e c t u a l matter but that i t i s to be 
shared by a l l men.'(93) 
I n Pittenger's thought i t i s as we share i n the fellowship of Christ, 
that i n his grace we w i l l come to approach t h i s actualization and 
that i s the way of salvation leading to 'wholeness'. 
(93) i b i d . , p. 245. 
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CHAPTER 3 - APPENDIX 
A Critique of Pittenger's Degree Christology by Hick and Mclntyre 
(a) John Hick 
Hick characterizes such an approach as Neo-Arian, 'not to suggest 
g u i l t or error by association, but because essentially the issue that 
was raised by Arianism i s now being raised again'.(l) The essence of 
his c r i t i q u e of Pittenger's incarnationalism i s an insistence that 
Christian theology has taught not that Jesus i s d i f f e r e n t only i n degree 
but that he 'is the (unique) Logos become a man or become man' which 
means that 'incarnation i s an a l l or nothing event, not a general 
feature of human l i f e that was more intensively manifest at t h i s point 
than at others'. (2 ) Hick analyses a major d i f f i c u l t y i n a theology such 
as Pittenger's, which speaks of the Logos being united i n some degree 
w i t h every human being 'from zero i n an e v i l man to the one hundred per 
cent incarnation which we see i n Jesus',(3) as being 'how di d i t come 
about that there has been i n a l l history one and only one man who has 
responded so f u l l y to the divine influence as to be a perfect vehicle 
of the Logos i n our human world'. (4 ) This problem does not arise f o r 
classical Christology with i t s tenet that 'Jesus i s unique both i n fa c t 
and i n p r i n c i p l e ' , but f o r degree Christology which only sees him as 
'unique i n fac t ' i t i s a re a l problem;(5) f o r i f , as Pittenger would 
admit, 'the creator-creature relationship between God and mankind i s 
(1) John Hick: 'Christology at the Cross Roads' i n Ed. F. G. Healey, 
Prospect f o r Theology: Essays i n honour of H. H. Farmer, Welwyn, 
Nisbet, 1966, p. 140. 
(2) i b i d . , p. 141. 
(3) i b i d . , p. 142 . 
(4) i b i d . , p. 14^. 
(5 ) i b i d . , p. 144. 
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such that God i s able to cause a perfect human being to 'emerge' i n 
histo r y ' once, why could i t not happen more often, indeed, why has i t 
not happened i n every case? I f the Word at a l l times i s 'seeking to 
become incarnate i n human beings i n the sense he was in. Jesus why has 
he only succeeded i n the one case?' Hick suggests that 'the answer 
must be either that he did not want to do t h i s i n other cases or that 
he was unable to do so'.(6) He i s correct, however, to say that the 
whole tenor of Pittenger's theology would preclude the former, so the 
l a t t e r must be the answer. Yet the only satisfactory reason Hick can 
put forward as to why t h i s should be so i s that 'God had to wait f o r an 
adequate human vehicle of the Word to emerge; and t h i s ... i s the 
theological essence of Adoptionism'.(7) The t r a d i t i o n a l objection to 
adoptionism, he says, 'is that i t denies by implication the sovereign 
freedom of God i n His redeeming a c t i v i t y ' by making his entry i n t o 
human his t o r y dependent on the chance of a suitable human instrument 
appearing.(8) Pittenger's p a r t i c u l a r form of adoptionism would be that 
the operation of the Word was attendant upon there being one who 
f u l f i l l e d the God-given aim of his l i f e . 
Secondly Hick questions whether degree Christology i s 'compatible 
wi t h the New Testament data from which any Christology ought to s t a r t 
and he instances those passages both i n the Synoptics as well as the 
Fourth Gospel i n which 'Jesus i s depicted as speaking of himself as 
exi s t i n g i n a unique relationship to the Father'. (9) He suggests that 
(6) i b i d . , p. 145. 
(7) i b i d . , p. 145. 
(8 ) i b i d . , p. 145. 
(9 ) i b i d . , p. 146. e.g. Jn. 3 : 3 3 f ; 10:30; 14:6 and 9 f ; Mark 8 :38 ; 
Matt. 1 0 : 3 2 f ; 1 1 : 2 5 - 2 7 . 
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Pittenger would i n t e r p r e t such as evidence of 'Jesus' uniqueness i n 
f a c t ' ; of him knowing himself to be the 'perfect human vehicle of the 
Logos'. Personally I doubt i f Pittenger would, even speak of a 
'uniqueness of f a c t ' ; rather the over-all impression of Jesus to be 
found i n the Gospels would lead him to regard such verses as betraying 
early church influence. Referring to such verses Pittenger says: 
'In respect to the claims put i n t o Jesus' mouth, 
especially those i n the fourth Gospel but also those 
i n the synoptics as w e l l , we may be sure that he did 
not t a l k l i k e that.'(10) 
Such preconceptions would i n Hick's eyes deny to Pittenger the necessary 
ingredients f o r a thorough Christology. 
Hick's t h i r d argument draws upon a quotation i n which Athanasius 
i n order to safeguard the doctrine of redemption rejects any 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the relationship between God and Christ which i s other 
than of 'ultimate essence or substance'. The opposing Arian view which 
a t t r i b u t e d 'adjectival deity' to Christ spoke also of the goal of men's 
l i v e s as becoming %£o\ K^V,* ^ oi^I>I ', (God's according to grace or by 
grace, or God's i n the sense of having the divine grace w i t h i n us)' -
of whom the prototype was Christ.(11) There i s indeed here a close 
p a r a l l e l to Pittenger's emphasis on God's indwelling through grace or 
£OSOKIO6. Such a view, Hick comments, 'places incarnation at the top 
of a continuous scale which descends through saintliness to the 
ordinary levels of human l i f e . The paradox of grace, which i s realized 
i n every good man, and i n every man i n so f a r as he i s good, was 
realized i n Christ with unique fulness and consistency'.(12) Echoes 
(10) C.R., p. 3 0 . 
(11) Hick, op.cit., p. 147. 
(12) i b i d . , p. 148. 
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o f P i t t e n g e r ' s treatment o f i n c a r n a t i o n are obvious here. Hick's 
c r i t i c i s m of t h i s approach i s t h a t ' i f s a l v a t i o n i s only a matter of 
a t t a i n i n g the p e r f e c t e d human nature seen i n Jesus, by f o l l o w i n g him, 
(which w i l l be shown t o be the essence of P i t t e n g e r ' s atonement v i e w ) , 
then what p r a c t i c a l ( i . e . s o t e r i o l o g i c a l ) d i f f e r e n c e does i t make 
whether or not he i s 'God i n c a r n a t e ' ? ' . ( l j ) 
Hick's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h a degree G h r i s t o l o g y , f o u r t h l y , i s 
t h a t i t does not do j u s t i c e t o the f u l n e s s of C h r i s t i a n f a i t h and 
worship. The a t t i t u d e o f worship i s not a p p r o p r i a t e t o one who simply 
as man revealed the path of wholeness of l i f e through d i v i n e 
i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n . Yet worship has always been the C h r i s t i a n ' s response 
t o C h r i s t . Hick r e q u i r e s t h a t C h r i s t o l o g y should say much more than i s 
allowed f o r i n degree C h r i s t o l o g y ; 'impelled by the i n n e r l o g i c of the 
worship he has evoked by h i s redeeming i n f l u e n c e upon human l i f e ' . ( l 4 ) 
I b e l i e v e t h a t these inadequacies i n P i t t e n g e r ' s theology w i l l become 
more apparent when h i s atonement views are s t u d i e d . 
(b) John McIntyre 
Mclntyre's c r i t i c i s m s are s i m i l a r t o those of Hick. He w r i t e s : 
' i n t a k i n g the compresence of God and man i n a man 
s t r i v i n g p e r f e c t l y t o respond t o the grace of an 
i n d w e l l i n g God, as the analogue o f the presence of 
two natures i n Jesus C h r i s t , Dr. P i t t e n g e r f a i l s t o 
see t h a t C h r i s t o l o g y has always assumed as a f i r s t 
premise t h a t God i s not i n C h r i s t i n the same way as 
he i s i n o r d i n a r y men or even i n s a i n t s ; and t h a t 
t h i s d i f f e r e n c e has been the C h r i s t o l o g i c a l problem. 
We do not solve t h a t problem by i g n o r i n g i t or 
denying i t . ' ( 1 5 ) 
i b i d . , p. 148. 
i b i d . , p. 149. 
John Mclntyre: The Shape of C h r i s t o l o g y , London, S.C.M. Press, 
1966, p. 140. 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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Mclntyre recognises t h a t t h i s a r i s e s from P i t t e n g e r ' s d e s i r e t o 
'safeguard the genuine and complete humanity of C h r i s t ' , but he 
suggests t h a t n ot only i s h i s s o l u t i o n of 'compresence' an evasion, 
i t i s also confused. P i t t e n g e r ' s t a l k about the Word so a p p r o p r i a t i n g 
Jesus' humanity through Mary ' t h a t he possessed ... an organ f o r s e l f -
expression adequate t o h i s purposes', comes i n Mclntyre's view very 
close t o Adopt!onism.(16) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t although P i t t e n g e r acknowledges 
the c r i t i c i s m s of Hick and Mclntyre (17) he o f f e r s no 'expended r e p l y ' ( l 8 ) 
but merely o f f e r s C h r i s t o l o g y Reconsidered as a f u r t h e r statement of h i s 
p o s i t i o n . This confirms t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s a t t i t u d e t o C h r i s t o l o g y i s 
based upon presuppositions very d i f f e r e n t from those o f h i s c r i t i c s . 
These c r i t i c i s m s , however, w i l l be used l a t e r i n the study when 
Pi t t e n g e r ' s whole p o s i t i o n i s evaluated. 
(16) i b i d . , pp. 140-141 quo t i n g P i t t e n g e r , W.I., p. 92. 
(17) C.R., p. i x . 
(18) i b i d . , p. 18. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DECISIVENESS OF CHRIST 
Since P i t t e n g e r ' s C h r i s t o l o g y i s an attempt t o understand C h r i s t 
i n the context of the i n c a r n a t i o n a l presence of the Word of God i n 
nature and h i s t o r y , t o see him as p a r t of the ongoing a c t i v i t y of God, 
the r e l a t i o n of C h r i s t t o t h a t a c t i v i t y must be considered f o r t h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n of h i s C h r i s t o l o g y t o be complete. Thus the f i r s t h a l f of 
t h i s chapter w i l l be concerned w i t h h i s r e j e c t i o n of the concept of 
' f i n a l i t y ' when a p p l i e d t o C h r i s t and h i s preference f o r the idea o f 
the 'importance' o f C h r i s t w i t h i n the ongoing d i v i n e a c t i v i t y ; a phrase 
he borrows from Whitehead. This w i l l l e a d on t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
Church as p a r t of the C h r i s t event. 
(1) His r e j e c t i o n of the concept of f i n a l i t y 
P i t t e n g e r f i n d s i t u n h e l p f u l t o speak of the ' f i n a l i t y of C h r i s t ' , 
not only because i t might seem t o imply t h a t God's r e v e l a t i o n ended w i t h 
C h r i s t , which 'no responsible t h e o l o g i a n and no s e n s i t i v e C h r i s t i a n 
would wish t o a s s e r t ' , ( l ) but also because i t e x h i b i t s a ' f a l s e C h r i s t o -
centrism' i m p l y i n g t h a t God's r e v e l a t i o n i s confined 'to Jesus C h r i s t 
and t o him alone'.(2) Such a theology which centres ' a l l possible 
s a l v a t i o n i n an acceptance o f the h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e of Jesus C h r i s t ' 
would deprive 'the v a s t m a j o r i t y of men throughout the h i s t o r y of the 
w o r l d and across the globe a t t h i s moment of any hope of a u t h e n t i c 
e x i s t e n c e ' . ( j ) Such i s unacceptable t o P i t t e n g e r since i t would 
(1) C.R., p. 88. 
(2) i b i d . , p. 89. 
0) i b i d . , p. 90. 
116. 
i m p l i c i t l y deny h i s claim t h a t the Logos i s a t work t o some degree i n 
every man w i t h the attendant p o s s i b i l i t y o f awareness of God-given 
t r u t h and s a l v a t i o n . 
I f P i t t e n g e r had t o use the word ' f i n a l i t y ' a t a l l of C h r i s t i t 
would only be as the ' c l a s s i c a l instance' of God's working through 
c r e a t i o n and h i s t o r y , ( 4 ) and i n t h i s context what i s 'decisive' (the 
word P i t t e n g e r p r e f e r s ) about him i s t h a t he discloses and demonstrates 
the nature of God t o be l o v e . ( 5 ) The i n c a r n a t i o n gives the clue t o the 
' i n c a r n a t i o n a l presence of the Word o f God i n nature, i n h i s t o r y and i n 
human l i f e ' . ( 6 ) This d e c i s i v e d i s c l o s u r e of the d i v i n e nature which i s 
the c e n t r a l a f f i r m a t i o n both o f h i s C h r i s t o l o g y and s o t e r i o l o g y , 
P i t t e n g e r explains i n terms of i t s 'importance' w i t h i n the c r e a t i v e 
advance.(7) 
(2) The 'importance' of the C h r i s t event 
He defines the Whiteheadian concept of 'importance' by saying 
t h a t i t i s employed; 
'to i n d i c a t e the f a c t t h a t some s p e c i f i c occurrence, 
some p a r t i c u l a r event or s e r i e s of concurrent events, 
some p a r t i c u l a r stance or a t t i t u d e , provides f o r any 
responsible t h i n k e r the "clu e " which he takes f o r h i s 
understanding of "how t h i n g s go"'.(8) 
He goes on: 
'That which i n t h i s sense i s "important" n o t only seems 
t o sum up or t o c r y s t a l l i z e (so t o say) our p r i o r 
experience, but also opens up f o r us new avenues of 
p o s s i b i l i t y , l e a d i n g t o f u t u r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which 
w i l l be e n r i c h i n g and deepening i n our experience. 
(4) i b i d . , p. 89. 
(5) i b i d . , pp. 92-95. 
(6) W.I., p. 240. 
(7) C.R., p. 99-
(8) P.T.C.P., p. 18. 
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Even more s i g n i f i c a n t , the "important" w i l l a c t u a l l y 
inaugurate a new l e v e l of understanding and thus give 
r i s e t o a new l e v e l of experience f o r us and f o r those 
who f o l l o w us. I t has an o b j e c t i v e as w e l l as a 
s u b j e c t i v e reference.'(9) 
The o b j e c t i v e aspect i s c l e a r l y the C h r i s t i a n a s s e r t i o n ' t h a t i n 
Jesus C h r i s t , i n what prepared f o r him and f o l l o w e d a f t e r him' there 
was 'a unique, s p e c i a l and d e f i n i t i v e a c t i o n of God towards men'.(10) 
I n Jesus C h r i s t there ' i s a d i s c l o s u r e which i n the h i g h e s t degree i s 
"important"';(11) because i t i s a d i s c l o s u r e of God's a c t i v i t y i n the 
wo r l d . I n the 'event of Jesus C h r i s t ' 'an occurrence of c r u c i a l and 
d e c i s i v e "importance"' ... 'something has happened which provides the 
clue t o how the w o r l d goes and t o how God acts i n t h a t world'.(12) 
R e f e r r i n g t o t h i s b e l i e f t h a t i n the C h r i s t event the nature of 
God was d i s c l o s e d , he comments: 
'This d e c l a r a t i o n o f f a i t h i s indemonstrable, so f a r as 
s t r i c t l o g i c goes; i t must be accepted by a commitment 
of s e l f t o i t s 'importance'. Yet, so the C h r i s t i a n says, 
i t 'proves i t s e l f ' because of i t s remarkable f e r t i l i t y , 
i t s e x t r a o r d i n a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s , and i t s c apacity t o 
e n r i c h and 'enable' those who accept i t . 1 ( 1 5 ) 
I t seems c l e a r then t h a t there i s a s t r o n g s u b j e c t i v e element i n 
P i t t e n g e r ' s use of the concept of importance, f o r i t i s as men respond 
t o the C h r i s t event and f i n d i n i t a source of enrichment t h a t i t s 
'importance' i s asserted. This conclusion i s r e i n f o r c e d by t h i s 
d e f i n i t i o n . 
(9) i b i d . , p. 19. 
(10) W.I., p. 25. 
(11) P.T.C.F., p. 19. 
(12) W. N. P i t t e n g e r : 'The Doctrine of C h r i s t i n a Process Theology', 
The Expository Times, V o l . 82, 1970, p. 9. 
(15) i b i d . , p. 9. 
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'Certain aspects of human experience s t r i k e us as having 
unusual s i g n i f i c a n c e . Through the fo r c e of t h e i r impact 
upon us, and through t h e i r f r u i t f u l n e s s f o r us i n a l l o f 
our l a t e r l i f e , they open up new depths f o r our 
understanding, i l l u m i n a t e what we have already 
experienced, and prepare the way f o r what we may 
experience i n the f u t u r e . They shape us and they shape 
our way o f experiencing the world. I t i s i n t h i s way 
t h a t the r e v e l a t i o n of God i n C h r i s t i s ' s p e c i a l ' f o r 
the C h r i s t i a n . That i s , i t i s 'important', n o t merely 
because we choose t o make i t so, but because t h i s event 
or s e r i e s of events, as i t comes upon us w i t h such 
enormous impact, i s f r u i t f u l f o r us i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of our present experience, the opening up t o us of our 
new avenues f o r the understanding of t r u t h , the a b i l i t y 
which i t gives us t o grasp the s i g n i f i c a n c e of our own 
l i f e now and i n the f u t u r e . I n a l l these ways i t makes 
i t p o s sible f o r us t o grasp, as we may say, more of the 
nature and purpose of the God who ceaselessly moves i n 
upon us.'(14) 
This s u b j e c t i v e emphasis, however, seems t o be i n danger o f making 
C h r i s t o l o g y l i t t l e more than a s e r i e s of d e s c r i p t i v e statements as t o 
how C h r i s t has been received. I f C h r i s t ' s 'decisiveness' or 
'importance' i s dependent upon i t having an impact upon men, h e l p i n g 
them t o i n t e r p r e t t h e i r experience and grasp the s i g n i f i c a n c e of l i f e , 
then C h r i s t o l o g y as t r a d i t i o n a l l y understood has been diminished. 
C h r i s t o l o g y means the d o c t r i n e o f C h r i s t and has sought t o express the 
t r u t h o f the divine-human r e l a t i o n s h i p i n C h r i s t . To make t h a t 
dependent, t o any degree, upon i t s impact upon those who have received 
i t as s i g n i f i c a n t f o r themselves, i s a marked extension beyond normal 
C h r i s t o l o g i c a l boundaries. P i t t e n g e r then seems only able t o i n t e r p r e t 
C h r i s t i n an e v o l u t i o n a r y context i n terms of h i s impact upon the 
c r e a t i v e process. I f t h i s i s so, then the n o t i o n of 'importance' by 
which he seeks t o e x p l i c a t e C h r i s t ' s involvement i n the c r e a t i v e process 
would seem t o be a t o o l of u n c e r t a i n value. 
(14) W.I., p. 2J. 
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This w i l l become more apparent i n the course o f a comparison of 
Pi t t e n g e r ' s C h r i s t o l o g y w i t h t h a t of L i o n e l Thornton, both of whom use 
Whiteheadian i n s i g h t s , both of whom seek t o r e l a t e the i n c a r n a t i o n t o 
a processive view o f the universe, but who reach very d i f f e r e n t 
conclusions. 
(3) P i t t e n g e r and Thornton c o n t r a s t e d 
L i o n e l Thornton's book 'The Incarnate Lord' was an attempt t o 
present the i n c a r n a t i o n w i t h i n the context o f a world-view which took 
s e r i o u s l y 'emergent e v o l u t i o n ' and which was l a r g e l y based on Whitehead's 
view of the universe. W i t h i n a view which h e l d t h a t the cosmos ' i s i n a 
process o f development through time'(15) he sought t o e x p l i c a t e how God 
i s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s process and more p a r t i c u l a r l y how 'the transcendent 
c r e a t o r has entered ' i n t o the order or process of space and time, of 
nature and h i s t o r y , i n the person of Jesus C h r i s t ' , ( 1 6 ) which he believes 
the d o c t r i n e of the i n c a r n a t i o n has t r a d i t i o n a l l y asserted. This indeed 
i s Thornton's dilemma, f o r w h i l e he would speak of Jesus C h r i s t as the 
new emergent w i t h i n the e v o l u t i o n a r y process i n which the i n c a r n a t i o n 
o f God occurs, so t h a t 'the i n c a r n a t i o n brings c r e a t i o n t o i t s t r u e end 
i n God' thus meaning t h a t 'the cosmic s e r i e s i s gathered up i n t o the 
human organism of Jesus C h r i s t ' , ( 1 7 ) y e t he believes t h a t t h i s can only 
be so i f something more than simple processive e v o l u t i o n i s recognised 
and t h a t i s the involvement o f God i n the l i f e o f Jesus C h r i s t t o which 
t r a d i t i o n a l i n c a r n a t i o n a l theology has always pointed. To t h i s e x t r a 
i n Thornton's scheme P i t t e n g e r o b j e c t s . 
(15) L i o n e l Thornton: The Incarnate Lord, London, Longmans, 1928, 
p. 66. 
(16) i b i d . , p. 28. 
(17) i b i d . , p. 225. 
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He accuses Thornton of being so concerned 'to a s s e r t the 
C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f t h a t i n some sense Jesus C h r i s t i s both f i n a l and 
t r a n s c e n d e n t ' ( l 8 ) t h a t he abandons the emergent e v o l u t i o n c o n c e p t u a l i t y 
and 'introduces i n t o the p i c t u r e an i n t r u s i o n or descent o f God the 
Word i n t o the c r e a t i v e process',(19) an ' a r b i t r a r y i n t r u s i o n 
ab e x t r a ' , ( 2 0 ) which c o n t r a d i c t s the whole of the Whiteheadian approach 
which Thornton had employed thus f a r . P i t t e n g e r quotes(21) several 
c r i t i c s and reviewers of Thornton's work who agree t h a t i n h i s e f f o r t 
'to safeguard the uniqueness and ' f i n a l i t y ' of the r e v e l a t i o n of God 
i n C h r i s t , Thornton i s i n e f f e c t o b l i g e d t o give up the very schema 
which he has employed throughout h i s study'.(22) Others, though, who 
applaud Thornton b e l i e v e t h a t Whitehead's system i s n o t s t r o n g enough 
t o c o n t a i n a l l t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l i n c a r n a t i o n a l theology he sought t o 
express. A. M. Ramsey suggests t h a t Whitehead's scheme r e q u i r e s the 
i n c a r n a t i o n as Thornton i n t e r p r e t e d i t ' f o r i t s v a l i d i t y and coherence', 
so t h a t i t f i n d s i t s 'completion i n the h i s t o r i c f a i t h ' : ( 2 ^ ) and 
E. L. Mascall says t h a t Thornton was c o r r e c t 'to p a r t company w i t h 
Whitehead a t the precise p o i n t where the r e l a t i o n of f i n i t e being t o 
u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y i s involved'.(24) Thus t h i s divergence of o p i n i o n 
(18) C.R., p. 101. 
(19) i b i d . , p. 101. 
(20) W.I., p. 168. 
(21) i b i d . , p. 109-
(22) e.g. Dorothy Emmet: Whitehead's Philosophy o f Organism, London, 
Macmillan, 1966, (2nd E d i t i o n ) , p. 255n. 
' i t (Thornton's argument) i n e f f e c t s a c r i f i c e s the conception of 
an organic connection between the e t e r n a l order and the temporal 
s e r i e s i n order t o preserve a f i n a l i t y c f r e v e l a t i o n . ' 
(23) A. M. Ramsey: From Gore t o Temple, London, Longmans, I96O, p. 25. 
(24) E. L. Mascall: The Openness of Being, London, Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1971, P- 1^2] 
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w i t h i n an agreed e v o l u t i o n a r y world-view, i s e s s e n t i a l l y one of how 
the i n c a r n a t i o n should be understood, which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t i v e 
f o r t h i s study. 
Mascall's comment, given above, although t e c h n i c a l l y accurate as 
t o the precise p o i n t a t which Thornton p a r t e d from Whitehead's 
metaphysic also p o i n t s t o the general u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t Thornton h e l d 
about Whitehead's thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n respect of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of God t o the created world. Whitehead suggests t h a t ' c r e a t i v i t y ' , 
'the c r e a t i v e advance i n t o n o v e l t y ' i s the metaphysical u l t i m a t e t o 
which both God and the w o r l d are su b j e c t and i n the p u r s u i t o f which 
both God and the World are dependent on each ether. Now although t h i s 
was most f u l l y worked out i n 'Process and R e a l i t y ' , expressed i n phrases 
such as God ' i s not before a l l c r e a t i o n , but w i t h a l l c r e a t i o n ' ( 2 5 ) or 
' i t i s as t r u e t o say t h a t God creates the worl d , as t h a t the w o r l d 
creates God'(26), which was published i n the year a f t e r 'The Incarnate 
Lord', nevertheless these ideas were present i n e a r l i e r works, and 
Thornton f i n d s them unacceptable. His c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t by making God 
dependent upon c r e a t i v i t y , 'God i s made out t o be something l e s s than 
the e t e r n a l order';(27) 'the transcendent otherness and a c t u a l i t y of God 
are diminished'.(28) He proceeds: 
'Creation must always be the product of e t e r n i t y ; t h a t i s 
t o say, such processes as we recognise i n the organic 
s e r i e s must always be r e f e r r e d t o an a c t i v i t y d e r i v i n g 
from the e t e r n a l order ... I f i t be granted t h a t God i s 
i n some sense transcendent over t h i s c r e a t i o n , then t h i s 
a c t i v i t y o f s e l f - g i v i n g has f o r i t s necessary o b j e c t 
something less than i t s e l f . ' ( 2 9 ) 
(25) Whitehead, o p . c i t . , p. 405. 
(26) i b i d . , p. 410. 
(27) Thornton, o p . c i t . , p. 397. 
(28) i b i d . , p. 397-
(29) i b i d . , pp. 397-8. 
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Thornton's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Whitehead's general system thus 
leaves the way open f o r h i s departure from t h a t system i n respect of 
C h r i s t o l o g y , i n which Mascall says, Thornton was 'altogether determined 
t o be orthodox'.(JO) Thus w h i l e f o l l o w i n g the o r g a n i s t i c view of 
c r e a t i o n Thornton can speak of the e t e r n a l order being i n c o r p o r a t e d 
' i n t o the succession of events i n space-time through an ascending 
cosmic s e r i e s ' , ( 3 1 ) y e t he refuses t o acknowledge t h a t God can i n any 
sense be dependent upon t h a t 'organic s e r i e s ' ( 3 2 ) and thus he i s q u i t e 
c o n s i s t e n t when he claims t h a t C h r i s t i s i n no sense a product of the 
c r e a t i v e organic s e r i e s but an i r r u p t i o n of the Logos-Creator or the 
absolute e t e r n a l order i n t o the s e r i e s . As he says: 
'For the i n f i n i t y o f the e t e r n a l order does n o t f i n d i n 
man on h i s own l e v e l an adequate medium or agent o f 
r e v e l a t i o n . The C h r i s t o l o g y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , however, 
places the C h r i s t higher than any other man i n a p o s i t i o n 
beyond comparison as the agent of supreme r e v e l a t i o n ... 
Consequently the argument of t h i s book can f i n d no place 
f o r the mediator of an absolute r e v e l a t i o n , except h i s 
metaphysical s t a t u s be a l t o g e t h e r beyond the organic 
s e r i e s and on the l e v e l o f the e t e r n a l order.'(33) 
Thus Thornton i s concerned t o m a i n t a i n the d i v i n e transcendence 
and the uniqueness of C h r i s t as p a r t o f t h a t transcendence n o t l e a s t 
because the redeeming work of C h r i s t i s thereby safeguarded. 
'The r e v e l a t i o n of God i s given i n the form of a 
redeeming a c t i v i t y which i s u n i v e r s a l i n scope and 
a l l - p e n e t r a t i n g i n power. A C h r i s t o l o g y which leaves 
the absolute q u a l i t y of t h i s saving power i n an u n c e r t a i n 
p o s i t i o n i s one which breaks w i t h the C h r i s t i a n 
conception of God.'(34) 
I t i s i n order t o safeguard t h i s transcendence and the d i v i n e redemption 
(30) E. L. Mascall: C h r i s t , the C h r i s t i a n and the Church, London, 
Longmans, 1946, p. 45. 
(31) Thornton, o p . c i t . , p. 98. 
(32) i b i d . , p. 397. 
(33) i b i d . , p. 260. 
(34) i b i d . , p. 260. 
123. 
w i t h i n an 'organic-series' view of the w o r l d t h a t Thornton upholds the 
uniqueness of C h r i s t by speaking of h i s l i f e being subsumed i n the 
E t e r n a l Word. Thornton, however, was c a r e f u l n ot t o suggest some 
' c e n t r a l core' o f Jesus' being 'which must be ab s t r a c t e d t o make room 
f o r the E t e r n a l Word',(35) p r e f e r r i n g t o speak i n terms o f 'the 
p r i n c i p l e s of u n i t y which e x i s t i n any other human organism e x i s t also 
i n him'. The f o l l o w i n g i s h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between Jesus and other men. 
'Whereas i n created human beings the hi g h e s t law of being 
i s t h a t transcending p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y which i s proper t o 
a human organism on the l e v e l of s p i r i t and which flows 
down from the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of the e t e r n a l order; 
t h i s i s not the hi g h e s t law of being i n the Incarnate Lord. 
The h i g h e s t law of being i n h i s case i s the law of being 
proper t o d e i t y . ' ( 3 6 ) 
Through t h i s device of 'the h i g h e s t law of being' Thornton i s t r y i n g t o 
say t h a t although i n C h r i s t there i s a complete human nature y e t t h a t 
nature i s not personalized by or i n i t s e l f but by and i n the p r e - e x i s t e n t 
person of the Divine Word. 
Thornton sets t h i s w i t h i n the context of an organic view of the 
universe by speaking o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
' i n the Incarnate Lord the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s 
super-organic and cannot t h e r e f o r e be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t y proper t o a human organism i n the 
organic s e r i e s . I n any organism the degree o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
which i t embodies i s determined by i t s transcending p r i n c i p l e 
of u n i t y , which imparts t o the organism i t s s t a t u s i n the 
s e r i e s . The p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y proper t o a human organism 
i n the s e r i e s determines i t s degree of i n d i v i d u a l i t y , which 
i s the hi g h e s t degree of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n the s e r i e s , y e t 
s t i l l created and incomplete. But the p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y 
which determines the s t a t u s o f the Incarnate Lord i s not a 
p a r t i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y , but the E t e r n a l 
Word Himself, who i s the source of a l l c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y . 
Consequently the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n the Incarnate 
Lord i s not a created m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of 
(35) i b i d . , p. 287. 
(36) i b i d . , pp. 237-8. 
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i n d i v i d u a l i t y , n ot a f u r t h e r development of t h a t p r i n c i p l e 
i n i t s organic form. The p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n 
the Incarnate Lord i s Absolute I n d i v i d u a l i t y as i t e x i s t s 
i n the Person of the E t e r n a l Word.'(37) 
P i t t e n g e r c r i t i c i z e s Thornton i n three main respects. F i r s t l y , 
as has already been noted, he r e j e c t s any i n t r u s i o n ab e x t r a i n t o the 
ev o l v i n g universe. He would p r e f e r i n c a r n a t i o n t o be understood w i t h i n 
an e v o l u t i o n a r y context. Thornton c l e a r l y believes t h a t no e v o l u t i o n a r y 
v iew-point w i l l be able t o do j u s t i c e t o a l l t h a t C h r i s t i a n theology has 
sought t o say about the Incarnate Lord. 
Secondly, P i t t e n g e r accuses Thornton o f reducing 'the f u l l n e s s o f 
our Lord's humanity'.(38) Now w h i l e Thornton's u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o allow 
C h r i s t t o remain as an emergent which consummates the c r e a t i v e process 
and the nece s s i t y he f i n d s l a i d upon him t o speak of the Incarnate Lord 
being taken up t o the l e v e l of d e i t y makes such a c r i t i c i s m from someone 
l i k e P i t t e n g e r , who l a y s such heavy s t r e s s on C h r i s t ' s humanity 
i n e v i t a b l e , Thornton s t i l l r e j e c t s the c r i t i c i s m . He suggests t h a t 'a 
being who shares our humanity, y e t c o n t r a d i c t s the normal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of humanity i n c e r t a i n respects'(39) i s n ot the l e s s human f o r t h a t . 
Thornton wishes t o speak i n f u l l , dynamic terms of the s p e c i a l i t y of 
Chri s t ' s humani t y . 
'The humanity of the Incarnate Lord i s not a s t a t i c 
metaphysical e n t i t y , but a s p i r i t u a l organism ... A l l 
the p r i n c i p l e s of u n i t y which e x i s t i n any other human 
organism e x i s t also i n Him. But whereas i n created human 
beings the hi g h e s t law of being i s t h a t transcending 
p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t y which i s proper t o a human organism on 
the l e v e l of s p i r i t and which flows down from the c r e a t i v e 
a c t i v i t y of the e t e r n a l order, t h i s i s not the hi g h e s t law 
of being i n the Incarnate Lord.'(40) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
w.i 
Thornton, o p . c i t . 
i b i d . , pp. 237-8. 
i b i d . , p. 282. 
p. 107. 
p. 237. 
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Thornton's suggestion t h a t i n some sense C h r i s t represents the f u l l n e s s , 
p o s s i b l y the p e r f e c t i o n of humanity i s r e j e c t e d by P i t t e n g e r on the 
basis of what has been suggested i s a low, basic view of humanity. 
Thornton's ' l i f t i n g the "human organism" o f Jesus C h r i s t out of the 
context o f the emerging s e r i e s ' means, P i t t e n g e r suggests, t h a t 'the 
r e a l i t y of h i s belonging and hence of h i s being t r u l y human i n the 
f u l l e s t sense i s denied'.(41) These two c o n t r a s t i n g views o f humanity 
must thus be l e f t side by side. 
The t h i r d , and, i n the present context, most s i g n i f i c a n t 
c r i t i c i s m t h a t P i t t e n g e r r a i s e s against Thornton i s t h a t he was n o t 
s u f f i c i e n t l y f a m i l i a r w i t h Whitehead's concep'ouality t o recognise the 
value o f the concept o f 'importance' f o r h i s attempt t o speak of the 
decisiveness of Jesus w i t h i n the e v o l v i n g process.(42) P i t t e n g e r has 
been seen t o regard the n o t i o n of 'importance' as p r o v i d i n g the clue 
as t o how a p a r t i c u l a r occasion can have 's p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e as 
r e v e l a t o r y of the p o i n t and purpose of the whole e n t e r p r i s e i n which 
God i s engaged';(43) thus consonant w i t h h i s t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , 
meaning t h a t the C h r i s t event i s the important clue t o the whole of 
God 1s working i n the world. The f a c t t h a t P i t t e n g e r lays such s t o r e 
by t h i s concept t o the ext e n t of c r i t i c i s i n g Thornton f o r n o t having 
a s u f f i c i e n t grasp of Whitehead's work i n n e g l e c t i n g i t , means t h a t 
t h i s idea of 'importance' must be s t u d i e d i n more d e t a i l . Several 
p o i n t s may be made. 
F i r s t l y , Thornton i s not alone i n not grasping the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the idea of 'importance'. None of the other i n t e r p r e t e r s of 
(41) W.I., pp. 108-9. 
(42) C.R., p. 102. 
(43) i b i d . , p. 99. 
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Whitehead's thought f i n d i t s u f f i c i e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t t o warrant f u l l 
d i s c u s s i o n . W i l l i a m C h r i s t i a n ' s thorough a n a l y s i s of Whitehead's 
metaphysics cannot even f i n d room f o r an index reference t o the 
word;(44) John Cobb does n o t use the concept even i n h i s recent 
C h r i s t o l o g i c a l study;(45) and s i m i l a r l y David G r i f f i n makes no 
reference t o it. ( 4 6 ) Indeed the concept i s n o t found i n 'Process and 
R e a l i t y ' a t a l l . I t a r i s e s i n Whitehead's thought i n a chapter 
devoted t o i t i n 'Modes o f Thought'. Thus i t might be suspected t h a t 
P i t t e n g e r ' s c r i t i c i s m o f Thornton i n f a i l i n g t o grasp the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of t h i s concept should be reversed. P i t t e n g e r might be regarded as 
having over-employed a concept which has no r e a l v a l i d i t y i n Whitehead's 
thought. 
Secondly, t h i s i s i m p l i c i t l y conceded by P i t t e n g e r i n a f o o t n o t e 
t o h i s discussion of 'importance' where he admits t h a t , 'As experts i n 
Whitehead's philosophy w i l l observe, I am using the concept of 
'importance' i n a wider sense, and w i t h a s l i g h t s h i f t i n emphasis, 
although I be l i e v e my use of i t i s i n accord w i t h the tenor of 
Whitehead's thought'; (47) and he goes on t o say t h a t 'my p a r t i c u l a r 
sense o f the idea i s drawn from two statements' i n 'Modes o f Thought' 
i n which the idea of importance 'serves as a (my i t a l i c s ) dominant 
theme'.(48) C e r t a i n l y t h i s i s the most t h a t can be s a i d about the 
place o f 'importance' w i t h i n the book. 
(44) W i l l i a m A. C h r i s t i a n : An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 
New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959• 
(45) John B. Cobb Jnr.: C h r i s t i n a P l u r a l i s t i c Age, P h i l a d e l p h i a , The 
Westminster Press, 1975« 
(46) David R. G r i f f i n : A Process C h r i s t o l o g y , P h i l a d e l p h i a , The 
Westminster Press, 1973• 
(47) W.I., p. 2Jn. 
(48) i b i d . , p. 2Jn. 
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'Modes of Thought', which was published i n 1938, some t e n years 
a f t e r 'Process and R e a l i t y ' , i s very d i f f e r e n t from i t s systematic 
predecessor i n t h a t i t o f f e r s a s e r i e s of e x p l o r a t o r y essays suggesting 
t e n t a t i v e l y new modes of t h i n k i n g i n the v e i n of organic philosophy. 
Whitehead described the aim of the l e c t u r e s which comprise the book as 
being 'to examine some of those c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of our experience 
which are presupposed i n the d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t i e s o f mankind'.(49) Thus 
he takes c e r t a i n data of experience such as 'perspective', 'understanding' 
and 'expression' and examines them i m a g i n a t i v e l y i n order t o d i s c e r n 
whether such general notions can be seen t o have a wider a p p l i c a t i o n 
f o r p h i l o s o p h i c thought. I t i s an approach t o philosophy t h a t could be 
described as ' d e s c r i p t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' . P i t t e n g e r says of t h i s 
Whiteheadian approach t o philosophy: 
'Central t o process-philosophy as Whitehead developed 
i t , i s the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we must look a t experience 
as a whole. We must also look a t the w o r l d i n the same 
way, t a k i n g account o f a l l the data which are presented 
t o us ... Hence we may say t h a t u n i t y o f experience and 
the u n i t y of the w o r l d i n which t h a t experience i s 
enjoyed must be primary i n our e f f o r t t o understand the 
way i n which the w o r l d goes and the meaning of our 
experience i n the world.'(50) 
'Modes of Thought' i s a good example of Whitehead's doing t h i s . 
The n o t i o n of 'importance', i n the sense of p a r t i c u l a r relevance, 
when contrasted w i t h the 'matter of f a c t ' , i s one of the data of 
experience t h a t Whitehead considers. Thus a sense of 'importance' 
enables one t o make s e l e c t i o n from the ' m u l t i p l i c i t y of the matter o f 
f a c t ' . ( 5 1 ) Again, i n a phrase quoted by P i t t e n g e r w i t h approval, 
Whitehead speaks of 'importance' i n these terms. 
(49) Whitehead: Modes, p. 1. 
(50) W. N. P i t t e n g e r : A l f r e d North Whitehead, London, L u t t e r w o r t h , 
1969, P. 13. 
(51) Whitehead: Modes, p. 7. 
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'One c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of importance i s t h a t i t i s t h a t 
aspect of f e e l i n g whereby a perspective i s imposed upon 
the universe of t h i n g s f e l t . I n our more self-conscious 
entertainment of the n o t i o n , we are aware of grading the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i n g s about us i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t ... The two notions of importance and of 
perspective are c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d . ' ( 5 2 ) 
I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t however i n t e r e s t i n g such a discussion might be 
i t does not provide m a t e r i a l f o r a systematic C h r i s t o l o g y . Indeed 
Whitehead's use o f the term almost demands t h a t i t be used s u b j e c t i v e l y . 
His s t r e s s upon the data of experience means t h a t 'importance' w i l l be 
understood i n terms of how the i n d i v i d u a l assesses what i s important 
and s i g n i f i c a n t f o r him. Indeed P i t t e n g e r admits t h i s when he recommends 
t h a t 'Modes of Thought' should be read, ' e s p e c i a l l y f o r i t s r e c o g n i t i o n 
of the p a r t 'importance' has i n moulding and shaping our experience'. (53) 
P i t t e n g e r ' s suggestion, then, t h a t Whitehead's concept of 
'importance' i s v i t a l f o r C h r i s t o l o g y evaporates. He t r i e s t o show t h a t 
i t i s p o s s i b l e t o speak of God a c t i n g i n an 'important' manner i n Jesus 
but he cannot s u s t a i n such a p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t drawing i n s u b j e c t i v e 
reference. Indeed Whitehead's use of the n o t i o n was w h o l l y s u b j e c t i v e . 
When P i t t e n g e r uses t h i s concept t o i n t e r p r e t the decisiveness of 
Jesus i t i s most o f t e n i n terms of the 'importance' t h a t he has f o r us. 
He should only 'dare t o speak o f the decisiveness of the event Jesus 
C h r i s t , provided I recognized the richness of t h a t event and the 
o b j e c t i v e - s u b j e c t i v e q u a l i t y of i t s "importance" as i t impinges upon 
human experience'. (54) 
P i t t e n g e r here c l e a r l y wishes t o counter any accusation t h a t 
'importance' i s simply s u b j e c t i v e . I n the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n he 
(52) i b i d . , p. 11. 
(53) W.I., p. 23n. 
(54) C.R., p. 110. 
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endeavours to stress i t s objective aspect; but I f i n d his arguments 
unconvincing. 
'An occasion may be called 'important' when i t occurs 
w i t h i n the continuing process of events, provides 
i l l u m i n a t i o n of what has gone before, speaks to us now 
with a special impressiveness, and offers new ways of 
understanding what i s happening i n consequent hist o r y . 
We are drawn to that occasion, we are brought to respond 
to i t , because i t possesses a compelling q u a l i t y that 
demands our attention. There i s o b j e c t i v i t y here, i n 
that the occasion actually i s present to awaken our 
response ... There i s also s u b j e c t i v i t y . Since 'unless 
and u n t i l we respond the occasion cannot serve i t s 
function, our experience of i t i s as important as the 
occasion i t s e l f ; i t i s an experience of something and 
yet the something i s other than the experience. 1(55) 
I t i s my submission that an adequate Christology requires that we 
can t a l k about the divine a c t i v i t y of Christ apart from human response. 
Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' i n the Christ event does not 
f u l f i l t h i s . On analysis the 'importance' of -the Christ event i s seen 
to be wholly r e l i a n t upon i t s a b i l i t y to give the clue to the meaning 
of human existence. Pittenger's c r i t i c i s m s of Thornton are thus seen 
to be gratuitous. Thornton believed that the organic view of the 
universe was not able to do j u s t i c e to a l l that t r a d i t i o n a l theology 
had t r i e d to say about God i n Christ. Pittenger's counter suggestion 
that Whitehead's concept of 'importance' provided the necessary clue 
has been dissolved. 
This discussion has also raised a question mark against the 
continued use of the word 'incarnational' with reference to Pittenger's 
theology. This has been employed to describe his emphasis upon the 
a c t i v i t y of the Logos i n every man and throughout creation, and his 
placing of Jesus w i t h i n that context. Thornton's c r i t i q u e of Whitehead's 
(55) i b i d . , p. 110. 
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system, however, and the necessity he saw f o r introducing a special 
revelation of God i n Christ i n t o Whitehead's process!ve view, raises 
doubts about the v a l i d i t y of the continued use of t h i s word as an 
accurate description of Pittenger's approach. Thornton's insistence 
that the incarnation must be seen as a special revelation of the divine 
Word c a l l s i n question Pittenger's more general application of the 
word. To prevent confusion a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ought to be made between 
the two uses of the word 'incarnational', uses which betray two 
contrasting theological approaches. Since, then, the word 'incarnation' 
i s most often used with reference to the coming of Christ as a special 
revelation, and since i t i s Pittenger who i s presenting a theology 
based upon a more general application of the word, i t s use f o r the 
purposes of t h i s study should be accredited to that represented by 
Thornton. The word 'immanentist' might be suggested as being descriptive 
of Pittenger's approach, since he wishes to lay emphasis upon the more 
general indwelling of the Logos w i t h i n the creative process. I t i s then 
t h i s word that w i l l be used of Pittenger's theology i n the remainder of 
t h i s thesis. 
There remains, however, a further element i n Pittenger's 
Christology which claims that the decisiveness of Christ w i t h i n the 
ongoing a c t i v i t y of God cannot be divorced from the Church. A 
consideration of t h i s w i l l h i g h l i g h t 2sa£ a further subjective element 
i n his Christology. 
(4) The location of the incarnation 
Pittenger uses t h i s phrase to indicate that he 'locates' the 
incarnation not i n the h i s t o r i c a l person alone but i n the whole 'Christ 
event' of which Jesus i s the focus. 
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'God's a c t i v i t y i n the event we c a l l by Jesus' name must 
be seen i n the t o t a l i t y of that event and not simply i n 
the discrete i n d i v i d u a l who was i t s centre. I t i s e n t i r e l y 
appropriate that the name of Jesus should be given to the 
event whose central figure he i s , but i t would be a false 
abstraction to i s o l a t e the central figure from his context.'(56) 
The significance of t h i s i s best introduced by reference to an apparent 
difference of emphasis between Pittenger and John Knox, to whom 
Pittenger acknowledges great indebtedness.(57) 
Knox also professes h i s high regard f o r Pittenger's work, 
especially 'The Word Incarnate', to the extent that he would have 
' d i f f i c u l t y i n pointing to any matter on which (he) thinks i n a 
d i f f e r e n t way'.(58) The foundation of t h e i r agreement i s t h e i r 
presentation of an 'event' Christology which Knox wi t h reference to 
Pittenger represents as an 'emphasis on the genuineness of Jesus' 
humanity and on the dynamic character of his d i v i n i t y ' . ( 5 9 ) Knox, 
however, indicates one s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n emphasis between 
Pittenger and himself. 
' I believe I lay more stress than Dr. Pittenger on the 
'social' character of the h i s t o r i c a l locus of God's action 
i n Christ. He i s able to locate the Incarnation somewhat 
more s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Jesus himself than I seem able to do. 
He can say that the word was incarnate i n Jesus without 
the misgiving of the need of fu r t h e r explanation which I 
should f e e l i f I used these same words. I should always 
need to say, i f I were t r y i n g to speak precisely at a l l , 
t h at the Incarnation took place i n Jesus - in-the-midst-
of-his-own, i n other words, i n the nascent church. I f e e l 
sure Dr. Pittenger would not deny the t r u t h of t h i s kind 
of statement. But I see i t s importance and i t s bearing i n 
what, I believe, i s a somewhat d i f f e r e n t way. S t i l l the 
word he used i s always 'focus' rather than 'locus' - and 
perhaps his insistence on that term goes some distance i n 
resolving even t h i s difference.'(60) 
(56) C.R., p. 81. 
(57) i b i d . , p. 46, p. 66, p. 147. 
(58) John Knox: The Humanity and D i v i n i t y of Christ, Cambridge, The 
University Press, 1967, p. 112. 
(59) i b i d . , p. 112. 
(60) i b i d . , p. 112. 
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The area of Pittenger's thought i n which he might be accused of locating 
'the incarnation more s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Jesus h i m s e l f a n d to which Knox 
i s probably r e f e r r i n g , i s that emphasis upon the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus which 
forms part of his 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' . Although t h i s concept i s only 
defined as such i n 'Christology Reconsidered' Pittenger's attempt to 
hold together the two emphases of the faith-experience of the Church 
and the recognition that the l i f e of Jesus i s of decisive importance 
f o r the ongoing divine a c t i v i t y i s to be found i n his e a r l i e r books. 
Thus Knox, as he says, would have found t h i s emphasis upon the l i f e of 
Jesus as the area of the incarnation i n 'The Word Incarnate'. Yet the 
difference between Knox and Pittenger i n t h i s matter i s only one of 
very s l i g h t emphasis. Not only i s Knox correct i n recognising Pittenger's 
use of the word 'focus' as s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r i t i s an attempt to prevent 
any suggestion that the l i f e of Jesus was the exclusive area of the 
operation of the Word but, as has already been indicated, Pittenger's 
concept of 'double h i s t o r i c i t y ' i s very unbalanced with the f a i t h -
experience of the Church being the more predominant element. That, 
however, the Church when seen as part of the Christ event and the divine 
a c t i v i t y , i s a most s i g n i f i c a n t element i n Pittenger's thought, i s 
indicated by his reaction to Knox's comment. While acknowledging Knox's 
c r i t i c i s m he does not concede i t s v a l i d i t y though he does imply that as 
a r e s u l t of Knox's book his own emphasis upon the Church was given 
clearer d e f i n i t i o n by using the concept of the 'locus' of the 
incarnation.(6l) 
A consideration of these two words 'focus' and 'locus' i n 
Pittenger's thought w i l l help i n the d e f i n i t i o n of his Christology and 
(61) C.R., p. 66. 
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also indicate that despite Knox's hesi t a t i o n the Church plays a 
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n his theology. 
(a) Focus and Locus 
Pittenger says that his use of the word 'focus' i s to avoid the 
'falla c y of simple location', by which he means his wish to avoid any 
suggestion that God's revelation of himself was r e s t r i c t e d to Jesus, 
and any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f i n a l i t y of Christ which claims that i n 
Jesus God's revelation was f i n a l l y completed. 'The event of Jesus Christ' 
says Pittenger 'is not e n t i r e l y and absolutely d i f f e r e n t from a l l other 
events ... t h i s event i s not so much 'the supreme anomaly' as i t i s 'the 
classical instance' of God's mode of operation i n the world'.(62) As 
was established e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, the 'decisiveness' of Christ, 
i n Pittenger's view, means that i n the l i f e of Christ God acted i n such 
a way that he gave the clue, the d e f i n i t i v e example of a l l his working 
i n the world, of his self-revelation. Thus i n speaking of the Logos as 
the eternal self-expression of God,(63) Pittenger says that i t finds 
i t s 'focus' i n the l i f e of Jesus. 
'The Word who i s universally operative i n the natural 
world, i n human history, and i n the depths of man's l i f e , 
i s f o c a l l y expressed i n our Lord's f u l l and true 
humanity.'(64) 
Pittenger brings out the f u l l significance of t h i s , even f o r the 
salvation of mankind, i n the sense of the clue that i t offers to how 
l i f e should be l i v e d , i n the following quotation. 
(62) W. N. Pittenger: 'The Doctrine of Christ i n a Process Theology', 
The Expository Times, Vol. 82, 1970, p. 8. 
(63) w.i., p. 183. 
(64) i b i d . , p. 219. 
' i n Jesus Christ Christian f a i t h sees the pervasive and 
universal A c t i v i t y (called i n Christian theology the 
Eternal Word as the divine 'Logos', who i s Deity i n his 
Self-Expression) given a focus and a point, f o r us men 
and our wholeness of being. The entire movement i s 
crowned, so f a r as human-kind i s concerned, with an 
Action which shows the meaning of i t a l l . 'This' i s 
what God i s up to. And i n t h i s focusing i n Christ, men 
are given the t r u t h about l i f e , the way to l i v e , and the 
l i f e which i s worth l i v i n g ... Jesus Christ i s the focal 
manifestation i n Man of God who i s creative power and 
sovereign r u l e r of a l l things v i s i b l e and i n v i s i b l e . He 
i s the focal manifestation of that God who i s the only 
God, i n terms of 'action'; and that action i s on our 
'human' plane and i n our 'human' condition.'(65) 
But, and here we move on to the cluster of ideas associated with 'locus', 
the divine action on the human plane which was focused i n Jesus was not 
r e s t r i c t e d to him. Thus Pittenger says; 
'whatever decisiveness or f i n a l i t y i s predicated of Jesus 
Christ i s predicated not of the h i s t o r i c a l figure i n 
supposed i s o l a t i o n from his consequences i n h i s t o r y , but 
i t i s predicated of the complex r e a l i t y of Christ i n his 
Church, Christ w i t h his consequences i n the world of 
human experience and i n the ongoing h i s t o r y of the race.'(66) 
This societal emphasis, t h i s holding of Christ and Church together, 
which Knox believed received less than adequate emphasis i n Pittenger's 
writings, i s , I consider, a large factor i n Pittenger's Christology. 
I t was c l e a r l y present i n 'The Word Incarnate' as t h i s quotation shows. 
'The t o t a l New Testament record t e l l s of the creation by 
God of a society which mediates the Messiah and his 
salvation. Hence i t i s his 'Body'. I t i s Christ's - that 
i s God-in-Christ's - instrument f o r bringing new l i f e to 
man ... I t was not e n t i r e l y 'de novo' any more than the 
Incarnation i t s e l f was an e n t i r e l y novel act of God without 
relationship to the past h i s t o r y of man. Jewish r e l i g i o u s 
f a i t h and b e l i e f were essential i n the preparation f o r that 
which 'was' newly wrought and newly established. But 
granted that, the supreme and c r u c i a l act of God f o r man i s 
not Christ alone, nor i s i t Christ 'and' his Church: rather 
i t i s 'Christ-Church', Christ i n his Church and his Church 
i n him as i t s Lord and sole meaning.'(67) 
(65) G.P., p. 20. 
(66) C.R., p. 98. 
(67) W.I., p. 273. 
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The f i n a l sentence of that quotation encapsulates a prime emphasis i n 
Pittenger's theology; with significance not only f o r his Christology 
but also f o r his understanding of salvation. For since 'the supreme 
and cr u c i a l act of God f o r man i s not Christ alone ... i t i s 'Christ-
Church' then the church i s part of the event of Christ;(68) i t i s 'the 
r e f l e x of the act of God i n Christ', ' i t i s therefore part of the 
Gospel of the Lord himself', ' i t i s the sphere of redemption'.(69) 
The importance of t h i s w i l l be drawn out i n a l a t e r chapter. 
Before, however, moving on to demonstrate how t h i s notion of the 
Christ-Church event received clearer d e f i n i t i o n with the a i d of process 
thought, certain aspects of i t , which are related to b i b l i c a l c r i t i c i s m 
and which are associated p a r t i c u l a r l y with the name of J. M. Thompson, 
should b r i e f l y be considered to complete the picture of t h i s aspect of 
Pittenger's thought. 
(b) The influence of J. M. Thompson 
Pittenger describes Thompson, one time Dean of Magdalen College, 
Oxford, as a 'martyr' to honest, unhampered New Testament criticism.(70) 
Although he died i n 1956, his l a s t published piece of theological 
w r i t i n g appeared i n 1918; an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'The Christian Faith'. 
Up to that time, Thompson's theological career had been marked by 
opposition and controversy, and he had been i n h i b i t e d i n the performance 
of h i s ministry by several bishops. The prime causes of h i s supposed 
offence were his views on miracles and the h i s t o r i c i t y of those New 
Testament stories which contain miraculous elements. The whole tenor, 
however, of Pittenger's references to Thompson indicates the high regard 
(68) C.R., p. 145. 
(69) W.I., p. 272. 
(70) i b i d . , p. 78n. 
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i n which he holds him even to the extent of being an apologist f o r 
him. He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n accord with Thompson's a t t i t u d e to Christ's 
d i v i n i t y . As Pittenger says, 
'Thompson ... indicates the basis of his view - one w i t h 
which the present w r i t e r i s i n deep agreement - that the 
b e l i e f i n the d i v i n i t y of Jesus i s not apart from, added 
to , or contradictory of, his humanity, but i s an 
evaluation of his significance, known to f a i t h , i n the 
l i g h t of the experience of those who have been i n his 
company.'(71) 
Thompson's views are summarized by Pittenger as suggesting 'that the 
Christian experience "created" the "divine" Christ of f a i t h ' . 
'What Thompson meant by t h i s ... i s that the Christian 
community, l i v i n g by i t s f a i t h i n the risen Lord and 
convinced of the continuity of the object of that f a i t h 
w i t h the h i s t o r i c Jesus, was obliged to make a religious 
judgement about Jesus Christ - a judgement which was i n 
one sense a 'value judgement', since i t was b u i l t upon an 
evaluation of the significance of Christ f o r the community, 
but i n another sense an 'existential-judgement', since 
that evaluation was concerned with the r e a l role which 
Jesus played i n the actual l i v e s of those who so believed 
i n him and i n consequence was concerned wi t h the r e a l role 
which he was believed to play i n the t o t a l structure of 
r e a l i t y interpreted i n terms of that significance.'(72) 
Thompson himself believed that there i s a creative element to Christian 
F a i t h which i s essentially an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the facts i n the l i g h t 
of human needs and experience. I n the present area of discussion t h i s 
would mean that 'to a modernist (sic) the incarnation includes two 
essential things, the l i f e of Jesus, and the Church's b e l i e f about i t : 
the one an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , taking i t s place among other incidents of 
the past; the other an act of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h with a past, a present, 
and a future; and both are involved i n his d e f i n i t i o n of i t ... The 
f a i t h of the Church i s s t i l l necessary to give divine value to Jesus' 
(71) i b i d . , p. 97n. 
(72) i b i d . , pp. 78f. 
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humanity.(73) I n addition Pittenger finds support f o r the conclusion 
that what we know of Christ as 'divine' i s mediated through the 
experience and f a i t h of the Church, from form-criticism. I n that i t 
i s possible through that c r i t i c a l method to detect the influence, 
concerns and l i f e of the e a r l i e s t Christian community w i t h i n the Gospels, 
then further grounds are provided f o r seeing the whole 'Christ-event' 
including the ongoing l i f e of the Church, as what i s determinative of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y . That 'there i s no such being as a completely uninterpreted 
Jesus'; that 'the f o r m - c r i t i c a l way of studying the Gospels has made i t 
abundantly clear that whatever i s t o l d about Jesus' acts and words i s 
t o l d by the community with i t s p a r t i c u l a r l i f e - s i t u a t i o n ' and that 'the 
community has coloured the testimony by i t s convictions and worship' 
provides fo r Pittenger an 'unintentional demonstration'(74) of Thompson's 
suggestion that the ' f a i t h of the Church i s necessary to give divine 
value to Jesus' humanity' because Jesus as divine i s unknown and 
unknowable apart from the Church's f a i t h and witness. 
I t i s thus i n the context of seeing the Church as i n t e g r a l to the 
t o t a l Christ event that the insights that Pittenger finds i n Thompson's 
work and the conclusions of the fo r m - c r i t i c s have t h e i r f u l l e s t impact. 
I f Christ i s indeed unknowable as divine except w i t h i n the Christian 
fellowship then cer t a i n l y t h i s i s corroboration f o r Pittenger's view 
that i t i s the l i f e of the Church, with Christ as i t s focus, which i s 
the location of the incarnation, the scene of the ongoing loving action 
of God. That t h i s i s Pittenger's conclusion i s confirmed when he quotes 
some words of Nineham which state as one of the bases of an 'event' 
(73) i b i d . , p. 240 quoting from J. M. Thompson, 'The Christian Faith', 
a r t . i n The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XVII, (1918-1919)* pp. 229-24-1. 
(74) C.R., p. 84. 
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Christology the b e l i e f that 
'God was seeking to do through Jesus what he has i n 
f a c t done, bring i n t o existence a community under the 
lordship of the rise n one, i n which r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h 
God himself and the power of a holy l i f e should become 
at least p o t e n t i a l l y a r e a l i t y . ' ( 7 5 ) 
These words must be regarded as characteristic of Pittenger's own 
position, as w i l l be confirmed i n a l a t e r chapter when the place of 
the Church i n the economy of salvation w i l l be discussed. Now the 
influence of process thought upon t h i s aspect of Pittenger's thought 
w i l l be considered. 
(c) The 'Christ-event' i n a process perspective 
An equation of 'prehension' with 'focusing' i s the basis of 
Pittenger's understanding of the whole Christ event i n process terms; 
as t h i s quotation indicates. 
'Every actual e n t i t y , every occurrence or occasion, i s a 
focusing or ( i n process terms) a prehending of the whole 
vast range of environmental and r e l a t i o n a l factors which 
at that point and i n that way came to a specific and 
decisive ( i n the sense of cutting o f f other possible 
prehensions of p o s s i b i l i t y ) moment or instance. But there 
i s also the relationship of that instance to i t s own past, 
which i t s e l f has been open s i m i l a r l y to many influences; 
i t s immediate and inescapable contacts; and the future 
developments which come from i t s dynamic towards r e a l i z i n g 
i t s specific aim and which through decision have become 
d i r e c t l y relevant ... But i f i t i s true, as I believe i t 
i s , i n respect of a l l e n t i t i e s , i t must also be true of 
the man Jesus.'(76) 
Here again the relationship of 'focus' to 'locus' should be 
noted. I f the whole event i s the 'locus', then i t i s the 'focus' which 
gives i t i t s character; and t h i s i s a prehending of past, present and 
future influences. Applying t h i s i n s i g h t , Pittenger proceeds to work 
(75) i b i d . , pp. 134-5* quoting Dennis Nineham: 'Jesus i n the Gospels', 
ed. W. N. Pittenger: Christ f o r us Today, London, S.C.M. Press, 
1968, p. 64. 
(76) i b i d . , p. 67. 
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out i n d e t a i l what i t means f o r a person's l i f e , w ith special reference 
to Jesus. He suggests that no person can be understood i n separation 
from the past h i s t o r y to which he belongs and from which he emerges; 
from his present range of relationships and associations and t h e i r 
influence; and furt h e r , the consequences of his p a r t i c u l a r impact on 
his t o r y must be seriously taken i n t o account. A person can thus only 
be understood as a focusing of the past, of present relationships and 
the results of his l i f e . ( 7 7 ) Pittenger explains t h i s i n rather general 
terms with h i s t o r i c a l examples. Churchill and Roosevelt are suggested 
as men who could not be understood apart from the society which reared 
them and who had a profound influence on future developments. Speaking 
of Jesus i n t h i s way, his Jewishness i s emphasized which means the 
impact of that culture and r e l i g i o n upon him. Pittenger also outlines 
the present influences upon the l i f e of Jesus including his family and 
friends; the Roman authorities which guaranteed security and even his 
undoubted love of the Palestinian landscape. Jesus' impact on the 
future i s also stressed. His influence i s l i k e that of other famous 
men on the course of hi s t o r y , only more so. Not only has Jesus made a 
great and decisive impact upon those who met him; but t h i s impact 
continued to be real a f t e r his death. The preservation of the 
rememb«rance of Jesus i n the l i f e of the Christian community i s evidence 
of t h i s . Yet t h e i r memory was much more than a memorial to a passed 
worthy; i t was expressive rather of a continuing, l i v i n g impact. 
'After his death ... Jesus was s t i l l being received. He 
was remembered: and what he had said and done made t h e i r 
l a s t i n g impression i n an even more objective way ... This 
process of impact-and-reception has continued down the 
centuries.'(78) 
(77) i b i d . , p. 67. 
(78) i b i d . , p. 77. 
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The significance of t h i s discussion f o r Pittenger's thought i s that i t 
provides what i s f o r him the only proper context f o r understanding the 
a c t i v i t y of God i n the l i f e of Jesus, namely the divine influence i s 
seen i n the whole Christ-event. Having established that 'every person 
i s to be seen as the focusing of the past, his present relationships, 
and the results of his appearance at some given time and place' 
Pittenger goes on to say: 
'any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such a person must have regard f o r 
a l l these factors; and i f an a c t i v i t y of God i s said to 
have taken place i n association with that person, however 
we conceive t h i s , especially i f such a c t i v i t y i s believed 
to be of singular importance and remarkable i n t e n s i t y , 
that a c t i v i t y of God must be taken as occurring i n and 
through the whole constellation of which the person i s the 
centre. Thus the concept of 'event' must be applied to 
t h i s t o t a l i t y rather than to the supposedly discrete 
i n d i v i d u a l who may (and usually does) give his name to i t . ' ( 7 9 ) 
Support i s thus provided, Pittenger believes, by process thought, f o r 
his primary Christological datum that the f u l l significance of Jesus 
can only be understood w i t h i n the context of the whole Christ event, 
which would include the Church. 
(d) Criiicisms from a process angle 
David G r i f f i n , whose sphere of study i s Christology from a process 
viewpoint s p e c i f i c a l l y c r i t i c i z e s Pittenger f o r his confusion of Jesus 
and the Church. While he agrees that 'we can never t a l k ... about the 
Church as separate from Jesus', he rejects as inaccurate 'within a 
Whiteheadian framework' the converse, that Jesus can never be talked 
about as separate from the Church'. Pittenger's f a u l t , G r i f f i n 
suggests,(80) l i e s i n his use of Whitehead's notion of prehension. 
(79) i b i d . , p. 68. 
(80) David G r i f f i n : 'The Process Theology of Norman Pittenger', 
Process Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1971, p. 137. 
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Whitehead only employed 'prehension' f o r 'past a c t i v i t i e s ' : only past 
events could a f f e c t a new occasion i n t e r n a l l y , future events are wholly 
external to an occasion'.(81) I t i s , however, t h i s mistaken use of 
prehension, G r i f f i n suggests, which causes Pittenger to confuse issues 
of person and significance and thus f a i l to take advantage of the 
insights that process thought offers f o r Christology. G r i f f i n thus 
disagrees with Pittenger's thought as expressed i n such sentences as: 
'To grasp the significance of any man ... past and present and future 
must be taken i n t o account',(82) and 'The way i n which I have been and 
sh a l l be received ... has i t s essential role i n establishing me f o r 
what I am on the way to becoming now and f o r what I have or sha l l have 
accomplished or done or effected'.(83) While the former may simply be 
true, nothing i s thereby added to the understanding of anyone's 
selfhood, and the l a t t e r quotation makes the similar mistake of not 
making a s u f f i c i e n t l y clear d i s t i n c t i o n between 'appearance' (or 
significance) and'reality'. Whitehead's system, however, does make 
allowance f o r such a contrast and indeed concentrates upon r e a l i t i e s 
f o r ' i t i s precisely t h i s that i s one of the great merits of Whitehead's 
conceptuality f o r Christology, that one can intend to t a l k about 
a c t u a l i t i e s as they were " i n themselves", p r i o r to t h e i r reception by 
others'.(84) From t h i s , i n the present context, G r i f f i n draws the 
following conclusion: 
'an adequate Christology demands, and Whitehead's r e a l i s t i c 
philosophy allows f o r , t a l k of God's a c t i v i t y i n human 
events apart from any response by subsequent events, 
accepting or otherwise. I t i s cer t a i n l y true that an act 
(81) i b i d . , p. 139. 
(82) C.R., p. 79-
(83) i b i d . , p. 80. 
(84) G r i f f i n , op.cit., p. 138. 
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of God would not have been a revelation apart from an 
accepting response; but i f God did indeed act supremely 
i n a certain event, then t h i s event would have been the 
supreme act of God even i f no one had prehended i t as 
such.'(85T~ 
The f i n a l sentence of t h i s quotation refers to one of the implications 
of Pittenger's approach that God's a c t i v i t y i n Christ cannot be 
understood or discussed apart from the response to that a c t i v i t y . 
G r i f f i n by contrast believes that not only does the process conceptuality 
allow one to do t h i s but also that an adequate Christology depends upon 
understanding the work of God i n Christ by i t s e l f . Thus G r i f f i n not 
only debates whether Pittenger has employed Whitehead's insights 
adequately; he also c a l l s i n question Pittenger's whole approach w i t h 
what he would suggest i s i t s confusion of the h i s t o r i c a l person and 
the whole h i s t o r i c a l event. 
'The task of Christology proper i s to present an 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n which i s credible ( h i s t o r i c a l l y and 
philosophically) of Jesus' person, meaning precisely the 
past r e a l i t y that was Jesus of Nazareth, and which 
provides a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the decisive role he has i n 
fa c t had i n man's l i v e s . To redefine 'Jesus' as r e f e r r i n g 
to the t o t a l event of Jesus and his reception and then to 
claim f i n a l i t y f o r t h i s complex event merely begs the 
question, which i s whether the Christian estimation of 
Jesus' importance f o r man's relationship to the divine i s 
based on a correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jesus' own 
relationship to God.'(86) 
(e) C r i t i c a l summary 
G r i f f i n here indicates the weakness of Pittenger's Christology. 
For i t i s clear from t h i s chapter that i n order to account f o r the 
'speciality' or 'decisiveness' of Christ w i t h i n a processive understanding 
of God's involvement i n the world that Pittenger has had to recourse to 
making that 'decisiveness' dependent upon his reception by and continuing 
(85) i b i d . , p. 139. 
(86) i b i d . , p. 138. 
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significance f o r the Church; and that as G r i f f i n indicates i s to avoid 
the r e a l Christological question. Pittenger's promise of a fresh 
presentation of Christology i n dynamic terms, with the aid of process 
thought has been shown to be an uneasy passage between the threat of 
adoptionism on the one hand and making his significance dependent upon 
his reception on the other; and fur t h e r a leading process technician 
has been seen to question the accuracy of his use of Whitehead's 
conceptuality. 
That Christ i s made so dependent upon his reception i n the Church 
i s , however, quite consistent w i t h Pittenger's Christological approach. 
I f Jesus' difference from other men i s only a matter of degree, the 
degree to which he has f u l f i l l e d his God-given aim, the degree to which 
he made a ful l - h e a r t e d response to the divine love to the extent of 
becoming the personification of that love, then his significance must 
be r e s t r i c t e d to the human plane which he shares with a l l other men and 
his significance must be dependent upon the manner i n which he has 
enabled others to respond with f u l l e r hearts to God's love. Thus i t i s 
only i n the company of those who have been inspired by what they have 
seen and understood of the divine w i l l and love i n him that he w i l l 
have true significance at a l l . This, however, i s to move in t o the 
realm of Pittenger's understanding of salvation which alone can 
complete t h i s discussion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PITTENGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF GOD'S SAVING WORK 
(1) His preference f o r the Exemplarist Atonement theme 
Pittenger's own ' S t r i c t l y Personal Account' indicates that the 
impact of process thought upon his theology was greatest i n respect of 
conventional atonement doctrines. These 'had to go, since they were 
predicated on a view of God which no c h r i s t i a n ought to entertain'. 
I n coming to recognise the essence of sin to be 'the breaking of a 
loving relationship', 'atonement could only mean the renewal of that 
relationship'.(1) This, however, I regard as a piece of special 
pleading, f o r i t seems clear that although Pittenger may have been 
f o r t i f i e d i n his views by process insights, his basic understanding of 
atonement theology had developed much e a r l i e r i n his Modernist 
theological upbringing. I n the following quotation i n which he 
i d e n t i f i e s himself with the 'moral' or 'exemplarist' atonement theory 
associated with Abelard, he also mentions Hastings Rashdall, the famous 
Anglican Modernist scholar, whose Bampton Lectures, published as 'The 
Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology' (London, Macmillan, 1919) did 
so much to make Abelard's theory the accepted Modernist view. 
F. R. Barry comments that the Rashdall thesis caused ' l i b e r a l s v i r t u a l l y 
(to) take f o r granted that only a "subjective" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
e t h i c a l , s c r i p t u r a l or credible'.(2) This applies to Pittenger; as he 
writes: 
(1) op.cit., p. 132. 
(2) F. R. Barry: The Atonement, London, Hodder and Stoughton, I968, 
P. 145. 
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'My own theory of the atonement would be a combination of 
Abelard's (and Hastings Rashdall's) so called 'exemplarism', 
which i s a poor name f o r so great a view, with an 
ontological grounding, i n the very structure of r e a l i t y , 
f o r what was done i n Christ.'(5) 
This 'ontological grounding, i n the very structure of r e a l i t y ' , with 
which Pittenger combines the 'exemplarist' doctrine 'for what was done 
i n Christ', refers to his underlying concept of God as Love, which the 
process metaphysics confirms f o r him. I t i s because his understanding 
of r e a l i t y takes as i t s key the divine love that f o r him only an 
atonement doctrine which 'placards'(4) the divine love i s tenable or 
Christian. 
'For to say ... that God i s love, and to say i t on the basis 
of love's demonstration i n act i n the event of Jesus Christ, 
i s also to say that i n everything we assert t h i s t r u t h i s to 
be determinative. I t i s a t r u t h demonstrated i n act, ... to 
take ... one example ... atonement theology can never be 
mechanical, transactional, legal or j u r i d i c a l i f t h i s 
Christian i n s i g h t i s accepted] i t must always be personal 
and r e l a t i o n a l , f o r these are the terms i n which love 
operates.'(5) 
How Pittenger understands, w i t h the help of process thought, the 
divine loving a c t i v i t y i n i t s atoning work w i l l be a major section of 
t h i s study, but f i r s t i t must be emphasized, as the f i n a l sentence of 
the previous quotation confirms, that Pittenger's doctrine of atonement 
i s confined w i t h i n a subjective, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y , exemplarist 
approach. 
An objective approach sees man freed from the power of e v i l 
p r i m a r i l y by some transactional means such as j u r i d i c a l a c q u i t t a l or 
the o f f e r i n g of s a c r i f i c e to God, both made possible by the death of 
Jesus, and represents the atonement 'as an act by which God's a t t i t u d e 
O) G.P., p. 62. 
(4) G.D., p. 62. 
(5) C.R., p. 93. 
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to sinners has been changed, and by which he has been enabled to 
forgive them without v i o l a t i n g the ordinary principles of j u s t i c e ' . ( 6 ) 
Such Pittenger rejects as 'horribly sub-Christian i n ( i t s ) concept of 
God'.(7) His preference f o r the subjective approach stresses that i t 
i s man's relationship to God which i s changed. I n the cross the 
divine love i s seen clear l y and the spectacle of such suffering love 
i s a profound incentive f o r s i n f u l men to be moved to repentance and 
to obedience to God's w i l l . 
I n a rare discussion of t r a d i t i o n a l atonement symbols, such as 
s a c r i f i c e , j u s t i f i c a t i o n and payment of debt, i t i s clear that 
Pittenger's main purpose i s to r e i n t e r p r e t these o r i g i n a l l y 'objective' 
categories i n a broadly 'subjective' manner. The 'ransom' theory i s , 
f o r example, evacuated of any 'objective' reference and translated by 
saying that the c r i s i s answered by the 'ransom' theory i s that 'man 
has sold himself to narrow selfishness ... and to a l l manner of e v i l ' , 
of which 'the d e v i l i s the symbol'. Since 'man cannot win himself 
back' or 'buy himself out of his c a p t i v i t y ' , 'only "the expulsive 
power of a new a f f e c t i o n " , the love which i s able to p u l l us out of 
ourselves, can do that'. 'Christ, not merely by e x h i b i t i n g God's love 
but by enacting i t and by himself being i t i n action, pours that love 
i n t o our hearts, and ransoms us from "the d e v i l " . His death on Calvary 
i s the v i c t o r y of divine love over the wickedness of demon-possessed 
men. The v i c t o r y was guaranteed on Easter and made an e f f e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y f o r his followers through the Church on Pentecost'.(8) I t i s 
(6) G. W. H. Lampe: 'The Atonement: Law and Love' i n ed. A. R. Vidler 
Soundings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 196^, p. 182. 
(7) G.P., p. 61. 
(8) W. N. Pittenger: Theology and Reality, Greenwich, Connecticut, 
The Seabury Press, 1955* P«114. 
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only human beings and. t h e i r attitudes who are affected by the work of 
Christ. This i s the essence of the subjective atonement approach and 
i s wholly characteristic of Pittenger. 
At the conclusion of t h i s discussion of 'a few of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
conceptions of the means by which salvation has been brought to men' he 
highlights the one that completes them, namely the 'exemplarist' view. 
' ( I t ) i s the so-called Abelardian conception, i n which, as 
I think, the heart of the matter i s indicated. The 
exh i b i t i o n of God's love i n the l i f e , and supremely i n the 
death, of Jesus awakens i n us an answering love to God and 
a desire to be obedient to the Father's w i l l , even as Jesus 
Himself was obedient. Man i s shown i n the death of Christ 
as the sort of being who can k i l l Incarnate God; but God i s 
shown as the sort of being who can and s t i l l does love man, 
and bears the consequences of that murder. So man 
penitently responds to t h i s f r e e l y given love; he i s morally 
changed, repents of his deicidal sinfulness, and strives to 
become l i k e Christ.'(9) 
The adjective 'deicidal' i s s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r Pittenger's exemplarism 
i s not merely the example of a good man done to death, but essential 
to his view of atonement i s the b e l i e f that 'on Calvary,, and i n the 
t o t a l l i f e of Christ, the very action of God Himself on man's behalf', 
i s to be found 'radically a l t e r i n g the human situation'.(10) 
'So we see that the Atonement w i l l involve action from God 
to man, the divine i n i t i a t i v e , c a l l i n g f o r t h action from 
man to God. Insomuch as our Lord i s God-in-Man and 
Man-in-God, there i s i n Him a double movement of the divine 
a c t i v i t y f o r us and human a c t i v i t y toward God. The two are 
distinguishable, but i n him they cannot be separated. The 
purpose which governs the entire process i s that men might 
become, by the supremely characteristic and uniquely 
effectual action of Divine Reality i n Christ, that which 
they were intended to be, that which t h e i r deep-rooted 
self-seeking has prevented t h e i r being: sons of God, 
heirs of eternal l i f e , true men.'(11) 
(9) i b i d . , p. 116. 
(10) i b i d . , p. 116. 
(11) i b i d . , p. I l 6 f . 
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Pittenger's understanding of atonement i s thus thoroughly 
'exemplarist' and he refuses to countenance any deviation from that 
norm. Within that context, however, two major areas of his atonement 
thought may be detected, which must be examined more closely. F i r s t l y 
there i s his understanding of how God i s involved i n the redeeming 
work of Christ, how he i s connected with the cross, how he overcomes 
e v i l . This discussion which w i l l constitute the remainder of t h i s 
chapter, w i l l draw heavily upon process insights. Indeed t h i s i s the 
area of Pittenger's atonement theology where process influence i s most 
marked. The next chapter w i l l take up the idea, suggested i n the 
opening sentences of t h i s section, that the essence of atonement i s the 
restoration of relationship. I t w i l l consider Pittenger's description 
of salvation as wholeness, known w i t h i n the loving relationship which 
i s exemplified by the Christian Church. A further chapter w i l l indicate 
that a l l Pittenger's t a l k of atonement and salvation i s to be understood 
solely w i t h i n a 'this-worldly' context. This w i l l be followed by a 
f i n a l chapter o f f e r i n g a broad appraisal and c r i t i c i s m of Pittenger's 
t o t a l scheme. 
Before moving on, however, the cr i t i c i s m s made of Pittenger at 
the beginning of t h i s section, that the impact of process thought upon 
his theology was greatest i n respect of conventional atonement doctrines 
was a piece of special pleading, must now be substantiated. I t has 
already been indicated that f o r Pittenger 'exemplarism' i s the essence 
of atonement, but the further suggestion that t h i s pre-dates his 
conversion to Whitehead's conceptuality and may best be accounted f o r 
by his Modernist upbringing, has not been proved. However, i n a book 
published i n 1939* which on his own admission was before his f i r s t 
reading of process material, he offers a summary statement of his 
understanding of atonement, which i s wholly r e l i a n t upon 'exemplarism' 
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and which i s indistinguishable from his most recent discussion of 
atonement doctrine. Here i s part of that summary. 
'By Atonement i s meant the union of God and man, at-one-ment. 
L i f e adjusted to Reality on the deepest l e v e l , r i c h and 
overflowing i n love - that i s the goal. Through Christ that 
goal i s made possible. ... I n the larger sense the 
Incarnation i s the Atonement. ... I t i s incorrect to 
think that any change i s made i n the nature of God by 
Christ's a c t i v i t y . The whole point i s that a l l that 
Christ has done i s i n the most re a l sense the work of God. 
That i s the kind of God with whom men have to deal. A 
re a l change i s made i n man, however. Through the loving 
influence which Christ and his relentless S p i r i t exert upon 
men, they are brought back from wilfulness and errin g ways 
to love and obedience towards God. 
There i s an objective side to the Atonement. That ... i s 
the i n t e n s i f i e d and intimate action of God i n man on our 
behalf. I t i s the whole l i f e of Christ, culminating i n the 
death which crowned and gave meaning to his s e l f - s a c r i f i c e 
and service. I n that l i f e and death a v i c t o r y was won which 
the risen power of Christ has demonstrated. A new energy 
was released i n t o the world. But there i s also a 
subjective side to the Atonement. For that energy (which 
theologians c a l l the grace of God) must be accepted by men. 
I t redeems from narrowness, meanness, selfishness, and sin, 
and brings men the clean, fresh, winsome l i f e of communion 
with God i n perfect l i b e r t y and mutual understanding. But 
i t s acceptance i s not easy. We must open ourselves to i t s 
influence. The weakened w i l l of man must make an act of 
glad obedience, and of w i l l i n g acceptance of the love of 
God. We must centre our thought, w i l l and affections on 
the 1 Calvary-God'; and by so doing we sh a l l be f i l l e d w ith 
the S p i r i t of Christ, receive his power, and be made part 
of the incarnating l i f e of the eternal Word.'(12) 
Here i n 1939 i s the characteristic Pittenger approach to atonement, of 
an exemplarism mixed with a heavy incarnational or immanentist stress. 
The conclusion i s inescapable that process thought played no seminal 
part i n the development of Pittenger's atonement theology, rather i t 
merely provided ammunition f o r positions already reached. Indeed i t 
i s i n Pittenger's r i g i d adherence to the exemplarist theme that the 
weakness of his atonement theology w i l l be seen to l i e . 
(12) W. N. Pittenger: The Approach to C h r i s t i a n i t y , London, The 
Centenary Press, 1939> p. 46. 
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(2) How God, overcomes E v i l 
(a) Introduction 
Whitehead's teaching that God includes both a 'primordial' and a 
'consequent' aspect, which he developed to show that God i s both 
i n f i n i t e , unchanging and 'abstract from the world'(13) and at the same 
time related to and affected by a l l that goes on i n his creation, i s 
the theory upon which Pittenger bases his understanding of how God 
overcomes e v i l . The consequent aspect emphasises that God i s , i n 
Pittenger's phrase, ' r i c h l y concrete'.(14) By t h i s i s meant that he 
i s intimately related to the processive nature of the world and i t s 
creative endeavour as i t advances. He i s ' i n on things' not only 
a f f e c t i n g but being affected by what goes on. This 'relationship 
between God and the world, i n which there are influences and affects 
i n both directions'(15) i s basic to process thought and derives from 
the concept of the consequent aspect of God. Pittenger expresses t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y . 
'For the process theologian, the simple believer's 
conviction that God i s the tender Lover, "the fellow-
sufferer who understands" ( i n Whitehead's words), the 
participant i n a l l human experiences both j o y f u l and 
pai n f u l , i s taken with the most complete seriousness.'(16) 
The purpose of God's involvement i n the world i s to secure by lur e , 
persuasion and s o l i c i t a t i o n 'the free consent of the creation to his 
purpose of good',(17) so that the creative process might advance. Yet 
t h i s advance i s thwarted by negative, contrary decisions which 
(13) G.D., p. 36. 
(14) P.T.C.F., p. 28. 
(15) G.D., p. 36. 
(16) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited' - Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), p. 213. 
(17) i b i d . , p. 213. 
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constitute e v i l ; and God i s thereby affected. As Pittenger says; 
'A conception of God which sees him i n mutual relationship 
with the creation w i l l i n e v i t a b l y go on to say that the 
e v i l i n the world has i t s a f f e c t upon God, while God i s 
continually at work to reduce or to transform t h i s e v i l 
so that i t may become an instrument f o r the accomplishment 
of the good which he purposes.'(18) 
Two points which emerge from t h i s must be stressed i n preparation f o r 
considering how God overcomes e v i l . F i r s t l y , i t i s clear that on t h i s 
view God i s affected by e v i l . Pittenger c r i t i c i z e s t r a d i t i o n a l 
theologies f o r teaching God's aseity, his being the 'unmoved mover' 
removed from the world, suggesting as replacement the process view that 
rather than being unaffected by e v i l God shares i n i t and knows i t s 
effects and consequences. Secondly, i n order to overcome i t he must 
remain consistent to his nature which means he w i l l operate by loving 
s o l i c i t a t i o n , respecting the freedom of creaturely decision which i s 
of the essence of the creative process. We can thus expect that i f he 
i s to remain true to himself he cannot simply override e v i l or destroy 
those responsible f o r i t but rather transform i t through the operation 
of his loving nature. Indeed what i s characteristic about t h i s notion 
of the 'consequent' aspect of God's nature i s that God 'takes i n t o 
himself a l l that has i n f a c t occurred. Whether t h i s be good or e v i l , 
whether i t be directed to further prospective f u l f i l m e n t or a denial 
of that end, whether i t be adjustment or maladjustment: a l l i s 
accepted by God and i n one way or another can be used by him'.(19) 
This picture of God ceaselessly at work I n the world s t r i v i n g by 
s o l i c i t a t i o n f o r the world's 'good' which i s the f u l f i l m e n t of i t s 
God-given aim and thereby being deeply affected by the world must be 
(18) G.D., p. 38. 
(19) P.T.C.F., p. 32. 
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looked at more closely. Pittenger l i s t s four important elements of 
t h i s f o r consideration. 
' F i r s t , i n a l l the "perishing of occasions" by which the 
creative process i s marked, God uses everything available 
to him f o r his purpose; he knows i t and keeps i t . Second, 
whatever i s i n f a c t useable i s p o s i t i v e l y prehended by 
God and made to serve love's ends. But, t h i r d , God can 
use that which has e v i l ingredients i n a manner that w i l l 
secure good ends. He "turns even the wrath of men to his 
praise", as we might say; and f o r process thought God's 
praise s i g n i f i e s not some s e l f - g l o r i f i c a t i o n of deity, 
but the outgoing action of love i n ever wider c i r c l e s of 
expression. Anything that i s thus available may become 
an occasion f o r fu r t h e r advance. But i n the fourth place 
i f there i s some surd e v i l which i s not assimilable, God 
w i l l negatively prehend i t ; i t has occurred and i t cannot 
be annihilated, but i t remains as a moment from which a l l 
possible good has been extracted by the alchemy of the 
divine loving persuasion.'(20) 
Pittenger seems fond of the word alchemy to describe t h i s process 
whereby the dross of e v i l by some mysterious process i s turned i n t o the 
gold of goodness. He indicates that i t i s the divine love which effects 
t h i s process and he i d e n t i f i e s the Cross as the 'sign and symbol' of 
t h i s suffering love 'which by a mysterious alchemy can transmute ( e v i l 
and human wickedness) i n t o good'.(21) The process thought background 
w i l l have to be examined f o r t h i s to be understood better. 
(b) The process background 
I n the foregoing quotations the word 'prehension' has been used 
to indicate how God takes both good and e v i l i n t o himself. I t w i l l be 
recalled that an actual e n t i t y or occasion, that instant of experience 
which i s the basic u n i t i n process thought i s i n f a c t a concrescence, 
a coming together of previous e n t i t i e s to make the new one. The new 
e n t i t y prehends those that make i t up. Thus prehensions are the 
(20) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited', p. 218. 
(21) G.P., p. 16. 
153. 
vehicles by which one actual e n t i t y becomes objectified, i n another. 
I n f a c t prehensions are what an actual e n t i t y i s composed of. As 
Whitehead says; 
'The f i r s t analysis of an actual e n t i t y , i n t o i t s most 
concrete elements, discloses i t to be a concrescence of 
prehensions which have originated i n the process of 
becoming.'(22) 
The c r i t i c a l point about Whitehead's system, however, i s that he said 
that God 'is an actual e n t i t y ' as ' i s the most t r i v i a l puff of existence 
i n f a r o f f empty space'.(23) Amongst process thinkers there i s a debate 
as to whether Whitehead was correct or consistent with the remainder of 
his system i n saying t h i s . Those who are unhappy about t h i s notion 
point out that Whitehead did not mean by t h i s that God i s an 'actual 
occasion', which would be nonsense. Peter Hamilton explains t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n by saying that 'occasions perish, and only l i v e on 
objectively' whereas 'God exists throughout time without loss of 
immediacy'.(24) He goes on to say that 'Whitehead elsewhere seems to 
have accepted the idea that God i s not an e n t i t y , but rather a whole 
sequence of entities'.(25) He quotes Charles Hartshorne i n support. 
'God i s , as Whitehead agreed i n a car e f u l l y noted 
conversation w i t h A. H. Johnson, a l i n e a r sequence (which 
Whitehead terms "a personally ordered society") of 
occasions - with the difference, as contrasted to ordinary 
personal sequences, that i n God there i s no lapse of 
memory, no loss of immediacy, as to occasions already 
achieved.'(26) 
Now i t would clear l y run counter not only to common sense but also to 
the process view of God which has been developed thus f a r to suggest 
(22) Whitehead: Process, p. 28. 
(23) i b i d . , p. 23. 
(24) Peter Hamilton: The Living God and the Modern World, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1967* p. 168. 
(25) i b i d . , p. 168. 
(26) Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese: Philosophers Speak of 
God, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1953* P« 174. 
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that God i s but a single 'actual e n t i t y ' l i k e any other. What has been 
quoted from Hartshorne and Hamilton would seem to of f e r the most 
satisfactory i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s idea. Hamilton summarizes t h i s 
as follows. 
'On t h i s view, i t remains true that at any given moment 
God i s an actual e n t i t y ; but when viewed over the.entire 
span of time, God i s seen to comprise a whole sequence of 
divine occasions of experience.'(27) 
Although Pittenger does not enter i n t o t h i s technical debate of 
Whiteheadian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n his whole approach would i d e n t i f y him as 
following the l i n e of Hartshorne and Hamilton here quoted. This i s 
apparent i n one of his references to Whitehead's aphorism that 'God i s 
not to be treated as an exception to a l l metaphysical principles, 
invoked to save t h e i r collapse. He i s t h e i r chief exemplification'.(28) 
Pittenger suggests that t h i s quotation does not preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that i n certain respects God i s d i f f e r e n t and he proceeds to suggest 
what the nature of t h i s difference might be; i n so doing he shows that 
he thinks of God as being involved i n the creative process moment by 
moment or better, occasion by occasion. 
'He i s d i f f e r e n t i n that he abides i n and through a l l 
process, he abides i n and through i t i n his i d e n t i t y as 
creative love, and he i s both the p r i n c i p l e i n i t i a t o r of 
a l l that happens and also the chief recipient of the 
affects of what happens.'(29) 
Thus while Pittenger following Whitehead, would deny that God should be 
placed i n a category d i f f e r e n t from the world; he i s not to be 'treated 
as an exception to a l l metaphysical categories' yet he i n s i s t s that t h i s 
does not mean that there are 'no di s t i n c t i o n s or differences between 
(27) Hamilton: op.cit., p. I69. 
(28) Whitehead: Process, p. 405. 
(29) G.D., p. 36. 
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God and other actual e n t i t i e s ' 'since ( f o r one thing) God endures and 
does not "perish".'(30) I n explaining further the nature of t h i s 
difference Pittenger quotes some words of Professor Donald Sherburne 
which have a special reference to the subject under discussion. 
Sherburne had w r i t t e n that 'the principles governing a l l actual e n t i t i e s 
are i n some instances exemplified i n a reverse way i n God'. (31) 
Pittenger draws two conclusions from t h i s . F i r s t he points out that 
'while e n t i t i e s i n the world of time-space originate with physical 
prehensions of occasions of data ... God i n his 'primordial nature' 
works with his conceptual valuation of 'eternal objects".(32) By t h i s 
Pittenger means that God i s not l i m i t e d to the physical world. Indeed 
that would be to reduce God to mere physical existence which would be 
to make a nonsense of the idea of God. Rather the 'primordial' aspect 
of God ensures that God brings to the creative process, to each actual 
occasion the value enshrined i n 'eternal objects'. Secondly Pittenger 
says that 'while temporal e n t i t i e s move from physical to conceptual 
prehensions, God i n his 'consequent nature' (as affected by the world) 
i s constituted by his physical prehensions of those e n t i t i e s and t h e i r 
accomplishments'.(33) What Pittenger i s stressing here i s that God i n 
his consequent aspect can be said to be made, to be 'constituted' by 
his prehension of other e n t i t i e s and what they effect. The notion of 
God as actual e n t i t y i s c r u c i a l here. The pr i n c i p l e of how actual 
e n t i t i e s are constituted i s here taken to mean that God as 'actual 
(30) W. N. Pittenger: a r t . 'A Thing i s what i t does: A discussion of 
God', The Modern Churchman, Vol. 15, No. 4, New Series, July 1972, 
p. 241. 
(31) Donald W. Sherburne: A Key to Whitehead's 'Process and Reality', 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1966, p. 226. 
(32) W. N. Pittenger: a r t . 'A Thing i s what i t does', p. 24l. 
(33) i b i d . , p. 241. 
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e n t i t y ' i s made up by a physical prehension of other e n t i t i e s whether 
t h e i r e f f e c t i s good or e v i l . Both are taken i n t o God. Good i s 
immediately used f o r the advance of the creative process; e v i l i s 
prehended negatively i n that whatever of good can be found there i s 
drained from i t and the residue kept back by God. 
This process view of God as 'actual e n t i t y ' or better as 'a 
l i n e a r sequence of occasions' means that God i s present throughout 
the creative process as a factor i n , a 'prehension' i n the concrescence 
of each actual e n t i t y . God i s at the heart of every moment of 
experience. His operation there i s two-fold. F i r s t he brings to each 
actual occasion ' i n the cosmos i t s ' i n i t i a l aim', i n accordance with 
his o ver-all purpose of the achievement of highest i n t e n s i t y of 
experience'. 'From the eternal realm of p o s s i b i l i t y , t h i s or that 
special aim i s selected. I t i s then supplied to the concrescent e n t i t y , 
but not as an addendum; the e n t i t y emerges as and with t h i s aim'.(34) 
This aim i s not simply the application of 'eternal values' or 'an 
abstraction from the realm of p o s s i b i l i t y ' ( 3 5 ) hut takes account of 
the s i t u a t i o n of the new e n t i t y and also builds upon the achievements 
of the creative process so f a r . I n that God also receives the affects 
of previous e n t i t i e s i n the process the movement of the process i s thus 
deposited i n God and so i n o f f e r i n g i n i t i a l aim to each new e n t i t y there 
i s 'a u t i l i z a t i o n of e a r l i e r achievements i n creation which have been 
received by God i n his 'consequent nature' and now pass back i n t o the 
temporal world'.(36) Secondly God's involvement i n each actual occasion 
means that he prehends the decision involved i n that occasion f o r good 
(34) i b i d . , p. 243. 
(35) i b i d . , p. 243. 
(36) i b i d . , p. 243. 
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or e v i l . God i s thus affected by the free creaturely decision enshrined 
i n every instant of experience throughout the creative process. 
I t i s on t h i s basis that i t i s possible to say, w i t h i n the process 
conceptuality that God i s able to transmute the e v i l that i s i n the 
world. I t i s because God i s intimately involved i n the decision of 
every moment of l i f e and i s affected by i t , that i t can be said that 
'God can use that which has e v i l ingredients i n a manner that w i l l 
secure good ends'.(37) I t i s only because process thought i s able to 
see God at work at the microscopic l e v e l of l i f e that i t i s able to 
make judgements about the macroscopic aspect. I t i s because God as 
'actual e n t i t y ' prehends other actual e n t i t i e s that i t i s possible f o r 
process theologians to say that God i s affected by what goes on i n the 
creative process. 
I t i s on the broader scale, however, that the motive f o r God's 
operation throughout the cosmos can be seen. Pittenger says that God's 
work i s 'to produce a stream of influence which has i t s consequence i n 
the creation'(38) and he goes on to say that there are consequences 
also f o r God i n that he i s affected by what goes on i n the world but 
through his consequent nature he i s able to employ everything he has 
received whether good or e v i l 'for further a c t i v i t y i n the world of 
temporal actual entities'.(39) This view of God's a c t i v i t y e n t i r e l y 
accords with Whitehead's dictum that 'the divine element i n the world 
i s to be conceived as persuasive agency and not as coercive agency',(40) 
(37) W. N. Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited' i n Theology 
Today, Vol. 27, (1970), p. 218. 
(38) W. N. Pittenger: a r t . 'A Thing i s what i t does: A discussion of 
God', The Modern Churchman, Vol. 15, No. 4, New Series, July 1972, 
p. 242. 
(39) i b i d . , p. 242. 
(40) Whitehead: Adventures, p. 170. 
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and Is the basis f o r Pittenger's repeated insistence, noted throughout 
t h i s thesis, that God can only properly be known as Love. To understand, 
though, how God can both overcome e v i l and also operate only by love 
and s o l i c i t a t i o n , i t i s necessary to see how Fittenger i n t e r p r e t s e v i l . 
(c) The f a c t of e v i l 
Pittenger vigorously defends himself and others who employ the 
process conceptuality against the accusation that they do not t r e a t the 
f a c t of e v i l w ith s u f f i c i e n t seriousness.(4l) Indeed his argument i s 
that f a r from minimizing i t , e v i l i s recognised as an important element 
i n the Whiteheadian view of the creative process and of God's involvement 
i n i t . 
'For every Process thinker known to me, notably f o r 
Whitehead e v i l i s very r e a l indeed. I t i s a h o r r i b l e but 
inescapable fa c t . I n Whitehead i t i s one of the elements 
which enters i n t o his v i s i o n of the world-process and of 
God as marked by high tragedy. This i s no light-hearted 
dismissal of e v i l ; on the contrary, i t i s the taking of the 
consequences of e v i l with such profound seriousness that 
they enter i n t o God's own l i f e i n what he styled God's 
'consequent nature' - God as affected by the world i n his 
eminent temporality. Thus one might claim that here e v i l 
i s given a much more profound recognition than i n 
conventional t h e i s t i c schemes i n which i t s effects have no 
place whatever i n the divine l i f e . ' ( 4 2 ) 
This apologia can only be sustained, however, by i n t e r p r e t i n g e v i l i n 
a special and r e s t r i c t e d sense, as w i l l be shown. 
Pittenger begins from a recognition of what he c a l l s the 'fact 
of e v i l ' by which he means that e v i l 'is so p l a i n l y part of the world 
i n which we l i v e and of our own human experience'.(43) How he accounts 
(41) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology - A Short Comment', The 
Expository Times, Vol. 85, No. 2, November 1973* P- 56. 
(42) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited', Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), pp. 216-217. 
(43) G.D., p. 14. 
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f o r t h i s 'fact of e v i l ' i s best introduced by three negatives. 
F i r s t l y he rejects any suggestion that e v i l i s i n t r i n s i c w i t h i n 
creation or endemic to mankind.(44) This i s an aspect of that major 
element i n his theology, which Pittenger would describe as his 
'incarnationalist' stress and which has been accorded a f u l l e r 
discussion i n an e a r l i e r chapter. Secondly he rejects the concept of 
a dev i l or any power of e v i l at large i n the world which might be held 
responsible f o r evil.(45) Thirdly he i n s i s t s that 'we must once and 
f o r a l l get r i d of the barbarously unchristian notion that God i s i n 
some sense responsible f o r the h o r r i b l e e v i l s , the ghastly suffering, 
and everything else that i s wrong with creation ... above a l l we must 
j e t t i s o n the dreadful and subchristian idea that God punishes men by 
sending e v i l upon them'.(46) Thus he would never ascribe e v i l to the 
agency of God f o r whatever hidden purpose, since such would be a denial 
of the loving nature of God.(47) 
I n o f f e r i n g his own explanation of the 'horrible e v i l s ' and 
'ghastly suffering' i n the world Pittenger acknowledges that much of i t 
i s a t t r i b u t a b l e either d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to human sin and wrong-
doing. Much animal suffering, f o r example, can be l a i d at the door of 
human cruelty,(48) and amongst human beings themselves thoughtless or 
wanton behaviour or careless l i v i n g habits, which on Pittenger's 
d e f i n i t i o n amount to sin, can cause much suffering.(49) He also 
(44) L.T.P.P., p. 59- ' e v i l i s not rad i c a l , i f by that i s intended 
'at the root of things' - f o r i t cannot be, i f God i s love and 
i s Himself 'at the root of things" 1 through his c r e a t i v i t y at 
work i n them'. 
(45) W. N. Pittenger: 'Is God responsible f o r Ev i l ? ' , The Modern 
Churchman, Vol. 19, (N.S.), No. 3, Spring 1976, p. 86. 
(46) i b i d . , p. 89. 
(47) Pittenger: God's Way With Men, pp. 2 1 f . 
(48) G.D., p. 23. 
(49) i b i d . , p. 26. 
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suggests that some of the suffering associated with natural disasters 
can be a t t r i b u t e d to human sin. His argument here i s that natural 
events such as earthquakes and t i d a l waves can be regarded as necessary 
f o r the preservation of 'the natural or physical status quo'(50) of the 
earth so that human l i f e might continue to be possible on i t . Thus 
Pittenger comments that a t i d a l wave that swept over an uninhabited 
a t o l l would not be regarded as e v i l , simply a 'fact of nature'. (51) 
Such natural phenomena only come to be regarded as e v i l when human 
l i f e and habitation are affected or endangered by them. He implies, 
though, that such e v i l s might be accounted to human sin, since i t i s 
'irresponsible' and 'preposterous to b u i l d houses known to be subject 
to earthquakes or where they are l i k e l y to suffer from floods'. (52 ) 
There remains, however, much e v i l which cannot be accounted f o r 
by human sin. These non-moral e v i l s are various. There might be 
human suffering caused by natural disasters such as famines, epidemics 
or catastrophes, there i s the wide range of suffering i n the animal 
world, (53) and there i s also that human suffering a r i s i n g from ailments 
such as painful cancer, many sorts of emotional and mental disorders or 
various forms of congenital abnormality. Pitte;nger says of such e v i l 
t hat i t has 'something to do' with 'some i n t r a c t a b i l i t y i n the created 
order', (54) or, as he more closely defines i t 'such e v i l i s a surd 
i n the creative advance ... i t i s a refusal to move with the process'.(55) 
(50) i b i d . , p. 18. 
(51) i b i d . , p. 19. 
(52) i b i d . , p. 26. 
(53) i b i d . , pp. 21 f . 
(54) Pittenger: 'i s God responsible f o r Evil?', The Modern Churchman, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 1976, p. 87 . 
(55) Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited', Theology Today, Vol. 27, 
(1970), p. 217. 
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The word surd, which comes from the Lati n surdus meaning deaf, i s a 
term used i n mathematics and there means a 'quantity inexpressible by 
r a t i o n a l numbers or which has no root', so the word comes to mean 
something that i s i r r a t i o n a l or inexpressible. I n the context of the 
phrase quoted above t h i s would seem to suggest that e v i l i s a factor 
w i t h i n the creative process which prevents that process from reaching 
i t s f u l f i l m e n t ; i t i s a denying factor present w i t h i n the process which 
need not be there. Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of e v i l then i s very similar 
to his d e f i n i t i o n of sin , as t h i s quotation confirms. 
'Evil means ... that there i s i n the created world 
disorderliness, maladjustment of vehicle to purpose, 
disproportion i n the arrangements of the r e l a t i v e l y good 
r e a l i t i e s which makes them unworthy or misleading; while 
sin means that there i s a dis-ease i n man which can, and 
observably does, lead to a state of alie n a t i o n from his 
true end and hence to actual sinning, because i t involves 
an inordinate or disproportionate employment of his desire 
towards ends that are not f i n a l l y good.'(56) 
E v i l then i s to be recognised as that disorder or maladjustment w i t h i n 
the creative process which arises from refusal to f u l f i l the God-given 
aim. Hence i t i s analogous to Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of sin. Just as 
sin i s the refusal of i n d i v i d u a l human beings to f u l f i l t h e i r God-given 
aim; so e v i l can be recognised as j u s t such a refusal at other levels 
of the creative process. Pittenger makes i t clear that 'the whole of 
the created order' including both humanity and the realm of nature i s 
being 'appraised' as to whether they have 'played or f a i l e d to play, 
t h e i r part i n the good which i s being achieved by God'.(57) Sin and 
e v i l both constitute f a i l u r e , a refusal to pursue the God-given aim. 
(56) Human Nature, pp. 62-63. 
(57) L.T.P.P., pp. 58-59. 
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'Evil ... i s a f r e e l y chosen refusal, coming from 
creaturely decisions i n t h e i r varying ways and. at t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t levels. God's purpose f o r the world i s to 
secure a f i e l d f o r the expression of love - his own and 
that of the creatures; he i s " i n the world" f o r precisely 
that end. He secures that expression, but not by 
a r b i t r a r y imposition or interference, but by e l i c i t i n g 
the amen of the creatures to the enormous good that i s 
offered them. That good i s nothing less than the 
actualizing of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t y , the making-real of 
t h e i r f r e e l y chosen "subjective aim". This occurs i n 
ways that vary according to the creatures and with 
d i f f e r i n g i n t e n s i t y of conscious apprehension. I n the 
creative advance a ra d i c a l freedom obtains, so that the 
given e n t i t y may decide not to realize i t s p o t e n t i a l i t y 
f o r good. This i s e v i l , f o r i t i s a v i o l a t i o n of the 
purpose of the whole process; i t i s always a p o s s i b i l i t y 
and i t may become, i t has become, an actual fact.'(58) 
As that quotation shows i n i t s penultimate sentence such e v i l i s 
possible because 'radical freedom obtains throughout the creative 
process'. 
'The world ... has i t s own freedom of decision, i t s own 
capacity to make choices, i t s own capacity f o r the 
choices made. At the human l e v e l t h i s works by 
consciousness of the creatures; elsewhere i t lacks that 
awareness but none the less the creation i s free to decide 
w i t h i n the l i m i t s of such order or pattern as are present 
i n i t s movement towards actualizing of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . ' ( 5 9 ) 
E v i l then l i k e sin can only be seen, i n Pittenger's scheme, as the 
almost inevitable by-product of the freedom i m p l i c i t w i t h i n the 
creative process. Although s i n and e v i l remain as 'surds' i n the 
sense that they are not i n t r i n s i c to the process; yet i f freedom i n 
the self-creation of the world through evolutionary process, which i s 
marked by movement towards novelty and c r e a t i v i t y , i s the mark of 
r e a l i t y , as process thought teaches, then e v i l should be expected. 
I t i s almost an inevitable consequence, however unpleasant or painful 
(58) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited', Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), p. 217. 
(59) W. N. Pittenger: 'i s God responsible f o r Evi l ? ' , The Modern 
Churchman, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 1976, p. 88. 
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the effects of t h i s may be. (60) Pittenger comments: 
'Why there i s such e v i l and sin we are not able to say. 
I t may be that these things are a necessity i n the 
continual creative a c t i v i t y of God, i n the sense that a 
world which i s i n some sense the realm of freedom must 
ine v i t a b l y possess a certain a b i l i t y t o go o f f on i t s 
own and show recalcitrance to the divine goodness. I t 
may be that God permits e v i l and sin i n order to secure 
a greater good - namely a free response of the created 
order to his goodness.'(6l) 
What i s more s i g n i f i c a n t , though, i s that i n process thought God 
operates i n a way which respects that freedom. 
'God cannot prevent e v i l , which i s brought about by the 
genuine freedom and i n t e g r i t y of the very creation 
i t s e l f ; he can and he does work i n and w i t h his creation 
against e v i l of every kind and sort, so that out of i t 
some good may come. Good Friday and Easter Day, taken 
together, are the Christian paradigm here.'(62) 
The significance of the f i n a l sentence w i l l be shown l a t e r i n t h i s 
chapter, but f i r s t i t must be emphasised that God, i n process thought, 
works w i t h i n the context of the self-creating freedom which i s 
characteristic of the creative process. God operates by love and 
s o l i c i t a t i o n and i t i s i n such a way that he works against e v i l . 
Pittenger believes that w i t h i t s p a r t i c u l a r view of the world and God's 
involvement i n i t process thought i s p a r t i c u l a r l y suggestive i n i t s 
understanding of how God overcomes e v i l . The process view, he suggests, 
i s more h e l p f u l i n understanding how God faces e v i l than ever 
'classical theism' could be, which i s so 'hopeless i n the face of 
evil'.(63) His discussion of how God i s able to transmute the e v i l 
thrown up i n the freedom of the creative process, through the operation 
of his Consequent Nature, w i l l now be considered. 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
G.D., p. 5-
G.P., p. 16. 
a r t i c l e , 'is God responsible f o r Evil?', p. 88. 
i b i d . , p. 89. 
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(d) God's Consequent Nature and the overcoming of e v i l 
Pittenger's major claim f o r process thought i s that i t dispenses 
with any conception of a 'remote deity' emphasising rather that 'God 
i s operative i n the whole creation, at every l e v e l of existence; he 
moves through i t , works upon i t , accomplishes his good w i l l i n i t . 
He i s closer to us than breathing, nearer than hands or feet'.(64) 
God's involvement i n the prehension of each actual e n t i t y i s the 
substance of t h i s claim. Process thought goes on from t h i s to propose 
two principles about God's mode of operation i n the creative process. 
F i r s t , 'he i s the chief causative agency i n the world, working through 
the provision of i n i t i a l aim and through lure'.(65) Secondly, he i s 
the Principle of Limitation. He works according to his purpose or 
aim; he sets l i m i t s w i t h i n which the creative advance i n t o novelty 
may proceed'.(66) 
Both of these principles, however, are only operable i n terms of 
God's 'consequent nature' e f f e c t i v e at the le v e l of actual e n t i t i e s . 
While o f f e r i n g creative lure to each occasion God has the capacity to 
receive i n t o himself the creation's achievement and thus the creative 
process i s enhanced. This concept of God as the 'supreme a f f e c t ' also 
relates to the negative decisions of e v i l i n creation. As Pittenger 
says; 
'He i s also the 'supreme a f f e c t ' , influenced by what goes 
on i n the creation and i n what Whitehead styled his 
'consequent nature' participant i n the world's suffering 
as i n i t s joy, receiving i n t o Himself the good achieved i n 
that world, making the e v i l which has occurred i n t o an 
(64) G.P., p. 17. 
(65) W. N. Pittenger: 'A Thing i s what i t does: A discussion of 'God'', 
The Modern Churchman, Vol. 15, (N.S.), No. 4, July 1972, p. 243. 
(66) i b i d . , p. 24j. 
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occasion f o r new good, r e j e c t i n g such e v i l as cannot thus 
be 'used' - and acting always f o r the establishment of 
greater good i n more ways, despite the setbacks, the 
recalcitrance, the s e l f i s h decisions, and the s i n which 
must be taken seriously i n t o account.'(67) 
Thus by t h i s 'negative prehension' of wrong i n the world God i s 
not only able to l i m i t the movement of the process from false 
directions, he i s also w i t h i n his 'consequent nature' 'able to extract 
from such e v i l or wrong whatever elements of good may be hidden there; 
and he can make 'even the wrath of men' serve as an occasion f o r the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of a good which otherwise might not be possible'.(68) 
Pittenger i n t h i s regard likens God to 'the sculptor who can turn an 
artisan's mistaken and d i s t o r t i n g c h i s e l l i n g into a lovely figure. 
His purpose i s to make hi s t o r y meaningful even when man has done his 
utmost to destroy i t s meaning'.(69) 
From t h i s we pass to the next step that Pittenger takes which i s 
to describe the nature of God's purpose and then relate t h i s to Jesus. 
Pittenger finds the clue to God's loving purpose w i t h i n and throughout 
the creative advance i n the world of men and supremely i n Jesus. He 
suggests that whatever may be the 'remoter i n t e n t i o n of God i n the 
awe-inspiring stretch of space and time, i t i s a l l of a piece with 
what he i s doing i n the h i s t o r i c a l experience of man' and he goes on 
to add, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 'in a way, that i s what the homo-ousion' of 
the Nicene Creed affirms'.(70) This i s clear evidence of his 
immanental view of the world, namely that the divine a c t i v i t y e f f e c t i v e 
i n every aspect of l i f e was supremely exemplified i n the event of Jesus 
(67) W. N. Pittenger: 'The Attributes of God i n the Light of Process 
Thought' i n The Expository Times, Vol. 81, 1969, p. 22. 
(68) w« N. Pittenger: 'A Thing i s what i t does: A discussion of 'God'', 
The Modern Churchman, Vol. 15, (N.S.), No. k, July 1972, p. 24j. 
(69) L.T.P.P., p. 67. 
(70) i b i d . , p. 67. 
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Christ. 
Pittenger finds Teilhard de Chardin's word 'amorization' h e l p f u l 
to describe the nature of God's a c t i v i t y i n the world, which he 
int e r p r e t s to mean 'the development i n creation of a relationship i n 
which a l l creaturely constituents are caught up i n t o and share a love 
which i s f u l f i l l i n g f o r each and f u l f i l l i n g f o r a l l ' . On the human 
l e v e l the goal of such a process of 'amorization' w i l l be 'a society of 
men i n and under God, whose love i s 'sole, sovereign l o r d ' and where 
everything thought, said or done w i l l be i n love, by love and f o r love'. 
He comments that such 'mutuality at i t s highest possible l e v e l i s the 
Kingdom or realm of God'.(71) 
Although such i s the good that God seeks to achieve f o r the world 
i t i s thwarted by decisions negative to God's design, and these are the 
substance of e v i l . Yet his complete p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
w ith the world at every l e v e l means that not only can positive decisions 
be used to the f u l f i l m e n t of God's loving purpose but e v i l ones also can 
be overcome and turned to his glory. ' i n every way and i n every place, 
God makes the best of everything, including human lovelessness and the 
f a i l u r e which i t entails'.(72) God's overcoming of e v i l must then be 
seen as the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of his loving a c t i v i t y i n the world. 
The symbol of t h i s i s the cross of Christ. The following quotation 
indicates how Pittenger relates these themes. 
'The Christian Church has claimed ... that i t does have 
the p r a c t i c a l answer to e v i l and human wickedness; that 
answer i s the suffering love which by a mysterious alchemy 
can transmute them i n t o good. Of this the Cross of Jesus 
i s the sign and symbol ... C h r i s t i a n i t y i s basically a 
(71) W. N. Pittenger: a r t . 'A Thing i s what i t does', p. 245. 
(72) i b i d . , p. 24-5. 
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f a i t h which finds i n God himself, i n his love and tender 
mercy as manifested i n Christ, the only r e a l answer to 
t h i s question.'(73) 
(3) The cross i n God's overcoming of e v i l 
(a) Introduction 
Two s i g n i f i c a n t points arise from the quotation with which the 
preceding section closed. F i r s t l y the cross i s seen only as 'the sign 
and symbol' of God's continuing loving a c t i v i t y i n overcoming e v i l . 
Secondly the use of the word 'suffering' implies that the cross 
characterized t h i s a c t i v i t y of God as necessitating suffering. I n 
these l i e the key to Pittenger's understanding of the cross. 
God's transmuting of e v i l w i t h i n his 'consequent nature' might 
be regarded as some hidden impersonal operation w i t h i n the deity. 
Pittenger would r e j e c t t h i s c r i t i c i s m , seeing God rather as the 'supreme 
a f f e c t ' , whose nature the Cross disclosed as suffering love. 'The 
doctrine of the Atonement', says Pittenger, ' i s a way of asserting that 
God has both l i v e d i n the human s i t u a t i o n and also has faced i t as i t 
i s ' , ( 7 ^ ) and thus has known 'genuine p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the pain of the 
world'.(75) He i s 'the tender Lover, "the fellow-sufferer who 
understands"' ( i n Whitehead's words).(76) God has overcome e v i l by 
taking i t i n t o his own l i f e ( 7 7 ) and the cross i s evidence that such an 
operation i s costly and marked by suffering. The following i s 
Pittenger's description of t h i s suffering yet victorious love known on 
the cross. 
(73) G.P., p. 16. 
(7^) G.D., p. 81. 
(75) i b i d . , p. 46. 
(76) Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited' i n Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), p. 213. 
(77) i b i d . , p. 217. 
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'God's consequent nature - that i s , God as he concretely 
' i s ' w ith a l l the affects and influences that the world 
has offered and he has accepted - i s so superabundant i n 
love that we may speak of the divine 'victory' which 
brings the divine 'joy'. God i s u t t e r l y vulnerable; but 
he i s also invulnerable - by t h i s I intend that his love 
i s so indefeasible and so indefatigable, so r i c h and 
inexhaustible, that nothing can f i n a l l y defeat or overcome 
i t or turn i t i n t o anything else ... i t i s the most profound 
i n s i g h t of the Christian f a i t h that i t i s so ... the o r i g i n 
of that i n s i g h t ... i s i n the l i f e of Jesus Christ and above 
a l l i n his willingness to give himself up to death. Calvary 
i s the heart of the matter ... The Cross i s the sign of 
divine v i c t o r y over e v i l by absorbing i t and assimilating i t 
and using i t . ' ( 7 8 ) 
Pittenger looks at Calvary i n two d i s t i n c t yet related ways. While he 
sees i t as a symbol of eternal t r u t h about the nature of God's love, 
he i s only able to do so because he recognises that i n that event 
something was accomplished and displayed, namely that God's love i s at 
once ' u t t e r l y vulnerable' yet victorious. How t h i s i s possible i s 
summarized by Pittenger when he says that 'Calvary i s i t s e l f an e v i l 
thing; yet as that inescapable e v i l , God has used i t f o r a greater good 
than any man could have conceived'.(79) To understand t h i s aspect of 
Pittenger's thought i t i s necessary to place God's overcoming of e v i l 
w i t h i n the context of the work of Christ. 
(b) The cross as the work of Christ 
Pittenger's f i r s t point i s that ' i n the t o t a l i t y of Jesus' human 
l i f e , obedient to the w i l l of the Father to the point of death, there 
i s the enactment on the stage of h i s t o r y and i n the circumstances of 
human existence, of the r i g h t human relationship to God'.(80) This 
has been established i n previous chapters; now secondly the significance 
(78) G.D., pp. 41-42. 
(79) Pittenger: a r t . 'Process Theology Revisited', p. 218. 
(80) G.P., p. 35-
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of the phrase 'to the point of death' must be taken further. Pittenger 
submits that Jesus 'f i r m l y believed' his death to be 'the f u l f i l m e n t of 
the divine purpose f o r the world';(8l) that he 'quite l i t e r a l l y gave 
himself "unto death, even the death of the Cross"',(82) so that God's 
w i l l might be f u l f i l l e d . 
'In obedience to what he believed to be God's unmistakable 
w i l l , Jesus went to the Cross and died there i n order that 
God's sovereign rule might be established ( i n New Testament 
terms, that the Kingdom of God might come).'(83) 
Thirdly, Pittenger implies that Jesus had t h i s strong sense that death 
would be the culmination of his mission because he knew that a l i f e 
that consciously sought the f u l f i l m e n t of i t s God-given aim and worked 
f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of God's Rule of Love would come i n t o c o n f l i c t with 
the sin and e v i l i n the world caused by man's denial of God's aim. I t 
i s i n t h i s sense that his death was 'occasioned by wicked men' and was 
'the r e s u l t of human si n and moral e v i l ' ; 'the consequence of human 
re j e c t i o n and condemnation'.(84) But, f o u r t h l y , Pittenger suggests 
that Jesus faced and accepted the very worst i n the cause of the 
f u l f i l m e n t of God's w i l l of love i n order that others might enjoy that 
freedom which would be won by the v i c t o r y of love.(85) F i f t h l y , t h i s 
acceptance of the focal position i n the c o n f l i c t between love and e v i l , 
as the f u l f i l m e n t of his l i f e ' s mission,(86) meant that on the cross 
he knew 'a sense of d e r e l i c t i o n 1 , even a 'loss of awareness of, perhaps 
confidence i n , the divine presence'.(87) On the cross Jesus knew i n 
(81) G.D., p. 44. 
(82) i b i d . , p. 45. 
(83) G.P., p. 35. 
(84) G.D., p. 46. 
(85) i b i d . , p. 45. 
(86) i b i d . , p. 44. 
(87) i b i d . , p. 46. 
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the depths of his agony how e v i l 'can c a l l i n question the love of God, 
his care f o r the world, and his u n f a i l i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y to his human 
children',(88) and yet i n that he faced that and was not overcome by 
t h i s sense of de r e l i c t i o n , love had the v i c t o r y . For t h i s to be so, 
however, another dimension has to be added to our understanding of 
Calvary. As Pittenger says; 
' i f Jesus were nothing more than 'another man', called 
upon to suffer pain and endure death, there would be no 
s p e c i f i c a l l y Christian i n s i g h t . I n that case we would 
have one more instance of the horror of e v i l . The problem 
would be aggravated, i t would not be illuminated.'(89) 
This extra dimension i s that 'the cross brings to us the assurance that 
i n t h e i r a f f l i c t i o n s ' God was and i s a f f l i c t e d ' . ( 9 0 ) 
(c) God i s reigning from the Tree 
For Pittenger t h i s phrase offers a profound i n s i g h t i n t o the 
meaning of the cross; because i t emphasizes that i n the man Jesus God 
demonstrated ' i n act his v i c t o r y of love over a l l s i n ... a l l e v i l and 
over death i t s e l f ' . ( 9 1 ) This rec a l l s e a r l i e r discussions of Christology 
where Pittenger's preference f o r what he called 'act-Christology' against 
schemes which spoke of substances and essences was noted. Thus the 
event of Christ i s seen as the 'classical instance' of God's working 
i n creation. I n the present context t h i s means that; 
'In the l i f e of the Man of Nazareth, a l l of i t under the 
shadow of the Cross', and supremely i n the events of the 
l a s t few days culminating i n the passion and death on 
Calvary, God i s involved.'(92) 
(88) i b i d . , p. 46. 
(89) i b i d . , p. 48. 
(90) i b i d . , p. 48. 
(91) i b i d . , p. 12. 
(92) i b i d . , p. 52. 
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The significance of t h i s i n Pittenger's thought, i s that i t i s not 
only of Jesus but also of God himself that i t can be said that 'he 
bears the suffering which men must know i n the world, and i n knowing 
t h i s suffering he shares also i n that kind of d e r e l i c t i o n which the 
cry on the Cross so poignantly symbolises'.(93) Then expanding the 
idea that i t i s God who i s reigning from a Tree Pittenger writes; 
'The only crown he wears i s a crown of thorns; the only 
throne he occupies i s a Cross; the only rule he exercises 
i s the reign of suffering and participant love.'(94) 
I t i s i n t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God's love with the suffering of the 
world, facing e v i l to the point of d e r e l i c t i o n that i s the essence of 
the divine v i c t o r y . I t i s because God i n Christ chose to face the 
horror of e v i l and lovelessness that his loving nature could be shown 
to be v i c t o r i o u s l y at work i n the world. Here the subject of the 
Resurrection i s raised. 
(d) The Resurrection v i c t o r y of God's love 
Pittenger's h i s t o r i c a l scepticism towards the Easter narratives 
was noted i n an e a r l i e r chapter as was his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
Resurrection as being the aff i r m a t i o n that i n Christ i n v i r t u e of his 
relationship with God there i s seen l i f e which not even death can 
conquer. The Resurrection, says Pittenger, i s 'God's vindication and 
v a l i d a t i o n of Jesus';(95) i t i s the vindication of what was done i n 
Christ's l i f e and i n his suffering and death. He continues; 
' i t i s as i f God had w r i t t e n over Calvary, 'That i s how I 
myself r e a l l y am. That i s how I am related to the world's 
pain i n the face of e v i l . That i s what I do about i t . " (96) 
(93) i b i d . , p. 53. 
(9^) i b i d . , p. 53. 
(95) W.I., p. 69. 
(96) G.D., pp. 53-54. 
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Although Pittenger adds that God would never act w i t h such blatant 
self-advertisement yet as a poetic summary of how he understands God's 
vic t o r y through the cross i t i s h e l p f u l . Easter Day, he i n s i s t s , does 
not cancel out or reverse Good Friday but i t s message works 'to suffuse 
the h i l l of Calvary with the l i g h t of God's v i c t o r y over si n and 
death'.(97) Calvary remains an e v i l thing but i t i s also the assurance 
of the divine v i c t o r y over e v i l because there God i n Christ faced 
ultimate e v i l and lovelessness. As a r e s u l t of Calvary, Pittenger can 
say, 'there i s a Cross planted i n God's heart; he suffers i n and 
because of the horror of that h i s t o r i c a l event, while at the same time 
he triumphs over i t through his employment of i t precisely to declare 
his love f o r his children'.(98) I t i s because the divine love was 
w i l l i n g to go to the extremity of the cross that men have the assurance 
of the v i c t o r y of love and goodness. I t i s t h i s that i s c r u c i a l i n 
Pittenger's thought about the cross and resurrection; namely that the 
Easter v i c t o r y i s 'the v a l i d a t i o n ... of God's indefatigable love i n 
using that murder f o r bringing good to his children';(99) that 'the 
Cross i s the sign of the divine v i c t o r y over e v i l by absorbing i t and 
assimilating i t and using i t ' . ( 1 0 0 ) 
(e) The divine v i c t o r y i n Christ 
The divine v i c t o r y known on the cross i s the 'sign and symbol' 
of God's eternal loving a c t i v i t y . This i s what i s v i t a l to Pittenger 
about Calvary. God i n his 'consequent nature' i s ceaselessly at work 
(97) Pittenger: 'Process Theology Revisited' i n Theology Today, 
Vol. 27, (1970), p. 218. 
(98) i b i d . , p. 218. 
(99) i b i d . , p. 218. 
(100) G.D., p. 42. 
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at every instant of l i f e seeking by lure and s o l i c i t a t i o n to move 
forward his purpose of good f o r creation. When he i s faced with e v i l 
which arises from decisions taken i n contradiction of his w i l l of love, 
then although his purpose i s thwarted he i s able to transmute that e v i l 
using some aspects of i t f o r further good, taking the remainder i n t o 
himself. This divine transmuting of e v i l , however, i s no passionless 
process, rather the facing of e v i l causes suffering to God. The very 
suffering as seen on the Cross i s the nature of the suffering that God 
knows i n his loving work of overcoming e v i l . Calvary i s 'the deepest 
possible i n s i g h t i n t o what God i s l i k e and what he i s accomplishing'.(101) 
I n thus r e l a t i n g Calvary to the process i n s i g h t that God i s able 
to overcome e v i l w i t h i n his 'consequent nature" Pittenger claims a 
'practical answer' to the problem of evil.(102) E v i l on t h i s view i s 
not ignored nor i s i t accorded the status of being an independent 
force w i t h i n the cosmos. E v i l i s the unhappy yet unnecessary r e s u l t 
of free human choice, which i n the process view i s i n t e g r a l to God's 
ordering of the creative process. 'But once e v i l has happened, i t can 
be used. I n thus using i t and conquering over i t , God manifests 
himself as the indefeasible and indefatigable love that he is'.(103) 
The following summarizes Pittenger's views that have been outlined 
i n the preceding sections. 
Calvary, seen i n the l i g h t of Easter, i s a window i n t o the 
heart of God himself. I n him the pain and suffering, the 
e v i l i n the world, whatever and wherever i t may be, has 
been received so f a r as i t possesses any redeemable 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ... I n the paradigm case of Calvary (the 
'classic instance of what God i s and i s "up t o " i n his 
world') we ... have been granted the deepest possible 
(101) i b i d . , p. 57. 
(102) i b i d . , p. 4. 
(103) i b i d . , p. 57. 
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in s i g h t i n t o what God i s l i k e and what he i s accomplishing, 
we have also the assurance of f a i t h that e v i l can be made 
in t o an occasion of good, so that nothing worthy of 
saving i s lost.'(104) 
(4) The Cross i n Pittenger's Christology 
The proposal f o r t h i s section i s to draw out the implications of 
the preceding discussion with respect to Pittenger's Christology 
because these have d i r e c t relevance to his understanding of salvation. 
(a) His reliance upon other Process thinkers 
I n h i s b r i e f discussion as to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d i s t i n c t i v e 
process presentation of Christology i n 'Process Thought and Christian 
Faith', Pittenger's argument consists i n the main of quotations from 
the writings of Hartshorne and Whitehead. These are s i g n i f i c a n t 
because they provide the background f o r understanding Pittenger's 
approach both to Christology and salvation. 
Pittenger comments that i t might seem surprising that process 
thinkers who possibly did not regard themselves as 'believing Christians' 
and whose prime concern was a 'philosophically oriented study of nature 
and history' s t i l l make frequent references to Jesus. The reason f o r 
t h i s , he suggests, i s that i n Jesus they see 'a "revelation i n act" of 
that which a sound philosophical understanding of the world can discern 
" i n theory" 1, which Pittenger quotes Hartshorne as meaning that i n Jesus 
there i s the embodiment of the t r u t h that 'God i s Love'.(105) 
Pittenger summarizes the process position by saying that 'the Nisus 
working through the whole course of events has i n Jesus revealed 
(104) i b i d . , pp. 56-57-
(105) P.T.C.F., pp. 65-66. 
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himself i n a specially v i v i d manner',(106) and thus he indicates that 
i t i s the incarnation which has importance f o r process thinkers, even 
though they are not concerned with detailed d e f i n i t i o n s of the two-
natures theory. For them the t e s t of the incarnation l i e s i n i t s 
revelation of the divine nature and that as suffering. I n t h i s regard 
Pittenger quotes Hartshorne i n which he relates the incarnation and 
the cross to the dipolar nature of God. 
'... the dipolar view must hold not only that God contains 
suffering but that he suffers and that i t i s i n his 
character to suffer, i n accordance with the suffering i n 
the world. Here the Christian idea of a suffering deity -
symbolized by the Cross, together with the doctrine of the 
Incarnation - achieves technical metaphysical expression.'(107) 
I n his writings Charles Hartshorne i s at pains to eradicate the notion 
of God as being above and immune to suffering. One of the main thrusts 
of his argument i s that the i n s i g h t of f a i t h i n Jesus as the Christ 
would point to the t r u t h about 'there must be suffering i n God'.(108) 
I t i s to t h i s he points when i n the following quotation he speaks of 
Jesus not suffering alone upon the Cross. 
'Jesus was a man who suffered, mentally and physically, i n 
an intense degree, and not alone upon the cross. Thus his 
acceptance of suffering symbolizes the supreme value of 
humility. The f i r s t of men dies the death of a slave. 
But should we not go further? Jesus was termed the Christ, 
the self-manifestation of God.'(109) 
(106) i b i d . , p. 67. 
(107) Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese: Philosophers Speak of 
God, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953* P. 15* 
(108) Charles Hartshorne: 'A Philosopher's Assessment of C h r i s t i a n i t y ' 
i n ed. Walter Leibrecht: Religion and Culture: Essays i n Honour 
of Paul T i l l i c h , London, S.C.M. Press, 1959, p. 175-
(109) i b i d . , p. 175. (This quotation i s taken d i r e c t l y from the 
o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e . Pittenger's quotation i n Process Thought and 
Christian Faith contains an error. Instead of 'depths of 
humility' Pittenger reads 'depths of humanity'. This might be 
a typographical error but one can suspect that Pittenger's mis-
reading of t h i s word supports his view that Christ's acceptance 
of the Cross i n f u l f i l m e n t of his God-given aim can be seen as 
the epitome of humanity at i t s best.) 
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A further quotation completes the argument. Here Hartshorne of f e r s ; 
'the simple suggestion that Jesus appears to be the supreme 
symbol furnished to us by hi s t o r y of the notion of a God 
genuinely and l i t e r a l l y sympathetic (incomparably more 
l i t e r a l l y than any man ever i s ) , receiving i n t o his own 
experience the suffering as well as the joys of the world.'(110) 
The use of the word 'symbol' i n each of these quotations i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Again employing Hartshorne's words Pittenger summarizes the process 
position as recognising that 'Jesus was, and can s t i l l be, a l i v i n g 
and unique symbol' of God's loving and suffering mode of operation i n 
the w o r l d . ( i l l ) We have noted elsewhere Pittenger's own reference to 
the cross as 'the sign and symbol of the divine v i c t o r y over e v i l ' and 
there would seem to be l i t t l e doubt that he has borrowed that phrase 
and the idea behind i t from Hartshorne. 
He goes on to quote the following famous passage from Whitehead's 
'Adventures of Ideas': 
'The essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the appeal to the l i f e of 
Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his 
agency i n the world. The record i s fragmentary, 
inconsistent and uncertain ... but there can be no doubt as 
to what elements i n the record have evoked a response from 
a l l that i s best i n human nature. The Mother, the Child, 
and the bare manger: the lowly man, homeless and s e l f -
f o r g e t f u l , with his message of peace, love and sympathy: 
the suffering, the agony, the tender words as l i f e ebbed, 
the f i n a l despair: and the whole with the authority of 
supreme victory.'(112) 
Pittenger comments that these 'beautiful words' 'sum up most of what a 
Christian would wish to say about Jesus'. They indicate that Whitehead 
'believed that the tenderness, sympathy and lcve which were shown i n 
Jesus' l i f e and death are the disclosure of the nature of the divine 
(110) Charles Hartshorne: Reality as Social Process, Collier-Macmillan, 
New York, 1963, p. 24. 
(111) i b i d . , p. 152. 
(112) Whitehead: Adventures, p. 167. 
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r e a l i t y , who i s the chief ... p r i n c i p l e of explanation f o r a l l that 
has been, i s and w i l l be'. The person and work of Jesus are thus the 
'revelation i n act' of the divine working i n the world which Whitehead 
described as 'persuasive, creative, dynamic energizing love'.(113) 
Pittenger's own placing of the cross w i t h i n a t o t a l incarnational 
world-view i s thus shown to be i n a large measure inspired by the 
writings of Whitehead and Hartshorne. 
(b) The Cross w i t h i n Pittenger's immanentist world-view 
That f o r Pittenger ' i n the larger sense the Incarnation i s the 
Atonement'(114) i s consistent w i t h the emphasis on incarnation which 
characterizes his theology. I n t h i s thesis i t has been noted that he 
regards the world as incarnational;(115) that the Logos present i n 
every man guarantees that no man i s wholly s i n f u l or depraved;(116) 
and that the supreme manifestation of the Divine Logos or 'Deity Self-
Expressive' i s the incarnation i n Jesus.(117) The cross f i t s i n t o 
t h i s approach by being regarded as the high-point of the divine 
a c t i v i t y known i n the incarnate Word. Thus Pittenger regards i t as 
'quite mistaken to separate the cross from the t o t a l l i f e of Jesus 
Christ' because 'that which happened on the Cross i s a placarding before 
the world of what Jesus was during the whole course of h i s l i f e among 
u s ' . ( l l 8 ) Clearly then Pittenger's atonement thought i s but an 
extension of h i s emphasis on 'act-Christology'. The event of Jesus 
(113) P.T.C.F., p. 71. 
(114) W. N. Pittenger: The Approach to C h r i s t i a n i t y , London, The 
Centenary Press, 1939, p. 50. 
(115) W.I., p. 6. 
(116) i b i d . , p. 5. 
(117) i b i d . , p. 152. 
(118) G.D., p. 44. 
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Christ i s thus seen as the focus of the action of God i n the world. 
His dictum that 'Jesus cannot be viewed as the supreme anomaly but as 
the classical instance of God's working i n creation'(119) summarizes 
his perception that while God i s active throughout human experience 
and hi s t o r y yet 'the stance of the Christian f a i t h i s that i n t h i s 
Jesus ... God i s at work ... and that i n a maimer unprecedented i n 
degree of fulness ... and i n a decisive manne:? revelatory of what God 
i s and of what God i s "up t o " i n the world'.(120) The cross i s then 
the supreme manifestation of the character of God's involvement i n 
the world.(121) Yet i n a l l t h i s discussion Pittenger does not o f f e r 
explanations as to why such an extremity of the cross was necessary to 
display the divine love. He does not ask whether t h i s was the only 
satisfactory means available to God to display his loving nature and 
int e n t i o n . He remains simply content to repeat that i t was on the 
cross that God's love was displayed. 
'But why the Cross? We do not know; but we do see that 
i t i s by l i f e poured out i n death that the secret s e l f -
giving of God i s received. The Christian centuries have 
seized on the Cross as t h e i r central symbol, not by some 
freakish accident, but because Christian i n s i g h t has 
understood that i t i s i n the One who 'loved me and gave 
himself f o r me' that the t r u t h about God and man i s spoken 
and that t h i s loving and giving were consummated on 
Calvary, 'on a green h i l l f a r away'. The heart of God as 
compassionate fellow-sufferer i s there disclosed as 
nowhere else.'(122) 
This offers no advance upon Pittenger's immanentist position that the 
cross i s the consummation of that focus of the divine loving a c t i v i t y 
which was the event of Jesus Christ. 
(119) 
(120) 
(121) 
(122) 
i b i d , 
i b i d , 
G.P 
i b i d 
• > 
• > 
P. 37. 
P. 52. 
P. 51. 
P. 51. 
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Perhaps the nearest Pittenger gets to asking 'Why the Cross?', 
i s when he relates i t to human sin, which i n one sense he regards as 
i t s cause. Thus he can wr i t e that 'the death of Jesus was the r e s u l t 
of human sin or moral e v i l ' , that i t was 'the consequence of human 
re j e c t i o n and condemnation', that his suffering was 'occasioned by 
'wicked men''.(123) Recalling his d e f i n i t i o n of sin as being the 
f a i l u r e to realise the God-given aim of one's l i f e the following 
quotation relates t h i s to the Cross. 
'On the Cross, where love went to the l i m i t of death, we 
men are shown f o r what we are i n our sin - unloving, s e l f -
w i l l e d , i n contrast to that perfect love. Our defects, 
our weaknesses, our f a i l u r e s to follow and reach our ideals 
are now recognised f o r what they r e a l l y are: not harmless 
peccadilloes, but thoughts and words and deeds that tend to 
k i l l the God who i s active w i t h i n us.'(124) 
This quotation, however, does not take the argument any further. A l l 
i t says i s that the Cross underlines the gravity of sin p r i m a r i l y by 
confirming the contrast i n respect of sin between Jesus and other men 
and thereby showing that sin k i l l s 'the God who i s active w i t h i n us'. 
This f i n a l phrase emphasises the contrast between s i n f u l men and Jesus. 
The sinlessness of Jesus was e a r l i e r interpreted as his f u l f i l m e n t of 
God's aim and thus his l i f e was seen as that 'love-in-action, by which 
a man relates himself to his brethren and becomes the adequately 
expressive, highly personalized, fully-dec!ding instrument f o r the 
Cosmic Lover who i s God'.(125) I n r e l a t i n g t h i s to the cross, he says; 
'in the t o t a l i t y of Jesus' human l i f e , obedient to the w i l l 
of the Father to the point of death, there i s the enactment 
on the stage of hi s t o r y and i n the circumstances of human 
existence, of the r i g h t human relationship to God.'(126) 
(125) 
(124) 
(125) 
(126) 
G.D., p. 46. 
G.P., p. 36. 
C.R 
G.P., p. 35-
P. 53. 
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Yet t h i s avoids the question as to whether the cross was necessary. 
A l l that Pittenger i s doing i s to repeat that Jesus i n the furtherance 
of God's kingdom was prepared to face death; whereas we by contrast 
s t i f l e i f not k i l l God and his aim w i t h i n us. This i s our si n , the 
'reductio ad horrendum' of which i s the cross. 
The cross, then, remains f i r m l y w i t h i n the framework of Pittenger's 
immanentist world-view. I n t h i s discussion two p a r a l l e l yet related 
themes have emerged which hold together both a view of the Cross and 
an incarnational stress. F i r s t l y on the view that God's aim w i t h i n 
each man i s rejected and thereby God's loving a c t i v i t y i n the world i s 
thwarted, the cross Pittenger implies, shows that t h i s i s tantamount 
to k i l l i n g God, f o r i t i s the ' k i l l i n g of the God wi t h i n ' one. 
Secondly i n Jesus we see the f u l f i l m e n t of God's aim of love which was 
accomplished through r e j e c t i o n to the point of death. The cross thus 
stands as the highest manifestation of the divine love. I t w i l l 
presently be seen that these two strands come together i n Pittenger's 
theology when the cross i s presented as the source of i n s p i r a t i o n 
leading to the transformation of men's l i v e s . 
(5) A divine i n i t i a t i v e ? 
Some consequences that arise from Pittenger's description of how 
God overcomes e v i l must now be drawn out, f o r I believe they indicate 
a weakness i n his theological scheme and h i g h l i g h t a problem i n the 
process view of God. Quotations early i n t h i s chapter show that 
Pittenger regards his stress upon the divine a c t i v i t y i n salvation and 
atonement as consistent with what i s called the 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' . ( 1 2 7 ) 
(127) footnote 11. 
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I t i s my view, however, that his description of God's involvement i n 
the world as outlined i n t h i s chapter displays a marked difference from 
the way the concept of the 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' would normally be 
understood. His process view of God and of the manner of his 
transmuting of e v i l , means that God i s dependent upon what occurs; 
whether good which he readily employs f o r his purposes or e v i l which 
he negatively prehends a f t e r a l l possible benefit has been extracted 
from it ; ( 1 2 8 ) and t h i s i s very d i f f e r e n t from the usual d e f i n i t i o n of 
i n i t i a t i v e , which would be understood i n terms of f i r s t step, 
o r i g i n a t i o n or taking the lead. When i n i t i a t i v e i s understood i n a 
m i l i t a r y context, as being the a b i l i t y to make the enemy conform to 
one's own movements, then Pittenger's picture of the divine i n i t i a t i v e 
i s very d i f f e r e n t , f o r he sees God responding to and being affected by 
what i s originated by other agencies whether human or other e n t i t i e s 
w i t h i n the creative process. This betrays a prime weakness i n the 
process concept of God. 
D. W. D. Shaw indicates that a major problem i n any process 
theological system i s that the 'principle of c r e a t i v i t y ' i s central to 
i t , w i th God dependent upon i t and subject to it . ( 1 2 9 ) Such a 
conclusion has, I believe, been i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s chapter. 
Although God offers his lure and presents his aim, thereby seeking to 
mould the way the world s h a l l develop and the creative process sh a l l 
advance yet he remains subject to c r e a t i v i t y and to the freedom implied 
i n i t . Once, though, i t has been conceded that there exists a p r i n c i p l e 
greater than God to which God i s subject then not only can God not 
(128) footnote 20. 
(129) D. W. D. Shaw: 'Process Thought and Creation', Theology, Vol. 78, 
No. 661, July 1975, PP. 546-347. 
182. 
r e a l l y be spoken of as creator, as 'Father almighty, maker of heaven 
and earth',(130) but also a very d i f f e r e n t understanding of the 'divine 
i n i t i a t i v e ' , with consequences f o r salvation, i s implied. 
The problems posed f o r the concept of the 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' by 
the process concept of God have occasioned much debate amongst process 
thinkers. Shaw comments that while most process theologians have, i n 
seeking to i n t e r p r e t Christian doctrine i n the l i g h t of a Whiteheadian 
view of God, remained 'true to Whitehead and process proper', John Cobb 
i s one who has departed 'from s t r i c t "process" theory at t h i s point so 
as to give God the ultimate role i n creation, and make him the supplier 
of creativity'.(131) Consistent with t h i s approach, Cobb i s able to 
speak of 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' , saying: 
' I t would be a r b i t r a r y to deny to God (the) freedom to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e his relations to p a r t i c u l a r occasions. 
Hence, we may suppose that God may well take the i n i t i a t i v e 
i n presenting himself to human occasions w i t h peculiar 
force and specific efficacy p r i o r to and quite independently 
of t h e i r self-preparation or desire f o r t h i s occurrence.'(132) 
Schubert Ogden, i n a review a r t i c l e of Cobb's book quotes t h i s phrase 
and comments: 
'Given the unique r e l a t i o n by which Whitehead conceives God 
to be related to other actual e n t i t i e s , such " i n i t i a t i v e " 
would seem to be neither necessary nor possible, and 
Whitehead himself, so f a r as I am aware, nowhere suggests 
anything different.'(133) 
Here i s a clear admission that i n a s t r i c t process theology the concept 
of a 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' i s not sustainable. 
Colin Gunton i n an a r t i c l e discussing the process concept of God 
(130) i b i d . , p. 347. 
(131) i b i d . , p. 347. 
(132) John B. Cobb Jr.: A Christian Natural Theology, London, 
Lutterworth Press, 1966* p. 237-
(133) Schubert Ogden: 'A Christian Natural Theology', Process 
Philosophy and Christian Faith, edd. D. Brown, R. E. James, 
and G. Reeves, Indianapolis and New York, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1971, PP. 113-H4. 
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uses that quotation, describing i t s conclusion as 'both honest and 
radical'.(13^) He comments: 
'To gloss Ogden's conclusion, we can say that i n i t i a t i v e 
i s not necessary because a l l that the Bible a t t r i b u t e s 
to divine i n i t i a t i v e - creation, covenant, incarnation, 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , consummation - are replaced by the 
necessary progress that Process thought a t t r i b u t e s to 
the cosmic process.'(135) 
He goes on to say that the 'Process concept of God' can be c r i t i c i z e d 
f i r s t l y as 'Procrustean', i n the sense that i t tends to produce 
uniformity i n the way God i s recognised as operating, thus 'making i t 
impossible to say many of the things that Christian theology has 
wanted to say about God', and, secondly, as 'necessitarian', thus 
depriving 'the Christian Gospel of i t s q u a l i t y as free grace'. 
'Grace of creation and redemption are replaced by 
metaphysical optimism, which would hold sway quite 
independently of anything done through Jesus Christ.'(136) 
These cr i t i c i s m s are I believe substantiated i n the case of Pittenger 
by the discussion of t h i s chapter. The mode of divine operation can 
be categorized as 'uniform' because God has been seen as acting i n a 
broadly similar manner over every instant of experience, presenting his 
aim, u t i l i z i n g positive decisions, transmuting negative ones, thereby 
seeking to enable his w i l l of love f o r creation to move towards i t s 
f u l f i l m e n t . This leads to 'metaphysical optimism' because by t h i s 
uniform operation of God there i s b u i l t i n to the process a mechanism 
whereby the good must ultimately succeed, since what i s e v i l can be 
transmuted. Further i n that Jesus Christ and p a r t i c u l a r l y his cross 
i s only the 'sign and symbol' of the divine a c t i v i t y , by which i t s 
(134) Colin Gunton: 'Process Theology's Concept of God, An Outline 
and Assessment', The Expository Times, Vol. 84, No. 10, July 
1973, P- 295. 
(135) i b i d . , p. 295. 
(136) i b i d . , p. 295. 
184. 
character i s recognised, then i t must be conceded that the divine 
operation 'could hold sway independently of anything done through 
Jesus Christ'. On Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n the cross i s not essential 
to the divine operation. I have already remarked that Pittenger offers 
no coherent explanation of why the cross was necessary. To say, as he 
does, that i t manifested the character of the divine a c t i v i t y must 
mean that the divine operation could have continued without that 
revelation. God's loving work i n l u r i n g the creation and overcoming 
e v i l , i t must be assumed, could and would continue, whether i t s true 
nature were revealed or not. These cr i t i c i s m s taken together mean 
that Pittenger's description of God's involvement i n the world and of 
the manner of his overcoming of e v i l does not add up to what Christian 
theology has called the 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' . 
Pittenger himself r e p l i e d on behalf of process theology to the 
cri t i c i s m s of Gunton. Two points made by him are germane to t h i s 
discussion. F i r s t l y he rejected Gunton's phrase 'metaphysical optimism' 
commenting that 'he (Gunton) f a i l s to recognise that the only optimism 
i s i n respect to God's capacity to receive and use e v i l f o r greater 
good'.(137) Secondly he repudiates the accusation of 'necessary 
progress' by saying that no 'Process theologian known to me, would f o r 
a moment accept such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 'process' and 'progress'. 
Indeed there i s process or change; but i t i s not ine v i t a b l y progress. 
To put i t vulgarly, one can "process to h e l l " quite as much as "process 
to heaven".'(138) These comments, though, indicate that Pittenger has 
missed the point of the c r i t i c i s m s ; as Gunton acknowledges i n a 
(137) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology (Short Comment)', The 
Expository Times, Vol. 85, No. 2, 1973, P. 56. 
(138) i b i d . , p. 57. 
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subsequent reply;(139) by f a i l i n g to recognise that they re l a t e 
p r i m a r i l y to the process view of God which makes him essentially 
passive and receptive. I f God's involvement with the world, no matter 
how intimate, i s to be responsive to what occurs i n the creative 
process and i f i n that sense he i s subject to the onward movement of 
c r e a t i v i t y , then he becomes i n the f i n a l analysis a mechanism b u i l t 
i n t o the creative process to assist i t s adva.nce towards novelty. Once 
God i s f i x e d i n t o the system i n such a capacity then the creative 
process must have a 'metaphysical optimism' b u i l t i n t o i t , because 
everything that happens can either be used f o r the advancement of the 
process or i n the case of e v i l be negatively prehended and where possible 
turned to a good purpose. Progress must be the inevitable by product 
of such a system. Indeed despite Pittenger's comment nothing i n such 
a system could be said to be processing to h e l l , i n a l a t e r chapter he 
himself w i l l be seen to r e j e c t the concept of h e l l and also to assert 
that through the operation of God's consequent nature e v i l w i l l be 
transmuted and whatever i s good w i l l f i n d 'objective immortality' i n 
being used towards the furtherance of God's loving purposes. 
Pittenger believes that the process view of God i s an active 
one.(140) His repeated use of the word ' a c t i v i t y ' confirms t h i s . Thus 
he either f a i l s to recognise the force of or does not accept the 
cr i t i c i s m s that the process view of God i s essentially passive, w i t h 
c r e a t i v i t y central to the process metaphysical system. Thus while 
other process w r i t e r s , such as Ogden, recognise that the notion of 
'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' i s inappropriate i n a s t r i c t process scheme, 
(139) Colin Gunton: 'Process Theology: A Reply (Short Comments)', 
The Expository Times, Vol. 85, No. 7, 1974, p. 215. 
(140) W. N. Pittenger: 'Process Theology (Short Comment)', The 
Expository Times, Vol. 85, No. 2, 197'3, p. 57. 
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Pittenger both wants to speak of 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' and also use 
process insights to the f u l l . Yet, i n my view, the process view of 
how God faces and overcomes e v i l i s determinative of his theology to 
the point of making h i s concept of the 'divine i n i t i a t i v e ' very 
d i f f e r e n t from what Christian theology means by that phrase. This i s 
demonstrated by his description of how Jesus relates to God's overcoming 
of e v i l . I n that i n his l i f e and death God's character was revealed 
and his suffering concern f o r the world demonstrated, there i s no need 
fo r a special divine i n i t i a t i v e i n Jesus. Indeed Pittenger rejects any 
idea that i n Jesus there i s a special action of God f o r the world's 
salvation. His insistence that Jesus's difference from other men must 
only be a matter of degree i s further evidence that the idea of a 
special divine i n i t i a t i v e i n Jesus i s inappropriate i n his theology. 
But these considerations arise from his use of the process view of God. 
Jesus' passion i s thus the 'sign and symbol' of God's suffering, indeed 
passive nature. Yet t h i s i s f a r removed from what Christian experience 
has sought to say about the divine saving a c t i v i t y i n Christ. This 
i n a b i l i t y to cope with the idea of divine i n i t i a t i v e also betrays the 
weakness f o r Christian theology of the process view of God. As Colin 
Gunton says i n his a r t i c l e on process theology's concept of God: 
'My own view i s that the Gospel cannot bear the changes 
that appear to be required and remain the Christian Gospel, 
i f by that i s meant the good news of God's g i f t to men i n 
Jesus of Nazareth. However successful Process theology may 
be as a theologia crucis - and i t s suggestiveness i n t h i s 
sphere should not be denied - there are other factors, of 
overwhelming importance f o r the New Testament understanding 
of the events of and accompanying the l i f e of Jesus, that 
cannot be conceptualized s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by t h i s doctrine of 
God: f o r example, the conceptions of the kingdom that breaks 
i n t o the world; of the love that a c t i v e l y seeks out the l o s t 
and judges those who r e j e c t i t ; and the power that raises 
the dead. A l l require a more ' a c t i v i s t ' understanding of 
God than i s possible on the Process account.'(l4l) 
(141) op.cit., p. 295. 
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CHAPTER 5 - APPENDIX 
PITTENGER'S THESIS COMPARED WITH JUR.GEN MOLTMANN' S 
'THE CRUCIFIED GOD' 
Pittenger's scattered and unsustained references to God's 
involvement i n the cross hardly bear comparison with Moltmann's 
magisterial thesis which has been acknowledged as a major contribution 
to current atonement thought. Further Pittenger's discussion seems 
somewhat idealized when compared with the astringency with which 
Moltmann writes of the 'cr u c i f i e d God' i n a theology born from the 
horrors of Auschwitz where God was t r u l y to be seen 'hanging from the 
gallows'.(l) Yet because the theme of the 'cr u c i f i e d God' i s common 
to both and because Moltmann refers to the contribution of process 
thought to t h i s discussion some attempt at comparison must be effected. 
Several areas of marked s i m i l a r i t y between Moltmann and the 
process w r i t e r s , including Pittenger, are readily detected. 
F i r s t l y , as Pittenger rejects any notion of God's 'aseity' 'his 
self-existence and self-containedness'(2) so Moltmann rejects the idea 
of his 'apatheia' i n the sense of his being 'incapable of being affected 
by outside influences, incapable of feeling',(3) rather he speaks of 
'the pathos of God' which i s descriptive of 'the way i n which God i s 
affected by events and human actions and suffering i n history'.(4) 
(1) Jlirgen Moltmann: The Crucified God, London, S.C.M. Press, 1974, 
p. 274. 
(2) W. N. Pittenger: 'The Attributes of God i n the Light of Process 
Thought', The Expository Times, Vol. 8 l , 1969, p. 22. 
(3) Moltmann: op.cit., p. 267 also p. 228. 
(4) i b i d . , p. 270. 
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He comments that 'incapability of suffering i n t h i s sense would 
contradict the fundamental Christian assertion that God i s love.(5) 
Secondly, Moltmann wishes to free theology from a metaphysics 
which sees God i n terms of 'unity, i n d i v i s i b i l i t y , immovability and 
immutability'.(6) Against t h i s 'philosophical concept of God' he 
ranges a s p e c i f i c a l l y Christian theology and he quotes as an accurate 
estimate of and antidote to t h i s 'philosophical theism' Whitehead's 
suggestion that 'the Galilean o r i g i n of C h r i s t i a n i t y ' 'which dwells 
upon the tender elements of the world' i s the only v a l i d a lternative 
to those three strains of thought which fashion God i n the image of 
'the r u l i n g Caesar or the ruthless moralist or the unmoved mover'.(7) 
Pittenger's frequent use of t h i s quotation has been noted. 
Thirdly, l i k e Pittenger, Moltmann believes that the cross reveals 
the nature of God; that i t i s mistaken to confine the cross 'within the 
horizon of soteriology', rather theological thought should 'concentrate 
the question and knowledge of God on the death of Christ on the cross 
and attempt to understand God's being from the death of Jesus'.(8) 
'With the Christian message of the cross of Christ, 
something new and strange has entered the metaphysical 
world. For t h i s f a i t h must understand the death of God 
from the event of the suffering and death of the Son of 
God and thus bring about a fundamental change i n the 
orders of being of metaphysical thought and the value 
table of re l i g i o u s f e e l i n g . I t must think of the 
suffering of Christ as the power of God and the death 
of Christ as God's p o t e n t i a l i t y . ' ( 9 ) 
Such sentiments accord closely with Pittenger's theological position. 
(5) i b i d . , p. 230. 
(6) i b i d . , p. 214. 
(7) i b i d . , p. 250 also p. 28l, note 36, quoting Whitehead: Process, 
p. 404. 
(8) i b i d . , p. 201. 
(9) i b i d . , p. 215. 
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Moltmann develops these insights i n t o an understanding of the 
'cr u c i f i e d God' which f o r him i s the central, theological t r u t h ; that 
God suffered i n the suffering of Jesus; that 'God himself r e a l l y 
enters i n t o the suffering of the Son and i n so doing i s and remains 
completely God'.(10) He recognises how t h i s runs counter to the 
axioms of the philosophers that 'by d e f i n i t i o n God cannot suffer and 
die',(11) but he affirms that the Christian f a i t h says that 'God 
suffered i n the suffering of Jesus, God died on the cross of Christ'.(12) 
Within a discussion of the cry of d e r e l i c t i o n Moltmann speaks of Jesus 
as 'the godforsaken',(lj) dying 'as one rejected by his God and 
Father',(14) and comments that 'to comprehend God i n the c r u c i f i e d 
Jesus, abandoned by God, requires a 'revolution i n the concept of 
God''.(15) God deliberately 'delivers up his son on the cross',(16) 
but because of the intimate relationship between Father and Son t h i s 
'not sparing and abandoning also involves the Father himself'. 'In 
the forsakenness of the Son the Father also forsakes himself. I n the 
surrender of the Son the Father also surrenders himself'.(17) Hence 
he i s the c r u c i f i e d God. 
While, however, Moltmann and the process w r i t e r s share a common 
approach i n understanding God, believing that the Christ event should 
be normative f o r such understanding, conspicuous differences remain 
between them which w i l l provide a f e r t i l e area of discussion f o r t h i s 
study. 
(10) i b i d . , P- 205. 
(11) i b i d . , P. 214. 
(12) i b i d . , P- 216. 
(13) i b i d . , P- 145. 
(14) i b i d . , P. 152. 
(15) i b i d . , P. 152. 
(16) i b i d . , P. 243. 
(17) i b i d . , P- 243. 
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Moltmann quotes Whitehead's dictum that 'God i s the great 
companion - the fellow-sufferer, who understands',(18) i n the sense 
that 'God i s , God i s i n us, God suffers i n us, where love suffers' and 
he suggests that when 'understood i n t r i n i t a r i a n terms' t h i s means that 
'God both transcends the world and i s immanent i n history'.(19) Now 
while recognising that t h i s i s what 'process theology says i n the 
bipolar concept of God' he implies that i t i s d e f i c i e n t i n f u l l y 
t r i n i t a r i a n terms. I n a precursor a r t i c l e to the publication of the 
English t r a n s l a t i o n of his book he states t h i s more clearl y saying 
that he 'does not believe that the cosmological conception of God (God's 
primordial and consequent nature) s u f f i c i e n t l y grasps the problem of 
suffering'. He goes on; 'on the other hand, the s t a r t i n g point f o r a 
t r i n i t a r i a n theology of the cross can take up process theology ideas 
of the suffering God and use them f o r a Christian cosmology. Even the 
cosmos i t s e l f groans i n t r a v a i l (Romans 8), and even i t s suffering has 
become through Christ a part of the suffering of God.'(20) I t i s these 
c r i t i c i s m s of the process position, namely, i t s i n s u f f i c i e n t grasp of 
the problem of suffering, i t s lack of a t r i n i t a r i a n dimension i n i t s 
understanding of God and i t s f a i l u r e to relate them together that seems 
to me to apply most clear l y to Pittenger's understanding of the 
' c r u c i f i e d God'. 
I n i t s simple form the question of suffering can be readily 
dealt with, though i t s further ramifications belong to a discussion of 
the T r i n i t y . The c r i t i c i s m has already been made that Pittenger does 
(18) i b i d . , p. 255, Whitehead: Process, p. 4 l J . 
(19) i b i d . , p. 255. 
(20) Jlirgen Moltmann: 'The Crucified God', Theology Today, 1974-5, 
Vol. 31 J Pt. 1, p. 15n. 
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not face the trag i c dimension of sin, that despite his protestations 
of taking e v i l seriously he does not see sin and e v i l i n the l i g h t of 
the desperate suffering they so often bring i n t h e i r wake. His, i t has 
been suggested, i s essentially an i d e a l i s t i c picture. This i s not true 
of Moltmann. His theology of the c r u c i f i e d God arises from Auschwitz, 
i t takes oppression and suffering very seriously. For example i n a 
symposium, 'Hope and the Future of Man' i n which Moltmann and others 
debated that subject with process theologians, Moltmann c r i t i c i z e d 
them f o r t h e i r 'purely speculative expression of hope' which i s 
concerned with the future of 'this world' viewed as a 'global v i l l a g e ' 
and which ignores 'separation, oppression, ghettos, apartheid, etc.'.(21) 
He caricatures them as ' l i b e r a l theologians of the white bourgeoisie' 
whose t a l k of hope i s i n terms of the future 'of the a f f l u e n t 
technologically developed nations' exemplified by t h e i r 'making theology 
s c i e n t i f i c and t h e i r dialogue with other sciences equally s c i e n t i f i c , 
while overlooking the social and p o l i t i c a l context of science and of 
t h e i r own theologies'.(22) He relates an assertion that 'the central 
question i n any Christian theology i s e v i l ' to an ev o l u t i o n i s t view 
such as process thought by asking i f i t i s possible to 'integrate e v i l 
i n t o creation as part of a world i n evolution or process'.(23) Despite 
once again acknowledging his a t t r a c t i o n f o r Whitehead's description of 
God as the 'fellow sufferer who understands' he i s forced to recognise 
great dangers w i t h i n an evol u t i o n i s t theory which concentrates upon God 
(21) jiirgen Moltmann: 'Response to the opening presentations' i n 
ed. Ewart H. Cousins Hope and the Future of Man, pub. The 
Teilhard Centre f o r the Future of Man, (Vol. 6 of The Teilhard 
Study L i b r a r y ) , London, 1973* P- 55-
(22) i b i d . , p. 56. 
(23) i b i d . , p. 58. 
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the mover of evolution because i n such a system e v i l can be minimized 
i n that the suffering of m i l l i o n s i n the process of h i s t o r y i s i n 
danger of being forgotten.(24) Now although t h i s reference i s aimed 
at Teilhard i t can also be applied to the process wr i t e r s and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y to Pittenger. 
The d i f f i c u l t y I f i n d w i t h the concept of God subsuming e v i l 
w i t h i n his consequent nature, i n addition, that i s , to h e s i t a t i o n about 
being able to speak so d e f i n i t i v e l y about the inner workings of God, i s 
that i t seems such an abstract remote transaction which does nothing 
r e a l l y to answer the immediate horror of suffering. To o f f e r a 
facetious example, i t i s rather l i k e a vacuum mopping up the debris 
from the night before, without i t s e l f having shared at a l l i n the 
revelry. To know that one's own e v i l deeds and t h e i r consequences or 
one's own suffering r e s u l t i n g from e v i l are prehended by God and 
subsumed w i t h i n his ongoing purposes does nothing to a l l e v i a t e the 
present trauma. Such a theology i s small consolation to a starving 
c h i l d , a v i c t i m of Auschwitz or to someone who senses his e v i l deeds 
to be irrevocable. The further suggestion that the divine operation 
i s fraught with suffering, the 'sign and symbol' of which i s the cross 
does not lessen i t s remoteness. Despite Pittenger's contention that 
such a view 'placards' and offers new, profound insights i n t o the divine 
suffering, i t seems to me to do the opposite. Moltmann's book confirms 
t h i s impression, f o r he, by contrast, indicates that the recognition of 
an intimate relationship between God the fellow sufferer and the cross 
speaks d i r e c t l y to the problem of e v i l and suffering. 
(24) i b i d . , p. 58. 
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'For i n l i s t e n i n g to the oppressed, the oppressors and 
the theologians among them might become sensitive to the 
"oppression of God", the oppression God suffers i n Jesus 
Christ and by which he liberates mankind.'(25) 
He sees t h i s expressed most clear l y i n the T r i n i t y . I n The Crucified 
God' Moltmann relates t h i s notion of the suffering God very closely to 
an understanding of the T r i n i t y , the conjunction of which he suggests 
as the d i s t i n c t i v e concept of the divine i n C h r i s t i a n i t y . I n large 
measure t h i s i s Moltmann's protest against 'the r e l i g i o u s conception of 
many Christians' which proves 'to be no more than a weakly Christianized 
monotheism'.(26) This i s a c r i t i c i s m I would suggest as being applicable 
to Pittenger. To understand t h i s an in d i c a t i o n of the closeness i n 
which he holds the cross and the doctrine of the T r i n i t y should be 
given. As he says: 
'The theological concept f o r the perception of the 
c r u c i f i e d Christ i s the doctrine of the T r i n i t y . The 
material p r i n c i p l e of the doctrine of the T r i n i t y i s the 
cross of Christ.'(27) 
Moltmann outlines the significance of holding the T r i n i t y and the cross 
closely together when he says: 
'When one considers the significance of the death of Jesus 
fo r God himself, one must enter i n t o the i n t e r - t r i n i t a r i a n 
tensions and relationships of God and speak of the Father, 
the Son and the S p i r i t . But i f that i s the case, i t i s 
inappropriate to t a l k simply of 'God' i n connection with 
the Christ event.'(28) 
Thus a f t e r looking at Moltmann's positive contribution to t h i s question, 
those areas that he regards as 'inappropriate' because they 'talk simply 
of "God" i n connection w i t h the Christ event' w i l l be considered, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y with r e l a t i o n to Pittenger. 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
i b i d . , p. 57. 
Moltmann: op.cit., p. 236. 
i b i d . , pp. 240-241. 
i b i d . , p. 204. 
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Moltmann begins from the recognition of Jesus as the 
'godforsaken',(29) as the 'one rejected by his God and Father',(30) 
but he comments, 'to comprehend God i n the c r u c i f i e d Jesus, abandoned 
by God requires a "revolution i n the concept of God"'.(31) Such, 
though, he suggests has not been forthcoming i n Christian history, f o r 
most Christian theology has begun with the attempt to explicate a 
general doctrine of God, o f f e r i n g philosophical proofs f o r his 
existence and has only offered t r i n i t a r i a n understanding at best as 
secondary thoughts, at worst as 'theological speculation with no 
relevance f o r l i f e ' , ( 3 2 ) hence his conclusion that the r e l i g i o n of many 
Christians i s no more than a 'weakly Christianized monotheism'. I t i s 
Moltmann's b e l i e f , however, that i t i s only when cross and T r i n i t y are 
held together that true value can be given to either, indeed i t i s 
God's presence i n the cross that i s the s c r i p t u r a l basis f o r Christian 
b e l i e f i n the triune God.(33) 
Moltmann works out t h i s i n s i g h t i n terms of God 'delivering up' 
his son to death, based on Romans ch. 1 vs. 18 f f . He points out that 
Paul i n i t i a l l y uses the idea of 'delivering up' f o r judgement, i n the 
sense that because of t h e i r godlessness and corruption God abandons 
them to t h e i r own l u s t s . Thus the Godless become the Godforsaken. But 
Paul proclaims, i t i s i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n that the saving righteousness 
of God i s manifested, made possible by God abandoning his own son and 
delivering him up to an accursed death. 
(29) i b i d . , p. 145. 
(30) i b i d . , p. 152. 
(31) i b i d . , p. 152. 
(32) i b i d . , p. 237. 
(33) i b i d . , p. 241. 
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'Thus i n the t o t a l , inextricable abandonment of Jesus 
by his God and Father, Paul sees the delivering up of 
the Son by the Father f o r godless and godforsaken man. 
Because God 'does not spare' his Son, a l l the godless 
are spared.'(34) 
Yet t h i s 'not-sparing and abandoning also involves the Father 
himself',(35) but t h i s , Moltmann asserts, can only be understood i n 
T r i n i t a r i a n terms. 
'The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of 
the Son. The g r i e f of the Father here i s j u s t as 
important as the death of the Son. The Fatherlessness of 
the Son i s matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and 
i f God has constituted himself as the Father of Jesus 
Christ, then he also suffers the death of his Fatherhood 
i n the death of the Son. Unless t h i s were so, the doctrine 
of the T r i n i t y would s t i l l have a monotheistic background.'(36) 
Thus the T r i n i t a r i a n emphasis expresses the 'deep community of w i l l 
between Jesus and his God and Father' seen mcst clear l y 'at the point 
of t h e i r deepest separation, i n the godforsaken and accursed death of 
Jesus on the cross'.(37) ' i n the cross, Father and Son are most deeply 
separated i n forsakenness and at the same time are most inwardly one i n 
t h e i r surrender'.(38) This Moltmann interprets as the manifestation of 
the divine love i n the cross. But t h i s , he i n s i s t s , i s no mere divine-
human event but a t r i n i t a r i a n event between the Son and the Father, f o r 
i t i s r e l i a n t upon the personal response of the Sonship of Jesus. 
This i s very d i f f e r e n t from Pittenger's understanding of the 
cr u c i f i e d God. On Moltmann's d e f i n i t i o n Pittenger i s wholly 'monotheist' 
i n his approach. His prime concern i s with the loving a c t i v i t y of God, 
subsuming e v i l w i t h i n his consequent nature, the 'sign and symbol' of 
(34) i b i d . , P- 242. 
(35) i b i d . , P. 243. 
(36) i b i d . , P- 243. 
(37) i b i d . , pp. . 243-244. 
(58) i b i d . , P- 244. 
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which i s the cross. This i s consonant with his Christology. A 
Christology which because of i t s immanentist presuppositions accounts 
f o r the s p e c i a l i t y of Jesus i n terms of a difference of degree from 
other men must have a r e s t r i c t e d view of the cross. I t could not speak 
of i n t e r - t r i n i t a r i a n involvement as Moltmann has been seen to do. At 
best i t can speak of the Christ-cross event as the supreme manifestation 
of the divine character; the key event f o r his a c t i v i t y . From Moltmann's 
stance such i s not only an inadequate view of the cross but also weak 
theology. On Pittenger's view Jesus on his cross seems to be reduced 
to a t o o l , a l b e i t a w i l l i n g one, w i t h i n the ongoing a c t i v i t y of God, i n 
order to display i t s true character. This does not even approximate to 
t r i n i t a r i a n understanding. 
Moltmann was noted e a r l i e r as saying that ' i t i s inappropriate to 
t a l k simply of "God" i n connection with the Christ event', yet t h i s i s 
precisely what Pittenger does. I n t h i s regard several c r i t i c a l points 
that Moltmann makes w i l l be applied to Pittenger. 
F i r s t l y there i s Moltmann's contention that 'even the doctrine of 
grace i s monotheistic, and not t r i n i t a r i a n , i n practice'.(39) This 
c l e a r l y has relevance f o r Pittenger who emphasizes grace both i n 
Christology and salvation experience. Grace f o r him i s synonymous with 
the divine a c t i v i t y , i t i s 'God's favour and his help',(40) yet for i t 
to operate ( i n Moltmann's words) 'no t r i n i t a r i a n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n God 
seems to be necessary'.(4l) That Jesus by his f u l l - h e a r t e d response to 
the divine aim i s a greater recipient of grace than others confirms 
that Pittenger's understanding of Jesus, and by extension of the cross, 
(39) i b i d . , p. 236. 
(40) W.I., p. 43. 
(41) Moltmann, op.cit., p. 236. 
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i s confined w i t h i n what Moltmann would designate as a monotheistic 
scheme. 
Secondly, Moltmann finds similar f a u l t with a doctrine of creation 
which he claims a 'weakly Christianized monotheism' could share with 
Islam.(42) Such a s t r i c t u r e would apply whether creation were viewed 
as a single primaeval event or an ongoing process. A theological 
immanentism such as Pittenger's, expressed i n terms of the ongoing 
creative a c t i v i t y of God, known i n a l l men and events yet exemplified 
i n certain c r u c i a l and 'important' ones i s essentially monotheistic i n 
i t s conception, i n the sense i n which Moltmann uses the word. 
Thirdly, Moltmann believes that an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the cross i n 
theopaschite terms i s also narrowly monotheistic.(43) This would apply 
to Pittenger's description of God reigning from a tree when seen i n the 
context of his act-Christology. The cross then becomes the poignant 
symbol of God's willingness to face d e r e l i c t i o n and suffering i n order 
to overcome e v i l . I t i s the divine loving a c t i v i t y which i s paramount 
with Jesus but the w i l l i n g instrument w i t h i n the operation. Moltmann, 
however, would counter such by saying that a f u l l t r i n i t a r i a n 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would not speak simply of a divine-human event but of 
the 'relationship of Christ to his Father'. 
'i n that case one w i l l understand the deadly aspect of the 
event between the Father who forsakes and the Son who i s 
forsaken, and conversely the l i v i n g aspect of the event 
between the Father who loves and the Son who loves. The 
Son suffers i n his love being forsaken by the Father as he 
dies. The Father suffers i n his love the g r i e f of the death 
of the Son. I n that case, whatever proceeds from the event 
between the Father and the Son must be understood as the 
s p i r i t of the surrender of the Father and the Son, as the 
s p i r i t which creates love f o r the forsaken men, as the 
s p i r i t who brings the dead alive.'(44) 
(42) i b i d . , p. 236. 
(43) i b i d . , p. 203. 
(44) i b i d . , p. 245. 
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Any such sense of 'an event between the Father and. the Son' and the 
Inte r a c t i o n between them i s quite foreign to Pittenger's thought. His 
stress upon the loving a c t i v i t y of God of which Jesus i s the instrument 
would be adjudged on Moltmann's estimate to be of inadequate t r i n i t a r i a n 
emphasis. Pittenger's own teaching about the T r i n i t y confirms t h i s 
conclusion. 
He explains the T r i n i t y i n terms of 'three-fold experience' of 
the revelation of the divine Reality;(45) God encountered as Father i n 
Israel's history, as Son i n the Christ event and as S p i r i t , the one who 
e l i c i t e d response, i n the Christian community. I t i s Christ, though, 
who i s the d e f i n i t i v e factor, f o r , 'the 'Christian God' i s indeed 
continuous with the God of I s r a e l ; he i s the same God but he i s now 
more deeply understood, i n terms of Jesus and a l l that he has done'.(46) 
I t i s on the basis of t h i s experience of God that the ' d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
Christian concept of God' arose, that while remaining monotheist t h i s 
a t t i t u d e was 'enriched by the b e l i e f that i n the mystery of the divine 
Reality there are di s t i n c t i o n s and relationships';(47) f o r Pittenger 
i n s i s t s that since God 'must reveal himself i n action as he r e a l l y i s 
and of himself 1,(48) there must be ' i n the depths of the Divine L i f e , 
i n the very heart of the divine Reality ... a three-foldness which 
corresponded with the three-foldness of the human experience of the 
divine working'.(49) He finds i t d i f f i c u l t to describe these 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s i n terms of 'persons', with the implication of 
individuation, preferring to speak of 'modes', though (no doubt to avoid 
(45) G.P., p. 47-
(46) W.I., p. 220. 
(47) i b i d . , p. 216. 
(48) G.P., p. 47. 
(49) i b i d . , p. 48. 
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the accusation of modalism) not i n any sense as ' a c t i v i t i e s of a 
single divine Being'.(50) His d e f i n i t i o n thus i s equivocal, f a l l i n g 
between ad j e c t i v a l and substantival senses. 
' I f they are 'aspects', they are eternal and are r e l a t i v e l y 
d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t ; i f they are 'persons', they are so 
interpenetrating and so make up the one l i f e which i s God 
that they are also one together.'(51) 
I t may be doubted i f t h i s can be described as f u l l Trinitarianism 
according to Moltmann's c r i t e r i a . Although Pittenger speaks of 
interpenetration between the 'persons' w i t h i n the T r i n i t y nowhere does 
he explicate t h i s i n terms such as Moltmann has been seen to describe 
the i n t e r a c t i o n between Father and Son on Calvary. Pittenger's prime 
stress i s upon the divine involvement i n hi s t o r y understood i n terms 
of the Christian experience and i t i s only a f t e r that has been 
established that he would speak of t h i s experience defining the nature 
of Godhead as at once self-disclosing and triune i n i t s relationship. 
He makes no attempt to define t h i s i n terms of anything but the 
Christian experience. He prefers to employ the process dipolar concept 
of God to explain God's involvement with the world and he relates the 
cross to that as being symbolic of i t s character but that can be 
recognised as no more than a device f o r explicating the divine a c t i v i t y 
and has been seen to be described by Moltmann as less than t r i n i t a r i a n . 
(50) W.I., p. 225. 
(51) i b i d . , p. 225. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EXPERIENCE OF SALVATION 
( l ) Wholeness 
Pittenger speaks of 'salvation' as 'the wholeness of l i f e , the 
"integration" which comes through a radical adjustment to God made 
known and available to men i n the emergent l i f e of our Lord'.(l) 
He variously describes t h i s wholeness as 'man becoming t r u l y a 
lover' by allowing his l i f e to be grasped by 'God the Cosmic Lover',(2) 
or as a renewal of strength, a freshness of purpose or the overcoming 
of the f r u s t r a t i o n of our loving.(J) This i s 'his true nature'(4) to 
which man can be restored when he i s no longer i n s i n f u l defection 
from his true s e l f . 
'Although man i s i n such defection, yet he has the 
p o t e n t i a l i t y of restoration to health and wholeness. 
I n the language of Christian f a i t h , he has been "saved" 
by being brought i n t o a r i g h t relationship with his 
Creator and hence i n t o a r i g h t relationship with 
himself and others. And t h i s , which i s a given f a c t 
fo r the Christian - a f a c t established i n Jesus Christ -
a man can be brought to accept and hence to realize, to 
enter i n t o and f i n d made actual, i n his own l i f e . ' ( 5 ) 
This wholeness clear l y relates to Pittenger's understanding of both 
sin and human po t e n t i a l , which have been discussed e a r l i e r , and can 
be seen as t h e i r opposite. 
Sin when viewed as the f a i l u r e to f u l f i l the God-given aim of 
l i f e , as 'that which contradicts the true - that i s , the di v i n e l y 
intended - nature of man, as mind-body i n social relationships'(6) 
(1) W.I., p. 5. 
(2) C.R., p. 52. 
(3) Love i s the Clue, p. 49. 
(4) Human Nature, p. 106. 
(5) i b i d . , p. 106. 
(6) i b i d . , p. 99. 
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w i l l suggest as i t s opposite 'positive, outgoing, active, p a r t i c i p a n t 
goodness'.(7) Salvation as wholeness would thus be 'love i n action, 
by which a man relates himself to his brethren and becomes the 
adequately expressive, highly personalized, f r e e l y deciding instrument 
of the Cosmic Lover who i s God'.(8) This i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of human 
po t e n t i a l ; f o r Pittenger has been seen to stress a human p o t e n t i a l i t y 
which no sin can t o t a l l y d i s t o r t and which ce.n be i d e n t i f i e d as the 
image of God i n man. Despite sin we are ' s t i l l God's children, s t i l l 
grounded i n him, s t i l l made i n his image (however we have damaged i t ) , 
s t i l l possessed of an u n f u l f i l l e d capacity f o r him'.(9) Salvation 
thus becomes f o r Pittenger an 'adjustment to God', a l b e i t a radical 
one.(10) 
'Man, then, needs restoration. Nothing i n him needs 
destruction; but his s i n f u l affections and desires, 
with t h e i r rooting i n his w i l f u l mind and proud s p i r i t , 
must be reoriented and centered i n God so that they are 
no longer sinful.'(11) 
How t h i s restoration to wholeness i s realized i n Christ i s the essence 
of Pittenger's atonement thought. For i t i s 'by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
l i f e of that man' i n whom man's divi n e l y intended nature was displayed 
that 'we are integrated, made one, brought back to ourselves, to 
others and to God'.(12) 
(2) Jesus and the Experience of Salvation 
I t i s because Pittenger begins from such an understanding of si n , 
human nature and salvation that he claims 'that our Lord i s not an 
(7) C.R., p. 53-
(8) i b i d . , p. 53. 
(9) G.P., p. 61. 
(10) W.I., p. 5-
(11) Human Nature, p. 8 l . 
(12) i b i d . , p. 126. 
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intruder i n t o the Creation, "a divine rescue expedition", but i s t i e d 
i n w ith and expressive of the whole God world and God man relationship, 
even while he i s also ... the Saviour from Sin'.(13) This i s consistent 
with what have been shown to be Pittenger's c h r i s t o l o g i c a l emphases. 
I t i s crucial though to see how w i t h i n t h i s framework he interprets 
Jesus as Saviour. He does t h i s by speaking of Jesus as our example and 
secondly as the source of grace the one i n whom God's power i s known. 
(a) Jesus as our example 
The example motif i s based upon the recognition that Jesus i s the 
one i n whom the God-given aim of l i f e i s seen to be f u l f i l l e d , that he 
i s Love i n action. Pittenger speaks of Jesus being manhood t r u l y 
f u l f i l l e d ; as 'God's idea of what man i s ' and 'what God i s up to i n 
respect of manhood'. He draws t h i s conclusion. 
'But i f Christ i s t h i s , he i s t h i s only because i n him 
there i s made actual, r e a l , complete, v i v i d , and clear 
what i s potential although unrealized a.nd unaccomplished 
i n every one of us men. He i s the Truth about us, 
placarded on the pages of hi s t o r y i n a genuinely human 
lif e . ' ( 1 4 ) 
Thus f i r s t l y the l i f e of Christ i s our example i n that i t shows 
by contrast what i s u n f u l f i l l e d i n every man. The l i f e of Christ and 
the cross i n p a r t i c u l a r shows human sin f o r what i t i s , a loveless 
unfulfilment of God's aim. 
Secondly the example of Christ evokes a response which Pittenger 
describes thus: 
'the response which the placarding of Christ on his cross ... 
demands from us and evokes from us i s the making real i n our 
own l i v e s the s p i r i t of s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the world's 
pain which was God's act i n Christ.'(15) 
(13) W.I., P. 156. 
(14) Human Nature, pp. 31-32. 
(15) G.D., p. 61. 
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I n a short a r t i c l e i n 'The Times' e n t i t l e d 'Learning Forgiveness i n 
Lent' Pittenger wrote t h i s . 
' i t i s that season of the church year when we can make 
a special e f f o r t to look at Jesus Christ, r e a l l y to look 
at him, so that his mind becomes ours, his w i l l ours, 
and his love ours too. I f we do that long enough, 
a t t e n t i v e l y and with singleness of heart, we sha l l become 
l i k e him - we shall "forgive everyone who has ever 
inj u r e d us" and to any question put to us we sha l l 
answer "simply 'Love' said with a countenance clothed i n 
humility".'(16) 
Further evidence of Pittenger's stress upon the 'example' of the l i f e 
of Christ i s afforded by his repeated quotation of Whitehead's words 
from 'Adventures of Ideas' that the essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the 
appeal to 'the mother, the c h i l d and the bare manger; the lowly man ... 
with his message of peace and love ... the suffering, the agony, the 
tender words as l i f e ebbed' because they have 'evoked a response from 
a l l that i s best i n human nature'.(17) 
This i s the s t a r t i n g point f o r Pittenger's atonement thought. 
The l i f e and death of Jesus are seen as a profound incentive 
persuading men to change t h e i r l i v e s and move towards that state of 
wholeness i n which they seek the f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r God-given aim, 
but only when the l i f e of Christ i s recognised as the arena of the 
divine a c t i v i t y . I t i s only because 'the l i f e of Christ i s i n i t s 
deepest significance God's act f o r man's wholeness, health, integration, 
f u l f i l m e n t , "salvation"', and because ' i t i s what God did i n true human 
l i f e to the end that the rest of us could have these things' that 'the 
Christian claim that i n the f u l l f i l i a l obedience of Christ we see the 
goal of human endeavour i s true at a l l ' . ( l 8 ) Thus while the example of 
the man Jesus i n i t s e l f i s not the source of salvation, yet when that 
l i f e i s seen as the revelation of God's love then not only i s i t a 
(16) The Times, Saturday, March 4th, 1972. 
(17) Whitehead op.cit., p. 167 quoted Pittenger Human Nature, p. 32 
P.T.C.F., pp. 70f. 
(18) Human Nature, p. 32 
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salvatory example but I t also becomes the source of grace and power. 
This i s the essence of his appeal to the Abelardian exemplarist 
theme. 
(b) Jesus the source of Grace 
Pittenger's stress on love provides the best introduction to t h i s 
aspect of his atonement thought. His personal apologia, quoted i n the 
introduction to t h i s study, suggests that when process thought began 
to influence him he was helped to recognise atonement as the renewal 
of loving relationship.(19) I n t h i s vein he describes wholeness, 
salvation and the deliverance from the sin s i t u a t i o n as ' f a l l i n g i n 
love'; which he defines thus. 
'By t h i s I mean l e t t i n g himself be grasped by the love 
which surrounds him and presses i n upon him, a love 
which ult i m a t e l y i s nothing other and nothing less than 
the cosmic Love which i s God. I n more personal ... 
terms, God the cosmic Lover environs man and moves 
towards him ... I n l e t t i n g himself be grasped by that 
Lover ... a man may be delivered, from the i n h i b i t i o n s 
which the past has imposed, opened to healthy 
relationships i n the present, and given a freedom to 
l i v e towards the future i n the dedication of the s e l f 
i n i t s organic wholeness to the subjective aim proper 
to him - he may become t r u l y a lover.'(20) 
Pittenger goes on to say that i t i s Jesus who 'can be f o r those whom 
he called his brethren a source of that grace which empowers them to 
become the lovers they are meant to be - or, i n theological idiom, to 
be saved'.(21) This w i l l be understood better by r e c a l l i n g two 
previous discussions. 
The f i r s t concerns human sin; man's f a i l u r e to realize the 
God-given aim of his l i f e . Pittenger i n s i s t s that man can never 
(19) op.cit., p. 132. 
(20) C.R., pp. 52f. 
(21) i b i d . , p. 55. 
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overcome t h i s s i t u a t i o n and. f u l f i l his potential by his own e f f o r t s . 
He rejects any accusation that his work i s Pelagian (22), i n s i s t i n g 
rather that man 'must be released; he must be placed i n grace; he 
must be empowered'.(23) 
Secondly how Pittenger sees Jesus as being the source of t h i s 
grace relates d i r e c t l y to his view of the sinlessness of Jesus, which 
he has been seen to i n t e r p r e t i n terms of the motivation and aim of 
Jesus' l i f e which was the wholehearted f u l f i l m e n t of God's w i l l and 
the bringing i n of his Kingdom, characterized by a l i f e of love i n 
action. The two concluding points of that e a r l i e r discussion have 
relevance here. These were that Jesus' f u l f i l m e n t of the God-given 
aim of his l i f e and thus his overcoming of sin was possible only 
through the operation of divine grace and love. Secondly Pittenger 
saw Jesus' overcoming of sin i n his own l i f e as being the source of 
victorious l i v i n g f o r his followers because the 'positive, creative, 
out-going love and goodness of Jesus i s shareable and i s shared'.(24) 
Both of these points are held together i n the following quotation. 
'To be caught up i n t o and to be grasped by Christ's 
love i s to l i v e i n Christ. To l i v e i n Christ i s to 
participate i n the creative Love, thus active i n 
human loving, which i s the very r e a l i t y of God 
himself.'(25) 
Beyond such statements, however, Pittenger does not explain how Jesus 
per se i s a source of grace, suggesting rather that i t i s w i t h i n the 
fellowship of Christ, w i t h i n the Church, that such grace i s known. 
This major element i n Pittenger's thought w i l l be granted f u l l e r 
discussion i n a separate section. 
(22) i b i d . , p. 64. 
(2J) Human Nature, p. 80. 
(24) C.R., p. 63. 
(25) i b i d . , p. 63. 
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Before that, however, i t would be h e l p f u l to see how such an 
understanding of salvation f i t s i n t o Pittenger's immanentist world 
view. 
(c) Salvation w i t h i n Pittenger's immanentist scheme 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that almost every time Pittenger uses the word 
"salvation" he places i t w i t h i n inverted commas, in d i c a t i n g his 
q u a l i f i e d use of the word and dissociating himself from i t s usual 
connotations. I n p a r t i c u l a r he i s denying that Jesus came i n t o the 
world on a 'rescue expedition', f o r t h i s view of salvation would 
contravene his whole theological approach, which has been defined as 
immanentist, though he would prefer to c a l l i t incarnational. By 
t h i s he means that 'God i s ... united i n some fashion with his whole 
creation and that he i s working through i t at various levels and i n 
various ways to reveal himself and to accomplish his purpose'.(26) 
'The Incarnation of Christ' i s to be understood as 'of a piece' with 
t h i s 'general sense' of incarnation, which i s the 'manner and mode of 
God's working i n his creatures'.(27) The grounding of man's l i f e i n 
the divine Logos i s one aspect of t h i s which means that 'God and man 
are always i n relationship'.(28) I t i s such an approach which causes 
him to r e j e c t a 'rescue expedition' view of "salvation" f o r t h i s , he 
would believe presupposes a broken God-man relationship. Several 
implications f o r Pittenger's atonement thought derive from t h i s 
approach. 
The f i r s t i s his confession that he i s a Scotist, by which he 
means his b e l i e f that 'even had man not sinned, the Incarnation would 
(26) W.I., p. 124. 
(27) i b i d . , p. 124. 
(28) i b i d . , p. 180. 
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have happened'. These are his reaons. 
' I am convinced that God - i n that magnificent 
consistency of purpose and constancy of operation of 
which the Jewish understanding of him, r e f l e c t e d i n 
the Old Testament, i s witness - would have crowned his 
creative work by his supreme creative act, so f a r as 
we men are concerned, manifesting himself w i t h a 
fulness and energizing with a uniqueness such as 
Christians believe they see i n our Lord Jesus 
Christ.'(29) 
Secondly, accepting the r e a l i t y of sin, "salvation" i s seen as 
the work of God himself, which i s of a piece with his creative work. 
I t can only be understood w i t h i n the context of the continuing 
creative and l i v i n g a c t i v i t y of God. Thus not only does he repudiate 
atonement theories which seem to him to minimize t h i s emphasis upon 
love but he also c r i t i c i z e s undue concentration upon atonement when 
extracted from the wider picture of God's a c t i v i t y because such 
'specific soteriology' loses 'sight of the wider implications and 
consequences of the coming among us of Jesus as Lord'.(30) The key-
note of his theology i s the loving a c t i v i t y cf God, of which the 
Cross i s the 'sign and symbol'. An atonement theory which does not 
share t h i s stance i s unsatisfactory f o r Pittenger. 
Thirdly, on t h i s view, fo r salvation and wholeness to be 
effected i n a person's l i f e what i s required i s a 'radical adjustment' 
towards God i n a response of f a i t h and self-surrender to the love of 
God seen i n Christ. Thus they make r e a l i n t h e i r l i v e s the potential 
which i s there by the indwelling of the Logos, and which was seen 
perfected i n Christ. Thus salvation i s of a piece with what Pittenger 
would describe as his incarnational emphasis. I t i s coming to be 
united with Christ and thus coming i n t o closer fellowship with God, 
(29) i b i d . , p. 4. 
(30) i b i d . , p. 4. 
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f o r 'Christ Jesus i s a unity i n whom God and man are brought together 
i n singular intensity',(31) and i t i s i n him that men are l i f t e d up 
'to a new l e v e l or stage i n the God-man relationship which became an 
achieved f a c t i n our Lord'.(32) I n Pittenger's scheme t h i s 
salvation i s experienced pre-eminently i n the fellowship of the 
Church. 
(5) The Church as the Vehicle of Salvation 
I n Pittenger's thought the Church and Christ are intimately 
related but not i n the sense that Jesus i s the one who ' i n s t i t u t e d 
i t , giving i t laws and ordering i t s l i f e according to rules he l a i d 
down', rather ' i t i s related to him i n quite a d i f f e r e n t way'.(33) 
That i s , both Jesus and the Church are elements i n the ongoing divine 
a c t i v i t y . Both are parts of the t o t a l Christ event. As Pittenger 
says: 
'the supreme and cru c i a l act of God for men i s not 
Christ alone, nor i s i t Christ and his Church; rather, 
i t i s Christ-Church, Christ i n his Church and his 
Church i n him as i t s Lord and sole meaning.'(34) 
I t i s working from t h i s position which he equates with the description 
of the Church as the 'extension of the Incarnation'(35) that Pittenger 
j u s t i f i e s his recognition of the Church as an element i n atonement. 
(31) C.R., p. 99-
(32) W.I., p. 4. 
(33) C.R., p. 95. 
(34) W.I., p. 273. 
(35) C.R., p. 95-
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'But we dare not think of the Church as God's method 
of extending the a c t i v i t y which he inaugurated i n 
Jesus, unless at the same time we see that the Church, 
i n doing t h i s , i s continuing - or, as I should l i k e to 
phrase i t , making both v i v i d l y r eal and concretely 
available - the Atonement. I n other words, i f the 
Church i s God's method f o r extending to succeeding 
generations that which he wrought i n Jesus, and hence 
i n t e g r a l to the t o t a l event which we name Jesus Christ, 
i t can be such only because i t i s essentially the 
method chosen by God f o r bringing his human children 
i n t o oneness with him i n terms of that q u a l i t y or 
character or specific s p i r i t which i s the r e s u l t of 
the l i f e of Jesus Christ i n the world.'(36) 
Pittenger here i s saying more than that the Church i s the medium i n 
which the Gospel message i s carried and propogated, rather i t i s 
'int e g r a l ' to the t o t a l Christ event, as i t s continuation. The 
loving a c t i v i t y of God which found i t s focus i n Jesus continues i n 
the Christian community. I t i s w i t h i n that fellowship that Christ 
i s known; and Christ i s known not i n terms of his 'natures' ('since 
to t a l k i n t h i s way i s to speak i n terms of an outworn metaphysic'); 
nor indeed i n terms of his 'benefits', f o r the way i n which Melancthon 
used that phrase 'he meant what Christ had accomplished f o r us' and 
Pittenger finds such a perspective on salvation incomplete and thus 
unsatisfactory; rather Pittenger i n s i s t s Christ i s known i n terms of 
his ' a c t i v i t i e s ' , 'or what i s being done i n him'.(57) Here i s 
confirmation that i n Pittenger's theology 'the Church and Jesus are 
so intimately related'(38) w i t h i n the incarnating a c t i v i t y of God. 
(36) i b i d . , pp. 95f. 
(37) i b i d . , p. 96. 
(38) i b i d . , p. 96. 
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'His work, his a c t i v i t y , or rather and better God's 
a c t i v i t y i n him as an occasion or occurrence, i s 
indeed centred or focused i n the h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e , 
but i t i s continued, extended, conveyed, made 
available, through that h i s t o r i c a l l y grounded 
community which has come to be called the Church, 
and which thus makes the event of Christ and the 
achievement wrought i n that event a present r e a l i t y 
f o r men, through the operation of the Holy S p i r i t . ' ( 3 9 ) 
Pittenger denies that t h i s means that 'God's saving love i s confined 
to the Christian church'.(40) His immanentist approach enables him 
to see God at work i n other r e l i g i o n s as well as i n men of good-will 
who claim no re l i g i o u s allegiance.(41) God's love i s 'operative 
everywhere'.(42) The Christian church exists to point to that t r u t h . 
I t i s able to do t h i s because i t s very existence arose from the 
decisive manifestation of the divine love i n Christ. This i s why the 
church i s called 'the Body of Christ'; 'because by i t s means the 
specific awareness of love brought near to man i n Christ i s known'. 
Thus the Church, 'his Body i s i n t e g r a l to the continuation i n the 
world of God's a c t i v i t y i n that mode'.(43) 
The Christian community i s thus, i n Pittenger's view, part of 
the economy of salvation because i t continues the loving a c t i v i t y of 
God, known decisively i n Jesus Christ, through whom a l l men might 
come to know the joy of wholeness i n harmony with God. The mechanisms 
by which the Church f u l f i l s t h i s role w i l l be considered i n more 
d e t a i l a f t e r a major influence upon Pittenger's thought has been 
estimated. 
(39) i b i d . , p. 96. 
(40) i b i d . , p. 96. 
(41) W.I., p. 5. 
(42) C.R., p. 96. 
(43) i b i d . , p. 97. 
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(a) The Influence of John Knox 
This section can be introduced, by a personal reminiscence. 
I n a conversation with Norman Pittenger I asked him why he had not 
undertaken a sustained study of the atonement, p a r t i c u l a r l y as so 
much of his theological w r i t i n g impinged so closely upon that 
doctrine. His reply was somewhat s t a r t l i n g , f o r he said: 
"There was no need f o r me to do so; John Knox has done i t a l l . 
He has said a l l I could ever wish to say about the atonement." 
Several times i n t h i s thesis Pittenger's acknowledged debt to John 
Knox has been noted. His comment, however, makes t h i s indebtedness 
more d e f i n i t e . 
I n our conversation i t became clear that he was r e f e r r i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r l y to Knox's book 'The Church and the Reality of Christ', 
confirming that Pittenger directs his atonement thought to the 
experience of salvation w i t h i n the fellowship of believers rather 
than to the mechanics of atonement theories; f o r t h i s i s the stress 
i n Knox's book. I n an essay i n honour of Knox Pittenger suggests 
that there i s evidence from his writings that Knox has been influenced 
by a 'metaphysic of process'(44) and p a r t i c u l a r l y by Hartshorne. He 
l i s t s three emphases as evidence of t h i s , namely that Knox holds a 
'dynamic view of hi s t o r y and by implication a processive view of 
world order'; that he interprets 'events' i n such a processive world 
'not as fi x e d moments' 'but as r i c h l y complex occasions' i n which the 
past, the present happening and future consequences are a l l involved; 
(44) W. N. Pittenger: 'Some implications i n John Knox's writings' 
Christian History and In t e r p r e t a t i o n Studies presented to 
John Knox, ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, R. R. Niebuhr, 
Cambridge, University Press, 1967* P« H-
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and l a s t l y that Knox i s 'convinced that i t i s only by engagement i n 
f a i t h that the revelatory and salvatory character of an event can be 
grasped'.(45) These emphases are also dominant i n Pittenger's own 
work and are ascribed by him to process insights. 
These elements combine together i n that concept which i s not 
only d i s t i n c t i v e of Knox's thought but also i s used by Pittenger to 
establish that the Church i s part of the economy of salvation; namely 
that 'the Church remembers Jesus'.(46) By t h i s Knox seeks to describe 
the r i c h pattern of the Church's l i f e , including l i t u r g y , scripture 
and experience of the l i v i n g Lord, through which the present Church i s 
seen to be one with i t s p r i m i t i v e predecessor. This 'remembering' 
Knox suggests has always been a feature of the Church's l i f e . I t even 
predates the New Testament. The e a r l i e s t Christian converts responded 
to the picture of Jesus that was presented to them and t h e i r response 
and Christian outlook became defined by the 'memory' of him they then 
came to share. The New Testament documents, he says, epistles and 
More. 
gospels are^'valuable f o r the testimony they bear to the existence 
and nature of the early Church's memory of Jesus than f o r any statement 
of more "objective" f a c t they may make about him and his career.'(47) 
Since the New Testament was 'written out of the Church's experience ... 
alone',(48) i t should be recognised as part of the memory and experience 
of the Early Church, though not exhaustive of that memory. 
The death of Jesus and i t s meaning are both enshrined w i t h i n that 
memory and thus the cross should never be viewed i n i s o l a t i o n from the 
larger event of which i t i s part. 
(45) i b i d . , p. 4. 
(46) John Knox: The Church and the Reality of Christ, Collins, 
London, 1963* P- 37 • 
(47) i b i d . , p. 49. 
(48) i b i d . , p. 50. 
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'For i t i s the meaning of the Cross i n the l i f e of the 
Church and i n the experience of the believer which i s 
the r e a l l y important thing ... The death of Christ 
actually took place only i n the context of an event 
which began ... with the gathering of Jesus' disciples 
and ended ... with the creation of the Church ... i n 
which Jesus was remembered and was s t i l l known as the 
l i v i n g Lord. The meaning of the Cross can be seen only 
i n t h i s context. Indeed the Cross i t s e l f stands only 
there. For by the Cross ... we mean the central moment 
i n a div i n e l y creative and redemptive event which only 
the Church remembers and the continuing meaning of 
which only the Church can know.'(49) 
Two conclusions follow from t h i s . These are that 'when we speak of 
God's atoning act i n Christ, we are speaking of nothing other than 
hi s act of bringing the Church i n t o being'(50), and that 'the 
ascri p t i o n of atoning s a c r i f i c e to the Event has i t s ground i n the 
actual existence of the Atoning community'.(51) 
These conclusions are l o g i c a l steps i n the l i g h t of the p r i o r i t y 
that Knox gives to the Church i n his theology. I f the basic Christian 
datum i s the Church and i f through i t s memory and fellowship the 
reconciling (the word Knox prefers to describe the divine action)(52) 
action of God, which was decisively expressed i n Christ, i s mediated, 
then not only i s Christ unknowable apart from the Church but the Church 
must be of the essence of the reconciling process. 
How Pittenger develops t h i s approach w i l l now be considered. 
(b) Pittenger on the Atoning work of the Church 
I n placing the Church w i t h i n the t o t a l Christ event Pittenger 
speaks of i t as 'God's method of extending the a c t i v i t y that was 
(49) John Knox, The Death of Christ, London, Collins, 1959, p. 129-
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
i b i d . , p. 107. 
i b i d . , p. 34. 
i b i d , p. 102. 
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inaugurated i n Jesus' and thus i t i s 'continuing the Atonement' i n 
the sense of making i t 'both v i v i d l y r e a l and concretely available'.(53) 
He l i s t s three major ways i n which the Church does t h i s : i t remembers 
Jesus; i t i s the source of b e l i e f ; i t i s the place of fellowship. 
F i r s t l y Pittenger claims that ' i t i s through the community and 
through i t alone, that the remembrance of the event, as o r i g i n a l l y 
apprehended, i s made a continuing r e a l i t y ' ; ( 5 4 ) 'that our knowledge of 
Jesus i n any real sense depends upon the community which believed i n 
him and worshipped him'.(55) The use of the word ' r e a l i t y ' i n t h i s 
context indicates that Pittenger i s pointing to something more than i s 
found i n the New Testament. To suggest what t h i s might be Pittenger 
speculates on what would have happened i f the entire Christian community 
had been wiped out some time w i t h i n the f i r s t century and the Christian 
documents that had been w r i t t e n i n the intervening f i f t y years or so 
since the death of Jesus had been secreted only to be discovered 
centuries l a t e r . I t i s impossible to imagine that upon discovery 
b e l i e f would have grown up i n a l i v i n g Lord, one who a f t e r a l i f e of 
goodness had been unjustly done to death yet had been raised from the 
dead. No, concludes Pittenger, 'does not t h i s suggest that i t i s 
precisely the continuing l i f e of the Christian Church which has i n fa c t 
played a major role not only i n preserving the records about 
C h r i s t i a n i t y but also i n making the Christian f a i t h a v i t a l and 
v i t a l i z i n g factor through succeeding generations down to the present 
hour?'(56) 
(53) C.R., pp. 95f. 
(54) W.I., p. 53-
(55) I b i d . , p. 57. 
(56) i b i d . , p. 58. 
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The New Testament documents keep us i n touch with the e a r l i e s t 
Christian facts but only 'as the facts were known to those who 
interpreted them by f a i t h as the working of God i n human af f a i r s ' . ( 5 7 ) 
So j u s t as the early Church by i t s preaching and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
l i f e of Jesus made Christ a r e a l i t y f o r men i n t h e i r day, so the 
contemporary Church i s more than j u s t a repository of Christian 
documents. Thus Pittenger concludes, with acknowledgement to John 
Knox,that i t i s as the Church remembers Jesus that i t makes him 'a 
present and real figure i n the l i v e s of men'. He proceeds: 
'One could almost say that i t i s the co:rcmunity which 
makes Jesus a l i v e today - and I am not t a l k i n g here 
of an ecclesiological substitute f o r the Resurrection, 
but of the p l a i n t r u t h that i t i s w i t h i n the community, 
and only there - no matter how one may be related to 
i t - that the question of Jesus, the confrontation of 
men by him, the demand that men come to terms with him, 
becomes a l i v i n g and inescapable factor i n experience.'(58) 
Secondly the Church i s the source of sound b e l i e f i n the sense 
that Jesus 'can never be correctly assessed or s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
apprehended i n his t o t a l Christian significance apart from the Church 
and i t s witness'.(59) This relates closely to e a r l i e r Christological 
discussion i n which Pittenger was found to defend the premise that the 
Church 'created the Divine Christ of Faith'. By t h i s he meant that 
w i t h i n the New Testament the Church's high estimate of the significance 
of Jesus can be discerned i n i t s ascribing Lordship and D i v i n i t y to 
him; a process that was continued i n t o the following centuries as the 
Church defended the divine t r u t h that i t found i n Christ through credal 
d e f i n i t i o n . What i s important, however, i s that the Church did not 
(57) i b i d . , p. 25. 
(58) i b i d . , p. 57. 
(59) i b i d . , p. 273. 
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embark upon t h i s process as an i n t e l l e c t u a l exercise but to express 
i t s 'soteriological experience'. 'That i s to say the b e l i e f i n 
Jesus was dependent upon having an experience of Christ's saving work, 
not i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i s o l a t i o n but as a member of the community of 
f a i t h f u l people, the Church'.(60) 
Thirdly t h i s saving experience i s known w i t h i n the Christian 
fellowship. Indeed 'to be a Christian means to be a member of the 
fellowship, f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y i s fellowship';(6l) to be a member of 
'the community of Love'.(62) Pittenger recognises that much i n i t s 
h i s t o r y and present occupation would detract from that t i t l e , but he 
goes on; 'the Church i s , at least i n p r i n c i p l e , the fellowship of 
those who are caught up i n t o the love of God i n Christ Jesus t h e i r 
Lord, and aim to l i v e one with another i n such a relationship of love 
that they w i l l contribute to the making present, i n the world, of t h i s 
love as man's authentic existence'.(63) 
The Holy Communion i s the heart of t h i s fellowship f o r there 
the several strands that comprise the Church's l i f e are held together. 
Jesus i s remembered, there i s an awareness of communion with the 
l i v i n g Lord as his followers meet together i n love at his table and 
there i s also an an t i c i p a t i o n that one day God's Kingdom of Love w i l l 
become a r e a l i t y throughout the world and a l l men w i l l meet i n love 
a t Christ's table as Christians do now.(64) 
Pittenger denies that the description of the Church simply as 
a human i n s t i t u t i o n i s at a l l adequate; i t s place and purpose w i t h i n 
(60) i b i d . , p. 83. 
(61) G.P., p. 64. 
(62) G.D., p. 105. 
(63) i b i d . , p. 105. 
(64) 'The Christian Church as Social Process', pp. 68f. 
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the divine a c t i v i t y known i n the Christ event i s i t s true description. 
The phrase, 'the Body of Christ' should be taken 'very seriously' i n 
t h i s regard. The following quotation i s Pittenger's d e f i n i t i o n of 
t h i s phrase. 
'The 'Body of Christ' i s the most adequate symbol f o r 
the t r u t h about the church. Hence the body of Christ 
i s the continuing organic expression of the l i f e of him 
i n whom God l i v e d most r i c h l y among us; i t i s informed 
by l i f e - i n - l o v e because i t i s i t s e l f l i f e - i n - u n i o n ; i t s 
head i s the everlasting Christ and i t s secret l i f e i s 
the Holy S p i r i t who i s the charity of God; i t s purpose 
i s the incorporation of a l l men i n t o Christ; i t s end i s 
the return of men with the entire creation to God, so 
that he may be sacramentally expressed and active 
throughout that entire creation by free and glad 
surrender to his purpose, u n t i l a l l shall f i n d i t s e l f 
i n him.'(65) 
Three elements may be distinguished here which describe the place of 
the Church i n atonement. 
F i r s t l y i t i s the continuing l i f e of Christ. I t i s the vehicle 
fo r making the event of Christ a present r e a l i t y ; but by t h i s Pittenger 
means more than that i t proclaims Christ i n i t s memory, preaching, 
creeds, worship and fellowship. Christ and the Church are intimately 
related w i t h i n God's action. 'The h i s t o r i c a l r e s u l t of the f a c t of 
Christ was the f a c t of the Church'.(66) The Christian society bound 
together i n worship, love and obedience to Christ arose because they 
understood certain events i n Palestine to have been the incarnating 
action of God i n the person of Jesus. Pittenger here implies a 
p r i o r i t y f o r the Church which he believes i s shown by the New 
Testament.(67) The act of God i n Christ i s unknowable apart from the 
(65) Human Nature, p. 64. 
(66) W.I., p. 272. 
(67) i b i d . , p. 272. 
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community which arose out of that divine action. Conversely, the 
Church cannot be understood i n i t s true nature apart from the act 
of God i n Christ'.(68) 
'The Church i s the r e f l e x of the act of God i n Christ. 
I t i s the consequence and r e s u l t of what Christian 
f a i t h conceives God to have done f o r man i n Christ. 
I t i s therefore part of the Gospel of the Lord himself. 
For the gospel i s the good news of 'God's mighty act' 
fo r man, and the Church i s the community which not 
only bears the message of God's act, but i s also 
i t s e l f the r e s u l t of the act.'(69) 
The action of God centered i n Jesus Christ resulted thus i n the 
community without which that action of God could never have been 
remembered, known or experienced. Pittenger's thought here i s very 
close to that of Knox. 
Secondly, the l i f e of the Church i s more than camaraderie; i t s 
fellowship ' i s informed by l i f e - i n - l o v e because i t i s i t s e l f l i f e - i n -
union'. The Church i s thus seen as an extension of the Incarnation, 
part of God's continuing incarnating love. Jesus Christ was the 
focal manifestation of God's Love i n a human l i f e , the actualization 
of God i n manhood. So the Church i n union with Christ i t s head i s 
the continuing manifestation of God's love i n human terms. 
Thirdly, the purpose of the Church 'is the incorporation of a l l 
men i n t o Christ'. The Church i s the 'instrument f o r Christ's continued 
relatedness to the world, so fa r as his incarnate l i f e and his 
'benefits' are concerned'.(70) ' i t i s i n the Church that Christ's 
'benefits' are to be found. Hence i n a true and important sense the 
(68) i b i d . , p. 272. 
(69) i b i d . , p. 272. 
(70) i b i d . , p. 273. 
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Church i s the sphere of redemption'.(71) The Church i s the society 
created by God 'which mediates the Messiah and his Salvation'; i t i s 
'God i n Christ's' instrument f o r bringing new l i f e to men.(72) The 
Church i s thus essential not only to our knowledge but also to our 
'communion' with Christ.(73) 
Pittenger does not mean by t h i s that God's Love i s confined to 
the Church and that men of other re l i g i o n s and philosophies are 
without God.(74) Yet i n Christ mankind has been presented with a 
special awareness of God's love and i t i s the task of the Church of 
Christ to ex h i b i t , l i v e out and proclaim that love, which i s the 
essence of i t s l i f e , so that men might be brought i n t o the f u l l e s t 
possible relationship with God and thus enjoy wholeness i n t h e i r 
l i v e s . I t i s as men are joined with Christ ' i n a fellowship of 
surrendering love' that they would be 'enabled to do through him what 
they are meant to do'; f u l f i l the aim of t h e i r l i v e s and l i v e i n 
wholeness and love,(75) which i n Pittenger's view i s the essence of 
atonement.(76) 
(c) The Church as future prehension 
I n an e a r l i e r chapter Pittenger's placing of the Church w i t h i n 
the whole Christ event was supported by the pirocess concept of 
'prehension'. He spoke of the Christ event as a complex of past, 
present and future prehensions. I t was because Jesus was prehended 
i n the future by the response to him i n the Church that Pittenger 
(71) i b i d . , p. 272. 
(72) i b i d . , p. 273. 
(73) i b i d . , p. 273. 
(74) C.R., p. 96. 
(75) G.D., p. 35 
(76) C.R., pp. 96f. 
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could, claim, with process philosophical support, that 'the Church i s 
part of the event of Christ'.(77) I n that discussion, however, i t 
was argued that such was a mistaken use of the process conceptuality. 
I n the present chapter a similar conclusion has been reached 
without specific process reference. This i s because the argument of 
the previous pages has been based upon books which while employing 
general process presuppositions do not sustain the argument with 
process d e t a i l s . 
Pittenger's b e l i e f that the Church i s part of the Christ event 
and thus i n t e g r a l to atonement can be upheld without specific 
reference to process thought. I n 'Christology Reconsidered' where 
his use of the prehension concept i n t h i s regard i s most evident, 
what Pittenger appears to have done i s support his conclusions arrived 
at on the basis of other c r i t e r i a w ith elements drawn from Whiteheadian 
metaphysics. The suspicion that t h i s i s how he has used process 
thought has been repeated at other places i n t h i s thesis. That 
Pittenger's use of process terms i s open to c r i t i c i s m i n t h i s regard 
does not i n i t s e l f invalidate his conclusion that the Church i s part 
of the Christ event and an element i n the economy of salvation; upon 
which, as has been seen, he lays much stress. 
As a f i n a l comment i n t h i s chapter, however, i t should be said that 
that conclusion and stress i s i n i t s e l f open to c r i t i c i s m . Although 
Pittenger recognises that 'much i n i t s history and present occupation 
would detract' from his description of the Church yet he continues to 
speak of i t as being the atoning community where God's love i n Christ 
i s known. For myself what I know of the history and present disposition 
(77) i b i d . , p. 145. 
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of the Church would prevent me from t r e a t i n g i t i n the idealized 
terms that Pittenger employs. That Pittenger does so i s somewhat 
surprising i n one who himself i s so c r i t i c a l of the Church i n many 
aspects of i t s l i f e . However much, though, he may d i s l i k e what he 
knows of the Church, he has to t r e a t i t i n the way he does, one 
suspects, to sustain his theological system. Since he has evacuated 
salvation of any suggestion of a special divine salvatory i n i t i a t i v e , 
i n t e r p r e t i n g i t rather as the wholeness of human p o t e n t i a l i t y achieved 
i n response to the divine love, he has to allow f o r a mechanism whereby 
that love expressed i n Christ might be experienced. I n ways that have 
been demonstrated the Church f u l f i l s t h i s role i n Pittenger's system. 
That he has to use the Church i n t h i s patently idealized way betrays, 
I believe, a marked weakness i n his theology. 
This examination of Pittenger's understanding of salvation w i l l 
be completed by a consideration of i t s eschatological dimension. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PITTENGER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ESCHATOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF SALVATION 
Pittenger presents a sustained discussion of Heaven, Eternal L i f e 
and related themes i n his book, ''The Last Things' i n a Process 
Perspective'. I n the opening chapter, because he regards i t as 
'impossible and i n c r e d i b l e ' , ( l ) Pittenger admits that he would welcome 
the 'disappearance or muting of the t r a d i t i o n a l teaching about the l a s t 
things',(2) 'which was sometimes expressed i n ghastly and ridiculous 
fashion'.(3) He does not want, however, 'to lose altogether the ins i g h t 
and i n t e n t i o n which was behind i t ' , ( 4 ) f o r he recognises that these 
t r a d i t i o n a l doctrines 'did point to important truths about human l i f e 
as well as about Christian Faith'.(5) So i n his r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he 
seeks the preservation of the 'values' of the old scheme while s t a t i n g 
them i n a fashion 'not quite so outrageous' as that he was taught.(6) 
( l ) The Immortality of the Soul 
The c r i t i c a l point of the t r a d i t i o n a l scheme f o r the purposes of 
t h i s study was b e l i e f i n the immortality of the soul. Pittenger says 
of t r a d i t i o n a l teaching that although i t recognised that 'every man 
dies' yet i t went on to say; 'but not a l l of him dies, f o r man himself 
i s compounded of soul and body; and while the body dies, the soul 
(1) W. N. Pittenger: 'The Last Things' i n a Process Perspective, 
London, Epworth Press, 1970, p. 15. 
(2) i b i d . , p. 11. 
(3) i b i d . , p. 15. 
(4) i b i d . , p. 15. 
(5) i b i d . , p. 11. 
(6) i b i d . , p. 12. 
cannot die. By i t s very nature i t i s immortal', so that at death, 
'the soul was "released" from i t s bodily dwelling-place and enabled 
to go elsewhere'.(7) Pittenger, however, i n s i s t s that death i s 
complete and that no part of the human being escapes death's f i n a l i t y . ( 8 ) 
His catchphrase i s 'we a l l die; and a l l of us dies'.(9) He further 
suggests that the 'notion of the "immortal soul" which "survives" the 
f a c t of our bi o l o g i c a l death' i s an attempt 'to evade' both death 'as' 
f i n a l i t y and the f i n a l i t y 'of' death .(10) He also regrets that the 
Greek notion of the immortal soul 'found i n the speeches that Plato put 
i n t o the mouth of Socrates' and r e l i a n t upon the idea of 'the eternal 
realms of forms' should have been confused with the B i b l i c a l phrase 
'resurrection of the body'. Pittenger i s d e f i n i t e that the attempts 
of theologians through the centuries to weld these concepts together 
was misleading and mistaken.(11) He concludes that: 
'the t a l k about "immortality of the soul" has served 
to provide f o r a great many Christian people what they 
wrongly took to be the r i g h t and proper Christian way 
of escaping the stark r e a l i t y of t o t a l death.'(12) 
Pittenger goes on to point to the contrast to t h i s to be found i n the 
Old Testament. The Jew, he says, was not only 'prepared to recognise 
the f u l l r e a l i t y of death' but also ' u n t i l the time of the Maccabees, 
Jewish f a i t h was not dependent upon nor did i t presuppose a kind of 
"immortality" or "resurrection" ... which alone made i t possible to 
commit oneself wholly to Jahweh and to the doing of his holy w i l l ' . ( 1 3 ) 
i b i d . , p. 5. 
i b i d . , p. 33« 
i b i d . , p. 35« 
i b i d . , p. 33-
i b i d . , pp. 33f. 
i b i d . , p. 3^ -
i b i d . , p. 35. 
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Pittenger emphasises t h i s point f o r i t i s the key to his own 
re-conception. The Old Testament f a i t h , he i n s i s t s , 'stands as a 
judgement upon any e f f o r t i n more recent times to i n s i s t that unless 
"immortality" or "resurrection" ... are i n the picture, there can be 
no deep and genuine f a i t h at a l l ' . ( l 4 ) His concluding comment on 
t h i s matter lays down the basis f o r his own reappraisal. 
'Christians may wish to say something more, but they 
simply must not suppose that God, fai t h , i n Him, 
commitment to Him, service of Him, and a denial of 
the r e a l i t y and inescapability of death go together. 
Above a l l , they must not suppose that i t i s i n t e g r a l 
to f a i t h i n God, with i t s consequences, to believe 
that a l l of us ( i n the special sense I have given 
that phrase) does not die.'(15) 
This quotation, i n that i t indicates that f o r Pittenger reference to 
an a f t e r l i f e has no part to play i n f a i t h i n God shows that f o r him 
'the t a l k about the l a s t things i s essentially a matter of e x i s t e n t i a l 
import'.(l6) The next section w i l l confirm t h i s . 
(2) Sin and Judgement 
(a) Sin and i t s appraisal 
Sin i n Pittenger's scheme i s the f a i l u r e to realize the God-given 
aim of one's l i f e i n r i c h loving mutuality with one's fellows. This i s 
no a r b i t r a r i l y imposed aim negating human freedom; rather ' i t i s the 
law ... f o r our becoming'; ' i t i s i n t e g r a l to our very "routing", to 
ourselves as a series of occasions const i t u t i n g our personality-in-the-
making'.(17) The new point, however, that Pittenger makes i n t h i s 
discussion i s that death i s the terminus of t h i s 'personality-in-the-
(14) i b i d . , p. 35. 
(15) i b i d . , p. 35-
(16) i b i d . , p. 6 l . 
(17) i b i d . , p. 39-
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making' and as such 'qualifies and colours each l i f e ' . ( l 8 ) Thus i t 
i s w i t h i n his l i f e alone that a man may actualize his p o t e n t i a l i t y 
and become the lover he i s intended to become or f a i l to do so; and 
so i t i s only w i t h i n l i f e that any judgement as to the character of 
his l i f e i s possible. Judgement, t r a d i t i o n a l l y one of the ' l a s t 
things' i s interpreted by Pittenger as contemporaneous 'appraisal'. 
'Every man, day by day, i s appraised.'(19) This i s a f u l l e r d e f i n i t i o n . 
'Appraisal i s a genuine and persisting factor i n human 
existence. Appraisal means that each man i s responsible 
f o r his l i f e and f o r the decisions which he has made i n 
the course of i t ; and i t also means that each man must 
be prepared to give what t r a d i t i o n a l thinking describes 
as "an account of his l i f e " - i n the face of whatever 
ulti m a t e l y determines and assesses true values i n the 
whole scheme of things. I f that "ultimate" i s love, as 
Christians believe, the appraisal i s a l l the more 
searching and i t i s a l l the more t e r r i b l e to be aware 
that one must face i t . ' ( 2 0 ) 
I t i s the f a c t of death which forces t h i s appraisal because i t reminds 
a man of his f i n a l i t y . I t i s love which i s the yardstick of t h e i r 
self-appraisal. As Pittenger says: 
'The question comes down to t h i s : i n what ways, to 
what degrees, have I or have I not opened myself to 
love, to give love and to receive love, to commit 
myself i n u t t e r f a i t h f u l ness, to l i v e i n ideal 
mutuality ... and thus i n the truest sense to have 
been "a man"?'(21) 
Any honest answer to such a question must acknowledge f a i l u r e time and 
again but Pittenger goes on to say that i t i s not the f a c t of 
i n d i v i d u a l sins and f a i l i n g s which i s s i g n i f i c a n t , rather the 
determinative factor i s 'the d i r e c t i o n our l i f e has taken the aim which 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
i b i d . , p. 45. 
ib i d . 
i b i d 
i b i d . , pp. 51-52. 
• > 
pp. 50-51. 
p. 50. 
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has been ours'.(22) This i s a s i g n i f i c a n t extension of his 
understanding of sin, f o r although s i n i s the f a i l u r e to f u l f i l the 
God-given subjective aim of our l i f e nevertheless, he implies here, 
i t i s the i n t e n t i o n to f u l f i l that aim which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t . Indeed i t i s 'i n terms of the di r e c t i o n he has taken i n 
his mortal existence' that his l i f e w i l l be adjudged i n respect of 
l i f e ' s true possible 'destinies', namely Heaven or Hell.(25) These 
possible destinies, further, although once again t r a d i t i o n a l l y ' l a s t 
things', are not to be thought of thus f o r ' i t i s i n the "now" that 
these destinies are made present as p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' . ( 2 4 ) Pittenger's 
e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s are, on the one 
hand, that 'blessedness which comes from s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t ' t h i s i s of 
course not i n i s o l a t i o n but i n relationship with others, and, on the 
other hand, 'the disintegration or f a i l u r e which comes from s e l f -
destruction or re j e c t i o n by God because there i s nothing to be 
received by God i n His consequent nature f o r the fu r t h e r i n g of His 
purpose of good, i n the course of the process of creative advance.(25) 
Thus men w i t h i n t h e i r l i f e t i m e are appraised as either 'blessed' or 
'damned' 'by the ineluctable working out of what they have made of 
themselves, what they have become'.(26) 
I t might appear that Pittenger has j u s t erased a l l the content 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l thinking about the 'last things' or i n his own 
often repeated saying 'thrown the baby out with the bath-water' and 
replaced i t by a form of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , humanistic self-examination. 
(22) i b i d . , p. 51. 
(23) i b i d . , p. 61. 
(24) i b i d . , p. 61. 
(25) i b i d . , p. 62. 
(26) i b i d . , p. 62. 
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Yet t h i s i s not so. For although Pittenger p l a i n l y rejects f u t u r i s t i c 
and mythological interpretations of the 'last things' yet God stands 
at the heart of his ^ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . References to the divine element 
i n Pittenger's scheme have already been quoted, as f o r example his 
insistence that 'blessedness' required the acceptance by God of human 
s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t ; yet his understanding of God with the ai d of the 
Process conceptuality w i t h i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 'last things' 
must be drawn out f o r his view of immortality to be understood. 
(b) The Process Background 
Several points discussed i n more d e t a i l i n the thesis must be 
l i s t e d i n b r i e f here as necessary background f o r t h i s discussion. 
F i r s t l y there i s the process presupposition that h i s t o r y i s a 
purposeful movement. This purpose 'is nothing other than God's 
incredibly cherishing love, shared with His creatures and moving 
through t h e i r free decisions towards a great end'.(27) Secondly the 
natural world shares i n t h i s purpose. This not only means that the 
world i s good because God has created i t but also that he i s involved 
at every moment of the creative process. Thirdly each human l i f e has 
such a subjective aim and God i s present at every instant of l i f e 
providing the lure of his i n i t i a l aims towards the f u l f i l m e n t of his 
'great end'. Failure to realize t h i s aim f o r Pittenger i s sin. 
Fourthly i t has been noted that the Process view of God as himself an 
'actual e n t i t y ' means that he i s present as a prehension i n every other 
actual e n t i t y providing lure and aim or overcoming negative response 
w i t h i n his consequent nature. The summary of these points i s that each 
person at each moment has a contribution to make, however s l i g h t , to 
(27) i b i d . , p. 67. 
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the ongoing div i n e l y aimed creative advance of the cosmos. I f that 
contribution i s not made then that advance i s held back and God's w i l l 
i s not f u l f i l l e d , which i s sin. I t i s w i t h i n t h i s context that 
Pittenger's r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Judgement and beyond that of Immortality 
i s founded. 
(c) The Divine Appraisal 
F i r s t l y judgement or the 'appraisal' of our l i v e s i s not only 
self-appraisal, there i s a divine element. We are judged as to whether 
or not we advance God's aim not only f o r our own l i v e s but ultimately 
f o r the cosmos. I t has already been noted that Pittenger thinks of such 
appraisal not so much i n terms of in d i v i d u a l sins but more i n respect of 
the i n t e n t i o n to be detected through a l i f e . The c r i t e r i o n f o r such 
appraisal has already been quoted as whether i n a l i f e there was anything 
'to be reclaimed by God for the fu r t h e r i n g of His purpose of good i n the 
course of the process of creative advance'.(28) Now although Pittenger 
i s here speaking on a broad scale yet i n a system such as process 
thought, which i s based upon microscopic e n t i t i e s , such a broad c r i t e r i o n 
of appraisal can only be b u i l t upon the fact of divine judgement or 
appraisal at each and every occasion of l i f e . 
Thus i n the 'perishing of occasions', that i s as each actual 
occasion passes i n t o the next, God i s present. Pittenger describes 
what God i s doing there as follows: 
(28) i b i d . , p. 62. 
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'with the "perishing of occasions" ... there i s ... the 
reception i n t o God. and hence both the preservation and 
use, of whatever good has been achieved w i t h i n the 
process i t s e l f , to the end that the advance may continue, 
that further good may be actualized, and that the purpose 
of God (which i s j u s t that actualization of good, through 
love which i s shared i n the widest conceivable degree) 
may be realized i n more places and times and i n more 
ways.'(29) 
Not only therefore does a man's action and character i n t h i s l i f e have 
a determining q u a l i t y i n respect to himself, to h i s t o r y and to the 
world, as has already been established, but also to God. This however 
i s but to repeat that God i s the 'supreme a f f e c t ' . I t i s i n t h i s way 
that Pittenger reinterprets the divine element i n Judgement, Heaven 
and H e l l . As he says, i n using these t r a d i t i o n a l words, 'we are not 
t a l k i n g about some state " a f t e r t h i s l i f e " ; we are t a l k i n g about the 
negative and positive prehensions by God of what i s going on i n t h i s 
existence'.(50) Thus God's judgement I s present every moment or better 
at every occasion. I n that he i s involved i n every occasion his 
judgement i s determined by whether he i s affected by and i s able to 
prehend that occasion 'negatively' or 'positively'. As Pittenger says: 
'The appraisal that God makes i s worked out i n what He 
does - or, i n words that describe the creative advance 
as we know i t , the appraisal i s worked out i n terms of 
what i s taken i n t o , and what i s refected from, the 
"consequent nature" of God, God as He i s affected by 
what occurs i n the world; and then, i n what use i s made 
of what has been thus taken or received i n the 
fu r t h e r i n g of the project or purpose of God, the 
implementation of good ' i n the widest commonalty 
shared. 1(31) 
This appraisal of a single occasion when viewed over the expanse of a 
l i f e , or at least over a s u f f i c i e n t l y long span of l i f e f o r the 
(29) i b i d . , p. 36. 
(30) i b i d . , p. 7h. 
(31) i b i d . , p. 58. 
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d i r e c t i o n of that l i f e to be f a i r l y judged, presents the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of appraising that l i f e i n terms of 'these two destinies, these l i v e 
ultimate p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' , t r a d i t i o n a l l y called Hell and Heaven. 
(d) Heaven and Hell 
Thus on the one hand there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a man 'shall 
so t e r r i b l y and persistently f a i l , i n his ignorance and impotence and 
i n his own decisions, that he must suffer a continuing r e j e c t i o n ' . 
'That i s H e l l ; by d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s the absence of God.' 'Hell i s 
always a re a l p o s s i b i l i t y ' since because of free human decision 'the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of w i l f u l alienation from God, and persistence i n that 
alienation' i s there.(52) The tenor of his words, however, makes i t 
clear that although Pittenger recognises such as a ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' , he 
does not think that i t can apply to many. This would accord with h i s 
basic theological premises that no man i s depraved and u t t e r l y s i n f u l 
but rather contains w i t h i n himself the 'image of God'. I t should be 
remembered further that i n speaking of Hell Pittenger i s not thinking 
i n terms of everlasting damnation rather what he i s saying I s that 
looking at l i f e over a l l no man i s wholly bad., Though most of his 
actions and decisions may a f f e c t God negatively such a man may s t i l l , 
a l b e i t i n small ways, respond p o s i t i v e l y i n love and thus God w i l l be 
enhanced. Indeed Pittenger would speak i n t h i s vein of 'universalism'. 
He asks, 'is there anything or anybody who cannot be saved?' and he 
proceeds to say that although God would not use coercion, f o r that 
would prevent the free response of the i n d i v i d u a l , yet 'love can 
s o l i c i t , i n v i t e , l u r e , entice, i n so many d i f f e r e n t ways and through 
so many d i f f e r e n t channels 'secular' and 'religious' that one need not 
(32) i b i d . , p. 75. 
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be hopeless about the matter'.(33) I t i s on such terms that he would 
say that everyone can or w i l l be saved, f o r salvation i s not some 
future state of b l i s s i t i s a process of becoming i n and towards God. 
This i s how Pittenger would speak of Heaven. I t i s not 'some state 
a f t e r t h i s l i f e ' but w i t h i n t h i s l i f e i t i s 'enjoyment of God, i n which 
God accepts and receives i n t o Himself the man who, i n his ignorance and 
impotence and by his free decisions, has yet been possessed of the kind 
of 'becoming' which makes him thus acceptable and able to be received 
by God'.(34) During the l i f e of such a man there may well be many sins, 
many rejections of God's w i l l but looked at over a l l i t i s characterized 
by a desire to see God's w i l l of love realized and as such i t has known 
the ' f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n ' , the joy, the f u l f i l m e n t , the happiness which i s 
associated t r a d i t i o n a l l y with Heaven. Heaven and Hell are thus 
t r a d i t i o n a l labels which Pittenger uses f o r two categories of people 
who can be said either to have accepted or rejected God's aim. I t 
would not be very mistaken, I think, to suggest that Pittenger i s 
probably embarrassed to be obliged to continue to use such words but a 
published discussion of 'la s t things' obliged him to do so. Since, 
however, any ' a f t e r - l i f e ' reference i s excluded by Pittenger the desire 
to know whether any l i f e could be appraised to f i t roughly i n t o either 
the Hell or Heaven category i s of l i t t l e more than academic i n t e r e s t . 
Further since Pittenger, although recognising the ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' , 
suspects that i t i s u n l i k e l y that anyone could throughout his l i f e 
consistently refuse the lure of Love offered 'through so many channels 
secular and r e l i g i o u s ' , such categorization becomes superfluous. 
(33) i b i d . , p. 83. 
(34) i b i d . , p. 74. 
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Indeed, such broad generalized judgements as are implied by the 
continued use of such words as Heaven or Hell are not r e a l l y h e l p f u l , 
since they only serve to obscure the r e a l c r i t e r i o n of judgement. This 
i s grounded at the l e v e l of the 'actual occasion' and t h i s 'appraisal 
i s worked out i n terms of what i s taken i n t o and what i s rejected from 
the 'consequent nature' of God'.(55) 
(e) Appraisal w i t h i n the Divine Purpose 
Decisions which respond to the God-given aim of each occasion 
are prehended by God i n h i s consequent nature and employed by him i n 
the creative advance towards further and f u l l e r good. Decisions 
against his aim, characterized by lovelessness and f a i l u r e and even 
e v i l are negatively prehended by God. Whatever good there might be 
i n such an occasion i s p o s i t i v e l y prehended. As the discussion of 
e v i l showed 'God i s able to transmute and transform what i s most 
cer t a i n l y e v i l i n t o opportunity f o r good'(36) but then 'anything not 
received, anything that i s negatively prehended, i s u t t e r l y use-less; 
i t i s "cast as rubbish to the void", i n Tennyson's words, because i t 
can make no contribution to the abiding good and i t s implementation i n 
the creative advance'.(37) What, therefore, i s ult i m a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
i s God's purpose f o r hi s t o r y , f o r the whole creative process. 'God 
sustains i t s every event and i s the chief (not only) causative p r i n c i p l e 
behind a l l causation. God loves His world and everything i n i t ; He i s 
there, i n the world, with cherishing care tending i t and bringing i t on 
towards f i n a l good, while at the same time he redeems i t from t r i v i a l i t y 
(35) i b i d . , p. 58. 
(36) i b i d . , p. 93. 
(37) i b i d . , p. 93-
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and frustration'.(38) Every human l i f e , every occasion i s to be 
judged as to whether i t has affected f o r good or i l l that divine 
progress. 
The c r i t i c i s m that Pittenger's this-worldly r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the l a s t things served to drain them of divine content, reducing them 
to a form of humanism, i s thus clea r l y false f o r what matters above 
a l l else i n Pittenger's scheme i s God and his creative purpose. The 
following sections w i l l confirm t h i s . 
(3) Immortality 
(a) Subjective immortality rejected by process w r i t e r s 
Pittenger begins by r e j e c t i n g certain popular notions about 
immortality. Referring to an essay, 'The Promise of Faith' by 
Schubert 0gden(39) Pittenger agrees that 'subjective immortality' 
(to use Ogden's phrase) by which he means the 'persistence beyond death 
of the conscious s e l f ' i s not ' i n and of i t s e l f , by necessity, u t t e r l y 
i n t e g r a l to Christian Faith'. (4-0) Indeed he "thinks that i t i s quite 
possible to 'be a Christian without holding f i r m l y to personal 
persistence beyond death'(4l), yet Pittenger cannot deny that the idea 
of l i f e a f t e r death i s one of the most popular and firmly-held aspects 
of Christian b e l i e f to the extent that i t can become 'the Christian 
hope'.(42) He suggests though, that t h i s i s due to 'self-centredness', 
that i t i s 'a strong i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c stress on the s e l f ' which l i e s 
(38) i b i d . , p. 67. 
(39) Schubert M. Ogden: The Reality of God and other essays, London, 
S.C.M. Press, 1967, pp. 206-230. 
(40) L.T.P.P., p. 78. 
(41) i b i d . , p. 79-
(42) i b i d . , p. 79-
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behind the desire f o r immortality. I t says i n e f f e c t 'Glory f o r me' 
which Pittenger sees as a denial of the Christian demand that men 
should lose themselves i n the 'love and service of God".(43) This 
point i s made very t e l l i n g l y e f f e c t i v e l y by Peter Hamilton, whom 
Pittenger quotes i n t h i s discussion.(44) 
Hamilton admits that 'there i s a strong element of s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
i n much of our thinking about what happens when we die*(45) and he 
proceeds to t e l l of how he was cured of t h i s himself. He had read 
some words of Charles Hartshorne i n which Hartshorne had w r i t t e n that 
not only was the common notion of immortality apparently ignored by 
Whitehead but that most of the arguments usually adduced i n i t s 
defence l e f t a Whiteheadian unconvinced. Process thought with i t s 
emphasis on the s a t i s f a c t i o n and enjoyment of the present occasion 
implies that 'this occasion has already a l l the reward _ i t can ever 
have'. Hartshorne goes on to say whether my personal l i f e or any 
other human l i f e can expect future joys i s not a primary question. 
What i s important though i s that 
'there must be a thread of personal i d e n t i t y connecting 
our present act and any future good with which i t can 
be concerned. Indeed, there must be, f o r t r u t h i t s e l f 
depends on t h i s thread, and so do the coherence and 
order of the world. But not our personality i s t h i s 
necessary, t h i s primary, personal unity, but only God's. 
I t i s a hard lesson to learn - that God i s more 
important than we are.'(46) 
Hamilton confesses that he was shattered by these words. The f i n a l two 
sentences p a r t i c u l a r l y revealed ' a l l too clear l y not only the probable 
(43) i b i d . , p. 80. 
(44) i b i d . , p. 79. 
(45) Peter Hamilton: The Living God and the Modern World, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1967, p. 108. 
(46) Charles Hartshorne and W. L. Reese: Philosophers Speak of God, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953* P« 285. 
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f a l s i t y but also the basic self-centredness of the bel i e f s (he) then 
held as to what happens when we die'. (47) I t i s the phrase 'God i s 
more important than we are' that Hamilton found so s i g n i f i c a n t and he 
goes on to say: 
'that i s why we ought not to expect, l e t alone i n s i s t , 
that "we" w i l l enjoy future rewards or suffer future 
punishments. Both the rewards and the punishments 
occur now: the reward of knowing ... that our actions 
are helping God's loving purpose f o r his world; or the 
punishment of knowing, i n the depths of our being, 
that our actions are incompatible with t h i s loving 
purpose.'(48) 
Hamilton's words here resemble closely Pittenger's position already 
outlined. From the two preceding quotations, however, with t h e i r 
repudiation of 'subjective immortality' come indications of an 
alter n a t i v e view. Hartshorne's statement that i t i s God, not ourselves, 
who i s the 'thread of personal i d e n t i t y ' which gives 'coherence and 
order to the world' i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important f o r i t expresses the 
substance of the process notion of 'objective immortality'. 
(b) Objective immortality 
'Objective immortality' can simply be taken to mean that each of 
us influences those who come a f t e r him and thus acquires an existence 
i n them beyond the termination of his own s u b j e c t i v i t y . Schubert Ogden 
comments on t h i s view that i t forgets that our human posterity i s j u s t 
as involved i n 'perpetual perishing' as we and he concludes, 'is the 
f i n a l meaning on my l i f e simply the ever decreasing impact I make on 
other men who come af t e r me?'(49) The process view, by contrast, 
(47) Hamilton, op.cit., p. 140. 
(48) i b i d . , pp. 140-141. 
(49) Ogden, op.cit., pp. 225-226. 
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stresses that our f i n a l destiny i s to be loved by God which means that 
our l i f e i s given everlasting significance. Schubert Ogden summarizes 
what t h i s means i n these words: 
'Because God's love ... i s pure and unbounded, and 
because he, therefore, both can and does participate 
f u l l y i n the being of a l l his creatures, the present 
moment f o r him never s l i p s i n t o the past as i t does 
for me. Instead, every moment retains i t s vividness 
and i n t e n s i t y forever w i t h i n his completely perfect 
love and judgement. He knows a l l things f o r j u s t what 
they are, and he continues to know and cherish them 
throughout the endless ages of the future i n a l l the 
richness of t h e i r actual being. I n other words, 
because God not only a f f e c t s , but i s also affected by, 
whatever exists, a l l things are i n every present quite 
l i t e r a l l y resurrected and restored i n his own 
everlasting l i f e , from which they can nevermore be 
cast out.'(50) 
The process concept of 'objective immortality' stresses that i t i s as 
the 'good' elements of one's l i f e are taken i n t o the everlasting l i f e 
of God and thus contribute to his aim f o r the greater good of the 
cosmos that we share i n the everlasting l i f e of God. I t i s God and 
his everlasting loving purpose alone which i s important and I f i n d my 
joy i n the knowledge that I am called to share i n that purpose. I t i s 
i n t h i s sense alone that I , i n Pittenger's words, ' w i l l be preserved 
beyond the "perishing of occasions"'.(51) 
The process 'mechanics' behind the concept are clear because they 
have been repeated several times and need here only to be summarized 
b r i e f l y . Each and every 'occasion' as 'entity' makes i t s contribution 
negatively or p o s i t i v e l y , through being taken i n t o God's consequent 
nature , towards God's loving purpose i n the creative advance of the 
cosmos. I t i s by being participant i n t h i s that alone grants us 
'immortality'. 
(50) i b i d . , p. 226. 
(51) L.T.P.P., p. 82. 
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(c) Personal immortality? 
The description of the Whiteheadian concept of immortality 
presented thus f a r does not appear to envisage our continuing as 
persons, which has always been one of the emphases i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
views of immortality. The thought of our actions and decisions being 
subdued i n the creative advance of God may be a l l very f i n e but i t can 
appear as a very i n f e r i o r alternative to a notion with a stronger stress 
on the personal aspect. I n saying t h i s there i s no desire to reassert 
any self-centred view of immortality; but i n Pittenger's words, 'may i t 
not be that exactly i n receiving a l l that has been done which i s 
valuable, the doer of the valuable i s able to be received?': and he 
goes on 'may not something l i k e the "communion of Saints", i n the 
divine l i f e and usable by the divine agency, be a p o s s i b i l i t y ? After 
a l l , "personality" i s i n relationships'.(52) Peter Hamilton offers a 
response to t h i s which i s essentially negative. Having emphasized 
that 'everything of any value i n our l i f e w i l l be prehended i n t o God 
and immortalized i n his supremely personal l i f e ' ( 5 3 ) he quotes part of 
t h i s sentence of Charles Hartshorne, 'Nothing i s more personal about a 
man than his concrete experiences - which "perish and yet l i v e f o r 
evermore" - i n the divine, supremely personal l i f e ' . (54) I n the context 
of that quotation Hartshorne i s saying that the Whiteheadian immortality 
i s personal i n a l i t e r a l sense since a l l that i s known to be actual of 
any human personality i s the l i f e of that person while on earth. A 
system l i k e process thought which stresses that r e a l i t y i s a matter of 
experiences rather than essences or substances must question whether 
(52) i b i d . , p. 82. 
(53) Hamilton, op.cit., p. l 4 l . 
(54) Hartshorne and Reese, op.cit., p. 285. 
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there can be anything of value beyond experience and go on to say 
that since the 'actuality of experience ... i s j u s t what ... i s 
immortalized i n the all-receptive u n i t y of God',(55) t h i s must be 
judged to be deeply personal. I n the following quotation Hamilton 
underlines t h i s . 
' i n God's prehensions of our experiences we do l i v e on 
everlastingly as persons - but f i n i t e persons as seen 
from the outside, not eternal persons as seen from the 
inside. Our "within" terminates at death; our "without" 
or "outside" - i n so f a r as i t i s compatible with God -
i s pri v i l e g e d to share, i n God, i n his everlastingness. 
What ultimately matters i s not our personality ... but 
only God's.'(56) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, however, that although t h i s i s the technical 
process answer i t f a i l s to s a t i s f y Pittenger,. I n spite of acknowledging 
that the Whiteheadian view of 'objective immortality' i s fo r him 
personally 'enough'(57) he clings to 'the i n t r i n s i c value of personal 
human existence'(58) and wishes to 'be permitted to hope' that ' i f God 
i s t r u l y love and i f love i s relationship' which means 'sharing' then 
he would 'wish to share with others that which i s good, that which i s 
being done towards good, and that which leads to enjoyment i n good'.(59) 
I n t h i s way Pittenger would i n t e r p r e t the 'Communion of Saints'; that 
everlasting fellowship of persons with t h e i r God i n the enjoyment of 
his good aim. Speaking of the love from God which binds people together, 
which because i t i s of God has about i t an 'enduring' q u a l i t y Pittenger 
adds that he does not know whether t h i s could mean the 'conscious and 
personal persistence beyond the dead of either partner or of both of 
(55) i b i d . , p. 285. 
(56) Hamilton, op.cit., p. 141. 
(57) L.T.P.P., p. 84. 
(58) i b i d . , p. 81. 
(59) i b i d . , p. 85. 
2^8. 
them ... but I may be permitted to hope that i t does'.(60) He also 
i d e n t i f i e s with John B a i l l i e ' s comment that i t would be 'oddly s e l f i s h 
of God' to 'permit the a n n i h i l a t i o n of human personality'.(6l) 
Elsewhere he goes further than what he here c a l l s his hope and speaks 
f i r m l y of 'the ground for the Christian assurance that there _is l i f e 
beyond death' which he finds ' i n the nature of God and i n the b e l i e f 
i n the resurrection of Christ from among the dead'.(62) By t h i s he 
means that i t i s 'inconceivable that a genuinely good and loving God 
would permit the an n i h i l a t i o n of those persons whom he has created, 
whom he has so lo v i n g l y sustained, and upon whom he has showered such 
super-abundant grace' and i t i s further inconceivable 'that the 
communion with the "risen Lord", which the fact of resurrection has 
made possible, should ever be brought to an end ... f o r i t has about 
i t the q u a l i t y of everlastingness, even of eternity'.(63) What 
Pittenger i s saying here i s of importance f o r t h i s thesis since i t 
shows him t r y i n g to add an extra Christian dimension to Whitehead's 
scheme. Since while admitting that f o r him -the Whiteheadian concept 
i s 'enough' either i n the sense that i t i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y s a t i s f y i n g 
or else that f o r himself the prospect of 'objective immortality' i s 
s u f f i c i e n t yet he has emotional, pastoral ( f o r his c r i t i c i s m s and hopes 
are on behalf of others and suggest pastoral situations) or r e l i g i o u s 
reservations which make him want to say more. 
(60) i b i d . , p. 86. 
(61) i b i d . , p. 85. 
(62) G.P., p. 86. 
(63) L.T.P.P., pp. 84-85. 
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With reference to 'objective immortality' he says t h i s . 
'Obviously (so I think) Christian f a i t h must say 
something more: but the more that i t says i s not 
i n contradiction to t h i s conception of human and 
cosmic destiny. Rather i t gives that conception 
an even f u l l e r significance and a wider application.' (64) 
This f u l l e r significance that w i l l accrue to the notion of 'objective 
immortality' i s a combination of a clearer emphasis on the value of 
human personality, an unambiguous stress on ":he love of God for 
i n d i v i d u a l persons and the f u l l use of the insights that the 
Resurrection of Christ provide. The question that needs to be 
resolved, though, i s whether t h i s does or not 'contradict' the 
Whiteheadian conception. Pittenger's main ground for believing i t 
does not l i e s i n Whitehead's remark that his doctrine ' i s e n t i r e l y 
neutral on the question of immortality'.(65) Although he goes on to 
acknowledge that i n a conversation recorded by Lucien Price, 
Whitehead said: 
' i n so f a r as man partakes of t h i s creative process 
does he partake of the divine, of God, and that 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s his immortality, reducing the 
question of whether his i n d i v i d u a l i t y survives the 
death of the body to the estate of an irrelevancy.'(66) 
Yet building upon Whitehead's n e u t r a l i t y on the question Pittenger 
s t i l l believes 'a more positive view i s possible'(67) while agreeing 
w i t h the process thinker's r e j e c t i o n of the self-centredness i m p l i c i t 
i n the t r a d i t i o n a l scheme and t h e i r b e l i e f that i t ought to be enough 
that one's personal achievement i s linked w i t h the 'wonderful 
(64) P.T.C.F., p. 82. 
(65) Whitehead: 'Religion', p. 111. 
(66) Lucien Price: 'Dialogues of A l f r e d North Whitehead', London, 
Max Reinhardt, 1954, p. 366. 
(67) P.T.C.F., p. 80. 
240. 
enrichment of the d i v i n e experience', (68) P i t t e n g e r i s s t i l l n ot f u l l y -
s a t i s f i e d , and wants t o f i n d other ways of t h i n k i n g of i m m o r t a l i t y . 
' i n any event, keeping e n t i r e l y on the l e v e l of 
s p e c u l a t i v e discussion, i s i t n ot possible t o f o l l o w 
c o n s i s t e n t l y the l i n e of thought advanced by 
Whitehead and accepted by Hartshorne and then go on 
t o say something l i k e the f o l l o w i n g ? P r e c i s e l y 
because God i s love and p r e c i s e l y because the 
achievement of gre a t e r good, e s p e c i a l l y through the 
a c t i v i t y of such personalized occasions as man may 
be s a i d t o be, i s i n i t s e l f a good, may not the 
achieved good i n c l u d e the agency by which i t was 
achieved? May not the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the 
s u b j e c t i v e aim which i s s p e c i f i c a l l y human i n c l u d e 
as a necessary consequence some s o r t of persistence 
o f the c r e a t i v e l y agent, and cannot t h i s persistence 
i t s e l f enhance the ongoing process? W i l l not t h i s 
i n f a c t provide more ways i n which the c r e a t i v e good 
can be both expressed and enjoyed?'(69) 
There seems t o be evidence of a c o n f l i c t here between P i t t e n g e r the 
process t h i n k e r and P i t t e n g e r the Anglo-Catholic. The emotional, 
p a s t o r a l and r e l i g i o u s reasons already suggested f o r h i s desire t o say 
more seems t o be confirmed by the hesitancy of the vocabulary he uses 
i n defence of the 'more' he wishes t o say t o add t o the process l i n e 
o f thought w i t h which he also agrees. He speaks of 'hope' or 'something 
more' or again 'may not' there be 'some s o r t of p e r s i s t e n c e 1 . The 
question t h a t must be asked t h e r e f o r e , i n the l i g h t of what must be 
reckoned as Whitehead's supposed ' n e u t r a l i t y ' on the question o f 
i m m o r t a l i t y i s , w i l l the process scheme s u s t a i n t h i s 'more' t h a t 
P i t t e n g e r hopes for ? The answer seems t o be no. 
F i r s t l y P i t t e n g e r ' s own i n s i s t e n c e t h a t ' a l l of us dies' seems t o 
c o n f l i c t s t r o n g l y w i t h the language used, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the previous 
q u o t a t i o n , about persistence. P i t t e n g e r ' s own firmness about the 
f i n a l i t y of death would seem t o be stronger evidence than h i s l a t e r 
(68) i b i d . , p. 81. 
(69) i b i d . , pp. 8 l f . 
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a s p i r a t i o n s and so h i s whole desire f o r more i s c a l l e d i n question. 
Secondly a f t e r disposing of most of the t r a d i t i o n a l l a s t t h i n g s f a i r l y 
f i r m l y P i t t e n g e r appears t o renegue on h i s previous thoroughness i n 
p o s t u l a t i n g h i s hope. I t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary t o ask whether or not 
there can be personal persistence a f t e r death i n the l i g h t of the two 
main arguments he puts forward; the love of God and the Resurrection of 
C h r i s t . These arguments, however, must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the process 
system and i f they f a l l down on t h a t t e s t o f consistency they w i l l be 
only s p e c i a l pleading. This i s t r u e of Pittesnger's suggestion t h a t 
because God i s love n ot only would i t be s e l f i s h o f him t o allow our 
a n n i h i l a t i o n but also i t would stand as a d e n i a l o f h i s love f o r 
persons. The i m p l i c a t i o n behind t h i s i s t h a t God could grant such 
p r e s e r v a t i o n i f only he would, but t h a t i s t o c o n t r a d i c t one of the 
basic tenets of Whitehead's thought which P i t t e n g e r h i m s e l f quotes 
f r e q u e n t l y t h a t 'God i s not t o be t r e a t e d as the exception of a l l 
metaphysical p r i n c i p l e s ' . The concept of ' o b j e c t i v e i m m o r t a l i t y ' i s 
the l o g i c a l development of process p r i n c i p l e s and i s accepted as such 
by process t h i n k e r s . P i t t e n g e r i s now i n t r o d u c i n g a new element which 
threatens t o make God an 'exception' t o the process system as o u t l i n e d 
and he does so w i t h o u t o f f e r i n g any t e c h n i c a l process grounds f o r doing 
so. His argument thus can only be seen as s p e c i a l , hopeful pleading 
and t h e r e f o r e of no v a l i d i t y . 
His argument based on the Resurrection of C h r i s t i s more complex. 
The Resurrection of C h r i s t i s o f f e r e d a f u l l e r d iscussion elsewhere; 
what i s important i n the present context, however, i s t h a t P i t t e n g e r 
i n t e r p r e t s the Resurrection as i n v o l v i n g the c o n t i n u a t i o n of Jesus' 
consciousness and goes on t o suggest t h a t i t i s inconceivable t h a t 
communion w i t h the ' r i s e n Lord', which the f a c t of r e s u r r e c t i o n has 
made p o s s i b l e , should ever be brought t o an end. P i t t e n g e r emphasizes 
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the aspect o f C h r i s t i a n hope, by saying: 
'The c o n v i c t i o n of the e a r l i e s t C h r i s t i a n d i s c i p l e s 
t h a t death had not put a stop t o t h e i r Lord and 
Master, but t h a t he was a l i v e and w i t h them "to the 
end o f the w o r l d " c a r r i e d w i t h i t the confidence t h a t 
because he l i v e d , they would l i v e also ... And since 
i t was God who had " r a i s e d Jesus from the dead", the 
C h r i s t i a n b e l i e v e r s were sure t h a t l i f e which was " i n 
C h r i s t " was i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , both f o r him t h e i r Lord 
and f o r themselves as those who were already u n i t e d 
w i t h him ... The " r e s u r r e c t i o n of the dead", then, 
i s the C h r i s t i a n hope - not simply "the i m m o r t a l i t y 
of the same". I t i*5> the t o t a l man, i n the f u l l 
i n t e g r i t y of h i s humanity, who w i l l be "raised".'(70) 
P i t t e n g e r q u a l i f i e s t h i s f i n a l sentence by emphasizing t h a t he i s not 
r e f e r r i n g t o the r e - c r e a t i o n of m a t e r i a l bodies but r a t h e r t o our 
r e - c r e a t i o n by God 'with a l l t h i n g s a p p e r t a i n i n g t o the p e r f e c t i o n o f 
our nature',(71) y e t even so such extravagant language i s very 
d i f f e r e n t from the process emphasis t h a t 'what u l t i m a t e l y matters i s 
n o t our p e r s o n a l i t y , but God's'.(72) Indeed t h i s i s P i t t e n g e r ' s 
s t r o n g e s t statement of b e l i e f about personal i m m o r t a l i t y . Perhaps 
t h i s can i n p a r t be q u a l i f i e d by suggesting t h a t the more t e n t a t i v e 
o p i n i o n found i n 'The Last Things i n a Process Perspective' might 
b e t r a y the acknowledged i n f l u e n c e of Peter Hamilton's book and 
Schubert Ogden's essay 'The Promise of F a i t h ' both o f which were 
published a f t e r h i s book 'God i n Process' had gone t o press. But even 
accepting the more moderate opinions of the l a t e r book i t s t i l l remains 
t o be asked whether P i t t e n g e r has f i r m p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounds f o r 
s upporting h i s contentions. I f he has, he does not o f f e r them. An 
a r t i c l e which o f f e r s a c r i t i q u e of P i t t e n g e r ' s p o s i t i o n from a 
t e c h n i c a l process viewpoint makes i t c l e a r t h a t s p e c i a l evidence such 
(70) G.P., pp. &7f. 
(71) i b i d . , p. 88. 
(72) Hamilton, o p . c i t . , p. 141. 
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as C h r i s t ' s Resurrection cannot simply be accepted as i n v a l i d a t i n g 
the general process p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t f u l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l support. 
I n other words i t could only be a f t e r P i t t e n g e r had argued cogently 
t h a t l i f e a f t e r death were a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t evidence l i k e C h r i s t ' s 
R e s u r r e c t i o n could be o f f e r e d as support. 
'Once t h i s r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y (of l i f e a f t e r death) were 
es t a b l i s h e d , the grounds t o which P i t t e n g e r appeals 
could have some persuasive power. But as i t i s , w i t h 
no arguments f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of S u r v i v a l ... h i s 
reasons f o r hoping f o r something more than o b j e c t i v e 
i m m o r t a l i t y c a r r y l i t t l e weight. This i s accentuated 
by the f a c t t h a t many of h i s own statements make 
i m m o r t a l i t y seem less o f a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y than 
Whitehead's p o s i t i o n does.'(73) 
P i t t e n g e r ' s hopes f o r something more beyond ' o b j e c t i v e i m m o r t a l i t y ' 
have from a process perspective been declared i n v a l i d . 
This judgement, however, does not mean t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s hope 
should be dismissed e s p e c i a l l y as i t i s such a t e n t a t i v e hope which 
does not a f f e c t h i s main t h e s i s . A l l he i s hoping i s t h a t a personal 
God whose love i s known through personal r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n t a k i n g the 
e f f e c t o f the decisions of i n v i d i d u a l s w i t h i n h i s ongoing l o v i n g 
purpose would w i t h i n t h a t ' o b j e c t i v e i m m o r t a l i t y ' make pos s i b l e the 
personal r e c o g n i t i o n of those whose p o s i t i v e decisions have enhanced 
the d i v i n e aim. I t seems t o be a desire t o make ' o b j e c t i v e i m m o r t a l i t y ' 
l e s s of an anonymous t r a n s a c t i o n and give i t a more human, l o v i n g and 
thus d i v i n e face. P i t t e n g e r i s simply expressing the hope t h a t one's 
own response t o God and the f e l l o w s h i p w i t h i n which t h a t l o v i n g 
response was engendered and made pos s i b l e might be recognised w i t h i n 
the d i v i n e c r e a t i v e advance. This hope whether i t be adjudged 
sentimental or n a t u r a l , proper or improper does not i n v a l i d a t e 
(73) David G r i f f i n : 'The Process Theology of Norman P i t t e n g e r ' , 
'Process Studies', Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1972, p. 148. 
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P i t t e n g e r ' s prime espousal of a view o f ' o b j e c t i v e i m m o r t a l i t y ' which 
he has l e a r n t from process w r i t e r s . His e x i s t e n t i a l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f the ' l a s t t h i n g s ' i s what i s important f o r h i s understanding of 
s a l v a t i o n . 
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CHAPTER 8 
PITTENGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF 'SALVATION' - CONCLUSIONS 
( l ) Summary 
Pi t t e n g e r ' s understanding of ' s a l v a t i o n ' i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s 
whole t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . Thus h i s view of s a l v a t i o n as the wholeness 
which a r i s e s from the r e s t o r a t i o n o f l o v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between man 
and man and man and God i s the n a t u r a l concomitant of what he would 
describe as h i s i n c a r n a t i o n a l emphasis, h i s s t r e s s t h a t i s upon the 
d i v i n e love who has been a c t i v e throughout the c r e a t i v e process and 
human h i s t o r y seeking wholeness and harmony f o r the w o r l d and mankind. 
That t h i s d i v i n e love was d e c i s i v e l y manifested i n the t o t a l C h r i s t 
event and supremely on the cross, and there shown t o be s u f f e r i n g love 
also f i t s n e a t l y i n t o h i s t o t a l t h e o l o g i c a l p i c t u r e . So also do the 
d e t a i l e d i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r C h r i s t o l o g y which f o l l o w from t h i s , namely 
t h a t Jesus was f u l l y human and d i f f e r e n t from other men only i n respect 
o f the degree t o which he f u l f i l l e d the God-given aim and i n t e n t i o n f o r 
human l i f e . Thus since i t was i n C h r i s t t h a t t h a t wholeness which 
P i t t e n g e r equates w i t h s a l v a t i o n was seen, t o which other men approximate 
i n i n f e r i o r degree, then the way t o s a l v a t i o n w i l l be f o l l o w i n g C h r i s t 
and seeking t o share i n h i s f u l f i l m e n t . I t i s only the exemplarist 
atonement theme which i s s u i t e d t o such an approach. 
This exemplarist emphasis, however, means, i n P i t t e n g e r ' s thought, 
much more than t h a t Jesus i s the example of a good l i f e which ought t o 
be emulated^ i t includes the response t o the d i v i n e love i n Jesus which 
was focused i n h i s cross. I t i s as men face the s i g h t o f God's love as 
s u f f e r i n g l o v e , which the cross symbolizes, t h a t they w i l l be l e d t o 
respond i n repentance f o r a l l t h e i r f a i l i n g s t o God's l o v i n g a c t i v i t y . 
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T h e i r l i v e s w i l l be changed by thus a l l o w i n g themselves t o be grasped 
by the d i v i n e love and grace which was manifested i n p l e n i t u d e i n 
C h r i s t . I t i s thus, i n P i t t e n g e r ' s system, t h a t C h r i s t , the v i c t o r i o u s 
p a r t i c i p a n t i n the human c o n d i t i o n , becomes the b r i n g e r of s a l v a t i o n 
f o r men w i t h i n the terms of t h e i r humanity, not as a rescue e x p e d i t i o n 
from beyond but as the one who so e f f e c t e d the d i v i n e grace and love i n 
h i s own l i f e t h a t he became the source of engracement f o r others. I t 
i s 'by f e l l o w s h i p w i t h him, through l i f e en C h r i s t o ( t h a t ) men are 
r e s t o r e d and brought t o t h e i r own f u l f i l m e n t by the gracious l o v i n g 
a c t i o n o f God i n h i m ' . ( l ) Thus i n the close i n t e r l o c k i n g o f the 
elements of P i t t e n g e r ' s theology h i s C h r i s t o l o g y and understanding of 
s a l v a t i o n belong t i g h t l y together. I t i s because C h r i s t i s 'the 
f u l f i l m e n t of man's capacity f o r God' and 'the f u l f i l m e n t of God's 
purpose i n man'(2) t h a t i t i s 'through f e l l o w s h i p w i t h him, through 
the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n him which we c a l l being ' i n C h r i s t ' , t h a t these 
c a p a c i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n the r e s t of us are quickened and 
brought t o l i f e ' . ( 3 ) I t i s t o come i n t o 'union o f f e l l o w s h i p w i t h God, 
made a v a i l a b l e i n the p e r f e c t e d humanity of Jesus' which ' i s the f i n a l 
goal f o r men'. This i s wholeness and s a l v a t i o n . 
P i t t e n g e r ' s system i s completed by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h i s i s 
onl y r e a l l y made possible w i t h i n the Church. The Church i s thus both 
the consummation of the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y i n the Christ-event and i t s 
c o n t i n u a t i o n through subsequent ages. P i t t e n g e r ' s salvation-system 
thus represents the f u l f i l m e n t of human p o t e n t i a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h others and, as has been seen, i s r e s t r i c t e d t o the plane of t h i s 
l i f e and i t s experiences. 
(1) W.I., p. 285. 
(2) i b i d . , p. 285. 
(3) i b i d . , p. 209. 
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I f i n d P i t t e n g e r ' s t h e o l o g i c a l scheme deeply u n s a t i s f y i n g but 
such an i n t e r n a l l y coherent system i s , I t h i n k , best c r i t i c i z e d n ot by 
an attempt a t wholesale d e m o l i t i o n but by p o i n t i n g out c e r t a i n areas 
where i t s answers are inadequate. Since P i t t e n g e r ' s i s such an 
i n t e r n a l l y coherent system t h i s i n t u r n w i l l have the e f f e c t of p u t t i n g 
i n doubt the v a l i d i t y of h i s theology as a whole. This i s perhaps best 
approached by seeing P i t t e n g e r ' s system i n the context of h i s t h e o l o g i c a l 
approach. 
(2) P i t t e n g e r ' s t h e o l o g i c a l s t y l e 
P i t t e n g e r ' s t h e o l o g i c a l method which has been demonstrated i n t h i s 
t h e s i s i s t o demolish or declare i n v a l i d those elements i n ' c l a s s i c a l ' 
or ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' theology t h a t are deemed t o be o f f e n s i v e t o the 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s or thought-forms of modern man. Only a t i n y residuum 
i s allowed t o remain, which P i t t e n g e r suggests encapsulates what 
t r a d i t i o n a l theology was t r y i n g and f a i l i n g t o say because i t was not 
on the wave-length o f the contemporary generation, t h i s i s then 
r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n thought-forms t h a t P i t t e n g e r c l e a r l y b elieves w i l l 
make i t r e a d i l y acceptable and understandable t o men of t h i s age. Such 
a r e d u c t i o n i s t approach i s the hall-mark o f the E n g l i s h Modernist 
movement which P i t t e n g e r espouses and the p a r t i c u l a r i n f l u e n c e s of which 
have been noted i n the course of t h i s study. I t has been s a i d t h a t the 
Modernists 'believed t h a t the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , as expressed i n the 
Creeds, was archaic and out of sympathy w i t h modern thought, and set 
themselves, t h e r e f o r e , t o produce a new statement of the C h r i s t i a n 
f a i t h i n simple terms of the love of God'(4) which had been 'considered 
(4) J. R. H. Moorman: A H i s t o r y of the Church i n England, London, 
A. & C. Black, 1953, Second E d i t i o n , 1967, p. 423. 
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a f r e s h i n the l i g h t of growing knowledge and r e s t a t e d i n a way s u i t a b l e 
t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s of the age'.(5) This i s a precise 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f P i t t e n g e r ' s work and, i n my o p i n i o n , l a r g e l y accounts 
f o r the neat, i n t e r l o c k i n g q u a l i t y o f h i s theology. I n a theology whose 
premises permit the d i s p o s a l of u n h e l p f u l elements the remainder can 
r e a d i l y be f i t t e d i n t o a coherent and p l a u s i b l e system. 
The mode of P i t t e n g e r ' s r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been w i t h the 
e v o l u t i o n i s t i n s i g h t s of Whitehead's process c o n c e p t u a l i t y , but as was 
i n d i c a t e d i n the opening chapter and has been confirmed i n the course 
o f the study h i s use of t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i t y i s i d i o s y n c r a t i c , dependent 
more on h i s e v a n g e l i s t i c approach t o process thought than upon h i s being 
i t s t e c h n i c a l exponent. His heavy st r e s s on the concept of aim and h i s 
employment of i t as explanatory o f s i n , t r u e human nature and i t s 
C h r i s t o l o g i c a l f u l f i l m e n t ; h i s confused use of 'prehension' towards the 
conclusion t h a t the Church i s p a r t of the Christ - e v e n t ; h i s novel use 
o f the idea of 'importance' as p r o v i d i n g the d e f i n i t i v e Whiteheadian 
clue as t o how the s p e c i a l i t y o f Jesus w i t h i n the ongoing c r e a t i v e 
process might be accounted f o r , have a l l been given as evidence of h i s 
imprecise use of Whitehead's thought. C e r t a i n l y P i t t e n g e r works 
w i t h i n the process atmosphere but h i s imprecise use of i t s concepts 
makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o regard him as one of i t s t r u e exponents. I t i s 
my cont e n t i o n t h a t the manner of h i s use of process thought provides 
c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t i s h i s modernist background which has determined 
h i s theology, and t h i s has been f o r t i f i e d f o r him by process i n s i g h t s . 
His basic t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n was already e s t a b l i s h e d before ever, on 
h i s own words, he found process thought. I have already i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
(5) i b i d . , p. 42J quoting H. D. A. Major E n g l i s h Modernism, 1927, 
p. 12. 
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t h i s i s t r u e i n respect of h i s atonement theology. P i t t e n g e r then has 
f o r t i f i e d h i s e s t a b l i s h e d Modernist t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n by p l a c i n g i t 
w i t h i n an e v o l u t i o n a r y , processive context and by employing i n s i g h t s 
taken from process thought which he has then adapted t o f i t what i s 
r e q u i r e d . This a d a p t a t i o n accounts f u r t h e r f o r the coherent, i n t e r -
l o c k i n g q u a l i t y o f h i s work. 
For reasons given P i t t e n g e r ' s system i s a l t o g e t h e r too neat. I t 
i s t i d y because d i f f i c u l t areas have been omitted and concepts used 
have been adapted t o f i t . The danger attendant upon such an approach 
i s t h a t i t s r e s u l t i n g theology i s too s i m p l i s t i c , and t h i s , I b e l i e v e , 
a p p l i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y t o P i t t e n g e r ' s understanding of ' s a l v a t i o n ' . This 
then i s the burden of my c r i t i c i s m of P i t t e n g e r ; t h a t h i s i s an 
inadequate t h e o l o g i c a l system because i t leaves out of account 
s i g n i f i c a n t areas of C h r i s t i a n thought and experience, i n i t s a n x i e t y 
t o present a coherent system of C h r i s t i a n theology acceptable t o modern 
t h i n k i n g . This i s demonstrable i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s understanding of 
' s a l v a t i o n ' and may be seen i n f o u r c r i t i c a l areas of h i s thought; 
namely, a t the i n t e r s e c t i o n of h i s C h r i s t o l o g y and s o t e r i o l o g y , i n the 
d i s t i n c t i v e view of s a l v a t i o n t h a t h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y approach r e q u i r e s , 
i n h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o allow more than a narrow exemplarist atonement 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o colour h i s view o f s a l v a t i o n and i n the type o f 
s a l v a t i o n t h a t h i s view of s i n n e c e s s i t a t e s . I n these areas i t w i l l 
be suggested t h a t i n h i s e f f o r t t o arrange a t i g h t , r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
t h e o l o g i c a l system he has impoverished the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n 
understanding o f s a l v a t i o n . 
(2) P i t t e n g e r ' s C h r i s t o l o g y and S o t e r i o l o g y c r i t i c i z e d 
I n h i s C h r i s t o l o g y P i t t e n g e r has sought t o present a dynamic 
view o f C h r i s t ' s d i v i n i t y which does not i n a,ny sense deny h i s humanity 
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but i t may be doubted whether an account o f Jesus, r e l a t i n g him t o the 
ongoing d i v i n e a c t i v i t y , present t o some degree i n every man, i s a 
f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s i n t e n t i o n . Such a view, as Hick and Mclntyre 
commented, comes close t o adoptionism, f o r despite P i t t e n g e r ' s t a l k 
about Jesus f u l f i l l i n g h i s God-given aim and being thus able t o o f f e r 
the f u l l divine-human i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n , t h i s adds up t o l i t t l e more 
than saying t h a t once i n h i s t o r y a human instrument was a v a i l a b l e who 
p e r f e c t l y e x h i b i t e d the d i v i n e l o v e . This i s t h i n l y v e i l e d adoptionism. 
Hick commented t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y w i t h adoptionism i s t h a t i t v i t i a t e s 
redemption, which i s a comment t h a t a p p l i e s t o P i t t e n g e r , f o r h i s 
'adoptionism' f i t s c l o s e l y w i t h h i s generalized view of ' s a l v a t i o n ' . 
Indeed P i t t e n g e r ' s 'adoptionism' i s best seen when he discusses the 
cross. P i t t e n g e r ' s references t o the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y subsuming e v i l 
being focused i n the cross seems t o imply t h a t God's l o v i n g a c t i v i t y 
needed a w i l l i n g human instrument i n order f o r i t s character t o be 
manifested, and t h i s i s patent adoptionism. I f a l l t h a t God r e q u i r e d 
was someone who would manifest the f u l l n e s s of l o v e , as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o f God h i m s e l f , not only throughout l i f e but even t o the p o i n t of death, 
then i t would not seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h i s r e v e l a t i o n of God's 
character t o await the coming of one who could bear the task, someone 
whose l i f e was d i r e c t e d towards the f u l f i l m e n t o f h i s God-given aim. 
Thus i n some sense the problem of adoptionism, r a i s e d by Hick, might 
not a t a l l be a problem f o r P i t t e n g e r ; hence h i s apparent r e f u s a l , 
perhaps, t o answer h i s c r i t i c s i n d e t a i l . I f t h i s surmise i s c o r r e c t , 
and P i t t e n g e r would not regard the accusation o f adoptionism as 
s i g n i f i c a n t , w h a t t h a t means f o r h i s theology i n general, and more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s s o t e r i o l o g y ^ i s brought out by the question-'. Why the 
cross? His r e p l y t h a t t h i s was the extent t o which the d i v i n e love i n 
C h r i s t was prepared t o go, seems u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I f the only purpose 
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of the cross was t o manifest the c o s t l y and s a c r i f i c i a l nature of God's 
love i t might be asked whether such s u f f e r i n g love could not e q u a l l y 
w e l l have been displayed by a l i f e o f s e l f - l e s s s e r v i c e f o r the good of 
others which l e d p o s s i b l y t o the untimely death of the servant, or by 
the w i l l i n g l y faced death of one who espoused some noble i d e a l whose 
f u l f i l m e n t would u l t i m a t e l y b e n e f i t mankind. I t might be f e l t t h a t 
such i d e a l i s t i c death might have expressed the message about the 
character of God's lo v e , which P i t t e n g e r c l e a r l y b elieves t o be of 
g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e , more d i r e c t l y and economically than Jesus' 
execution. I t might be wondered, then, i f P i t t e n g e r ' s answer t o the 
question, Why the Cross? i s s u f f i c i e n t . An element of t h i s i n s u f f i c i e n c y 
might be p o i n t e d out by Moltmann. 
Moltmann presumably would categorise such 'adoptionism' as 
P i t t e n g e r ' s as 'weakly C h r i s t i a n i z e d monotheism', i n the sense t h a t 
w i t h i n P i t t e n g e r ' s thought i t i s God's a c t i v i t y which i s of supreme 
importance, C h r i s t merely being i n s t r u m e n t a l w i t h i n i t . There i s no 
sense i n P i t t e n g e r , as was mentioned e a r l i e r , of what Moltmann would 
speak of as i n t e r - t r i n i t a r i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p s , which he saw as d i s t i n c t i v e 
about C h r i s t i a n f a i t h . But t h a t i s indeed i n e v i t a b l e . P i t t e n g e r ' s 
whole theology would preclude such a suggestion. A s o t e r i o l o g y which 
inc l u d e s the Church, seeing i t as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y 
and the s a l v a t o r y process^could never grant t h a t uniqueness t o C h r i s t 
which a view l i k e Moltmann's r e q u i r e s . I f Jesus i s not d i f f e r e n t from 
other men except i n degree, and i f the presence of the Logos i n him i s 
p o t e n t i a l i n a l l men, then such a f i g u r e could not be thought of as 
being p a r t y t o such i n t e r - t r i n i t a r i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p s . But i t i s ia. 
P i t t e n g e r ' s i n a b i l i t y t o account f o r such a f i g u r e which I b e l i e v e 
betrays the weakness of h i s s o t e r i o l o g y , f o r h i s s o t e r i o l o g y l i e s 
circumscribed w i t h i n h i s t h e o l o g i c a l framework. I f a l l t h a t u l t i m a t e l y 
252. 
matters i s t h a t God's character might be revealed and t h a t men might 
be enabled t o conform t o the w i l l o f God so revealed then the Saviour 
w i l l be p r i m a r i l y a r e v e a l e r and through t h a t r e v e l a t i o n an enabler. 
Thus exemplarism w i l l be the d i s t i n c t i v e atonement note. S a l v a t i o n 
w i l l come by f o l l o w i n g the example of the Saviour and l i k e him becoming 
r e c i p i e n t of the d i v i n e grace, i n order t h a t one's l i f e might become 
conformed t o the d i v i n e w i l l of love. F u r t h e r , i t i s such a f i g u r e , 
u n l i k e Moltmann's deeply t r i n i t a r i a n view of C h r i s t , who w i l l f i t more 
r e a d i l y i n t o a s o t e r i o l o g y set w i t h i n a processive and e v o l u t i o n i s t 
framework. 
(4) P i t t e n g e r ' s e v o l u t i o n i s t view of s a l v a t i o n 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , I t h i n k , t h a t P i t t e n g e r t r e a t s the words 
'atonement, redemption and s a l v a t i o n ' as synonymous.(6) To t r e a t them 
thus l o o s e l y means t h a t they are able t o be f i t t e d more e a s i l y i n t o 
P i t t e n g e r ' s system. When what i s of prime concern i s the d i v i n e l o v i n g 
a c t i v i t y , the clue t o which i s given by the l i f e and death of C h r i s t , 
then whatever word i s taken from b i b l i c a l and t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n 
theology can be seen t o be s e r v i c e a b l e . A g eneralized view of s a l v a t i o n 
w i l l s u f f i c e i n such a system. This can be demonstrated by reference t o 
Whitehead. ' C r e a t i v i t y ' i s the key concept i n Whitehead's philosophy. 
Movement towards n o v e l t y i s what i n Whitehead's view charac t e r i z e s l i f e . 
God i s s u b j e c t t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e of ' c r e a t i v i t y ' and so, as has been 
discussed already, i n process thought God i s seen as l e a d i n g c r e a t i o n 
onwards by l o v i n g l u r e and s o l i c i t a t i o n towards ever grea t e r good and 
when e v i l occurs by prehending i t n e g a t i v e l y and thus subsuming i t 
(6) e.g. W. N. P i t t e n g e r : 'Some i m p l i c a t i o n s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l and 
t h e o l o g i c a l i n John Knox's w r i t i n g s ' i n eds. W. R. Farmer, 
C. F. D. Moule, R. R. Niebuhr, C h r i s t i a n H i s t o r y and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
Studies presented t o John Knox, Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967, 
p. 6. 
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w i t h i n h i s own nature. His power of persuasive love a t each i n s t a n t 
o f l i f e , i n each moment o f human d e c i s i o n leads the c r e a t i v e process 
forward. On the basis of such a view of the d i v i n e o p e r ation, seeking 
the h i g h e s t and overcoming the worst through h i s i n t i m a t e involvement, 
Whitehead describes God as 'the f e l l o w s u f f e r e r who understands'.(7) 
P i t t e n g e r ' s repeated use of t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n has been noted. The 
problem t h a t i s r a i s e d by such an approach i s t h a t i f God i s i n v o l v e d 
a t every moment of the c r e a t i v e process l e a d i n g i t forward and over-
coming the e v i l t h a t i s thrown up, then there i s no place f o r a s p e c i f i c 
atonement event, f o r s a l v a t i o n would seem t o be b u i l t i n t o the process 
of c r e a t i o n . This conclusion i s confirmed by Whitehead's own words. 
'He does n o t create the w o r l d , he saves i t : or, more 
ac c u r a t e l y , he i s the poet of the w o r l d , w i t h tender 
patience l e a d i n g i t by h i s v i s i o n of t r u t h , beauty 
and goodness.'(8) 
I n process thought c r e a t i o n i s somewhat independent of God. I n h i s 
s e r i e s o f famous anti t h e s e s i n the chapter 'God and the World' i n 
'Process and R e a l i t y ' Whitehead concludes by saying: 
' i t i s as t r u e t o say t h a t God creates the w o r l d , as 
t h a t the w o r l d creates God.'(9) 
This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h speaking o f God as being 'not before a l l 
c r e a t i o n , but w i t h a l l creation',(10) and then seeing God's involvement 
w i t h c r e a t i o n as making him 'the u n l i m i t e d conceptual r e a l i z a t i o n of 
the absolute wealth of p o t e n t i a l i t y ' ( 1 1 ) or 'the l u r e f o r f e e l i n g , the 
e t e r n a l urge of d e s i r e ' ; 'the i n i t i a l o b j e c t of d e s i r e ' i n each c r e a t i v e 
(7) Whitehead: Process, p. 4 r j . 
(8) i b i d . , p. 408. 
(9) i b i d . , p. 410. 
(10) i b i d . , p. 405. 
(11) i b i d . , p. 405. 
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act.(12) The c r e a t i v e process i s thus i n one sense independent of God 
but God i s necessary f o r i t s ordered and harmonious advance. I n thus 
l u r i n g the c r e a t i v e process forward by h i s ' v i s i o n of t r u t h , beauty 
and goodness' God's involvement i s more a k i n t o a saving work r a t h e r 
than t o a c r e a t i n g one. A s p e c i f i c s a l v a t o r y event would thus seem t o 
be unnecessary. Here then, i t might be suggested, i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
support f o r P i t t e n g e r ' s attempt t o place s a l v a t i o n w i t h i n an e v o l u t i o n i s t 
context. The Christ-event defines t h i s c r e a t i n g - s a v i n g a c t i v i t y o f God 
but such a s a l v a t i o n cannot, almost by d e f i n i t i o n , be confined t o Jesus. 
I n a recent a r t i c l e d iscussing the process view of c r e a t i o n , i n 
a c l o s i n g paragraph which introduces the question o f 'new c r e a t i o n ' , 
D. W. D. Shaw asks, 
' i s t h i s d e c i s i v e m a n i f e s t a t i o n , t h i s ' c l a s s i c i n s t a n c e ' , 
enough t o j u s t i f y t r a d i t i o n a l language o f o n c e - f o r - a l l 
atonement and new c r e a t i o n a r i s i n g out o f i t , which deems 
i t a p propriate t o ascribe t o C h r i s t the worship t h a t i s 
due t o God? Only, I suspect, i f one i s prepared t o go 
f u r t h e r (as some process the o l o g i e s are n o t ) and claim 
t h a t by h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f c r e a t i v e 
l i f e , o r love , he has opened up new p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a l l 
which are i n f a c t n o t otherwise available.'(13) 
I d i f f e r , however, from Shaw's conclusion. P i t t e n g e r ' s i s a good 
example o f a process theology which does o f f e r new p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
c r e a t i v e l i f e , f o r the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r wholeness, 
t h a t i s , f o r salvation,- y e t the simple o f f e r i n g of such does not per se 
f u l f i l the atonement-salvation requirements t h a t Shaw h i m s e l f l a y s down. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f wholeness associated w i t h C h r i s t and w i t h i n the 
c r e a t i v e process i n no sense guarantees the ' o n c e - f o r - a l l ' character 
of atonement which Shaw believes t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t r a d i t i o n a l 
(12) i b i d . , p. 406. 
(13) D. W. D. Shaw: 'Process Thought and Creation', Theology, V o l . j8, 
No. 661, J u l y 1975, P. 354. 
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C h r i s t i a n language. Despite h o l d i n g t o a C h r i s t i a n experience of 
s a l v a t i o n P i t t e n g e r repudiates any ' o n c e - f o r - a l l ' view of Jesus other 
than i n the sense of the s i n g u l a r i n t e n s i t y of the C h r i s t event as 
r e v e l a t i o n of the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y . His confusion o f s a l v a t i o n 
terminology i s , I b e l i e v e , evidence t h a t f o r him only a generalized 
view of s a l v a t i o n i s tenable. Professor MacKinnon, however, i s one 
who f i n d s such confusion of language u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
MacKinnon draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between redemption and atonement, 
suggesting a t r a g i c element as being e s s e n t i a l t o the l a t t e r . 
' I f the idea of atonement, u n l i k e t h a t of redemption, 
i s both h e r o i c and t r a g i c , i t i s so because i t n e c e s s a r i l y 
includes reference t o the author of the act of atonement 
who i s , i t i s i m p l i e d , a human being.'(14) 
His d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t w h i l e a human agency i s needed f o r an a c t o f 
atonement, redemption can 'be achieved by a deus ex machina i n t e r v e n i n g 
t o deliver'.(15) I n modern theology, he says, the atonement theme has 
been q u i e t l y dropped and the redemption m o t i f has taken i t s place; f o r 
when demythologized of concepts, which o r i g i n a t e from the Roman p r a c t i c e 
of s l a v e r y , of people being i n bondage t o a l i e n power, t h i s redemption 
theme i s an ' e f f e c t i v e means o f pr o c l a i m i n g our c o n v i c t i o n t h a t our 
deliverance from a l l e v i l , our s a f e t y i n time and e t e r n i t y , are the 
work of God h i m s e l f , and none other'.(16) I n h i s r e v e l a t i o n i n C h r i s t 
and supremely i n the pain, r e j e c t i o n and contempt t h a t he faced, God 
has d i s c l o s e d t h a t the power of h i s love I s able t o face and overcome 
the very worst. This t r u t h i s of 'deepest c o n s o l a t i o n t o the b e l i e v e r ' 
f o r i t assures him t h a t ' i f he has f a i t h t o t u r n again, the very courses 
(14) D. M. MacKinnon: 'Subjective and Objective Conceptions of Atonement' 
i n ed. F. G. Healey, 'Prospect f o r Theology' Essays i n Honour of 
H. H. Farmer, Welwyn, Nisbet, 1966, p. 169. 
(15) i b i d . , p. 169. 
(16) i b i d . , p. 170. 
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o f a c t i o n whereby he estranges h i m s e l f from God. i n the service o f h i s 
own ends or perverted desires' may be shaped 'by the d i v i n e mercy' 
i n t o paths of self-knowledge, f a i t h f u l n e s s i n the service of God's 
kingdom and new s t r e n g t h and power. He continues: 
' i f the Cross occupies a c e n t r a l place i n t h i s scheme, 
i t i s as an i l l u s t r a t i o n w i t h o u t which, indeed, the 
lesson could h a r d l y have been l e a r n t ; necessary indeed 
t o i t s communication, i n such a way t h a t we can p r o p e r l y 
speak o f i t as a redemptive a c t , i n t h a t , by i t s 
c e n t r a l i t y i n the m i n i s t r y of Jesus, the i l l u s i o n s 
which bar us from the presence o f God are d e c i s i v e l y 
d i s s i p a t e d , and h i s being towards us as love, 
e s t a b l i s h e d beyond questioning.'(17) 
I t i s because P i t t e n g e r ' s theology can so r e a d i l y be recognised t o f a l l 
w i t h i n such a d e f i n i t i o n of redemption t h a t MacKinnon's f o l l o w i n g 
question: 'But can we c a l l t h i s i n any sense atonement?' takes on a 
s p e c i a l relevance f o r t h i s t h e s i s . 
MacKinnon's main c r i t i c i s m o f the 'redemption' approach i s t h a t 
' i t ignores a l t o g e t h e r the dimension of the i r r e v o c a b l e ' and 'comes 
p e r i l o u s l y near t o t a k i n g refuge i n a f a l s e optimism, which supposes 
a l l f o r the best i n the best of a l l p o s sible worlds'.(18) This 
c r i t i c i s m i s i n s i m i l a r v e i n t o t h a t o f f e r e d of P i t t e n g e r ' s understanding 
of s i n i n an e a r l i e r chapter where i t was suggested t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s 
approach ignored the t r a g i c and r a d i c a l consequences of s i n . To imply 
t h a t a man who has 'sowed h i s w i l d oats and then come t o h i m s e l f ' t o 
l i v e h enceforth i n wholeness, seeking the f u l f i l m e n t of h i s God-given 
aim i s f r e e d from the consequences t h a t h i s e a r l i e r behaviour caused 
i s t o d i m i n i s h the r e a l i t y o f s i n . As MacKinnon says, there are 
'consequences' i n such behaviour; 'the damage t o h i s v i c t i m s i s n o t 
(17) i b i d . , p. 171. 
(18) i b i d . , p. 172. 
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somehow j u s t i f i e d by h i s advance i n self-knowledge'.(19) He goes on 
t o suggest t h a t 'any p r e s e n t a t i o n of the work of C h r i s t m e r i t s 
r e j e c t i o n as mor a l l y t r i v i a l , i f i t does not touch the deepest 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of human l i f e ' . ( 2 0 ) MacKinnon f i n d s t h a t i t i s the 
' w r i t e r s of tragedy' who 'have not h e s i t a t e d t o recognize' those 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 'without the d i s t o r t i n g c o n s o l a t i o n of b e l i e f i n a 
happy ending'(21) and i t i s from t h e i r i n s i g h t s t h a t he takes h i s clue 
t o understand the work of C h r i s t . 
The t r a g i c and hero i c dimension i n the l i f e o f Jesus i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the manner i n which he set 'his face s t e a d f a s t l y t o go up 
t o Jerusalem', a phrase which MacKinnon believes t e l l s as much i f not 
more the i n t e n t i o n of Jesus regarding the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f h i s death as 
i t r e f l e c t s the t h e o l o g i c a l i n s i g h t s of the e a r l y Church. He suggests 
t h a t i n the Gospel n a r r a t i v e s 'however t h e o l o g i c a l l y or a p o l o g e t i c a l l y 
c o n t r o l l e d ' there i s the p r e s e n t a t i o n ' w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l d e t a i l ' o f 'a 
man going t o meet a h o r r i b l e death', 'who c l e a r l y dreaded both the 
p h y s i c a l and s p i r i t u a l ordeal i t entailed'.(22) 
'The language of the Fourth Gospel, both i n the upper 
room, and i n the f i n a l c r y from the Cross, make i t 
p l a i n t h a t f o r the w r i t e r the ordeal i s a burden l a i d 
on Jesus by h i s Father, and something of the same s o r t 
i s conveyed by the prayer i n Gethsemane.'(2J) 
This serves t o s u b s t a n t i a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t MacKinnon draws 
between redemption and atonement. The t r a g i c element i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
there are two sides t o atonement; namely t h a t w h i l e the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y 
(19) i b i d . , p. 172. 
(20) i b i d . , p. 172. 
(21) i b i d . , p. 172. 
(22) i b i d . , p. 174. 
(23) i b i d . , p. 174. 
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i s endorsed the human aspect must not be minimized. 
'A d o c t r i n e of the atonement i s the task of t r y i n g 
p a r t l y ( f o r the f i n a l s ecret belongs t o God alone) 
to capture the sense of the passion of Jesus f o r what 
i t i s : t h i s because, although i n the Cross, t o quote 
the words of Paul, 'God i s i n C h r i s t , r e c o n c i l i n g the 
w o r l d unto h i m s e l f ' , and we have t h e r e f o r e t o reckon 
w i t h an a c t i o n of which he i s the author, we have i n 
the C r u c i f i x i o n t o do w i t h something which i s also 
unquestionably a human act.'(24) 
The value of MacKinnon's t h e s i s f o r t h i s study l i e s i n i t s p o s i t i v e 
c r i t i q u e o f a view of s a l v a t i o n such as P i t t e n g e r takes. I t doubts 
whether an approach which concentrates on the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y i n 
general can give adequate weight t o the necessary atonement dimension. 
There are two elements t o t h i s . F i r s t l y there i s a s p e c i f i c d i v i n e 
a c t i o n i n C h r i s t f o r the s a l v a t i o n of the w o r l d and secondly there i s 
the ordeal faced by Jesus, conscious of i t as a burden l a i d on him by 
h i s Father. I t i s t h i s t h a t MacKinnon describes as unquestionably a 
human a c t . I t i s t h i s t r a g i c and h e r o i c a c t which plumbs the depths 
of the deepest c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of human l i f e . Such, MacKinnon c l e a r l y 
b e l i e v e s , i s the essence of atonement and w i t h o u t t h i s atonement 
dimension no understanding of s a l v a t i o n i s complete. MacKinnon's 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the elements o f atonement seem very s i m i l a r t o Moltmann's 
suggestion, already quoted, t h a t , ' i n the forsakenness o f the Son the 
Father also forsakes h i m s e l f . I n the surrender o f the Son the Father 
also surrenders h i m s e l f ' . Yet, i n h i s theology P i t t e n g e r takes no 
account of such a s p e c i a l divine-human encounter i n C h r i s t , and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s cross, which MacKinnon and Moltmann, from d i f f e r e n t 
p o i n t s o f view, see as e s s e n t i a l f o r any f u l l understanding of the 
saving work of God i n C h r i s t . Such an a c t of atonement i s , however, 
(24) i b i d . , p. 174. 
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precluded i n P i t t e n g e r ' s scheme, p r i m a r i l y because of h i s r e f u s a l t o 
countenance any s p e c i a l , d i r e c t i n i t i a t i v e from God i n C h r i s t . For 
him the Christ-event can only be d e s c r i p t i v e o f the c o n t i n u i n g d i v i n e 
a c t i v i t y . Thus despite P i t t e n g e r ' s claim t h a t h i s view of s a l v a t i o n i s 
complete I consider i t t o be s e r i o u s l y l a c k i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h i s 
area of a o n c e - f o r - a l l atoning work of God i n C h r i s t . I f such i s 
absent, however i t be i n t e r p r e t e d , then a v i t a l element o f the C h r i s t i a n 
Gospel i s omitted. F u r t h e r , P i t t e n g e r ' s t a l k of atonement i n an 
e x emplarist v e i n can also be seen t o be d e f i c i e n t i n t h i s regard. 
(5) The Exemplarist Atonement theme and the t r a g i c dimension 
P i t t e n g e r ' s espousal of the exemplarist atonement theory has been 
documented i n t h i s study. I t has also been shown t h a t such a view not 
only f i t s n e a t l y i n t o h i s general t h e o l o g i c a l scheme, but also i s more 
profound than mere moral enlightenment i n response t o the example of 
Jesus, f o r he would speak of a response t o the d i v i n e , s u f f e r i n g love 
seen i n C h r i s t through which such love i s enabled t o become e f f e c t i v e 
i n them. The Abelardian p o s i t i o n has been defined as saying t h a t 
' C h r i s t r e c o n c i l e s men t o God by r e v e a l i n g the love of God i n h i s l i f e 
and s t i l l more i n h i s death, so b r i n g i n g them t o love him i n return'.(25) 
This i s the h e a r t of P i t t e n g e r ' s view of atonement. His own c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to t h i s p o s i t i o n has been t o emphasize the supremacy of the d i v i n e love 
and t o i n d i c a t e w i t h the help of Whiteheadian concepts how God i s able 
t o overcome the e v i l of each moment and transmute i t w i t h i n h i s l o v i n g 
n a t u r e , r e l a t i n g t h i s t o the cross. The problem, however, w i t h a 
p o s i t i o n l i k e P i t t e n g e r ' s i s i t s i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t an understanding o f 
(25) R. S. Franks: The Atonement, London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
1934, p. 2. 
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s a l v a t i o n i n an e v o l u t i o n a r y context i s dependent on an exemplarist 
m o t i f . Few theologians, though, t r e a t the exemplarist theme as 
u n c r i t i c a l l y as P i t t e n g e r appears t o . 
Vincent Taylor, f o r example, recognises t h a t the c e n t r a l t r u t h 
o f the Abelardian approach i s 'an e s s e n t i a l element i n any d o c t r i n e of 
the Atonement worthy o f the name'; 'indeed i t may be s a i d t h a t any 
theory has l o s t i t s base unless i t i s c o n t i n u a l l y i n touch w i t h the 
statement of St. Paul: 'God commendeth h i s love towards us, i n t h a t 
w h i l e we were y e t sinners C h r i s t d i e d f o r us".'(Romans Ch. 5 vs. 8)(26) 
Yet w h i l e acknowledging the v a l i d i t y of t h i s , the inadequacies of the 
exemplarist p o s i t i o n are also apparent. Considering the theory i n i t s 
n o b l e s t dress, t h a t , not only i s the love of God manifested i n the 
death o f Jesus, but i s also ' d e f i n i t e l y o b j e c t i v e , since i t p e r s i s t s 
i n s p i t e of a l l t h a t s i n can do, and has f o r i t s end n o t h i n g l e s s than 
the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of s i n f u l men w i t h God i n the harmony of a r e s t o r e d 
mutual love'j(27) Vincent Taylor i s s t i l l able t o l i s t the f o l l o w i n g 
inadequacies of such a theory. 
'The o b j e c t i o n s most commonly brought against t h i s view 
are t h a t i t i s vague and i n d e t e r m i n a t i v e , t h a t i t gives 
no s a t i s f a c t o r y account of the s u f f e r i n g and death of 
Jesus, and t h a t i t i s inadequate t o human need, e s p e c i a l l y 
the need of those who are conscious o f the r e a l i t y and 
power o f sin.'(28) 
Taylor f i n d s the l a t t e r c r i t i c i s m ' p a r t i c u l a r l y pressing'. Penitence, 
he suggests, i s e s s e n t i a l f o r forgiveness and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h God 
and y e t i t i s a f a c t t h a t our penitence i s ' f i t f u l , incomplete and 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ' . Even among those most conscious o f i n d i v i d u a l s ins 
(26) Vincent Taylor: Jesus and h i s S a c r i f i c e , London, Macmillan, 
1959, P. 300. 
(27) i b i d . , p. 300. 
(28) i b i d . , pp. 300f. 
261. 
t h e r e I s a complacency towards ' s o c i a l sins o f n e g l e c t , n a t i o n a l 
p r i d e , s o c i a l c r u e l t y and oppression'. Penitence, he says, comes and 
goes 'quickened by the r e v e l a t i o n o f d i v i n e love i n the Cross, but 
s p e e d i l y l o s t again i n the w h i r l of l i f e ' . rJne example o f the cross 
alone i s thus i n s u f f i c i e n t . ' i t i s undoubtedly t r u e t h a t , as a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of d i v i n e l o v e , the Cross w i l l deepen penitence. When 
i t fades the Cross w i l l quicken i t , when i t i s complacent i t w i l l 
rebuke i t , when i t i s s e l f - c e n t r e d i t w i l l enlarge i t s range. I t w i l l 
expose our s i n as s i n against love and convince us t h a t forgiveness i s 
t h a t th'<5 
costly'.(29) But, Taylor suggests ew^ Ja does not match the depth of 
human need, f o r such a penitence i s 'compassed w i t h i m p e r f e c t i o n ; i t 
i s hedged about by a l l the l i m i t a t i o n s of the f i n i t e , never constant, 
never complete, never i n v e s t e d w i t h the note of u n i v e r s a l i t y . I t i s a 
penitence r e s t r i c t e d by s i n and constrained by creaturehood'.(JO) 
MacKinnon was p o i n t i n g t o ss*eia, when he suggested t h a t atonement l i k e 
tragedy must explore the ambivalence of the w o r l d , t h a t i t needs t o 
touch the deepest c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f l i f e . 
T aylor's c r i t i c i s m of the exemplarist theme i s summarized by h i s 
comment, already quoted, t h a t i t 'gives no s a t i s f a c t o r y account of the 
s u f f e r i n g and death of Jesus', r a t h e r i t a l t e r s the nature of s a l v a t i o n 
making i t a matter e s s e n t i a l l y of perception^ a l b e i t p erception of a 
'stupendous character', t h a t 'God loves us unto s u f f e r i n g and death'. 
Thus, ' i n consequence, s a l v a t i o n becomes response t o the r e v e l a t i o n , 
i t i s the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the soul a f t e r confession and t r u s t ' which 
approaches a 'God-mysticism'.(jl) I f Jesus' death i s b e l i e v e d t o be 
(29) i b i d . , p. 301. 
(50) i b i d . , p. 301. 
(31) i b i d . , p. 302. 
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simply the h i g h p o i n t of a d i v i n e s e l f - r e v e a l i n g process, as P i t t e n g e r 
would a s s e r t , then, on Taylor's view, a v i t a l element of C h r i s t i a n 
thought and experience i s being omitted. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t Taylor 
considers t h a t i t i s the ' s o - c a l l e d 'cruder' t h e o r i e s of Atonement 
(which) have a c l o s e r a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h Jesus' own thought' than any 
o t h e r s , not l e a s t because they represent t h a t ' p r i n c i p l e c a r d i n a l t o 
Jesus' t h i n k i n g t h a t , as the Son of Man, He f u l f i l s a m i n i s t r y f o r men 
before God'. 032) 
Furt h e r l i g h t w i l l be shed on t h i s d iscussion by r e l a t i n g i t t o 
the c r i t i c i s m made i n an e a r l i e r chapter t h a t P i t t e n g e r does n o t give 
s u f f i c i e n t weight t o the tragedy i n human l i f e of s i n and e v i l . 
P i t t e n g e r c l e a r l y resents the accusation t h a t he and other 
w r i t e r s i n the process v e i n t r e a t e v i l w i t h l e s s than f u l l seriousness. 
He even says t h a t such accusers 'only c o n v i c t themselves o f f a i l u r e t o 
read the r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l i n Whitehead ... and Hartshorne'.(33) This, 
however, i s t o miss the p o i n t . There i s no doubt t h a t l i k e other 
process t h i n k e r s P i t t e n g e r does speak of God's involvement w i t h the 
t r a g i c aspects of l i f e , the question t h a t remains i s whether such 
references i n themselves are enough. C r i t i c i s m s t h a t process t h i n k e r s 
do not t r e a t tragedy s e r i o u s l y seem t o me t o be saying, not t h a t the 
s u b j e c t i s not discussed but t h a t the whole process metaphysical scheme, 
by i t s very presuppositions i s unable t o encompass the t r a g i c dimension. 
This can be i l l u s t r a t e d from P i t t e n g e r . I n r e j e c t i n g t h i s accusation 
he o u t l i n e s the process understanding of God's love i n r e l a t i o n t o e v i l : 
(32) i b i d . , p. 303-
(33) W. N. P i t t e n g e r : 'Christology i n Process Theology', Theology, 
Vol. 80, No. 675, May 1977, p. 189. 
'The cosmic Lover, revealed because enacted i n the l i f e 
of Jesus, i s the v i c t o r over e v i l and s i n , the patent 
r e a l i t y o f which i s t o be seen f o r what i t i s , w i t h no 
s e n t i m e n t a l i t y and w i t h no r e d u c t i o n t o emotional s t a t e s 
or pleasant f e e l i n g s . God i s love - but he i s love i n and 
through and w i t h the f a c i n g of the a p p a l l i n g f a c t s of 
l i f e . ' ( 3 4 ) 
I t must be doubted, though, i f t h i s does encompass the t r a g i c dimension 
of s i n and e v i l i n human experience. I s someone who believes h i s deeds 
t o be i r r e v o c a b l e and irredeemable comforted or enabled t o l i v e anew by 
the advice t h a t God i n h i s love has subsumed the consequences of h i s 
g u i l t and he has but t o respond t o the one i n whom the d i v i n e love was 
manifested t o experience wholeness of l i f e . P i t t e n g e r ' s theology 
o u t l i n e d i n t h a t q u o t a t i o n and worked out i n t h i s study appears so 
b l a n d l y o p t i m i s t i c t h a t i t i s incapable of answering the problem of 
tragedy, although i t purports t o answer t h a t question. P i t t e n g e r ' s 
r e s t r i c t i o n of an answer t o the question, 'Why the Cross?' t o 
exemplarist terms i s evidence of t h i s f a i l u r e t o allow f o r so much of 
what C h r i s t i a n theology of the cross has sought t o say about the 
tragedy of s i n . 
I t probably must remain a s u b j e c t i v e judgement t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s 
understanding of s a l v a t i o n f a i l s t o touch the deepest c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
o f human l i f e , y e t i t might also be suggested t h a t C h r i s t i a n theology 
has recognised t h a t a f u l l e r understanding of t h i s problem i s t o be 
found i n the death of C h r i s t . 
A. M. Ramsey r e f e r s t o t h i s deeper understanding of the cross 
which theologians have by t h e i r own admission v a i n l y and inadequately 
t r i e d t o express, i n c o n t r a s t t o the somewhat s i m p l i s t i c answer of the 
(34) i b i d . , p. 189. 
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exemplarist school, by quoting (35) from John Oman's review o f 
Hastings Rashdall's magnum opus. There Oman r e f e r s t o the a d m i t t e d l y 
inadequate attempts o f Dale, Denney, Forsyth and Moberly t o give 
renewed expression t o penal and s a t i s f a c t i o n atonement t h e o r i e s , and 
he continues; 
'Nevertheless, one has a f e e l i n g t h a t a l l these w r i t e r s 
are reaching out a f t e r some s p i r i t u a l need w i t h which 
Dr. Rashdall i s untroubled, not because he has solved the 
problem, but because he has ignored i t . So f a r as he 
goes he i s wholly r i g h t , and u n t i l h i s c r i t i c i s m i s 
accepted a sound theology convincing by i t s own v e r a c i t y 
i s impossible. But when one compares him w i t h St. Paul, 
or even w i t h Luther, one r e a l i z e s how l i t t l e he cares t o 
l i v e i n h a l f l i g h t s , and how a l l r e a l l y c r e a t i v e souls 
have t o l i v e there a l l the time.'(36) 
This i s p r e c i s e l y the c r i t i c i s m I would make of P i t t e n g e r . His 
w a t e r - t i g h t t h e o l o g i c a l system betrays h i s neglect of the c r i t i c a l , 
indeed c r u c i a l , areas of C h r i s t i a n thought a.nd experience which can 
only adequately be approached w i t h an a t t i t u d e of r e v e r e n t and 
c r e a t i v e u n c e r t a i n t y . 
(6) Sin and s a l v a t i o n i n P i t t e n g e r ' s scheme 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two aspects of 
h i s theology which epitomizes the d e f i c i e n c y i n P i t t e n g e r ' s system 
w i l l be considered. 
I t i s apparent t h a t any understanding of s a l v a t i o n w i l l be 
determined by the d e f i n i t i o n o f s i n upon which i t depends. Thus, i n 
the case o f P i t t e n g e r , since s i n i s a f a i l u r e i n human p o t e n t i a l , a 
missing of the i d e a l mark, a l b e i t w i t h unhappy and even sometimes t r a g i c 
circumstances, then r e s t o r a t i o n need only be confined t o the human plane 
(35) A. M. Ramsey: From Gore t o Temple, London, Longmans, 1960, p. 55-
(36) i n Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. 21, A p r i l 1920 (not 1921 
as mentioned by Ramsey), p. 270. 
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and c o n d i t i o n , which i s where P i t t e n g e r places r e s t o r a t i o n i n C h r i s t . 
No i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the human c o n d i t i o n ab e x t r a w i l l be necessary, 
hence h i s r e p u d i a t i o n of the idea o f s a l v a t i o n as a rescue e x p e d i t i o n . 
I f , however, h i s d e f i n i t i o n of s i n i s inadequate, as has been suggested, 
then h i s t h e o l o g i c a l e d i f i c e would be fundamentally flawed. 
I t has been i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r t h a t an i r r e v o c a b l e , seemingly 
irredeemable element i n human e v i l doing, witnessed t o i n l i t e r a t u r e , 
i s l e f t unaccounted f o r i n P i t t e n g e r ' s scheme. This t r a g i c element, 
however, can be accounted f o r i n two ways. I t can e i t h e r be suggested 
t h a t c e r t a i n n o t o r i o u s people alone are l i a b l e t o experience such a 
sense o f the t r a g i c , or, as I would suggest, w r i t e r s who have expressed 
these themes intended t h a t these infamous cases should be recognised 
as symptomatic o f the human c o n d i t i o n i n general. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t r u e o f Dostoyevsky who was quoted e a r l i e r . Celebrated cases o f 
murder, c o r r u p t i o n , v i o l e n c e , s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , e t c . , p o r t r a y e d i n 
c 
l i t e r a t u r e are not intended u s u a l l y t o be t r e a t e d as abMerations but 
as i n d i c a t i v e of an u n d e r l y i n g f l a w i n the human c o n d i t i o n , no matter 
how much men may seek t o minimize or disguise i t . Such has been 
described i n t r a d i t i o n a l theology as o r i g i n a l s i n , which, as was shown 
i n Chapter 1, P i t t e n g e r r e j e c t s n ot only i n name but also i n r e a l i t y . 
I f , however, P i t t e n g e r i s wrong i n t h i s , as i n t h a t chapter references 
t o W i l l i a m s , Temple and Barry were intended t o suggest, then a very 
d i f f e r e n t approach t o s a l v a t i o n than t h a t taken by P i t t e n g e r would be 
re q u i r e d . The suggestion t h a t there i s a deep c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n human 
l i f e , t h a t there i s a f l a w i n human nature, whereby man i s incapable 
of s u s t a i n i n g the wh o l l y good, which causes e v i l i n i t s every 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n , which cannot be put r i g h t by man's e f f o r t alone, which 
represents an impasse i n h i s moral and s p i r i t u a l development and which 
cannot be co r r e c t e d by any adjustment, however r a d i c a l , even i f i t be 
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an adjustment t o God's love as seen i n C h r i s t , because such represents 
the ' f a l l e n ' nature of man whereby h i s f e l l o w s h i p w i t h God has been 
severed, then t h i s suggestion means t h a t s a l v a t i o n must be seen as a 
p u t t i n g r i g h t of what has gone wrong, a making po s s i b l e a r a d i c a l 
r e o r d e r i n g of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between God and man and man and man, and 
t h i s , t r a d i t i o n a l theology has asserted, r e q u i r e s the d i r e c t i n t e r -
v e n t i o n i n t o human a f f a i r s o f God, i n a s p e c i a l and d e c i s i v e manner, 
which he d i d i n Jesus C h r i s t . 
Such an approach t o s i n i n v o l v e s a d i f f e r e n t C h r i s t o l o g y . Unlike 
P i t t e n g e r who can only accept Jesus as the v i c t o r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t i n 
our human c o n d i t i o n C h r i s t i a n theology from b i b l i c a l times has s t r u g g l e d 
t o express the b e l i e f t h a t i n C h r i s t God d e c i s i v e l y i n t e r v e n e d i n 
human h i s t o r y i n order t o e f f e c t man's s a l v a t i o n , which was accomplished 
through the cross. St. Paul i n Romans Ch. 3 vs. 2Jff expresses t h i s i n 
the f o l l o w i n g way: 
'For a l l a l i k e have sinned, and are deprived of the d i v i n e 
splendour, and a l l are j u s t i f i e d by God's f r e e grace alone, 
through h i s a ct of l i b e r a t i o n i n the person of C h r i s t 
Jesus. For God designed him t o be the means of e x p i a t i n g 
s i n by h i s s a c r i f i c i a l death, e f f e c t i v e through f a i t h . 
God meant by t h i s ... t o demonstrate h i s j u s t i c e ..., 
showing t h a t he i s hi m s e l f j u s t and also j u s t i f i e s any 
man who puts h i s f a i t h i n Jesus.'(N.E.B.) 
Those words present a very d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e of s a l v a t i o n tteem such as 
has been o u t l i n e d i n t h i s study, and though commentators may debate 
t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n there can be no doubt t h a t they can only be 
understood as r e f e r r i n g t o some s p e c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n by God i n C h r i s t 
i n h i s t o r y . This co n t r a s t s markedly w i t h P i t t e n g e r ' s r e p u d i a t i o n of a 
rescue e x p e d i t i o n view of s a l v a t i o n . I m p l i c i t also i n these verses i s 
t h a t such i n t e r v e n t i o n was necessary because of the serious consequence 
of s i n . Sin, as there described, c l e a r l y breaks the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between God and man and r a d i c a l a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d f o r matters t o be 
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p u t r i g h t . 
R e f e r r i n g t o Anselm's understanding of these verses and the 
chapter i n which they were contained, James Denney wrote: 
'... s i n makes a r e a l d i f f e r e n c e t o God, and ... even i n 
f o r g i v i n g God t r e a t s the d i f f e r e n c e as r e a l , and cannot 
do otherwise. He cannot ignore i t , or regard i t as less 
than i t i s . I f he d i d so, He would not be more gracious 
than He i s i n the atonement; He would cease t o be God ... 
Paul i n Romans ii i , ... speaks of C h r i s t ' s death as a 
demonstration of God's righteousness. C h r i s t ' s death ... 
i s an a c t i n which ... God does j u s t i c e t o Himself. He 
who i s moved w i t h compassion f o r sinners does j u s t i c e t o 
h i s character as a gracious God.'(37) 
While i t i s not the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s study t o discuss the 
v a r i o u s atonement t h e o r i e s t h a t have been put forward through the 
c e n t u r i e s i t can be s a i d t h a t the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s t h a t have 
employed the coinage of ransom or s a t i s f a c t i o n or j u s t i f i c a t i o n or 
p e n a l t y have been s t r u g g l i n g t o understand, however p a r t i a l l y , the 
profound mystery t h a t C h r i s t i a n s have always recognised the cross t o 
be; t h a t i n the cross God i n C h r i s t has, w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g h i s j u s t i c e 
and mercy, been enabled by the s a c r i f i c e of h i s son t o remove the 
b a r r i e r between God and man caused by s i n and thus r e s t o r e communion 
between them. I n whatever forms these various t h e o r i e s have been 
advanced there seems t o have been the assumption f i r s t t h a t s i n has 
caused a r a d i c a l breach i n r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man, secondly 
t h a t the d e c i s i v e act of God was r e q u i r e d t o remedy t h i s and t h i r d l y 
t h a t such atonement was wrought by the death of C h r i s t . P i t t e n g e r ' s 
scheme, however, does not share these assumptions. His p a r t i c u l a r 
combination o f exemplarism w i t h an immanentist t h e o l o g i c a l approach 
leads him i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n , and, i t might be suspected, away 
(37) James Denney: The Death of C h r i s t , London, The Tyndale Press, 
1951, P. 188. 
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from t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n thought. Thus he both i n t e r p r e t s other 
atonement m o t i f s i n the l i g h t o f the exemplarist theme, as was i n d i c a t e d 
i n an e a r l i e r chapter, and also refuses t o see Jesus as the d e c i s i v e act 
of God, only as the supreme m a n i f e s t a t i o n of an ongoing d i v i n e a c t i v i t y . 
But i n thus dismissing these t h e o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s he also neglects 
the C h r i s t i a n experience which l i e s behind them. As t h i s s e c t i o n has 
t r i e d t o i n d i c a t e h i s view of s a l v a t i o n i s r e l i a n t upon h i s understanding 
of s i n . I f , however, s i n were recognized t o be a l t o g e t h e r more t r a g i c 
i n i t s consequences and more p e n e t r a t i n g i n i t s e f f e c t upon human nature, 
as t r a d i t i o n a l t a l k about o r i g i n a l s i n would a s s e r t , then s a l v a t i o n w i l l 
be seen i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t and w i l l need t o in c l u d e some understanding 
of the atoning work of C h r i s t on the cross. Once again A. M. Ramsey 
says of Rashdall what I would wish t o say of P i t t e n g e r : 
' I n d iscussing t h e o r i e s which are unacceptable, whether 
because they were i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 'dated' or because they 
f a i l e d t o do j u s t i c e t o C h r i s t i a n t r u t h , Rashdall seldom 
probes t o the r e l i g i o u s need or the t h e o l o g i c a l i n s t i n c t 
which l a y beneath a p a r t i c u l a r theory. Was i t mere 
p e r v e r s i t y which caused a Gregory of Nyssa, an Anselm or 
a Luther t o say what they did?'(38) 
P i t t e n g e r s i m i l a r l y f a i l s t o probe i n t o the experience which l i e s 
behind so much C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t r u e i n respect o f understanding s i n and atonement. His system i s 
compact and i t i s recognisably an attempt t o make C h r i s t i a n thought 
more r e a d i l y acceptable t o modern man, but i t s r e s u l t i s a f l a t , bland 
theology which f a i l s t o answer deep ' r e l i g i o u s needs and t h e o l o g i c a l 
i n s i g h t s ' even of contemporary man and y e t which so many theologians 
of the atonement sought t o a r t i c u l a t e as they grappled w i t h the mystery 
of the cross. 
(38) A. M. Ramsey: o p . c i t . , p. 54. 
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(7) Concluding Comments 
This study has, I b e l i e v e , i n d i c a t e d t h a t the main d i f f i c u l t y 
a t tendant upon any attempt t o i n t e r p r e t s a l v a t i o n w i t h i n a t h e o l o g i c a l 
system t h a t seeks t o understand the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y w i t h i n an 
e v o l u t i o n a r y and processive world-view i s how t o account f o r a d i v i n e 
s a l v a t o r y i n i t i a t i v e i n C h r i s t . P i t t e n g e r ' s approach, which i s t o 
deny any d e c i s i v e , unique, o n c e - f o r - a l l a c t i o n of God i n C h r i s t does 
not remove but merely serve t o u n d e r l i n e the problem. As the c l o s i n g 
s e c t i o n of Chapter 5 i n d i c a t e d , i f God's involvement i n the w o r l d i s 
dependent upon the c r e a t i v i t y which the Whiteheadian scheme suggests 
cha r a c t e r i z e s the e v o l u t i o n a r y process, then i n such a scheme there can 
be no place f o r an a c t i v i s t view of the d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e , and thus 
cannot be s a i d t o o f f e r a s a t i s f a c t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C h r i s t i a n 
Gospel. P i t t e n g e r ' s t h e o l o g i c a l system, as o u t l i n e d i n t h i s study, 
f a l l s under t h i s c r i t i c i s m . 
I n t h a t c l o s i n g s e c t i o n o f Chapter 5 i t was also suggested t h a t 
one process t h i n k e r a t l e a s t , namely John Cobb Jnr., has sought, w i t h i n 
a Whiteheadian scheme, t o h o l d f i r m l y t o a view of the d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e 
i n C h r i s t . This also was what L i o n e l Thornton was seeking t o do. I t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t P i t t e n g e r regards Thornton's attempt t o a s s e r t the 
C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f t h a t Jesus was i n some sense both f i n a l and transcendent 
because i n him God the Word descended i n t o the c r e a t i v e process, as a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f the Whiteheadian scheme t h a t Thornton purported t o use. 
This i s the c r i t i c a l p o i n t of d i v i s i o n between the two ways of 
i n t e r p r e t i n g God's involvement i n an e v o l v i n g world. P i t t e n g e r chose 
t o proceed i n such a way t h a t made C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e w h o l l y s u s c e p t i b l e 
t o the new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s presented by an e v o l u t i o n a r y world-view. 
Such an approach, though, i s incapable of s u s t a i n i n g any reference t o a 
s p e c i a l d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e i n C h r i s t , because t h i s would run counter t o 
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process view which i n t e r p r e t s the d i v i n e involvement only w i t h i n the 
c r e a t i v e advance. Such a view i s very d i f f e r e n t from t r a d i t i o n a l 
C h r i s t i a n theology but t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s camouflaged because 
t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n vocabulary continues t o be used. The d i f f e r e n t 
approach means t h a t C h r i s t i a n words are used i n a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
way. P i t t e n g e r v i r t u a l l y acknowledges t h i s by u s u a l l y p l a c i n g the 
word ' s a l v a t i o n ' w i t h i n p a r e n t h e t i c commas. This i s tantamount to 
a d m i t t i n g t h a t f o r him the t r a d i t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s of t h a t word, 
as s o c i a t i o n s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o a d i v i n e s a l v a t o r y i n i t i a t i v e i n 
C h r i s t , have l o s t t h e i r meaning and need t o be replaced by the f r e s h 
i n s i g h t s t h a t an e v o l u t i o n a r y approach to theology b r i n g . S i m i l a r l y 
h i s lumping together of ' s a l v a t i o n , redemption and atonement' as 
synonyms also i n d i c a t e s t h a t the d i f f e r e n t areas o f C h r i s t i a n under-
standing and experience contained w i t h i n these words have l o s t t h e i r 
relevance and can a l l be subsumed w i t h i n the new e v o l u t i o n a r y view of 
s a l v a t i o n . The marked, though s u b t l e , d i f f e r e n c e of meaning t h a t 
overtakes C h r i s t i a n words when i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y way can 
f u r t h e r be i l l u s t r a t e d from a b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n of P i t t e n g e r ' s use of 
the word 'grace'. This also w i l l conclude the t h e s i s by emphasising 
again t h a t P i t t e n g e r ' s t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n i s unable t o s u s t a i n a view 
o f a s p e c i a l d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e i n C h r i s t . 
P i t t e n g e r , as has been seen, v i g o r o u s l y defends hims e l f against 
the c r i t i c i s m t h a t he minimizes grace. His use of t h i s word, though, 
as i n several places t h i s study has shown, makes i t synonymous w i t h 
the ongoing, d i v i n e , l o v i n g a c t i v i t y . Thus a man needs t o be awakened 
and a l e r t e d t o t h i s d i v i n e gracious a c t i v i t y f o r him t o know t h a t 
wholeness of l i f e which i s s a l v a t i o n . The major persuasive f o r t h i s 
awakening w i l l be the l i f e o f C h r i s t and more e s p e c i a l l y h i s death, 
where the d i v i n e love and grace were manifested. Yet such a generalized 
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view o f grace leaves out of account the sudden, s u r p r i s i n g , s p e c i a l l y 
d i r e c t e d q u a l i t y o f grace which i s so much a p a r t of the C h r i s t i a n 
experience of i t . A l a r g e and v i t a l element i n C h r i s t i a n hymnody, 
devotion, s p i r i t u a l experience and theology speak of God i n h i s grace 
seeking, pursuing, a r r e s t i n g , s u r p r i s i n g and c o n f r o n t i n g the human 
sou l ; and t h i s a c t i v e , searching view of grace i s wh o l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h the b i b l i c a l p i c t u r e of the d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e . Yet t h i s whole 
element i s s e r i o u s l y neglected i n P i t t e n g e r ' s theology and h i s view of 
grace. This, however, i s q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n 
which sees the d i v i n e a c t i v i t y as circumscribed w i t h i n the e v o l u t i o n a r y 
process. No such s u r p r i s i n g view o f grace i s r e a l l y p ossible i n a 
theology which refuses t o acknowledge any s p e c i a l , d e c i s i v e a c t i o n by 
God i n C h r i s t , i n s i s t i n g r a t h e r t h a t C h r i s t can only be the man whose 
l i f e o f d e d i c a t i o n and obedience provided the r e v e l a t i o n of God's 
co n t i n u i n g work; a r e v e l a t i o n of how the w o r l d should be i f God's aim 
f o r i t were f u l f i l l e d . Such a Ch r i s t o l o g y , though, i s incapable, by 
v i r t u e of i t s presuppositions, of s u s t a i n i n g a l l t h a t the C h r i s t i a n 
Gospel has sought t o say o f God's s p e c i a l involvement i n the w o r l d 
' f o r us men and f o r our s a l v a t i o n ' . 
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